diff --git a/docs/provisioning/P3-LIVE-FLIP-PLAN.md b/docs/provisioning/P3-LIVE-FLIP-PLAN.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..793091d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/provisioning/P3-LIVE-FLIP-PLAN.md @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +# P3-LIVE-FLIP PLAN — agent-team build → verify → draft-PR + +Formal phased plan to take the agent-team Plane-2 pipeline from **clarify+plan only** +to **producing reviewable draft PRs**, while keeping the always-on R720 box +read-only and the apply path zero-AWS. Status as of 2026-06-22: **NOT STARTED** +(P3 is built but inert). This plan is the input to `/sh-plan-review` before any build. + +> **Prerequisite reading:** `docs/r720-agent-team-design.md` §3.3.2 (CI-as-verifier +> trust boundary, "B4"), `PROVISIONING-RUNBOOK.md` (the P3-live-flip section), +> and memory `project_r720_agent_team` (locked decisions). + +--- + +## 1. Objective & current state + +**Today (inert):** the pipeline runs `INTAKE → CLARIFIER → PLANNER → REVIEW`, but +`serve` passes `build_verify_wiring=None`, the Tier-3 fixer is `--dry-run` only, and +`agent-team/ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml` has its privileged steps disabled with +`if: ${{ false }}` and `pull-requests:write` / `environment:` commented out. So it +clarifies + plans but writes no code and opens no PR. + +**After P3:** the pipeline can emit a diff, have **org CI** build/test/security-review +it in an untrusted sandbox, a pure-code gate confirm green from authenticated +Checks-API results, and a scoped **GitHub App** open a **draft PR** for human review. +The box never gains a write token. + +## 2. Locked decisions (carried in — do not relitigate here) + +- **D-OIDC:** apply path uses a **GitHub App `pull-requests:write` token**, **ZERO AWS, no OIDC**. +- **D2:** box stays **read-only / no standing write token**; **org CI does the applying**. +- **B4:** the LLM-proposed diff is **untrusted code**; the CI trust boundary (below) is mandatory. +- Output is **draft PRs only** — nothing auto-merges; human approval is the merge gate. +- (Separate, not part of this plan: `aws-posture` resident access via step-ca + IAM Roles + Anywhere — that IAM is already cross-review-approved and is its own sub-task.) + +## 3. Hard gates (must clear before the flip — these block everything) + +| Gate | Why | Owner | +|---|---|---| +| `/sh-plan-review` on THIS plan | adversarial plan audit before build | me → GPT-4.1 | +| `/sh-security-review` on the apply/verify CI surface | auth + untrusted-input + CI trust boundary | me | +| GPT-4.1 cross-family review on the apply/verify CI + any permission change | mandatory for the trust-boundary / permissions surface | orchestrator | +| `GH_TOKEN`→`GITHUB_TOKEN` resolved | the GitHub transport reads `GITHUB_TOKEN`; box has `GH_TOKEN` | me (folded in here) | + +The flip does NOT proceed until `/sh-security-review` AND the GPT-4.1 cross-review on +the CI surface both pass. + +## 4. The CI trust boundary (design B4 — what the workflow must enforce) + +1. **Split CI.** An **untrusted build/test job**: `contents: read` only, **no secrets / no + OIDC / no write token**, egress-restricted. A **separate privileged job** that **never + checks out the patch code** (no `pull_request_target` + head checkout) opens the draft PR. +2. **Denylist.** A diff touching `.github/workflows/**`, IAM/permission IaC, + branch-protection / `CODEOWNERS` / Dependabot config, or out-of-scope files is + **rejected / escalated to a human — never auto-built**. +3. **Diff-hash integrity.** The box records the diff hash in its ledger; CI verifies the + hash before apply. The diff reaches CI as a signed artifact / short-lived branch-only + token (the box has no write token). +4. **Pure-code green gate.** Pass/fail is owned by a **pure-code gate** reading + **authenticated Checks-API results** (run id + diff hash). The **LLM verifier may propose + fixes but can never declare a build green**. +5. **Merge gate.** Draft PR + required checks + `/sh-security-review` + Claude Code App + review + **human approval**. + +## 5. Phases + +### Phase 0 — Plan review & pre-reqs 🤖/🧑 +- [ ] Run `/sh-plan-review` on this doc; fold BLOCK/FIX items in. +- [ ] Confirm a clean revert point (git tag main; Hyper-V snapshot of sh-secrev). +- [ ] Resolve `GH_TOKEN`→`GITHUB_TOKEN` (transport accepts both / box env updated). +- **Rollback:** none (no state changed). + +### Phase 1 — Author the split-CI apply/verify workflow 🤖 (review-gated) +- [ ] Write `agent-team/ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml` per §4: split jobs, denylist, + diff-hash verification, pure-code gate reading Checks-API. **SHA-pin all actions.** +- [ ] Implement/confirm `agent_team/ci_fetcher.py` (read-only Checks-API result fetcher; + fails closed: missing token / 404 / auth fail → `None` → gate BLOCKs, task parks) + and `agent_team/ci_gate.py` (pure-code green decision). +- [ ] `/sh-security-review` + GPT-4.1 cross-review on this surface. **Hard stop until both pass.** +- **Rollback:** workflow file stays inert (`if: ${{ false }}` not yet flipped); delete the file. + +### Phase 2 — Provision the GitHub App + environment 🧑 OPERATOR (browser/admin) +- [ ] Create a dedicated **GitHub App** with **`pull-requests:write`** (+ minimal contents to + open a branch/PR); install on the org. Token lives in **CI**, never on the box. +- [ ] Create the **`agent-apply` GitHub Actions Environment** with a **required reviewer** + (Adam) + branch-protection so the privileged job cannot run unreviewed. +- [ ] Store the App credentials as repo/org **Actions secrets** (not on the box). +- **Rollback:** uninstall the App; delete the environment + secrets. + +### Phase 3 — Bind the live wiring (still gated by the environment) 🤖 +- [ ] In the workflow: uncomment `permissions: pull-requests: write` and + `environment: agent-apply`; flip the two `if: ${{ false }}` → enabled. +- [ ] Bind `agent_team.coordinator.gated_build_verify_wiring(...)` (real diff builder + + read-only CI-result fetcher) so a leaf calls it only **after** the gate clears. +- [ ] Set the box-side apply env vars the live path reads (read-only CI-result token + + dispatch target). Confirm **no** write token lands on the box. +- **Rollback:** re-set `if: ${{ false }}`, re-comment `environment:`, set + `build_verify_wiring=None`; restart the coordinator. (Exercise this rollback once.) + +### Phase 4 — Smoke test to a first draft PR 🧑/🤖 +- [ ] Drive one trivial, in-scope task end-to-end → confirm: untrusted job builds/tests with + no secrets, denylist rejects an out-of-scope diff, pure-code gate gates on real Checks + results, privileged job opens a **draft PR** with required checks attached, **nothing merged**. +- [ ] Flip the **Tier-3 fixer** off `--dry-run` only after the smoke test passes; verify a + dependency-CVE bump produces a draft PR. +- **Rollback:** close the draft PR; Phase-3 rollback. + +### Phase 5 — Enable the cross-plane loop 🤖 +- [ ] Allow confirmed Plane-1 checker findings (`intake-checker`) to flow into pipeline tasks + that end in draft-PR fixes (start conservative: highest-severity, one at a time). +- **Rollback:** revert intake-checker wiring to report-only. + +### Phase 6 — Docs & memory 🤖 +- [ ] Update `OPERATOR-RUNBOOK.md`, the Confluence host page, and memory: P3 is LIVE, + what the apply path can/can't do, the denylist, the merge gate, the rollback. + +## 6. What changes (and what does NOT) + +**Changes:** +- The pipeline produces **draft PRs** for well-scoped work (dep bumps, small fixes, docs, + checker-surfaced issues). Your role shifts from author → reviewer/approver for that class. +- Tier-3 fixer goes live (dep-CVE bumps → draft PRs). +- Plane-1 findings can become draft-PR fixes (cross-plane loop). + +**Does NOT change:** +- Box stays read-only; **CI applies, not the box**. No AWS / no OIDC in the apply path. +- **Denylisted, high-blast-radius changes** (workflows, IAM, branch protection, CODEOWNERS, + Dependabot) are **never auto-built** — always escalated. +- Human gates stay: the clarifier question-set AND the PR approval are both yours. +- **Drafts, not merges** — you remain the merge authority. + +## 7. Risks & mitigations + +| Risk | Mitigation | +|---|---| +| Untrusted diff exfiltrates secrets / escalates in CI | split CI: build job has no secrets/OIDC/write, egress-restricted; privileged job never checks out patch code | +| Malicious diff edits CI/IAM/branch-protection to self-escalate | denylist → reject/escalate, never auto-build | +| LLM "declares" a broken build green | pure-code gate reads authenticated Checks-API only; LLM can't set status | +| Diff tampered between box and CI | diff-hash recorded in ledger, verified before apply | +| Standing write capability on the always-on box | there is none — App token lives in CI; box holds only a read-only CI-result token | +| Runaway PR volume | start with Tier-3 only + one finding at a time; required-reviewer environment gates each | + +## 8. Definition of done +- [ ] `/sh-plan-review`, `/sh-security-review`, and GPT-4.1 cross-review on the CI surface all passed. +- [ ] Phase-4 smoke test produced a draft PR; nothing auto-merged; rollback exercised once. +- [ ] No write token on the box (verified); apply path is zero-AWS. +- [ ] Docs + Confluence + memory updated. +- [ ] Snapshot retained until P3 runs clean for one cycle, then pruned.