diff --git a/agent-team/DEPLOY-R720.md b/agent-team/DEPLOY-R720.md
index 80d7f95..cfdf480 100644
--- a/agent-team/DEPLOY-R720.md
+++ b/agent-team/DEPLOY-R720.md
@@ -99,30 +99,48 @@ access tokens** on demand (`agent_team/github_app.py`). Set all three of these t
 turn the App path on (all-or-nothing — partial config logs one warning and falls
 back to the inert gh-default path, it never crashes serve):
 
+The App is the existing **`agent-team-apply`** App: **app_id `4119505`**,
+**installation `141992144`** (on `Sea-Haven-Industries/orchestrator`). These two
+IDs are not secrets (only the `.pem` is). Set all three vars (all-or-nothing —
+partial config logs one warning and falls back to the inert gh-default path, it
+never crashes serve):
+
 ```
-echo 'AGENT_TEAM_GH_APP_ID=...'              >> ~/secrev.env   # the App's numeric app_id
-echo 'AGENT_TEAM_GH_APP_INSTALLATION_ID=...' >> ~/secrev.env   # installation id on Sea-Haven-Industries/orchestrator
+echo 'AGENT_TEAM_GH_APP_ID=4119505'              >> ~/secrev.env
+echo 'AGENT_TEAM_GH_APP_INSTALLATION_ID=141992144' >> ~/secrev.env
 echo 'AGENT_TEAM_GH_APP_PRIVATE_KEY=/home/adam/.sea-haven/agent-team-apply.pem' >> ~/secrev.env   # PATH to the .pem
 chmod 600 ~/secrev.env
 ```
 
 Place the App private key on the box and lock it down — it is a write-capable
-credential and must be owner-only:
+credential and must be owner-only. The CI-side Actions secret
+`AGENT_APPLY_APP_PRIVATE_KEY` is write-only and cannot be re-exported, so the
+box gets its OWN freshly-generated private key for the same App (generate one
+under the App settings — the App holds several keys; the CI key keeps working).
+Secure-copy it from the Mac (do NOT commit it; it is not in the repo):
 
 ```
-install -m 600 /dev/stdin ~/.sea-haven/agent-team-apply.pem < the-downloaded-key.pem
-chmod 600 ~/.sea-haven/agent-team-apply.pem && ls -l ~/.sea-haven/agent-team-apply.pem   # expect -rw-------
+# From the Mac (the key lives in ~/Downloads after generation):
+scp ~/Downloads/agent-team-apply.*.private-key.pem adam@10.10.60.120:~/.sea-haven/agent-team-apply.pem
+# On the box:
+chmod 700 ~/.sea-haven && chmod 600 ~/.sea-haven/agent-team-apply.pem
+ls -l ~/.sea-haven/agent-team-apply.pem   # expect -rw-------
+# Then DELETE the Mac copy (the box now holds the only working copy):
+#   rm ~/Downloads/agent-team-apply.*.private-key.pem
 ```
 
 - `AGENT_TEAM_GH_APP_PRIVATE_KEY` is a **filesystem path** to the `.pem`, not the
   key material. The coordinator reads the file at graph-build time; an unreadable
   path logs one warning and falls back to gh-default (never crashes).
-- **App permission/scope audit (do before deploy).** The App (currently the
-  reused **`agent-team-apply`** App) must be installed on **only**
-  `Sea-Haven-Industries/orchestrator` with **Contents: Read/Write** + **Actions:
-  Read/Write** and nothing broader. Minting an installation token grants exactly
-  the App's scopes; over-broad scopes widen blast radius. (Follow-up: move to a
-  dedicated least-privilege App to replace `agent-team-apply`.)
+- **App permission/scope (verified 2026-06-24).** A test mint of an installation
+  token for app `4119505` / install `141992144` returned
+  `{"actions":"write","contents":"write","metadata":"read","pull_requests":"write"}`
+  with `repository_selection: selected` — i.e. Contents R/W + Actions R/W are in
+  place and the install is scoped to selected repos (not all). Minting grants
+  exactly the App's scopes; keep it scoped to `Sea-Haven-Industries/orchestrator`
+  only. (Follow-up: move to a dedicated least-privilege App to replace
+  `agent-team-apply`, dropping `pull_requests:write` which the box path does not
+  need.)
 - The minted token is short-lived (~1h), is **never** logged, never put in an
   exception message, and never written to the ledger/graph state; on the
   authenticated push it rides in a host-scoped `http.extraHeader` passed via