harden(agent-team): apply P3-live security-gate fixes (GPT-4.1 xreview + sh-security-review)

BLOCK-1/FIX-4: gate-and-pr re-comments pull-requests:write + environment:agent-apply
(provisioning-time uncomment) and gains needs.guard/build-test=='success' job guard —
zero privilege until provisioning. BLOCK-2/3+FIX-5: ci_fetcher validates run_id (^[0-9]{1,20}$),
owner/repo (^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$), and fetched_id (int) — fail closed, no SSRF/path
injection. FIX-1: conclusion allowlist. FIX-3: api_root removed from public builder (no
injectable endpoint). INJ-02: post-build denied-path check uses NUL-delimited git output +
explicit rename parsing, no backslash mangling, non-UTF8=violation. INJ-03: all three trust-
control denylists unified to one 22-entry union + drift-guard test. Q1: documented run_id/
diff_hash trust source (dispatcher/ledger only). 884 tests, ruff clean. Privileged steps stay
if:${{ false }} until provisioning.

agent-team/agent_team/ci_fetcher.py

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import logging
 import os
+import re
 from collections.abc import Mapping
 from typing import Any
 
@@ -54,6 +55,52 @@ __all__ = [
 
 _LOG = logging.getLogger("agent_team.ci_fetcher")
 
+# ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# TRUST SOURCE (design §3.3.2, QUESTION-1). ``state["run_id"]`` and
+# ``state["diff_hash"]`` are TRUSTED inputs to this fetcher and the pure-code
+# gate: they MUST be written ONLY by the trusted dispatcher / ledger at dispatch
+# time — NEVER by an LLM/builder/verifier node or by anything a candidate diff
+# can influence. The dispatcher records the run id it dispatched the apply/verify
+# workflow under (and the ledger-recorded diff hash) into task state; the LLM
+# build/verify nodes only READ them. If that ever changes, the run_id format
+# validation below (fail-closed) plus the gate's run-id EQUALITY check
+# (:func:`agent_team.ci_gate.evaluate_ci_gate`, which compares the fetched run id
+# against the dispatcher's ``expected_run_id``) are the defense: an attacker who
+# could rewrite ``state["run_id"]`` to point at a different (passing) run would
+# still have to match the dispatcher's expected_run_id, and a malformed/injected
+# value fails the regex and returns None -> gate BLOCK.
+# ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# A GitHub Actions run id is a positive integer. Validate the state-supplied
+# run_id against this BEFORE building any URL: a non-numeric value is either a
+# bug or an injection attempt (it would be path-spliced into the API URL), so we
+# fail closed (-> None -> gate BLOCK) rather than fetch an attacker-chosen path.
+_RUN_ID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9]{1,20}")
+
+# owner / repo path segments. GitHub restricts these to a conservative charset;
+# we validate both before URL construction so a crafted owner/repo cannot splice
+# extra path segments / traversal into the GitHub API URL. Fail closed on miss.
+_OWNER_REPO_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}")
+
+# Authenticated GitHub run conclusions we recognise. An unrecognised/missing
+# conclusion is ambiguous and must fail closed here (the gate also BLOCKs on
+# unknowns; validating at the fetcher makes the trust boundary explicit). Keep
+# this in sync with agent_team.ci_gate's PASS + _FAILURE_CONCLUSIONS plus the
+# benign non-failure values GitHub can return.
+_ALLOWED_CONCLUSIONS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
+    {
+        "success",
+        "failure",
+        "cancelled",
+        "skipped",
+        "timed_out",
+        "action_required",
+        "neutral",
+        "stale",
+        "startup_failure",
+    }
+)
+
 # The dedicated read-only token env var (preferred), falling back to the generic
 # GITHUB_TOKEN (the idiom github_live uses). The token MUST be read-only — the
 # fetcher only ever GETs; a write-scoped token here would be unnecessary blast
@@ -138,6 +185,28 @@ def fetch_ci_result(
         return None
     run_id = str(run_id)
 
+    # BLOCK-2: validate the run id BEFORE it is spliced into the API URL. A GitHub
+    # run id is a positive integer; anything else is a bug or a path-injection
+    # attempt -> fail closed. (See the TRUST SOURCE note: state["run_id"] is a
+    # trusted dispatcher input, but we validate it as defense-in-depth.)
+    if not _RUN_ID_RE.fullmatch(run_id):
+        _LOG.warning(
+            "ci_fetcher: run_id %r is not a valid integer run id; failing closed",
+            run_id,
+        )
+        return None
+
+    # BLOCK-3: validate owner/repo before URL construction so a crafted value
+    # cannot splice extra path segments / traversal into the GitHub API URL.
+    for _name, _value in (("owner", owner), ("repo", repo)):
+        if not _OWNER_REPO_RE.fullmatch(_value):
+            _LOG.warning(
+                "ci_fetcher: %s %r is not a valid GitHub path segment; failing closed",
+                _name,
+                _value,
+            )
+            return None
+
     echoed_hash = state.get("diff_hash")
 
     if client is None:
@@ -181,15 +250,43 @@ def fetch_ci_result(
         _LOG.info("ci_fetcher: run %s has no conclusion yet; failing closed", run_id)
         return None
 
+    # FIX-1: allowlist the conclusion. GitHub returns a fixed set of conclusion
+    # strings; an unrecognised value is ambiguous (a new GitHub state, a typo, or
+    # an injected value) and must fail closed here rather than be laundered to the
+    # gate. (The gate also BLOCKs unknowns; this makes the boundary explicit.)
+    normalized_conclusion = conclusion.strip().lower()
+    if normalized_conclusion not in _ALLOWED_CONCLUSIONS:
+        _LOG.warning(
+            "ci_fetcher: run %s has unrecognised conclusion %r; failing closed",
+            run_id,
+            conclusion,
+        )
+        return None
+
     # Bind the returned run_id to the run actually fetched (the API echoes id);
-    # fall back to the requested run_id. The gate independently re-checks this
+    # fall back to the requested (already-validated) run_id. The gate
-    # against expected_run_id, so this is provenance, not the trust decision.
+    # independently re-checks this against expected_run_id, so this is provenance,
+    # not the trust decision.
+    #
+    # FIX-5: the API ``id`` must be an integer / integer-string before it is used
+    # as the result run id; we do NOT launder an arbitrary string. An int is
+    # accepted; a digit-only string is accepted; anything else falls back to the
+    # already-validated requested run_id rather than propagating an unvalidated
+    # value into the gate's run-id equality check.
     fetched_id = data.get("id")
-    result_run_id = str(fetched_id) if fetched_id is not None else run_id
+    if isinstance(fetched_id, bool):
+        # bool is an int subclass; a JSON ``true``/``false`` id is not a run id.
+        result_run_id = run_id
+    elif isinstance(fetched_id, int):
+        result_run_id = str(fetched_id)
+    elif isinstance(fetched_id, str) and _RUN_ID_RE.fullmatch(fetched_id):
+        result_run_id = fetched_id
+    else:
+        result_run_id = run_id
 
     return {
         "run_id": result_run_id,
-        "conclusion": conclusion,
+        "conclusion": normalized_conclusion,
         "diff_hash": echoed_hash,
     }
 
@@ -199,20 +296,26 @@ def build_ci_result_fetcher(
     owner: str,
     repo: str,
     client: Any = None,
-    api_root: str = GITHUB_API_ROOT,
     timeout: float = _DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_S,
 ) -> CiResultFetcher:
     """Build a :data:`CiResultFetcher` bound to ``owner``/``repo`` (GATED-LIVE seam).
 
     Returns a single-argument ``state -> mapping | None`` callable shaped exactly
     like the VERIFY node's injected ``ci_result_fetcher`` seam, closing over the
-    target ``owner``/``repo`` (and the optional injected ``client`` / ``api_root``
+    target ``owner``/``repo`` (and the optional injected ``client`` / ``timeout``).
-    / ``timeout``). Compose it with
+    Compose it with
     :func:`agent_team.nodes.build_verify_subgraph.bind_ci_result_fetcher` (or the
     opt-in :func:`agent_team.coordinator.gated_build_verify_wiring`) once the
     §3.3.2 gate clears. It is read-only and fails closed (see
     :func:`fetch_ci_result`); binding it does not enable any apply/verify
     behaviour, it only gives the gate an authenticated conclusion to read.
+
+    FIX-3: the production path does NOT accept a caller-overridable ``api_root``.
+    The GitHub API host is hardcoded to :data:`GITHUB_API_ROOT` so a caller (and
+    anything that influences the coordinator's wiring) cannot redirect the
+    read-only GET at an attacker-controlled host. ``fetch_ci_result`` retains an
+    ``api_root`` kwarg for unit tests only; it is unreachable from this production
+    builder (and therefore from :func:`agent_team.coordinator.gated_build_verify_wiring`).
     """
 
     def fetcher(state: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
@@ -221,7 +324,9 @@ def build_ci_result_fetcher(
             owner=owner,
             repo=repo,
             client=client,
-            api_root=api_root,
+            # api_root deliberately NOT forwarded: hardcoded GITHUB_API_ROOT in
+            # the production path (FIX-3). Only the test-only direct caller of
+            # fetch_ci_result may override it.
             timeout=timeout,
         )
 

agent-team/agent_team/ci_gate.py

@@ -39,6 +39,18 @@ Decision semantics (a diff "ships" only on an unambiguous authenticated pass):
 * :data:`GateDecision.BLOCK` — a trust violation (denylist hit, hash mismatch,
   run-id mismatch, missing/ambiguous authenticated conclusion). This is an
   ALARM-worthy refuse-to-proceed, never a silent pass.
+
+TRUST SOURCE (§3.3.2, QUESTION-1). ``state["run_id"]`` (the run id the fetcher
+reads and the value compared against ``expected_run_id`` here) and
+``state["diff_hash"]`` MUST be written ONLY by the trusted dispatcher / ledger at
+dispatch time — NEVER by an LLM / builder / verifier node or by anything a
+candidate diff can influence. The dispatcher records the run id it dispatched the
+apply/verify workflow under (and the ledger-recorded diff hash); the LLM nodes
+only read them. The gate's run-id EQUALITY check below (``actual_run_id`` vs the
+dispatcher-supplied ``expected_run_id``) plus the fetcher's run_id format
+validation are the defense if that assumption is ever broken: a tampered
+``state["run_id"]`` would still have to equal the dispatcher's expected run id to
+pass, and a malformed value fails closed.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -85,12 +97,19 @@ class GateDecision(Enum):
 # touches any of these is escalated to mandatory human + GPT cross-review, never
 # auto-built — they are the mandatory-cross-review surface regardless. Globs are
 # matched against POSIX-canonicalized repo-relative paths.
+# INJ-03: this denylist is the UNION SUPERSET shared verbatim across all three
+# trust-control copies — this tuple, the guard-job inline DENY_GLOBS, and the
+# post-build inline DENY_GLOBS in ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml. The three had
+# drifted in BOTH directions (each carried entries the others lacked); they are
+# now identical, and tests/test_apply_verify_workflow_hardening.py asserts the
+# identity so any future drift fails CI. When editing one, edit all three.
 DENYLIST_GLOBS: tuple[str, ...] = (
     # CI workflow definitions — the "pwn request" surface.
     ".github/workflows/**",
     ".github/actions/**",
     # Branch protection / ownership / dependency automation config.
     ".github/CODEOWNERS",
+    "**/CODEOWNERS",
     "CODEOWNERS",
     ".github/dependabot.yml",
     ".github/dependabot.yaml",
@@ -101,9 +120,15 @@ DENYLIST_GLOBS: tuple[str, ...] = (
     "**/template.yaml",
     "**/samconfig.toml",
     "**/*.tf",
+    "**/*-stack.ts",
+    "**/*_stack.py",
     "**/iam/**",
     "**/policies/**",
+    "**/*iam*",
+    "**/policy*.json",
     "**/*policy*.json",
+    "**/*.pem",
+    "**/*.key",
 )
 
 # Authenticated GitHub run conclusions that count as a recognised failure (the

agent-team/ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml

@@ -162,23 +162,32 @@ jobs:
           # an auto-reject; such a diff is escalated to mandatory human + GPT
           # cross-review, never auto-built (these are the mandatory-cross-review
           # surface regardless). Matched against canonicalized POSIX paths. ---
+          # INJ-03: UNION SUPERSET, IDENTICAL across all three trust-control
+          # copies (this guard inline list, the post-build inline list below, and
+          # agent_team.ci_gate.DENYLIST_GLOBS). test_apply_verify_workflow_hardening
+          # asserts the three are byte-for-byte equal so drift fails CI. Edit all
+          # three together.
           DENY_GLOBS: tuple[str, ...] = (
               ".github/workflows/**",
               ".github/actions/**",
+              ".github/CODEOWNERS",
               "**/CODEOWNERS",
               "CODEOWNERS",
               ".github/dependabot.yml",
               ".github/dependabot.yaml",
               ".github/settings.yml",
-              # IAM / policy / permission IaC (CDK / SAM / Terraform).
-              "**/template.yaml",
-              "**/template.yml",
-              "**/*.tf",
               "**/cdk.json",
+              "**/template.yml",
+              "**/template.yaml",
+              "**/samconfig.toml",
+              "**/*.tf",
               "**/*-stack.ts",
               "**/*_stack.py",
-              "**/policy*.json",
+              "**/iam/**",
+              "**/policies/**",
               "**/*iam*",
+              "**/policy*.json",
+              "**/*policy*.json",
               "**/*.pem",
               "**/*.key",
           )
@@ -566,15 +575,26 @@ jobs:
           # an npm postinstall, a Makefile) running in THIS untrusted job can
           # ALSO write files — including into the trust-control surface or out of
           # the declared scope. We committed the patched tree as the baseline
-          # above, so anything that differs now is build-hook output. Collect it
+          # above, so anything that differs now is build-hook output. We FAIL the
-          # via `git diff --name-only` (tracked changes the hook made on top of
+          # job if any of it lands on a denied path or outside scope.
-          # the patch) + `git status --porcelain` (new untracked files the hook
+          #
-          # dropped) and FAIL the job if any of it lands on a denied path or
+          # FIX-2 / INJ-02: parse NUL-delimited, never newline-split. A malicious
-          # outside scope. Reuses the SAME denylist + scope logic as the guard.
+          # build hook can write a file whose name contains a tab/space/quote/
-          {
+          # NEWLINE; a `git status --porcelain | sed` + newline-split pipeline
-            git diff --name-only HEAD
+          # would either mangle or split such a name and let it evade the path
-            git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all | sed -E 's/^...//'
+          # match. So we emit machine-readable NUL-delimited records:
-          } | sort -u > ./_build_written_paths.txt
+          #   * `git status --porcelain=v1 -z --untracked-files=all` (each entry
+          #     is `XY <path>` and, for renames, `XY <new>\0<old>` — two NUL
+          #     fields), and
+          #   * `git diff -z --name-only HEAD` (NUL-separated tracked paths),
+          # and Python splits on NUL and parses rename entries explicitly. We also
+          # set `core.quotepath false` so git never C-quotes/escapes UTF-8 or
+          # special bytes in path output (belt-and-suspenders). No backslash
+          # mangling is done anywhere. A path that cannot be cleanly decoded is
+          # treated as a VIOLATION (fail closed).
+          git config core.quotepath false
+          git diff -z --name-only HEAD > ./_build_diff_z.bin || true
+          git status --porcelain=v1 -z --untracked-files=all > ./_build_status_z.bin || true
           python3 - <<'PY'
           from __future__ import annotations
 
@@ -583,30 +603,44 @@ jobs:
           import re
           import sys
 
-          # SAME denylist as the guard job (boundary 2). Kept in sync by review.
+          # SAME denylist as the guard job + ci_gate.DENYLIST_GLOBS (boundary 2,
+          # INJ-03 union superset). All three are byte-for-byte identical and
+          # test_apply_verify_workflow_hardening asserts it; edit all three.
           DENY_GLOBS: tuple[str, ...] = (
               ".github/workflows/**",
               ".github/actions/**",
+              ".github/CODEOWNERS",
               "**/CODEOWNERS",
               "CODEOWNERS",
               ".github/dependabot.yml",
               ".github/dependabot.yaml",
               ".github/settings.yml",
-              "**/template.yaml",
-              "**/template.yml",
-              "**/*.tf",
               "**/cdk.json",
+              "**/template.yml",
+              "**/template.yaml",
+              "**/samconfig.toml",
+              "**/*.tf",
               "**/*-stack.ts",
               "**/*_stack.py",
-              "**/policy*.json",
+              "**/iam/**",
+              "**/policies/**",
               "**/*iam*",
+              "**/policy*.json",
+              "**/*policy*.json",
               "**/*.pem",
               "**/*.key",
           )
           _GLOB_META = set("*?[]")
 
           def canonical(path: str) -> str:
-              p = path.strip().strip('"').replace("\\", "/")
+              # FIX-2 / INJ-02: paths come from `git -z` with core.quotepath=false,
+              # so they are RAW: real '/' separators and no C-quoting. We do NOT
+              # do `.replace("\\","/")` backslash mangling (a backslash is a literal
+              # filename byte here) and do NOT strip quotes (git did not add any).
+              # We only reject leading/trailing whitespace-only and escaping paths.
+              p = path
+              if not p:
+                  raise ValueError("empty path")
               norm = posixpath.normpath(p)
               if norm.startswith("/") or norm == ".." or norm.startswith("../"):
                   raise ValueError(f"path escapes repo root: {path!r}")
@@ -662,10 +696,89 @@ jobs:
           def in_scope(path: str, scope: list[str]) -> bool:
               return any(path == e or path.startswith(e + "/") for e in scope)
 
+          def _read_z(path: str) -> list[bytes]:
+              """Read a NUL-delimited file into a list of byte records (no trailing empty)."""
+              try:
+                  with open(path, "rb") as fh:
+                      blob = fh.read()
+              except FileNotFoundError:
+                  return []
+              if not blob:
+                  return []
+              parts = blob.split(b"\x00")
+              if parts and parts[-1] == b"":
+                  parts.pop()
+              return parts
+
+          def _decode(field: bytes) -> str | None:
+              """Strictly decode a path field as UTF-8; None if it cannot be cleanly decoded."""
+              try:
+                  return field.decode("utf-8")
+              except UnicodeDecodeError:
+                  return None
+
+          def _diff_paths() -> tuple[list[str], list[bytes]]:
+              """`git diff -z --name-only` records: each NUL field is one path."""
+              ok: list[str] = []
+              bad: list[bytes] = []
+              for rec in _read_z("./_build_diff_z.bin"):
+                  dec = _decode(rec)
+                  (ok if dec is not None else bad).append(dec if dec is not None else rec)
+              return ok, bad
+
+          def _status_paths() -> tuple[list[str], list[bytes]]:
+              """Parse `git status --porcelain=v1 -z` records.
+
+              Each entry is `XY <path>`; a rename/copy (X or Y in R/C) is followed
+              by a SECOND field, the rename/copy SOURCE, in a separate NUL record.
+              We surface BOTH the destination and the source (a rename INTO or OUT
+              of a denied/out-of-scope path must be caught). A record whose path
+              field cannot be cleanly UTF-8 decoded is reported as a violation.
+              """
+              ok: list[str] = []
+              bad: list[bytes] = []
+              recs = _read_z("./_build_status_z.bin")
+              i = 0
+              while i < len(recs):
+                  rec = recs[i]
+                  # `XY ` is a 3-byte prefix: two status codes + a space.
+                  if len(rec) < 4:
+                      bad.append(rec)
+                      i += 1
+                      continue
+                  xy = rec[:2]
+                  body = rec[3:]
+                  dec = _decode(body)
+                  (ok if dec is not None else bad).append(dec if dec is not None else body)
+                  # Rename (R) / copy (C) in either index or worktree column carries
+                  # a following SOURCE field as its own record — consume + check it.
+                  if xy[0:1] in (b"R", b"C") or xy[1:2] in (b"R", b"C"):
+                      i += 1
+                      if i < len(recs):
+                          src = recs[i]
+                          sdec = _decode(src)
+                          (ok if sdec is not None else bad).append(
+                              sdec if sdec is not None else src
+                          )
+                  i += 1
+              return ok, bad
+
           def main() -> int:
-              with open("./_build_written_paths.txt", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+              diff_ok, diff_bad = _diff_paths()
-                  raw_paths = [ln for ln in (x.strip() for x in fh) if ln]
+              status_ok, status_bad = _status_paths()
-              if not raw_paths:
+              raw_paths = sorted(set(diff_ok) | set(status_ok))
+              undecodable = diff_bad + status_bad
+
+              violations: list[str] = []
+              # FIX-2: a path that cannot be cleanly decoded is a VIOLATION (fail
+              # closed) — we never silently drop or lossily replace a build-written
+              # filename the path match cannot reason about.
+              for raw in undecodable:
+                  violations.append(
+                      f"build hook wrote an undecodable path: {raw!r}"
+                  )
+
+              if not raw_paths and not violations:
                   print("post-build check: build hook wrote no files; clean")
                   return 0
 
@@ -673,7 +786,6 @@ jobs:
                   [s for s in os.environ.get("DECLARED_SCOPE", "").splitlines() if s.strip()]
               )
 
-              violations: list[str] = []
               for raw in raw_paths:
                   try:
                       path = canonical(raw)
@@ -762,28 +874,40 @@ jobs:
   # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   gate-and-pr:
     needs: [guard, build-test]
-    # `always()` so the gate runs even when build-test failed, to record the
+    # Defense-in-depth: the privileged job NEVER runs on a failed/skipped/
-    # authoritative conclusion. The gate itself decides pass/fail from results.
+    # cancelled guard or build-test. We still want it to run on a build-test
-    if: always()
+    # FAILURE only to record the authoritative conclusion — but until
+    # provisioning this job holds ZERO privilege and does ZERO privileged work
+    # (the gate is pure-code, the token + draft-PR steps are `if: ${{ false }}`),
+    # so gating on both upstream jobs succeeding is the safe posture: a test
+    # dispatch today runs only the credential-less guard + build-test. At
+    # provisioning, revisit whether to relax to `always()` to record failures.
+    if: always() && needs.guard.result == 'success' && needs.build-test.result == 'success'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 5
+    # PROVISIONING-TIME PRIVILEGE (BLOCK-1 / FIX-4 / QUESTION-2). Privileged
+    # declarations must be PROVISIONING-time, not live: an `environment:` that
+    # does not exist yet and a `pull-requests: write` grant are unprotected holes
+    # if declared before the `agent-apply` environment (with its required
+    # reviewer) is created. So both stay COMMENTED here — the exact deploy-gated
+    # pattern the removed cloud token-federation grant used — and are uncommented
+    # at provisioning AFTER the environment exists. Today this job is
+    # credential-less and runs ONLY the pure-code gate.
+    #
     # The `agent-apply` GitHub Environment is the human-gate home: its REQUIRED
     # REVIEWER (and optional wait timer / branch policy) is configured on the
     # Environment at PROVISIONING — GitHub holds the job here until a human
     # approves. This cannot be authored in YAML; the `environment:` reference is
-    # the hook the provisioning step attaches the reviewer to. Until the
+    # the hook the provisioning step attaches the reviewer to.
-    # environment exists, dispatching this workflow is itself blocked, which is
+    # environment:                  # uncomment at provisioning AFTER the agent-apply environment is created with a required reviewer
-    # why the live flip is deferred to provisioning.
+    #   name: agent-apply           # uncomment at provisioning AFTER the agent-apply environment is created with a required reviewer
-    environment:
-      name: agent-apply
     permissions:
       contents: read
-      # The ONLY privileged grant: open a draft PR. Enabled here (no longer
+      # uncomment at provisioning AFTER the agent-apply environment is created with a required reviewer
-      # commented) because the auth model is locked — there is no cloud
+      # The ONLY privileged grant: open a draft PR. Kept COMMENTED until
-      # credential to federate. The draft-PR STEP stays `if: ${{ false }}` until
+      # provisioning so the job holds ZERO privilege on a test dispatch today;
-      # provisioning, so nothing privileged actually runs yet even with the
+      # the draft-PR + app-token STEPS also stay `if: ${{ false }}` until then.
-      # grant declared.
+      # pull-requests: write
-      pull-requests: write
       # NOTE: there is deliberately NO token-federation permission here — this
       # workflow uses a GitHub App installation token only, no cloud provider.
     steps:
@@ -934,7 +1058,11 @@ jobs:
           # apply path (the box has no write token, D2), so this step only OPENS
           # the PR for an already-pushed agent branch. Wire `--head` to that
           # branch input at provisioning.
-          title="agent-apply: ${TASK_ID} (diff ${DIFF_HASH})"
+          # NIT-2: build BOTH title and body with `printf '%s'` over the
+          # env-indirected vars (no `${TASK_ID}` shell interpolation in one and
+          # printf in the other) so the two are consistent and the untrusted
+          # values are only ever consumed as printf data.
+          title="$(printf 'agent-apply: %s (diff %s)' "$TASK_ID" "$DIFF_HASH")"
           body="$(printf 'Automated draft PR from the agent-team apply/verify pipeline.\n\nTask: %s\nDiff hash: %s\n\nDRAFT ONLY — never auto-merged. Requires: green required checks, security review, Claude Code App review, and human approval (D2, boundary 5).' "$TASK_ID" "$DIFF_HASH")"
           gh pr create \
             --draft \

agent-team/tests/test_apply_verify_workflow_hardening.py

@@ -9,9 +9,13 @@ later edit cannot silently regress it:
 * The workflow carries NO cloud token-federation (``id-token``) and NO AWS /
   cloud-OIDC references — the auth model is a GitHub App installation token.
 * The privileged draft-PR step is NOT flipped live (``if: ${{ false }}``).
-* The privileged job declares ``pull-requests: write`` and the ``agent-apply``
+* The privileged job's ``pull-requests: write`` grant and ``agent-apply``
-  environment, and download-artifact steps are run-id pinned.
+  ``environment:`` are COMMENTED OUT (provisioning-time, not live), and the job
+  ``if:`` guards on guard+build-test success; download-artifact steps are
+  run-id pinned.
 * The embedded gate's empty-hash handling is fail-closed (extracted + executed).
+* The three trust-control denylists (guard YAML, post-build YAML, ci_gate) are
+  identical (no drift), and the post-build NUL-delimited path parsing is robust.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -137,14 +141,47 @@ def test_draft_pr_step_is_not_flipped_live() -> None:
         )
 
 
-def test_gate_job_declares_pr_write_and_environment() -> None:
+def test_gate_job_privileged_declarations_are_commented_until_provisioning() -> None:
+    # BLOCK-1 / FIX-4 / QUESTION-2: privileged declarations must be
+    # provisioning-time, not live. `pull-requests: write` and `environment:` are
+    # both COMMENTED OUT until the agent-apply environment exists, so a test
+    # dispatch today holds ZERO privilege. Assert the live job declares neither.
     job = _doc()["jobs"]["gate-and-pr"]
     perms = job.get("permissions") or {}
-    assert perms.get("pull-requests") == "write"
+    # contents: read stays active; pull-requests must NOT be granted live.
-    env = job.get("environment")
+    assert perms.get("contents") == "read"
-    # environment may be a mapping {name: agent-apply} or a bare string.
+    assert "pull-requests" not in perms, (
-    name = env.get("name") if isinstance(env, dict) else env
+        "pull-requests: write must stay commented until provisioning"
-    assert name == "agent-apply"
+    )
+    # No live environment binding.
+    assert job.get("environment") is None, (
+        "environment: must stay commented until provisioning"
+    )
+
+
+def test_gate_job_provisioning_lines_are_present_as_comments() -> None:
+    # The exact deploy-gated scaffolding must remain in the file (commented) with
+    # the provisioning marker, so provisioning knows what to uncomment.
+    raw = _raw()
+    assert "# pull-requests: write" in raw
+    assert "# environment:" in raw
+    assert "#   name: agent-apply" in raw
+    assert (
+        raw.count(
+            "uncomment at provisioning AFTER the agent-apply environment is created "
+            "with a required reviewer"
+        )
+        >= 2
+    )
+
+
+def test_gate_job_if_guards_on_upstream_success() -> None:
+    # Defense-in-depth: the privileged job never runs on a failed/skipped/
+    # cancelled guard or build-test.
+    job = _doc()["jobs"]["gate-and-pr"]
+    cond = str(job.get("if", ""))
+    assert "needs.guard.result == 'success'" in cond
+    assert "needs.build-test.result == 'success'" in cond
 
 
 def test_download_artifact_steps_are_run_id_pinned() -> None:
@@ -238,3 +275,137 @@ def test_workflow_gate_blocks_on_empty_guard_hash(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
 def test_workflow_gate_blocks_on_hash_mismatch(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
     env = dict(_GOOD, DIFF_HASH="aaa", EXPECTED_DIFF_HASH="bbb")
     assert _run_gate(tmp_path, env) == 1
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# INJ-03: the three trust-control denylists must be identical (no drift)
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def _extract_deny_globs_blocks() -> list[tuple[str, ...]]:
+    """Extract every ``DENY_GLOBS: tuple[str, ...] = ( ... )`` tuple from the YAML.
+
+    The guard job and the post-build job each embed one inline copy. Returns the
+    parsed string tuples in file order (expected: exactly two).
+    """
+    raw = _raw()
+    blocks: list[tuple[str, ...]] = []
+    for m in re.finditer(
+        r"DENY_GLOBS:\s*tuple\[str,\s*\.\.\.\]\s*=\s*\((?P<body>.*?)\)",
+        raw,
+        re.DOTALL,
+    ):
+        body = m.group("body")
+        entries = re.findall(r'"([^"]*)"', body)
+        blocks.append(tuple(entries))
+    return blocks
+
+
+def test_three_trust_control_denylists_are_identical() -> None:
+    from agent_team.ci_gate import DENYLIST_GLOBS
+
+    yaml_blocks = _extract_deny_globs_blocks()
+    assert len(yaml_blocks) == 2, (
+        f"expected exactly two inline YAML DENY_GLOBS (guard + post-build), "
+        f"found {len(yaml_blocks)}"
+    )
+    guard_globs, post_build_globs = yaml_blocks
+    # All three must be byte-for-byte identical (same entries, same order) so a
+    # future edit to one copy that drifts from the others fails CI (INJ-03).
+    assert guard_globs == post_build_globs == DENYLIST_GLOBS, (
+        "trust-control denylists have drifted:\n"
+        f"  guard      = {guard_globs}\n"
+        f"  post-build = {post_build_globs}\n"
+        f"  ci_gate    = {DENYLIST_GLOBS}"
+    )
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# FIX-2 / INJ-02: robust NUL-delimited post-build denied-path parsing
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def _extract_post_build_script() -> str:
+    """Pull the ``python3 - <<'PY' ... PY`` heredoc defining ``_status_paths``."""
+    lines = _raw().splitlines()
+    blocks: list[tuple[int, int]] = []
+    start = None
+    for i, line in enumerate(lines):
+        if start is None and line.strip() == "python3 - <<'PY'":
+            start = i + 1
+        elif start is not None and line.strip() == "PY":
+            blocks.append((start, i))
+            start = None
+    for s, e in blocks:
+        body = lines[s:e]
+        text = "\n".join(ln[10:] if ln.startswith(" " * 10) else ln for ln in body)
+        if "_status_paths" in text:
+            return text
+    raise AssertionError("post-build NUL-parse heredoc not found")
+
+
+def _run_post_build(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+    *,
+    diff_z: bytes = b"",
+    status_z: bytes = b"",
+    scope: str = "src/**",
+) -> int:
+    import os
+
+    script = tmp_path / "post_build.py"
+    script.write_text(_extract_post_build_script(), encoding="utf-8")
+    (tmp_path / "_build_diff_z.bin").write_bytes(diff_z)
+    (tmp_path / "_build_status_z.bin").write_bytes(status_z)
+    env = dict(os.environ, DECLARED_SCOPE=scope)
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        [sys.executable, str(script)],
+        env=env,
+        cwd=str(tmp_path),
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+    )
+    return result.returncode
+
+
+def test_post_build_clean_when_no_writes(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    assert _run_post_build(tmp_path) == 0
+
+
+def test_post_build_in_scope_untracked_is_clean(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # `?? src/new.py\0`
+    status = b"?? src/new.py\x00"
+    assert _run_post_build(tmp_path, status_z=status, scope="src/**") == 0
+
+
+def test_post_build_denied_path_via_status(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # A build hook drops a workflow file: must be caught (denied).
+    status = b"?? .github/workflows/evil.yml\x00"
+    assert _run_post_build(tmp_path, status_z=status, scope="src/**\n.github/**") == 1
+
+
+def test_post_build_filename_with_newline_is_caught(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # The whole point of NUL parsing: a filename containing a NEWLINE that lands
+    # out of scope must still be caught, not split/mangled into a benign name.
+    status = b"?? src/ok.py\x00?? evil\nname.py\x00"
+    # 'evil\nname.py' is out of scope (src/**) -> violation.
+    assert _run_post_build(tmp_path, status_z=status, scope="src/**") == 1
+
+
+def test_post_build_rename_source_field_is_parsed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # porcelain v1 -z rename: `R  <new>\0<old>\0`. The SOURCE field is a separate
+    # record; a rename whose SOURCE is a denied path must be caught.
+    status = b"R  src/new.py\x00.github/workflows/old.yml\x00"
+    assert _run_post_build(tmp_path, status_z=status, scope="src/**\n.github/**") == 1
+
+
+def test_post_build_undecodable_path_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # A path field that is not valid UTF-8 must be treated as a violation.
+    status = b"?? src/\xff\xfe.py\x00"
+    assert _run_post_build(tmp_path, status_z=status, scope="src/**") == 1
+
+
+def test_post_build_diff_z_denied_path_is_caught(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # The tracked-diff side (git diff -z --name-only) is parsed too.
+    diff = b"src/app.py\x00main.tf\x00"
+    assert _run_post_build(tmp_path, diff_z=diff, scope="src/**") == 1

agent-team/tests/test_ci_fetcher.py

@@ -200,3 +200,158 @@ def test_build_ci_result_fetcher_fails_closed_on_error() -> None:
     client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(500, {"message": "boom"}))
     fetcher = build_ci_result_fetcher(owner="o", repo="r", client=client)
     assert fetcher({"run_id": "3", "diff_hash": "h"}) is None
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# BLOCK-2: run_id validation (fail-closed; never reaches the URL)
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "bad_run_id",
+    [
+        "abc",  # non-numeric
+        "12a",  # mixed
+        "../runs/999",  # path traversal
+        "1 2",  # whitespace
+        "1" * 21,  # too long (> 20 digits)
+        "-1",  # sign
+        "0x10",  # hex
+    ],
+)
+def test_invalid_run_id_fails_closed(bad_run_id: str) -> None:
+    client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(200, {"id": 1, "conclusion": "success"}))
+    assert (
+        fetch_ci_result(
+            {"run_id": bad_run_id, "diff_hash": "x"},
+            owner="o",
+            repo="r",
+            client=client,
+        )
+        is None
+    )
+    # It never made a request: rejected before URL construction.
+    assert client.calls == []
+
+
+def test_valid_numeric_run_id_is_accepted() -> None:
+    client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(200, {"id": 42, "conclusion": "success"}))
+    out = fetch_ci_result(_state(run_id="42"), owner="o", repo="r", client=client)
+    assert out is not None and out["run_id"] == "42"
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# BLOCK-3: owner/repo validation (fail-closed; never reaches the URL)
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "owner,repo",
+    [
+        ("o/../x", "r"),  # traversal in owner
+        ("o", "r/runs/9"),  # extra segments in repo
+        ("o ", "r"),  # whitespace
+        ("o", ""),  # empty repo
+        ("", "r"),  # empty owner
+        ("o", "r#frag"),  # url metachar
+        ("o?", "r"),  # query metachar
+    ],
+)
+def test_invalid_owner_repo_fails_closed(owner: str, repo: str) -> None:
+    client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(200, {"id": 1, "conclusion": "success"}))
+    assert fetch_ci_result(_state(), owner=owner, repo=repo, client=client) is None
+    assert client.calls == []
+
+
+def test_valid_owner_repo_with_dots_dashes_underscores() -> None:
+    client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(200, {"id": 1, "conclusion": "success"}))
+    out = fetch_ci_result(
+        _state(run_id="1"), owner="my-org.x", repo="repo_name.v2", client=client
+    )
+    assert out is not None
+    assert client.calls[0][0].endswith("/repos/my-org.x/repo_name.v2/actions/runs/1")
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# FIX-1: conclusion allowlist (unrecognised -> fail-closed)
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "conclusion",
+    [
+        "success",
+        "failure",
+        "cancelled",
+        "skipped",
+        "timed_out",
+        "action_required",
+        "neutral",
+        "stale",
+        "startup_failure",
+    ],
+)
+def test_allowlisted_conclusions_pass(conclusion: str) -> None:
+    client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(200, {"id": 1, "conclusion": conclusion}))
+    out = fetch_ci_result(_state(run_id="1"), owner="o", repo="r", client=client)
+    assert out is not None and out["conclusion"] == conclusion
+
+
+def test_conclusion_is_normalized_lowercase() -> None:
+    client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(200, {"id": 1, "conclusion": "SUCCESS"}))
+    out = fetch_ci_result(_state(run_id="1"), owner="o", repo="r", client=client)
+    assert out is not None and out["conclusion"] == "success"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad", ["bogus", "passed", "won", "", "in_progress"])
+def test_unrecognised_conclusion_fails_closed(bad: str) -> None:
+    client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(200, {"id": 1, "conclusion": bad}))
+    assert (
+        fetch_ci_result(_state(run_id="1"), owner="o", repo="r", client=client) is None
+    )
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# FIX-5: fetched_id validation (no arbitrary-string laundering)
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def test_integer_fetched_id_is_used() -> None:
+    client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(200, {"id": 999, "conclusion": "success"}))
+    out = fetch_ci_result(_state(run_id="1"), owner="o", repo="r", client=client)
+    assert out is not None and out["run_id"] == "999"
+
+
+def test_numeric_string_fetched_id_is_used() -> None:
+    client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(200, {"id": "888", "conclusion": "success"}))
+    out = fetch_ci_result(_state(run_id="1"), owner="o", repo="r", client=client)
+    assert out is not None and out["run_id"] == "888"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "bad_id",
+    ["../evil", "abc", "9a", True, {"x": 1}, ["1"], 1.5],
+)
+def test_non_integer_fetched_id_falls_back_to_validated_run_id(bad_id) -> None:
+    client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(200, {"id": bad_id, "conclusion": "success"}))
+    out = fetch_ci_result(_state(run_id="7"), owner="o", repo="r", client=client)
+    # Falls back to the already-validated requested run_id, never laundering the id.
+    assert out is not None and out["run_id"] == "7"
+
+
+def test_missing_fetched_id_falls_back_to_run_id() -> None:
+    client = _FakeClient(_FakeResponse(200, {"conclusion": "success"}))
+    out = fetch_ci_result(_state(run_id="55"), owner="o", repo="r", client=client)
+    assert out is not None and out["run_id"] == "55"
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# FIX-3: production builder does not accept a caller-overridable api_root
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def test_build_ci_result_fetcher_rejects_api_root_kwarg() -> None:
+    # The production builder must NOT expose api_root (so the host cannot be
+    # redirected from the coordinator/production wiring).
+    with pytest.raises(TypeError):
+        build_ci_result_fetcher(owner="o", repo="r", api_root="https://evil.example")