diff --git a/security-review/DEPLOY-R720.md b/security-review/DEPLOY-R720.md
index 24fde9e..4f1259b 100644
--- a/security-review/DEPLOY-R720.md
+++ b/security-review/DEPLOY-R720.md
@@ -1,54 +1,144 @@
-# Phase 3 — Path B deployment (R720 host + CI backstop)
+# Phase 3 — Path B deployment (R720 VM)
 
-Status: **design + scripts; NOT deployed.** Needs the R720 (hostname SH-NVR, deprecated NVR, no GPU)
-and Adam's hands-on involvement. Nothing here has been run against the box. See memory
+Status: **host built; headless runner built + validated; two-tier auto-discovery nightly sweep built.**
+Pending: provision the read-only `GH_TOKEN` and run one live VM dry-run to validate the clone-mirror path
+end-to-end. **CI was removed by design** — the git hooks + this nightly sweep are the backstop. See memory
 `project-security-review-agent`.
 
-## What Phase 3 delivers
-1. The orchestrator hosted on the R720 as an always-on service (the Path B execution engine).
-2. A **headless agentic runner** (`run_headless.py`) so the detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier
-   can run unattended (interactive `/sh-security-review` can't run in CI/cron).
-3. CI backstop (`ci/security-review.yml`) running the same `review.sh` on every PR.
-4. Nightly full-repo sweep + planted canary vulns + two-model disagreement on criticals.
-5. Budget/telemetry ceiling against the Max-20x **$200/mo Agent SDK credit pool**
-   (see memory `reference-claude-subscription-billing`).
+Path B is the unattended backstop that shares one pure-code gate (`review.sh`) with the interactive Path A
+(`/sh-security-review`). This file is the operator runbook for the box that runs it.
 
-## The load-bearing piece to BUILD first: `run_headless.py`
-The interactive skill orchestrates subagents via the Claude Code Agent tool (Max-covered). Headless,
-that must become explicit API/SDK calls. `run_headless.py` should:
-- take `--scope` + target dir, read the in-scope files;
-- run the 6 detectors (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/web-client/logic) as parallel calls,
-  each fresh context, using the SAME prompts as `~/.claude/commands/sh-security-review.md`;
-- run the proof-or-kill verifier pass;
-- emit the finding schema JSON that `review.sh --agent-findings` consumes.
-- **Billing:** authenticate via the **Claude Agent SDK with the subscription** to spend the $200/mo
-  pool before API overflow (NOT a raw key) — see the billing memory. Non-Claude cross-family tiebreak
-  stays on Bedrock/API. ⚠️ This code cannot be validated until it runs with real creds; do not mark
-  done until tested.
+## Host
 
-## R720 host setup (Windows Server 2022, no GPU)
-Recommended: run the Python orchestrator in **WSL2 or Docker** rather than native Windows Python.
-1. `git clone https://github.com/amoussa1229/orchestrator` onto the box.
-2. Python 3.12 + `pip install -r requirements.txt` (+ the Agent SDK).
-3. Install the deterministic scanners (semgrep/gitleaks/checkov/cfn-lint/pip-audit) on the box.
-4. Secrets on the box (NOT in git): Agent SDK subscription auth, Bedrock creds, Slack token, repo PATs.
-5. Run as a service (NSSM on Windows, or systemd inside WSL2). Expose to the harness as an
-   MCP/HTTP service (mirror the existing unifi MCP pattern) OR keep it as a local scheduled job.
-6. Scheduler: nightly full-repo sweep → `review.sh` → Slack report (ALARM-style, see
-   memory `feedback_cloudwatch_alarms`: only notify on findings, not clean runs).
+- **Hypervisor:** R720 at `10.10.60.40` (Windows Server 2022, Hyper-V role).
+- **VM:** `sh-secrev`, always-on Ubuntu 24.04 (kernel 6.8), Gen2, 4GB / 2 vCPU / 40GB dynamic vhdx.
+- **Reach it:** `ssh -i ~/.ssh/r720_seahaven adam@10.10.60.120` (key-only, NOPASSWD sudo).
 
-## Anti-complacency reinforcements (Phase 3)
-- **Canary vulns:** keep the testbed's planted vulns in a fixture the nightly sweep also scans; if the
-  agent ever misses a known canary, that's a complacency signal → alert.
-- **Two-model disagreement:** on confirmed criticals, run the cross-family reviewer (orchestrator
-  GPT-4.1) and flag disagreement for human review.
-- **Budget guard:** track output tokens vs the $200/mo pool; stop/alert before overflow.
+Operate on the VM, not from the Mac against the host by hand.
 
-## Open dependencies (Adam)
-- R720 reachable + WSL2/Docker chosen.
-- GitHub repo/org secrets: `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` (or SDK auth), set `vars.SECURITY_REVIEW_AGENTIC=1`
-  once `run_headless.py` is tested.
-- Decide: promote `ci/security-review.yml` into Sea-Haven-Industries/.github as a reusable workflow
-  (per engineering-handbook/cicd.md) vs per-repo copy.
-- checkov severity filtering (it emitted 51-55 best-practice mediums on payments-dashboard — tune
-  before nightly or the Slack reports are noise).
+## What is installed on the VM
+
+- **Deterministic scanners:** semgrep, gitleaks, checkov, pip-audit, cfn-lint. **Node 18** (`npm audit`).
+- **`claude` CLI** (Node) — the subscription-auth path for Path B.
+- **Python 3.12 venv** at `~/orchestrator/.venv` with `claude-agent-sdk`.
+- **Repo:** `~/orchestrator/` (rsync from the Mac, `.env` excluded — NOT a git clone). After editing the
+  sweep locally, re-sync: `rsync -av --exclude .env --exclude .venv ~/Documents/repositories/orchestrator/ adam@10.10.60.120:orchestrator/`.
+- **Testbed corpus:** `~/security-review-testbed` (also rsync'd; includes the Node + .NET fixtures).
+- **No `gh` CLI required** — discovery uses the GitHub REST API via `curl`. `run_headless.py` is
+  self-contained (detector/verifier prompts are inline), so the VM needs no `~/.claude` assets to run.
+
+## Auth, billing, and the read-only GitHub token
+
+### Claude (subscription OAuth)
+- Token from `claude setup-token`, stored in `~/secrev.env` as `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (mode 600, NOT in git).
+- The 2026-06-15 SDK-billing split was **deferred**, so automated SDK usage draws from the Max 20x
+  subscription's normal usage limits — the same pool as interactive Claude Code. The two-tier sweep below
+  is what keeps that draw bounded. See memory `reference-claude-subscription-billing`.
+- **CRITICAL:** a raw `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` would silently win and meter to API rates — it must NOT be set on
+  this host. `run_headless.py` pops it defensively and refuses to run without `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`.
+
+### GitHub (`GH_TOKEN`, read-only — REQUIRED for auto-discovery)
+The nightly sweep enumerates and clones org repos with a **fine-grained, read-only PAT**. Never give this
+always-on box a write-capable token.
+
+1. github.com → Settings → Developer settings → **Fine-grained personal access tokens** → Generate new.
+2. **Resource owner:** Sea-Haven-Industries. **Repository access:** All repositories.
+3. **Permissions:** Repository → **Contents: Read-only**, **Metadata: Read-only** (auto). Nothing else.
+4. Set an expiry (e.g. 90 days; calendar a rotation). Generate and copy the `github_pat_...` value.
+5. On the VM, append it to `~/secrev.env` and lock the file down:
+   ```
+   echo 'GH_TOKEN=github_pat_xxxxxxxx' >> ~/secrev.env && chmod 600 ~/secrev.env
+   ```
+6. Verify (should print repo names, not a 401):
+   ```
+   set -a; . ~/secrev.env; set +a
+   curl -fsS -H "Authorization: Bearer $GH_TOKEN" \
+     "https://api.github.com/orgs/Sea-Haven-Industries/repos?per_page=3" | jq '.[].full_name'
+   ```
+
+### Non-Claude provider keys
+The GPT-4.1 critical tiebreak (optional) uses keys in `~/orchestrator/.env` (mode 600, gitignored,
+auto-loaded by `run.py`). They bill to their own provider accounts — keep them out of `~/secrev.env`.
+
+## The headless runner: `run_headless.py`
+
+Runs the 6 fresh-context detectors + proof-or-kill verifier unattended via the Agent SDK; emits the
+finding-schema JSON that `review.sh --agent-findings` consumes. Read-only tools, hermetic
+(`setting_sources=[]`), fails toward over-reporting. CLI:
+
+```
+CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=... python3 run_headless.py TARGET_DIR \
+  [--scope "src infra web"] [--out findings.json] [--model claude-...] \
+  [--detectors injection,authz,...] [--concurrency 3] [--max-turns 40] \
+  [--detector-budget-usd 2.0] [--total-budget-usd 12.0]
+```
+When the total budget is exhausted the verifier is skipped and remaining candidates stay `unverified` —
+never silently dropped. Manual single-repo run:
+```
+cd ~/orchestrator
+set -a; . ~/secrev.env; set +a
+.venv/bin/python security-review/run_headless.py ~/security-review-testbed --out /tmp/agent.json
+security-review/review.sh --agent-findings /tmp/agent.json ~/security-review-testbed
+```
+
+## Nightly two-tier, clean-clone auto-discovery sweep
+
+`nightly_sweep.sh` needs **no per-repo wiring**. Each night it:
+
+1. **Discovers** every non-archived Sea-Haven-Industries repo via the REST API (`curl` + `GH_TOKEN`) and
+   **mirrors** each as a shallow clean clone (`git clone --depth=1`, default branch from the API
+   `default_branch`) into `~/repo-mirrors`. The token is injected only for the fetch and scrubbed from the
+   on-disk remote afterward. Clean clones contain no developer-local gitignored `.env`, so live secrets
+   stay out of scope by construction.
+2. **Canary first:** scans `~/security-review-testbed` agentically (anti-complacency) — must block and meet
+   the recall floor, else COMPLACENCY ALARM.
+3. **Tier 1 (every repo, $0 Claude):** `review.sh --scanners-only` over every mirror.
+4. **Tier 2 (bounded agentic):** `run_headless.py` over a deterministic round-robin rotation that fits
+   `TOTAL_BUDGET_USD`, with a persistent cycle pointer (`~/sweep-reports/.rotation-state.json`) so every
+   repo gets a deep pass within `MAX_CYCLE_NIGHTS`; a COVERAGE ALARM fires if it falls behind.
+
+ALARM-only (a clean night posts nothing). Secret-shaped values are redacted from the Slack string; reports
+under `~/sweep-reports/<UTC-date>/` are mode 600.
+
+### Config (env / systemd `Environment=`)
+`GH_ORG` (Sea-Haven-Industries) · `MIRROR_DIR` (~/repo-mirrors) · `TOTAL_BUDGET_USD` (20) ·
+`PER_TARGET_BUDGET_USD` (12) · `CANARY_FLOOR` (10) · `MAX_CYCLE_NIGHTS` (4) · `MAX_AGENTIC_PER_NIGHT`
+(0 = unlimited) · `CENTRAL_SKIP_FILE` (~/.secrev-skip.txt) · `ENABLE_XMODEL_HOOK` (0) ·
+`TARGETS` (manual override — scan explicit paths, no discovery).
+
+### Skip a repo
+Commit a `.security-review-skip` at its root, **or** add its name to `~/.secrev-skip.txt`. Marker-skips are
+logged in the report (a sensitive repo cannot silently self-exclude).
+
+### Manual dry-run (do this once after provisioning `GH_TOKEN`)
+```
+cd ~/orchestrator
+set -a; . ~/secrev.env; set +a
+./security-review/nightly_sweep.sh
+# Watch: discovery count, mirrors, canary block+recall, tier1 over all repos, tier2 rotation, clean exit.
+# Then re-tune CANARY_FLOOR to the reported recall, and confirm the ALARM path with a forced failure.
+```
+
+### Install the timer
+```
+sudo cp security-review/systemd/sea-haven-secrev.{service,timer} /etc/systemd/system/
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+sudo systemctl enable --now sea-haven-secrev.timer   # the timer drives it; do not enable the .service
+systemctl list-timers sea-haven-secrev.timer
+```
+Fires nightly ~02:00 local (`Persistent=true` catches missed runs). `TimeoutStartSec=21600` (6h) bounds a
+hang without killing a healthy long night; spend is capped by `TOTAL_BUDGET_USD`.
+
+## Anti-complacency reinforcements
+- **Canary:** the testbed (now Python/IaC/React + Node + .NET planted vulns) is scanned every night; a
+  recall drop or non-block is a COMPLACENCY ALARM.
+- **Coverage:** the rotation pointer + `MAX_CYCLE_NIGHTS` guarantee every repo gets a deep pass on a cadence,
+  with a COVERAGE ALARM if it slips — no silent incomplete coverage.
+- **Two-model disagreement (optional):** `ENABLE_XMODEL_HOOK=1` re-checks confirmed criticals with GPT-4.1.
+
+## Remaining (deferred by design)
+- **Persistent budget/telemetry ledger:** cross-run spend tracking beyond the per-run + nightly caps (optional).
+- **Phase 4 roster growth** (compliance/drift sweep, CVE agent, optional auto-fixer) — only per a real job.
+- **Phase 5 remediation:** harden findings as real repos surface them (payments-dashboard first).
+- **Confluence:** document `sh-secrev` as standing infrastructure (always-on VM holding a read-only org PAT,
+  pulling all org repos nightly) in the IT host/LAN inventory.
diff --git a/security-review/README.md b/security-review/README.md
index b542167..dc23536 100644
--- a/security-review/README.md
+++ b/security-review/README.md
@@ -1,32 +1,108 @@
 # security-review
 
-The Sea Haven security-review gate. One pure-code script (`review.sh`), many triggers.
+The Sea Haven security-review gate. One pure-code script (`review.sh`) is the decision-maker; everything
+else (hooks, the interactive skill, the headless runner, the nightly sweep) is a trigger that feeds it.
 See memory `project-security-review-agent` for the full design.
 
 ## Pieces
-- `review.sh` — merges deterministic-scanner findings + agent findings, dedups, applies
-  suppressions (justification required), and makes the **block decision** (no agent decides). Exit 1 = BLOCK.
-- `hooks/pre-commit` + `install-hooks.sh` — fast scanners-only hook for a target repo.
-- The agentic detector/verifier pass is the interactive `/sh-security-review` slash command
-  (`~/.claude/commands/sh-security-review.md`), schema at `~/.claude/security-review/finding.schema.json`.
+- `review.sh` — merges deterministic-scanner findings + agent findings, dedups, applies suppressions
+  (justification required), and makes the **block decision** (no agent decides). Exit 1 = BLOCK.
+- `hooks/pre-commit`, `hooks/pre-push` + `install-hooks.sh` — fast `--scanners-only` gates. Install once
+  globally for every repo, or per-repo (see below).
+- `skill/sh-security-review.md` — the interactive agentic detector/verifier prompt (Path A, Max-covered).
+  `finding.schema.json` — the structured finding contract both paths emit. `install-hooks.sh --global`
+  links these into `~/.claude/` (this repo is the source of truth).
+- `run_headless.py` — the Path B headless detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier (Claude Agent SDK,
+  subscription OAuth). Self-contained: prompts are inline, so the VM needs no `~/.claude` assets to run it.
+- `nightly_sweep.sh` + `systemd/` — the unattended two-tier sweep on the `sh-secrev` VM (R720).
 
 ## Triggers (one script, many entry points)
 - **On-demand (primary):** run `/sh-security-review` in a Claude Code session (Max-covered), have it
-  write its schema JSON, then `review.sh --agent-findings out.json <repo>` to gate.
-- **Pre-commit:** `install-hooks.sh <repo>` — fast deterministic scanners abort the commit early.
-- **CI (Phase 3):** the same `review.sh` runs headless as the unbypassable backstop.
+  write its schema JSON, then `review.sh --agent-findings out.json <repo>` to gate. Required before
+  pushing payments/auth/IaC/input-handling changes (see the global CLAUDE.md security-review rule).
+- **Pre-commit / pre-push:** the global git hooks run deterministic scanners automatically.
+- **Nightly:** the VM sweep (Path B) is the unattended backstop.
+
+### Installing the hooks
+```
+# Global — gate EVERY repo on this machine, and link the skill + schema into ~/.claude:
+security-review/install-hooks.sh --global
+
+# Per-repo — for a repo that sets its own core.hooksPath (e.g. husky) and would shadow the global hook:
+security-review/install-hooks.sh /path/to/repo
+```
+The global mode sets `git config --global core.hooksPath ~/.config/git/hooks`. Skip a repo with a
+`.security-review-skip` file at its root; suppress a specific false positive in the repo's
+`.security-review/suppressions.json` (a written justification is required and is surfaced); bypass once
+with `git push --no-verify`. Caveat: a repo with its own local `core.hooksPath` overrides the global hook
+— install per-repo there. See memory `reference_global_security_review_hook`.
+
+## No CI — by design
+There is **no CI** wiring for this gate. For a solo dev the git hooks + nightly VM sweep are the backstop,
+so the parked CI drafts (`ci/*.yml`, `CI-BACKSTOP-NOTES.md`) were removed; recover them from git history
+(the commit that deleted `security-review/ci/`) if the team ever goes multi-dev. The orchestrator repo's
+own `ci.yaml` (ruff + tests) is unrelated and stays.
 
 ## Scanners
-`review.sh` runs whatever is installed and logs the rest with install commands (no silent skips).
-Currently wired: `cfn-lint`. To give the deterministic layer teeth, install:
+`review.sh` runs whatever is installed and logs the rest with install commands (no silent skips):
+`semgrep` (`p/security-audit` + `p/secrets` + `p/javascript`), `gitleaks` (git-mode — scans committed
+history, respects `.gitignore`), `checkov`, `cfn-lint`, `pip-audit`, `npm audit`. Each is normalized into
+the finding schema. Install the full set:
 ```
-pipx install semgrep        # SAST: injection / authz / xss
-brew install gitleaks       # hardcoded secrets
-pipx install pip-audit      # vulnerable Python deps
-pipx install checkov        # IaC / IAM misconfig
+pipx install semgrep pip-audit checkov   # SAST / vulnerable Python deps / IaC misconfig
+brew install gitleaks                      # hardcoded secrets
+# cfn-lint via pip; Node.js provides npm audit
 ```
-Each needs a small normalizer added to `review.sh` (map its JSON to the finding schema) when installed.
 
-## Status
-review.sh gate validated against the local testbed: 16 findings, correct dedup of distinct
-same-CWE findings, suppression-without-justification rejected and surfaced, BLOCK on confirmed crit/high.
+## Nightly sweep (Path B) — two-tier, clean-clone auto-discovery
+`nightly_sweep.sh` runs on the `sh-secrev` Ubuntu VM (R720) and needs **no per-repo wiring**. It:
+
+1. **Discovers** every non-archived Sea-Haven-Industries repo via the GitHub REST API (`curl` + a
+   read-only `GH_TOKEN`; no `gh` CLI dependency) and **mirrors** each as a shallow clean clone
+   (`git clone --depth=1`, default branch from the API) into `~/repo-mirrors`. Scanning server-side
+   clones — not developer working trees — structurally keeps local gitignored `.env` secrets out of scope.
+2. **Tier 1 (every repo, every night, $0 Claude):** `review.sh --scanners-only` over every mirror —
+   complete deterministic baseline coverage.
+3. **Tier 2 (bounded agentic):** `run_headless.py` over a deterministic **round-robin rotation** that
+   fits `TOTAL_BUDGET_USD`, with a persistent cycle pointer so every repo gets a deep pass within
+   `MAX_CYCLE_NIGHTS`. This bounds the draw on the shared Max limits (a clean night never deep-scans all
+   repos). A `COVERAGE ALARM` fires if the rotation falls behind.
+
+It is **ALARM-only**: a clean night posts nothing. See memory `feedback_cloudwatch_alarms`.
+
+### Skip / override
+- A repo is skipped if it commits a `.security-review-skip` marker **or** is listed in the central skip
+  file (`~/.secrev-skip.txt`, one repo name per line). Repos skipped via their own committed marker are
+  **logged in the report** so a sensitive repo can't silently self-exclude.
+- `TARGETS="/path/a /path/b"` overrides discovery entirely (scan explicit paths, no cloning).
+- The canary corpus (`~/security-review-testbed`) is **always** scanned agentically first as the
+  anti-complacency check — independent of the skip filter.
+
+### Anti-complacency + guards
+- **Canary check:** the testbed MUST block AND surface ≥ `CANARY_FLOOR` (default 10) confirmed crit/high.
+  Otherwise → COMPLACENCY ALARM. The corpus now includes Node + .NET fixtures (see the testbed key);
+  re-tune the floor after the first VM canary run reports the expanded recall number.
+- **Budget ceiling:** `TOTAL_BUDGET_USD` (default 20) caps aggregate agentic spend; `PER_TARGET_BUDGET_USD`
+  (default 12) caps each repo; `MAX_AGENTIC_PER_NIGHT` (default 0 = unlimited) optionally caps wall-clock.
+  With the SDK-billing split deferred (memory `reference-claude-subscription-billing`), spend draws from
+  the Max subscription limits, so the two-tier design keeps full coverage cheap and bounds the agentic draw.
+- **Two-model hook (optional, off):** `ENABLE_XMODEL_HOOK=1` re-checks each confirmed CRITICAL with the
+  orchestrator cross-family reviewer (GPT-4.1) and flags disagreement; skips gracefully, never fails the sweep.
+- **Redaction:** secret-shaped values are masked in the Slack ALARM string; on-disk reports are mode 600.
+
+### Secrets / env (`~/secrev.env`, mode 600)
+- `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` — required (`run_headless.py` pops `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`).
+- `GH_TOKEN` — **read-only fine-grained PAT** scoped to the org (Contents + Metadata: read-only, nothing
+  else) for discovery + cloning. Never give this unattended box a write-capable token.
+- `SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` — alarms (plain incoming-webhook). `~/orchestrator/.env` → `OPENAI_API_KEY` (xmodel hook only).
+- Reports + per-target JSON land under `~/sweep-reports/<UTC-date>/`.
+
+### Install the timer
+Units are in `systemd/`; full runbook is `DEPLOY-R720.md`. On the VM:
+```
+sudo cp systemd/sea-haven-secrev.{service,timer} /etc/systemd/system/
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+sudo systemctl enable --now sea-haven-secrev.timer   # the timer drives it; do not enable the .service
+sudo systemctl start sea-haven-secrev.service        # optional one-off smoke test
+```
+The timer fires nightly at ~02:00 local (`Persistent=true` catches missed runs after downtime).