Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""``run-team.py`` — R720 agent-team operator entry CLI (design §3.3.1, §7.1 P1).
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This is the **entry CLI** named in the design (§2 "entry CLI ``run-team.py``";
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§9 "operator CLI"). It is the small manual path over the durable
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``pending_questions`` ledger that §3.3.1 ("Manual path") requires::
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A small CLI over the ledger lets an operator list ``open``/``parked``
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questions, re-deliver, force-expire, or answer on a task's behalf; a stuck
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task parks rather than spins. Destructive CLI actions (force-expire,
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answer-on-behalf, force-resume) are audit-logged and require an explicit
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confirmation flag.
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It imports the committed FOUNDATION contracts verbatim — it does not redefine
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them:
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* :mod:`agent_team.db.schema` — :func:`connect`, :func:`init_db`,
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:func:`answer_question`, :func:`expire_question`, :func:`supersede_question`,
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:data:`QUESTION_STATES`.
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* :mod:`agent_team.state_store` — :func:`atomic_write` for the append-only,
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crash-safe audit log of destructive actions (§6.7 discipline).
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Per the build constraints this is **pre-deployment scaffolding**: it provisions
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nothing, enables no live CI, and performs no network or rsync. It only reads and
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mutates the local SQLite ledger and writes a local audit log.
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Subcommands (P1 surface):
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* ``init-db`` — create/upgrade the agent-team tables in the ledger DB
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(idempotent; wraps :func:`init_db`).
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* ``list`` — list ``open`` (default) or any-status pending questions; with
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``--parked`` it lists questions whose status is read as parked context. Pure
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read; no confirmation needed.
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* ``show`` — print one question row by ``question_id``. Pure read.
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* ``expire`` — force-expire an ``open`` question (DESTRUCTIVE: requires
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``--confirm``; audit-logged). Maps to :func:`expire_question`.
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* ``answer`` — answer a question on a task's behalf (DESTRUCTIVE: requires
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``--confirm``; audit-logged). Maps to :func:`answer_question`.
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* ``supersede`` — mark a stale question ``superseded`` (DESTRUCTIVE: requires
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``--confirm``; audit-logged). Maps to :func:`supersede_question`.
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2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
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* ``intake-github`` — poll a repo for labeled open issues and start one pipeline
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task per not-yet-ingested issue (one pass). Reads issues + calls the committed
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coordinator intake entry only; no CI, OIDC, or git/patch apply. Opt-in/inert.
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2026-06-18 15:56:52 -04:00
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* ``intake-checker`` — the Plane-1 -> Plane-2 cross-plane loop (P5): read one or
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more checker report JSON files / a dir, select CONFIRMED findings at/above a
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severity threshold (default ``high``), de-dup, and start one remediation task
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per unique finding via the committed coordinator intake entry. Reads local
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report JSON only; no CI, OIDC, network, or git/patch apply. Opt-in/inert.
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feat(agent-team): Plane-1 fixer — finding→patch→CI draft-PR (dep-bumps, opt-in/inert) (#21)
* feat(agent-team): Plane-1 Tier-3 fixer — dependency-cve finding -> patch + CI dispatch (opt-in/inert)
The fixer (design §4 fixer row, §7 Phase 5, §3.3.2) takes a CONFIRMED,
low-risk dependency-cve finding (the narrowest fix class) and produces:
* a fix SPEC (Claude, via the §3.1 billing seam), and
* a minimal bump PATCH (DeepSeek fast_coder, via the orchestrator run.py
path that builders_llm uses),
records the candidate diff + its content-hash, and emits the org-CI
workflow_dispatch inputs (task_id / diff_artifact_name / expected_diff_hash /
declared_scope) for the gate-passed P3-live apply/verify surface.
INERT / opt-in / fail-safe, mirroring build_verify_wiring:
* plan_fix dispatches NOTHING; dispatch_fix has NO default dispatcher
(the box holds no write token, D2) so an un-wired call can never fire a
workflow.
* no git/patch/subprocess/fs-write in executable code — the patch is emitted
as diff TEXT only; CI applies it and opens a DRAFT PR, the box never
applies/pushes/merges.
* untrusted-patch hygiene: the generated diff is confined box-side to the
single dependency manifest (declared_scope) and rejected via
ci_gate.denylist_violations if it escapes scope or touches the
trust-control surface — defense-in-depth with the CI guard.
* bad/ambiguous findings (wrong check/status/category, missing
package/fixed_version, ambiguous fixed_version, unparseable/empty diff)
yield a FAILED no-op plan, never a fabricated fix.
29 new pytest tests under agent-team/tests/test_fixer.py.
* feat(agent-team): run-team.py 'fix --dry-run' subcommand for the Plane-1 fixer
Adds the fixer front door to the operator CLI: load one confirmed
dependency-cve finding from a dependency-cve.json report (--report
--finding-id), plan the fix, and in --dry-run print the spec + patch + the
org-CI workflow_dispatch inputs WITHOUT dispatching anything.
Opt-in/inert: the command binds NO workflow dispatcher and holds no write
token, so even an ok plan only prints; live dispatch is provisioning-gated
(refuses to run without --dry-run). A non-fixable finding prints the
fail-safe reason and exits 1.
4 new pytest tests under agent-team/tests/test_run_team.py.
2026-06-18 16:17:33 -04:00
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* ``fix`` — plan a Plane-1 Tier-3 dep-bump fix for one confirmed dependency-cve
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finding (spec via Claude + minimal bump patch via DeepSeek) and, in
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``--dry-run``, print the spec + patch + the org-CI ``workflow_dispatch`` inputs
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WITHOUT dispatching. Opt-in/inert: it binds no dispatcher and holds no write
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token; live dispatch is provisioning-gated (the P3-live apply/verify surface).
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Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
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Exit codes: ``0`` success, ``1`` operational failure (e.g. row not found, the
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compare-and-set lost the race), ``2`` usage error (argparse).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import argparse
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Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
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import getpass
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Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
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import json
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2026-06-23 14:17:08 -04:00
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import logging
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Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
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import os
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Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
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import sqlite3
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import sys
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from pathlib import Path
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2026-06-23 12:38:43 -04:00
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from typing import Any, Callable, Sequence
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Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
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# ``run-team.py`` lives in ``agent-team/`` next to the importable ``agent_team``
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# package. The hyphenated filename cannot itself be imported, so when run as a
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# script we make the sibling package importable without an editable install
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# (mirrors tests/conftest.py).
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_CLI_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
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if str(_CLI_DIR) not in sys.path:
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sys.path.insert(0, str(_CLI_DIR))
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from agent_team.db.schema import ( # noqa: E402 (path bootstrap must precede)
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QUESTION_STATES,
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answer_question,
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connect,
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expire_question,
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init_db,
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Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
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|
reopen_question,
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
supersede_question,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
from agent_team.transport.base import Transport # noqa: E402 (path bootstrap)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
# Transport choices the start/serve/intake commands accept (§3.3.1 D10). All
|
|
|
|
|
# three now have a live human-gate adapter wired in _build_transport: ``slack``
|
|
|
|
|
# (slack_sdk), ``github`` (requests issue/PR comment), and ``claude_code`` (local
|
|
|
|
|
# file drop). Each builder defers its optional SDK / token resolution to call
|
|
|
|
|
# time, so a missing dep/credential fails loudly only when that transport is
|
|
|
|
|
# actually selected.
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
_TRANSPORT_CHOICES: tuple[str, ...] = ("slack", "github", "claude_code")
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__all__ = [
|
|
|
|
|
"build_parser",
|
|
|
|
|
"main",
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Default ledger DB location. Kept out of the repo (the package .gitignore
|
|
|
|
|
# excludes ``state/`` and ``*.sqlite``) so durable state is never committed.
|
|
|
|
|
_DEFAULT_DB = _CLI_DIR / "state" / "agent_team.sqlite"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Default audit log for destructive actions, alongside the ledger DB.
|
|
|
|
|
_DEFAULT_AUDIT_LOG = _CLI_DIR / "state" / "audit.log.jsonl"
|
2026-06-23 14:17:08 -04:00
|
|
|
_LOG = logging.getLogger("agent_team.run_team")
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Columns selected for list/show rendering, in display order.
|
|
|
|
|
_QUESTION_COLUMNS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
|
|
|
|
"question_id",
|
|
|
|
|
"thread_id",
|
|
|
|
|
"turn",
|
|
|
|
|
"status",
|
|
|
|
|
"transport",
|
|
|
|
|
"channel_ref",
|
|
|
|
|
"posted_at",
|
|
|
|
|
"deadline_at",
|
|
|
|
|
"answered_at",
|
|
|
|
|
"answered_via",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Destructive subcommands that require ``--confirm`` and are audit-logged.
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
# ``force-resume`` is the design-named operator verb (§3.3.1/§6.6); ``supersede``
|
|
|
|
|
# is kept as its lower-level alias. ``redeliver`` is NOT here — it is idempotent
|
|
|
|
|
# and non-destructive (it only clears a delivery ref), though it is still
|
|
|
|
|
# audit-logged for provenance.
|
|
|
|
|
_DESTRUCTIVE_ACTIONS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
|
|
|
|
|
{"expire", "answer", "supersede", "force-resume"}
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _utc_now_iso() -> str:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Return the current UTC time as an ISO-8601 string (audit timestamps)."""
|
|
|
|
|
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
def _default_operator() -> str:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Best-effort OS login for audit attribution (never an empty string).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A previous empty default left destructive actions non-attributable (the
|
|
|
|
|
audit record named no one). Defaulting to the OS login keeps the §3.3.1
|
|
|
|
|
"audit-logged AND attributable" guarantee even when --operator is omitted;
|
|
|
|
|
falls back to "unknown" only if the login cannot be resolved.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
user = getpass.getuser()
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - getuser can raise on odd environments
|
|
|
|
|
return "unknown"
|
|
|
|
|
return user or "unknown"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
def _row_to_dict(row: sqlite3.Row) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Project a ``pending_questions`` row to a plain dict for display."""
|
|
|
|
|
return {col: row[col] for col in _QUESTION_COLUMNS if col in row.keys()}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _append_audit(audit_log: Path, entry: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
"""Append one JSON audit record with an atomic ``O_APPEND`` single write.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Destructive actions (§3.3.1) must leave an attributable trail. A previous
|
|
|
|
|
read-modify-rewrite design lost records under concurrent operators (two
|
|
|
|
|
processes each read the same bytes and the last rewrite wins). Instead each
|
|
|
|
|
record is one line written with ``O_APPEND``: the kernel serializes the
|
|
|
|
|
append and a write below ``PIPE_BUF`` is atomic on POSIX, so concurrent
|
|
|
|
|
appends never clobber each other. The file is created mode ``0600``
|
|
|
|
|
(operator identity / action content is sensitive) and re-chmod'd in case it
|
|
|
|
|
pre-existed wider. A failure here raises ``OSError`` BEFORE any ledger
|
|
|
|
|
mutation, preserving the audit-before-mutate guarantee.
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
audit_log = Path(audit_log)
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
audit_log.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
|
|
|
|
line = (json.dumps(entry, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
|
|
|
|
|
fd = os.open(str(audit_log), os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_APPEND, 0o600)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
os.write(fd, line)
|
|
|
|
|
finally:
|
|
|
|
|
os.close(fd)
|
|
|
|
|
os.chmod(audit_log, 0o600)
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
def _audit_attempt(
|
|
|
|
|
audit_log: Path,
|
|
|
|
|
action: str,
|
|
|
|
|
*,
|
|
|
|
|
question_id: str,
|
|
|
|
|
operator: str,
|
|
|
|
|
detail: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Record the *intent* to perform a destructive action BEFORE it mutates.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
§3.3.1 requires every destructive action to be audit-logged. Writing the
|
|
|
|
|
attempt before the ledger mutation closes the "mutation applied with no
|
|
|
|
|
audit record" gap: if this append fails (e.g. an unwritable audit path) it
|
|
|
|
|
raises before any ledger row is touched, so the action aborts cleanly with
|
|
|
|
|
nothing changed. The matching :func:`_audit_outcome` records what happened.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
_append_audit(
|
|
|
|
|
audit_log,
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
"ts": _utc_now_iso(),
|
|
|
|
|
"action": action,
|
|
|
|
|
"phase": "attempt",
|
|
|
|
|
"question_id": question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
"operator": operator,
|
|
|
|
|
**(detail or {}),
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _audit_outcome(
|
|
|
|
|
audit_log: Path,
|
|
|
|
|
action: str,
|
|
|
|
|
*,
|
|
|
|
|
question_id: str,
|
|
|
|
|
operator: str,
|
|
|
|
|
applied: bool,
|
|
|
|
|
detail: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Record the *result* of a destructive action AFTER it ran.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Carries ``applied`` (did the compare-and-set change a row). Pairs with the
|
|
|
|
|
:func:`_audit_attempt` record written before the mutation, so even if this
|
|
|
|
|
outcome append fails the attempt already proves the action was made.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
_append_audit(
|
|
|
|
|
audit_log,
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
"ts": _utc_now_iso(),
|
|
|
|
|
"action": action,
|
|
|
|
|
"phase": "outcome",
|
|
|
|
|
"question_id": question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
"operator": operator,
|
|
|
|
|
"applied": applied,
|
|
|
|
|
**(detail or {}),
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
def _require_confirm(action: str, *, confirm: bool) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Raise unless a destructive ``action`` was explicitly confirmed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mirrors the §3.3.1 rule: force-expire, answer-on-behalf, and force-resume
|
|
|
|
|
are audit-logged AND require an explicit confirmation flag. Failing closed
|
|
|
|
|
here means a typo can never silently mutate a live task's ledger row.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
if action in _DESTRUCTIVE_ACTIONS and not confirm:
|
|
|
|
|
raise PermissionError(
|
|
|
|
|
f"refusing destructive action '{action}' without --confirm "
|
|
|
|
|
f"(force-expire / answer-on-behalf / supersede are gated, §3.3.1)"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _fetch_question(conn: sqlite3.Connection, question_id: str) -> sqlite3.Row | None:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Return the ledger row for ``question_id`` or ``None`` if absent."""
|
|
|
|
|
return conn.execute(
|
|
|
|
|
"SELECT * FROM pending_questions WHERE question_id = ?",
|
|
|
|
|
(question_id,),
|
|
|
|
|
).fetchone()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
|
|
|
|
# Subcommand handlers. Each returns a process exit code (0 ok, 1 op failure).
|
|
|
|
|
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cmd_init_db(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Create/upgrade the agent-team tables (idempotent)."""
|
|
|
|
|
init_db(args.db)
|
|
|
|
|
print(f"initialized ledger DB at {args.db}", file=out)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cmd_list(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""List pending questions, optionally filtered by status.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Default lists ``open`` questions (the operator's "what is waiting" view).
|
|
|
|
|
``--status STATE`` narrows to one lifecycle state; ``--all`` lists every
|
|
|
|
|
state. ``--parked`` is a convenience alias that surfaces the parked-task
|
|
|
|
|
context an operator chases: questions that are no longer ``open`` (answered
|
|
|
|
|
but never resumed, expired, or superseded) and so may back a parked task.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
conn = connect(args.db)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
if args.all:
|
|
|
|
|
rows = conn.execute(
|
|
|
|
|
"SELECT * FROM pending_questions ORDER BY thread_id, turn"
|
|
|
|
|
).fetchall()
|
|
|
|
|
elif args.parked:
|
|
|
|
|
placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in _PARKED_STATES)
|
|
|
|
|
rows = conn.execute(
|
|
|
|
|
f"SELECT * FROM pending_questions WHERE status IN ({placeholders}) "
|
|
|
|
|
"ORDER BY thread_id, turn",
|
|
|
|
|
tuple(_PARKED_STATES),
|
|
|
|
|
).fetchall()
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
rows = conn.execute(
|
|
|
|
|
"SELECT * FROM pending_questions WHERE status = ? "
|
|
|
|
|
"ORDER BY thread_id, turn",
|
|
|
|
|
(args.status,),
|
|
|
|
|
).fetchall()
|
|
|
|
|
finally:
|
|
|
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
payload = [_row_to_dict(row) for row in rows]
|
|
|
|
|
print(json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True), file=out)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cmd_show(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Print one question row by ``question_id`` (pure read)."""
|
|
|
|
|
conn = connect(args.db)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
row = _fetch_question(conn, args.question_id)
|
|
|
|
|
finally:
|
|
|
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
if row is None:
|
|
|
|
|
print(f"no such question: {args.question_id}", file=sys.stderr)
|
|
|
|
|
return 1
|
|
|
|
|
print(json.dumps(_row_to_dict(row), indent=2, sort_keys=True), file=out)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cmd_expire(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
"""Force-expire an ``open`` question (destructive; audit-logged).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Audits the attempt BEFORE mutating so a mutation can never land without a
|
|
|
|
|
trail (§3.3.1); records the outcome after.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
_require_confirm("expire", confirm=args.confirm)
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
_audit_attempt(
|
|
|
|
|
args.audit_log, "expire", question_id=args.question_id, operator=args.operator
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
conn = connect(args.db)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
changed = expire_question(conn, question_id=args.question_id)
|
|
|
|
|
finally:
|
|
|
|
|
conn.close()
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
_audit_outcome(
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
args.audit_log,
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
"expire",
|
|
|
|
|
question_id=args.question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
operator=args.operator,
|
|
|
|
|
applied=changed,
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
if not changed:
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
f"expire no-op: question {args.question_id} was not 'open' "
|
|
|
|
|
"(already answered/expired/superseded or absent)",
|
|
|
|
|
file=sys.stderr,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return 1
|
|
|
|
|
print(f"expired question {args.question_id}", file=out)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
def _cmd_redeliver(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Clear an ``open`` question's ``channel_ref`` so it is re-posted (§3.3.1).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The design's "re-deliver" operator action. Re-delivery itself is performed
|
|
|
|
|
by the transport reconcile loop; clearing ``channel_ref`` makes that loop
|
|
|
|
|
re-post and record a fresh ref. Idempotent and non-destructive (the question
|
|
|
|
|
stays ``open``), so it needs no ``--confirm`` — but it is audit-logged for
|
|
|
|
|
provenance. Returns ``1`` if the question is absent or not ``open``.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
_audit_attempt(
|
|
|
|
|
args.audit_log,
|
|
|
|
|
"redeliver",
|
|
|
|
|
question_id=args.question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
operator=args.operator,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
conn = connect(args.db)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
row = _fetch_question(conn, args.question_id)
|
|
|
|
|
if row is None:
|
|
|
|
|
applied = False
|
|
|
|
|
prior_ref = None
|
|
|
|
|
status = None
|
|
|
|
|
elif row["status"] != "open":
|
|
|
|
|
applied = False
|
|
|
|
|
prior_ref = row["channel_ref"]
|
|
|
|
|
status = row["status"]
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
prior_ref = row["channel_ref"]
|
|
|
|
|
status = "open"
|
|
|
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
|
|
|
"UPDATE pending_questions SET channel_ref=NULL WHERE question_id=?",
|
|
|
|
|
(args.question_id,),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
applied = True
|
|
|
|
|
finally:
|
|
|
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
_audit_outcome(
|
|
|
|
|
args.audit_log,
|
|
|
|
|
"redeliver",
|
|
|
|
|
question_id=args.question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
operator=args.operator,
|
|
|
|
|
applied=applied,
|
|
|
|
|
detail={"prior_channel_ref": prior_ref},
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
if not applied:
|
|
|
|
|
reason = "absent" if status is None else f"status={status}, not open"
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
f"redeliver no-op: question {args.question_id} ({reason}); "
|
|
|
|
|
"nothing to re-post",
|
|
|
|
|
file=sys.stderr,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return 1
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
f"cleared channel_ref for {args.question_id}; reconcile loop will re-post",
|
|
|
|
|
file=out,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
def _cmd_answer(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Answer a question on a task's behalf (destructive; audit-logged).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Uses the foundation first-answer-wins compare-and-set: succeeds only if the
|
|
|
|
|
question is still ``open``. ``--answer`` is stored verbatim as the answer
|
|
|
|
|
payload string; ``--via`` records the answering identity for the audit
|
|
|
|
|
trail. The audit log records the operator regardless of outcome.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
_require_confirm("answer", confirm=args.confirm)
|
|
|
|
|
via = args.via or f"cli:{args.operator}"
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
_audit_attempt(
|
|
|
|
|
args.audit_log,
|
|
|
|
|
"answer",
|
|
|
|
|
question_id=args.question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
operator=args.operator,
|
|
|
|
|
detail={"answered_via": via},
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
conn = connect(args.db)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
changed = answer_question(
|
|
|
|
|
conn,
|
|
|
|
|
question_id=args.question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
answer_json=args.answer,
|
|
|
|
|
answered_via=via,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
finally:
|
|
|
|
|
conn.close()
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
_audit_outcome(
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
args.audit_log,
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
"answer",
|
|
|
|
|
question_id=args.question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
operator=args.operator,
|
|
|
|
|
applied=changed,
|
|
|
|
|
detail={"answered_via": via},
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
if not changed:
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
f"answer no-op: question {args.question_id} was not 'open' "
|
|
|
|
|
"(already answered/expired/superseded or absent)",
|
|
|
|
|
file=sys.stderr,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return 1
|
|
|
|
|
print(f"answered question {args.question_id} (via {via})", file=out)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cmd_supersede(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
"""Mark a stale ``open``/``answered`` question ``superseded`` (destructive)."""
|
|
|
|
|
_require_confirm("supersede", confirm=args.confirm)
|
|
|
|
|
_audit_attempt(
|
|
|
|
|
args.audit_log,
|
|
|
|
|
"supersede",
|
|
|
|
|
question_id=args.question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
operator=args.operator,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
conn = connect(args.db)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
changed = supersede_question(conn, question_id=args.question_id)
|
|
|
|
|
finally:
|
|
|
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
_audit_outcome(
|
|
|
|
|
args.audit_log,
|
|
|
|
|
"supersede",
|
|
|
|
|
question_id=args.question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
operator=args.operator,
|
|
|
|
|
applied=changed,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
if not changed:
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
f"supersede no-op: question {args.question_id} was not "
|
|
|
|
|
"'open'/'answered' (already expired/superseded or absent)",
|
|
|
|
|
file=sys.stderr,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return 1
|
|
|
|
|
print(f"superseded question {args.question_id}", file=out)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-23 12:38:43 -04:00
|
|
|
def _build_context_provider() -> "Callable[[], str]":
|
|
|
|
|
"""Return the WS5 (D10) context provider: the Sea Haven handbook conventions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The ``context_provider`` seam is zero-arg (``Callable[[], str]``), so it
|
|
|
|
|
supplies STATIC context — the handbook conventions loaded from
|
|
|
|
|
``SEA_HAVEN_HANDBOOK_DIR`` (or the default dir) via
|
|
|
|
|
:func:`agent_team.nodes.handbook.load_handbook_conventions`. That loader is
|
|
|
|
|
itself fail-safe (caps file count/size; returns ``""`` and never raises when
|
|
|
|
|
the dir is absent/empty/unreadable), so wiring it is safe even on a box where
|
|
|
|
|
the handbook has not been synced yet.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(Task-keyed memory retrieval is NOT wired here: the seam takes no task text,
|
|
|
|
|
so it cannot form a retrieval query — that would need a task-aware seam.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Imported lazily for the same import-hygiene reason as the coordinator
|
|
|
|
|
factories (keeps ``--help`` / ledger commands import-clean).
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.nodes.handbook import load_handbook_conventions
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return load_handbook_conventions
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-23 14:17:08 -04:00
|
|
|
def _build_notifiers(
|
|
|
|
|
args: argparse.Namespace,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> "tuple[Callable[[str], None] | None, Callable[[str], None] | None]":
|
|
|
|
|
"""Build the (notify, alarm_hook) Slack notifiers for the coordinator.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Returns ``(None, None)`` for dry-run / non-Slack / no-channel so import,
|
|
|
|
|
``--help``, ledger commands, and token-less dry runs stay silent and need no
|
|
|
|
|
Slack credentials. For live Slack with ``SLACK_CHANNEL_ID`` set, ``notify``
|
|
|
|
|
posts a plain status line to the channel (via the same ``build_slack_poster``
|
|
|
|
|
the transport uses), and ``alarm_hook`` logs the deadline-park WARNING AND
|
|
|
|
|
posts a parked-task notice. Both are best-effort — the coordinator wraps the
|
|
|
|
|
notify sink so a Slack failure never disturbs the pipeline.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
if getattr(args, "dry_run", False) or args.transport != "slack":
|
|
|
|
|
return None, None
|
|
|
|
|
channel = os.environ.get("SLACK_CHANNEL_ID", "")
|
|
|
|
|
if not channel:
|
|
|
|
|
return None, None
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.transport.slack_live import build_slack_poster
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
poster = build_slack_poster()
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - no token / SDK -> run without notifications
|
|
|
|
|
_LOG.warning(
|
|
|
|
|
"Slack notifier unavailable; coordinator runs without notifications"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return None, None
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-23 16:42:27 -04:00
|
|
|
def notify(message: str, thread_ts: str | None = None) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
# `thread_ts` is the one-thread-per-task root ts: the coordinator's
|
|
|
|
|
# `_emit` passes it so lifecycle milestones (plan-ready / parked /
|
|
|
|
|
# failed) thread under the task's "📥 Task received" root. Without this
|
|
|
|
|
# param `_emit` hit a TypeError and silently fell back to a TOP-LEVEL
|
|
|
|
|
# post, so every milestone landed unthreaded. build_slack_poster already
|
|
|
|
|
# forwards a `thread_ts` payload key to chat.postMessage.
|
|
|
|
|
payload = {"channel": channel, "text": message}
|
|
|
|
|
if thread_ts:
|
|
|
|
|
payload["thread_ts"] = thread_ts
|
|
|
|
|
poster(payload)
|
2026-06-23 14:17:08 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def alarm_hook(question_id: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
_LOG.warning("park ALARM: clarifier question %s expired", question_id)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
notify(
|
|
|
|
|
f"⚠️ Task parked: clarifier question {question_id[:8]} expired with "
|
|
|
|
|
"no answer in the window. Re-assign or answer to resume."
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - notify failure must not break the park path
|
|
|
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return notify, alarm_hook
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-23 19:06:08 -04:00
|
|
|
# The branch namespace the dispatcher pushes its apply/verify draft PRs under
|
|
|
|
|
# (see :func:`agent_team.dispatcher.apply_branch_name` -> ``agent-team/apply/``).
|
|
|
|
|
# The runaway/stale monitor is scoped to THIS namespace so it only ever surfaces
|
|
|
|
|
# agent-team's own draft PRs, never an unrelated human draft PR in the repo.
|
|
|
|
|
_DRAFT_PR_HEAD_PREFIX = "agent-team/apply/"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# gh's draft-PR enumeration must never block the daemon's tick() loop. A read-only
|
|
|
|
|
# ``gh pr list`` is one GET; bound it so a hung gh invocation parks the sweep
|
|
|
|
|
# rather than the whole coordinator.
|
|
|
|
|
_DRAFT_PR_LIST_TIMEOUT_S = 30
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _default_draft_pr_provider(*, owner: str, repo: str) -> "Callable[[], list[Any]]":
|
|
|
|
|
"""Build the production READ-ONLY draft-PR provider for the A4 monitor.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Returns a zero-arg callable that enumerates the currently-open *agent-team*
|
|
|
|
|
draft PRs via a single read-only ``gh pr list`` (one GET; it NEVER writes,
|
|
|
|
|
closes, or dispatches anything) and maps each into a
|
|
|
|
|
:class:`agent_team.draft_pr_monitor.DraftPr` snapshot the monitor consumes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The query is scoped to the ``agent-team/apply/`` head namespace
|
|
|
|
|
(:data:`_DRAFT_PR_HEAD_PREFIX`) so it only ever sees the dispatcher's own
|
|
|
|
|
apply/verify draft PRs — never an unrelated human draft PR. ``--json`` pulls
|
|
|
|
|
exactly the three fields the monitor keys off (``number`` / ``createdAt`` ->
|
|
|
|
|
``opened_at`` for the runaway window, ``updatedAt`` -> ``updated_at`` for
|
|
|
|
|
staleness).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mirrors :func:`agent_team.ci_watcher.default_ci_poller`: a thin closure over
|
|
|
|
|
``owner`` / ``repo`` that fails closed — a non-zero ``gh`` exit, a timeout, or
|
|
|
|
|
unparseable JSON yields an empty snapshot (the monitor then no-ops this pass)
|
|
|
|
|
rather than raising, so a transient gh hiccup never breaks the tick loop. (The
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator's ``_draft_pr_monitor_sweep`` ALSO swallows provider errors, so
|
|
|
|
|
this is belt-and-suspenders.)
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
repo_slug = f"{owner}/{repo}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def provider() -> list[Any]:
|
|
|
|
|
import json as _json
|
|
|
|
|
import subprocess # noqa: PLC0415 - deferred so import needs no gh
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.draft_pr_monitor import DraftPr # noqa: PLC0415
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
proc = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - args are a fixed, non-shell list
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
"gh",
|
|
|
|
|
"pr",
|
|
|
|
|
"list",
|
|
|
|
|
"--repo",
|
|
|
|
|
repo_slug,
|
|
|
|
|
"--draft",
|
|
|
|
|
"--state",
|
|
|
|
|
"open",
|
|
|
|
|
"--search",
|
|
|
|
|
f"head:{_DRAFT_PR_HEAD_PREFIX}",
|
|
|
|
|
"--json",
|
|
|
|
|
"number,createdAt,updatedAt",
|
|
|
|
|
"--limit",
|
|
|
|
|
"100",
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
check=True,
|
|
|
|
|
capture_output=True,
|
|
|
|
|
text=True,
|
|
|
|
|
timeout=_DRAFT_PR_LIST_TIMEOUT_S,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
except (
|
|
|
|
|
subprocess.CalledProcessError,
|
|
|
|
|
subprocess.TimeoutExpired,
|
|
|
|
|
OSError,
|
|
|
|
|
):
|
|
|
|
|
_LOG.warning(
|
|
|
|
|
"draft-pr-monitor: read-only `gh pr list` enumeration failed; "
|
|
|
|
|
"treating as no open draft PRs this pass",
|
|
|
|
|
exc_info=True,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return []
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
rows = _json.loads(proc.stdout or "[]")
|
|
|
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
|
|
|
_LOG.warning(
|
|
|
|
|
"draft-pr-monitor: `gh pr list` returned unparseable JSON; "
|
|
|
|
|
"treating as no open draft PRs this pass",
|
|
|
|
|
exc_info=True,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return []
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
snapshots: list[Any] = []
|
|
|
|
|
for row in rows:
|
|
|
|
|
number = row.get("number")
|
|
|
|
|
if number is None:
|
|
|
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
|
snapshots.append(
|
|
|
|
|
DraftPr(
|
|
|
|
|
number=int(number),
|
|
|
|
|
opened_at=row.get("createdAt"),
|
|
|
|
|
updated_at=row.get("updatedAt"),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return snapshots
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return provider
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
def _build_coordinator(args: argparse.Namespace) -> Any:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Construct a :class:`Coordinator` for the ``start`` / ``serve`` commands.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The live transport is built LAZILY here (never at import) so ``run-team.py``
|
|
|
|
|
imports, ``--help``, and the ledger subcommands all work with no Slack token
|
|
|
|
|
present. ``--dry-run`` substitutes a non-posting transport so an operator can
|
|
|
|
|
drive intake without a token (the ledger row is still written; only the
|
|
|
|
|
transport post is a no-op).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The coordinator is imported inside this function for the same reason: pulling
|
|
|
|
|
in the live runtime (and its optional SDK-adjacent deps) must not happen just
|
|
|
|
|
to render ``--help`` or run a read-only ledger command.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.coordinator import (
|
|
|
|
|
Coordinator,
|
2026-06-23 13:30:13 -04:00
|
|
|
default_clarify_node_factory,
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
default_plan_node_factory,
|
|
|
|
|
default_review_wiring,
|
2026-06-23 17:51:58 -04:00
|
|
|
failsafe_production_p3_wiring,
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
transport = _build_transport(args)
|
2026-06-23 13:30:13 -04:00
|
|
|
# WS5 (D10): inject the Sea Haven handbook conventions into BOTH the clarifier
|
|
|
|
|
# and the planner prompts via the context_provider seam. The provider is the
|
|
|
|
|
# zero-arg handbook loader, which is itself fail-safe (returns "" when the
|
|
|
|
|
# handbook dir is absent), and the clarifier/planner additionally swallow
|
|
|
|
|
# provider errors — so this never affects a run where the handbook is
|
|
|
|
|
# unavailable.
|
2026-06-23 12:38:43 -04:00
|
|
|
context_provider = _build_context_provider()
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-23 14:17:08 -04:00
|
|
|
# Lifecycle notifications: post plain status lines to the Slack channel so a
|
|
|
|
|
# task is never a black box (parked / needs-more-input / plan-ready, and
|
|
|
|
|
# deadline-park ALARMs). Live-Slack only; dry-run / non-Slack / no-channel =
|
|
|
|
|
# silent (notify None) so import + ledger commands need no token.
|
|
|
|
|
notify, alarm_hook = _build_notifiers(args)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-23 17:51:58 -04:00
|
|
|
# P3 fail-safe serve default (design Decision 5): the bound build→verify +
|
|
|
|
|
# dispatch wiring is now the production ``serve`` default, but it must NEVER
|
|
|
|
|
# crash-loop serve-start. ``failsafe_production_p3_wiring`` resolves the env
|
|
|
|
|
# ONCE: configured -> the live P3 pair; unconfigured -> (None, None) inert (a
|
|
|
|
|
# task reaching P3 parks), with one WARNING + one #agent-team inert notice
|
|
|
|
|
# via the lifecycle ``notify`` sink. Scoped to ``serve`` (the daemon): the
|
|
|
|
|
# one-shot ``start`` / ``intake-*`` paths never auto-bind P3 — they run to the
|
|
|
|
|
# first human gate and exit, well short of BUILD/VERIFY.
|
|
|
|
|
build_verify_wiring = None
|
|
|
|
|
dispatch_node_wiring = None
|
|
|
|
|
if getattr(args, "command", None) == "serve":
|
|
|
|
|
build_verify_wiring, dispatch_node_wiring = failsafe_production_p3_wiring(
|
|
|
|
|
notify=notify
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-23 18:13:18 -04:00
|
|
|
# CI-watcher seams (design §4 Decision 2 — async resume-on-CI-complete). ONLY
|
|
|
|
|
# wired when ``failsafe_production_p3_wiring`` returned a LIVE pair (a
|
|
|
|
|
# configured box): on the inert/unconfigured box both stay None, so the
|
|
|
|
|
# tick() CI sweep is a NO-OP and there is no behaviour change. The poller is
|
|
|
|
|
# the read-only default (one GET per run, never a write); the provider is the
|
|
|
|
|
# durable enumerator bound to THIS coordinator below (post-construction, so it
|
|
|
|
|
# can close over the just-built coordinator); the timeout is a sane default
|
|
|
|
|
# (30 min — generous headroom over the ~7-min CI run before a stuck run
|
|
|
|
|
# parks). Without these, a task that dispatches and suspends at VERIFY would
|
|
|
|
|
# wait forever — the async-resume gap this closes.
|
|
|
|
|
ci_poller = None
|
|
|
|
|
ci_timeout = None
|
|
|
|
|
if build_verify_wiring is not None and dispatch_node_wiring is not None:
|
|
|
|
|
from datetime import timedelta
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.ci_watcher import default_ci_poller
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
owner = os.environ.get("AGENT_TEAM_REPO_OWNER", "").strip()
|
|
|
|
|
repo = os.environ.get("AGENT_TEAM_REPO_NAME", "").strip()
|
|
|
|
|
ci_poller = default_ci_poller(owner=owner, repo=repo)
|
|
|
|
|
ci_timeout = timedelta(minutes=30)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
# Production runs the full P2 graph: the wrapped real planner + the bound
|
|
|
|
|
# GPT-4.1 review loop (Plane-2 depth-first). These factories are lazy and
|
|
|
|
|
# only build/bind the model seams when a task actually runs.
|
2026-06-23 12:38:43 -04:00
|
|
|
coordinator = Coordinator(
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
db_path=args.db,
|
|
|
|
|
transport=transport,
|
2026-06-23 13:30:13 -04:00
|
|
|
build_clarify_node=lambda: default_clarify_node_factory(
|
|
|
|
|
context_provider=context_provider
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
2026-06-23 12:38:43 -04:00
|
|
|
build_plan_node=lambda: default_plan_node_factory(
|
|
|
|
|
context_provider=context_provider
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
review_wiring=default_review_wiring,
|
2026-06-23 17:51:58 -04:00
|
|
|
build_verify_wiring=build_verify_wiring,
|
|
|
|
|
dispatch_node_wiring=dispatch_node_wiring,
|
2026-06-23 14:17:08 -04:00
|
|
|
notify=notify,
|
|
|
|
|
alarm_hook=alarm_hook,
|
2026-06-23 18:13:18 -04:00
|
|
|
ci_poller=ci_poller,
|
|
|
|
|
ci_timeout=ci_timeout,
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
2026-06-23 18:13:18 -04:00
|
|
|
# Bind the durable CI-pending provider to THIS coordinator (only on the live
|
|
|
|
|
# P3 path — ``ci_poller`` is the live-pair signal). It enumerates the durable
|
|
|
|
|
# threads suspended at VERIFY awaiting CI so the watcher has real tasks to
|
|
|
|
|
# poll; bound post-construction so it can reference the just-built
|
|
|
|
|
# coordinator. Left unbound on the inert box, the CI sweep stays a NO-OP.
|
|
|
|
|
if ci_poller is not None:
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator._ci_pending_provider = coordinator._enumerate_ci_pending
|
2026-06-23 19:06:08 -04:00
|
|
|
# Draft-PR runaway/stale monitor seam (P3 A4). Gated on the SAME live-pair
|
|
|
|
|
# signal as the CI watcher (``ci_poller`` is set ⇔ ``_p3_env_is_configured``
|
|
|
|
|
# via ``failsafe_production_p3_wiring``), so on the inert/unconfigured box it
|
|
|
|
|
# stays None and ``_draft_pr_monitor_sweep`` is a NO-OP (no behaviour change).
|
|
|
|
|
# On the live box it binds a read-only ``gh pr list`` enumerator of the open
|
|
|
|
|
# ``agent-team/apply/`` draft PRs so the sweep has a real snapshot to ALARM /
|
|
|
|
|
# remind on — without this the wired sweep would always see no PRs. Bound
|
|
|
|
|
# post-construction to mirror ``_ci_pending_provider``.
|
|
|
|
|
if ci_poller is not None:
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator._draft_pr_provider = _default_draft_pr_provider(
|
|
|
|
|
owner=owner, repo=repo
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2026-06-23 12:38:43 -04:00
|
|
|
# WS2: an allowlisted Slack /new-task starts a task on THIS coordinator. Set
|
|
|
|
|
# post-construction (the adapter closes over the just-built coordinator), and
|
|
|
|
|
# before serve() builds the listener. AUTHZ-01 (owner allowlist) gates this
|
|
|
|
|
# upstream in the listener; the source label is always "slack".
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator.set_new_task_callback(
|
2026-06-23 15:11:19 -04:00
|
|
|
lambda task_text, _source, slack_thread_ts: coordinator.start_task(
|
|
|
|
|
task_text=task_text,
|
|
|
|
|
transport_name="slack",
|
|
|
|
|
slack_thread_ts=slack_thread_ts,
|
2026-06-23 12:38:43 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return coordinator
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _build_transport(args: argparse.Namespace) -> Any:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Build the transport for a coordinator command (lazy; token-tolerant).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
``--dry-run`` (or any transport in dry-run) yields a non-posting transport so
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
intake works without credentials. Otherwise the live transport is built
|
|
|
|
|
lazily from the environment for the chosen ``--transport`` (so import,
|
|
|
|
|
``--help``, and ledger commands never need a token):
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* ``slack`` -> :func:`build_live_slack_transport` over ``SLACK_BOT_TOKEN`` /
|
feat(secrev): Plane-1 Phase 2 — coordinator + dependency-cve checker (#16)
* fix(agent-team): read SLACK_CHANNEL_ID, aligning code with deploy doc + systemd
run-team.py read os.environ['SLACK_CHANNEL'] while DEPLOY-R720.md and the
coordinator systemd unit both document SLACK_CHANNEL_ID; the mismatch would
silently default the live Slack transport channel to empty. Standardize on
SLACK_CHANNEL_ID (decision locked 2026-06-18).
* feat(secrev): dependency-cve Plane-1 Tier-1 checker (OSV, ALARM-only)
Read-only checker on the Phase-0 substrate: scans $MIRROR_DIR mirrors for
pinned deps (requirements/poetry/Pipfile/package-lock/yarn/csproj across
PyPI/npm/NuGet), cross-refs OSV querybatch (live) or an offline advisory
fixture (canary). Mode-600 reports, ALARM-only, --canary asserts 2 planted
vulns (jinja2 2.11.2, lodash 4.17.15). Complements Dependabot. Not provisioned.
* feat(secrev): Plane-1 checker coordinator (shared budget, rotation, dedup)
Coordinator (design §5/§6.7) orchestrating Tier-1 checkers under one shared
budget ledger + versioned rotation/coverage state (atomic write + schema/hash/
logical-consistency integrity, park-on-corrupt). Canary-suite-first
(COMPLACENCY skip), fan-out under the shared cap with defer-not-drop, COVERAGE
alarm past MAX_CYCLE_NIGHTS, cross-checker dedup/prioritize, ALARM-only routing.
--squeeze-dry-run proves deferral-not-drop + COVERAGE alarm. Not provisioned.
* fix(secrev): hide dependency-cve canary manifests from dependency-review
The canary fixtures intentionally pin known-vulnerable deps (jinja2 2.11.2,
lodash 4.17.15) so the checker has something to detect. GitHub's dependency
graph parsed those fixture manifests as real project deps, failing the
dependency-review PR gate (fail-on-severity: high). Store the manifests with a
.fixture suffix so the dependency graph ignores them; the --canary materializer
strips the suffix in its temp work area before scanning, so detection is
unchanged (still 2/2). No advisory allowlist, no change to the shared org
reusable workflow — the real gate stays strict for actual deps.
2026-06-18 15:08:58 -04:00
|
|
|
``SLACK_CHANNEL_ID``.
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
* ``github`` -> :func:`build_live_github_transport` over ``GITHUB_TOKEN`` and
|
|
|
|
|
the issue thread ``GITHUB_OWNER`` / ``GITHUB_REPO`` /
|
|
|
|
|
``GITHUB_ISSUE_NUMBER``. This is the §3.3.1 human-gate I/O only (post an
|
|
|
|
|
issue/PR comment); it carries NO CI, OIDC, git/patch apply, or GitHub
|
|
|
|
|
Actions network (the P3 apply/verify workflow is held for the security
|
|
|
|
|
gate).
|
|
|
|
|
* ``claude_code`` -> :func:`build_live_claude_code_transport` over the local
|
|
|
|
|
file-drop directory ``CLAUDE_CODE_DROP_DIR`` the Mac harness polls (D10).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Each live builder defers its optional SDK / token resolution to call time, so
|
|
|
|
|
a missing dependency or credential fails loudly here rather than at import.
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
if getattr(args, "dry_run", False):
|
|
|
|
|
return _DryRunTransport()
|
|
|
|
|
if args.transport == "slack":
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.transport.slack_live import build_live_slack_transport
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(secrev): Plane-1 Phase 2 — coordinator + dependency-cve checker (#16)
* fix(agent-team): read SLACK_CHANNEL_ID, aligning code with deploy doc + systemd
run-team.py read os.environ['SLACK_CHANNEL'] while DEPLOY-R720.md and the
coordinator systemd unit both document SLACK_CHANNEL_ID; the mismatch would
silently default the live Slack transport channel to empty. Standardize on
SLACK_CHANNEL_ID (decision locked 2026-06-18).
* feat(secrev): dependency-cve Plane-1 Tier-1 checker (OSV, ALARM-only)
Read-only checker on the Phase-0 substrate: scans $MIRROR_DIR mirrors for
pinned deps (requirements/poetry/Pipfile/package-lock/yarn/csproj across
PyPI/npm/NuGet), cross-refs OSV querybatch (live) or an offline advisory
fixture (canary). Mode-600 reports, ALARM-only, --canary asserts 2 planted
vulns (jinja2 2.11.2, lodash 4.17.15). Complements Dependabot. Not provisioned.
* feat(secrev): Plane-1 checker coordinator (shared budget, rotation, dedup)
Coordinator (design §5/§6.7) orchestrating Tier-1 checkers under one shared
budget ledger + versioned rotation/coverage state (atomic write + schema/hash/
logical-consistency integrity, park-on-corrupt). Canary-suite-first
(COMPLACENCY skip), fan-out under the shared cap with defer-not-drop, COVERAGE
alarm past MAX_CYCLE_NIGHTS, cross-checker dedup/prioritize, ALARM-only routing.
--squeeze-dry-run proves deferral-not-drop + COVERAGE alarm. Not provisioned.
* fix(secrev): hide dependency-cve canary manifests from dependency-review
The canary fixtures intentionally pin known-vulnerable deps (jinja2 2.11.2,
lodash 4.17.15) so the checker has something to detect. GitHub's dependency
graph parsed those fixture manifests as real project deps, failing the
dependency-review PR gate (fail-on-severity: high). Store the manifests with a
.fixture suffix so the dependency graph ignores them; the --canary materializer
strips the suffix in its temp work area before scanning, so detection is
unchanged (still 2/2). No advisory allowlist, no change to the shared org
reusable workflow — the real gate stays strict for actual deps.
2026-06-18 15:08:58 -04:00
|
|
|
channel = os.environ.get("SLACK_CHANNEL_ID", "")
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
return build_live_slack_transport(channel)
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
if args.transport == "github":
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.transport.github_live import build_live_github_transport
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
owner, repo, issue_number = _github_thread_from_env()
|
|
|
|
|
# Token resolves from GITHUB_TOKEN inside the builder (call-time read);
|
|
|
|
|
# a missing token fails loudly there rather than being captured here.
|
|
|
|
|
return build_live_github_transport(
|
|
|
|
|
owner=owner,
|
|
|
|
|
repo=repo,
|
|
|
|
|
issue_number=issue_number,
|
|
|
|
|
token=os.environ.get("GITHUB_TOKEN") or None,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
if args.transport == "claude_code":
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.transport.claude_code_live import (
|
|
|
|
|
build_live_claude_code_transport,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
drop_dir = os.environ.get("CLAUDE_CODE_DROP_DIR", "")
|
|
|
|
|
if not drop_dir:
|
|
|
|
|
raise SystemExit(
|
|
|
|
|
"live transport 'claude_code' requires CLAUDE_CODE_DROP_DIR (the "
|
|
|
|
|
"Mac file-drop directory the Claude-Code harness polls); set it, "
|
|
|
|
|
"or use --dry-run for a no-token dry run"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return build_live_claude_code_transport(drop_dir)
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
raise SystemExit(
|
|
|
|
|
f"live transport '{args.transport}' is not wired for the run-team CLI; "
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
"use --transport slack/github/claude_code, or --dry-run for a no-token "
|
|
|
|
|
"dry run"
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
def _github_thread_from_env() -> tuple[str, str, int]:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Resolve the GitHub issue thread (owner/repo/issue) from the environment.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The live GitHub transport posts the clarifier question-set as a comment on a
|
|
|
|
|
fixed ``owner/repo#issue_number`` thread, so the thread is configured via
|
|
|
|
|
``GITHUB_OWNER`` / ``GITHUB_REPO`` / ``GITHUB_ISSUE_NUMBER`` (read lazily so
|
|
|
|
|
the value is never captured at import). A missing or non-integer value raises
|
|
|
|
|
a clear :class:`SystemExit` rather than building a half-configured transport.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
owner = os.environ.get("GITHUB_OWNER", "")
|
|
|
|
|
repo = os.environ.get("GITHUB_REPO", "")
|
|
|
|
|
raw_issue = os.environ.get("GITHUB_ISSUE_NUMBER", "")
|
|
|
|
|
missing = [
|
|
|
|
|
name
|
|
|
|
|
for name, value in (
|
|
|
|
|
("GITHUB_OWNER", owner),
|
|
|
|
|
("GITHUB_REPO", repo),
|
|
|
|
|
("GITHUB_ISSUE_NUMBER", raw_issue),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
if not value
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
if missing:
|
|
|
|
|
raise SystemExit(
|
|
|
|
|
"live transport 'github' requires "
|
|
|
|
|
f"{', '.join(missing)}; set the issue thread (owner/repo/issue), or "
|
|
|
|
|
"use --dry-run for a no-token dry run"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
issue_number = int(raw_issue)
|
|
|
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
|
|
|
raise SystemExit(
|
|
|
|
|
f"GITHUB_ISSUE_NUMBER must be an integer, got {raw_issue!r}"
|
|
|
|
|
) from None
|
|
|
|
|
return owner, repo, issue_number
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
class _DryRunTransport(Transport):
|
|
|
|
|
"""A non-posting transport for ``--dry-run`` intake (no token, no Slack).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
``post_question`` records nothing on a real channel — it returns a synthetic
|
|
|
|
|
``channel_ref`` so :func:`agent_team.responder.notify_question` still writes
|
|
|
|
|
and stamps the durable ledger row (the durable seam is exercised; only the
|
|
|
|
|
side-effecting post is skipped). ``parse_answer`` is unused by the CLI path
|
|
|
|
|
but implemented so the ABC is concrete.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def post_question(
|
|
|
|
|
self,
|
|
|
|
|
*,
|
|
|
|
|
thread_id: str,
|
|
|
|
|
question_id: str,
|
|
|
|
|
turn: int,
|
|
|
|
|
question_set: Any,
|
|
|
|
|
deadline: str,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> str:
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
f"[dry-run] would post question {question_id} (turn {turn}) "
|
|
|
|
|
f"for thread {thread_id}",
|
|
|
|
|
file=sys.stderr,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return f"dry-run:{question_id}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def parse_answer(self, raw: Any) -> tuple[str, Any, str]:
|
|
|
|
|
raise NotImplementedError("dry-run transport does not parse answers")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cmd_start(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Intake: start one task and run it to the first human gate (§3.3, §3.3.1).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Builds a :class:`Coordinator` (transport from the lazy factory; ``--dry-run``
|
|
|
|
|
posts nowhere), runs ``setup`` + ``start_task``, and prints the minted
|
|
|
|
|
``thread_id``. The clarifier question-set is delivered over the chosen
|
|
|
|
|
transport (or no-op under ``--dry-run``); the durable ledger row is written
|
|
|
|
|
either way.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator = _build_coordinator(args)
|
fix(agent-team): handle real slack_bolt event envelope + map thread replies; bind start invoker (#26)
* fix(agent-team): handle real slack_bolt event envelope + map thread replies to open questions
The Socket Mode inbound listener was unit-tested against a SYNTHETIC payload
shape that does not match what slack_bolt actually delivers, so the suite was
green while a real Slack thread reply was silently dropped (the clarifier
question stayed `open`). Real slack_bolt delivers an Events API message /
app_mention as `{"type":"event_callback","event":{"type":"message",...}}` and
a free-text thread reply carries NO callback_id/question_id/metadata.
Three breaks fixed (all on the free-text reply path):
1. Type gate — handle_event gated on the OUTER `type`, which is
"event_callback" for a real message/app_mention, so the event fell outside
_ANSWER_BEARING_TYPES and was dropped. Now collapsed to the discriminating
INNER `event.type` via _discriminating_type / _inner_event.
2. question_id recovery — a real reply has no callback_id/question_id/metadata
(the bot's metadata is on the QUESTION message, not the reply). When explicit
id recovery fails, the listener now resolves the question by the inner
event's `thread_ts` against the OPEN ledger row whose `channel_ref` equals it
(new schema helper find_open_question_by_channel_ref, constrained to
status='open' as anti-replay). Explicit id recovery still takes precedence.
3. answer extraction — a real message event carries its text at `event.text`,
not a top-level `answer`/`text`. The thread-reply path now takes the inner
`event.text` (stripped) as the answer value.
AUTHZ-01 is unchanged and still runs FIRST: authorization gates on the sender's
Slack user id (`event.user` for the Events API shape) and fails closed on an
empty/unknown allowlist or unrecoverable sender. The new mapping only resolves
WHICH question is answered, never WHO may answer. Answers stay opaque DATA
(parameterized SQL + json.dumps; never eval/exec/interpolate).
Tests: replaced the synthetic events-API fixtures with REAL Bolt envelopes and
added regression coverage — real thread reply maps via channel_ref and is
accepted, text is stripped, non-owner reply rejected (row stays open), thread_ts
matching no open row is a no-op, reply to an already-answered row is a no-op
(anti-replay), and app_mention is normalized identically. block_actions /
slash_command paths retained.
* fix(agent-team): bind subscription invoker in the start CLI
`run-team.py start` runs the clarifier graph to the first human gate IN the CLI
process, and the clarifier calls Claude (assess_confidence). The invoker is a
process-local binding that only `serve` set, so `start` failed with
"claude_invoke has no invoker bound". Bind the real subscription invoker here,
mirroring Coordinator.serve(). Found during the live R720 P1 bring-up.
2026-06-22 15:30:48 -04:00
|
|
|
# start_task runs the clarifier graph to the first human gate IN THIS PROCESS,
|
|
|
|
|
# and the clarifier calls Claude (assess_confidence). The invoker is a
|
|
|
|
|
# process-local binding, so a running daemon does not help this CLI process —
|
|
|
|
|
# bind the real subscription invoker here, mirroring Coordinator.serve(), or
|
|
|
|
|
# start_task fails with "claude_invoke has no invoker bound".
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.invoker import bind_subscription_invoker
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bind_subscription_invoker()
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
coordinator.setup()
|
|
|
|
|
thread_id = coordinator.start_task(
|
|
|
|
|
task_text=args.task, transport_name=args.transport
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
print(thread_id, file=out)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cmd_serve(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Run the coordinator daemon loop (binds the live invoker; §7.1 P1).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Delegates to :meth:`agent_team.coordinator.Coordinator.serve`, which binds
|
|
|
|
|
the real Claude subscription invoker, runs the startup recovery sweep, then
|
|
|
|
|
loops on the deadline cadence. The Slack inbound feed is the slack_listener's
|
|
|
|
|
job; this command owns the maintenance loop. Runs until interrupted.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator = _build_coordinator(args)
|
2026-06-23 01:19:59 +00:00
|
|
|
# Bind the in-process non-Claude invokers (GPT-4.1 review, DeepSeek build)
|
|
|
|
|
# alongside the Claude subscription invoker (WS1).
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.invoker_multi import bind_multi_invoker # noqa: PLC0415
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bind_multi_invoker()
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
print("agent-team coordinator starting (Ctrl-C to stop)", file=out)
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator.serve()
|
|
|
|
|
return 0 # pragma: no cover - serve() loops until interrupted
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
def _cmd_intake_github(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Poll a repo for labeled issues and start one task per new issue (§3.3.1).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The GitHub-issue intake front door: builds a :class:`Coordinator` (transport
|
|
|
|
|
from the lazy factory; ``--dry-run`` posts nowhere), runs ``setup``, then
|
|
|
|
|
constructs a :class:`agent_team.transport.github_intake.GithubIntake` over a
|
|
|
|
|
read-only REST issue client
|
|
|
|
|
(:func:`~agent_team.transport.github_intake.build_default_issue_client`,
|
|
|
|
|
deferred-import, reads ``GITHUB_TOKEN`` at call time) and runs ONE
|
|
|
|
|
:meth:`~agent_team.transport.github_intake.GithubIntake.poll_once`. An
|
feat(agent-team): durable GitHub-issue intake de-dup + intake hardening (#32)
* feat(agent-team): durable GitHub-issue intake de-dup (schema v2)
The intake poller de-duped ingested issues in an in-memory set that does
not survive a process restart. A scheduled/cron intake (each run a fresh
process) would therefore re-ingest every still-open labeled issue on every
run and spawn duplicate pipeline tasks. Since the box is read-only (no write
token to remove the intake label), durable de-dup is the only correct guard.
- schema v2: new ingested_issues(source, issue_id, ingested_at) table +
issue_already_ingested / record_issue_ingested helpers; migrate() adds the
table to a legacy v1 DB and restamps; init_db creates it.
- github_intake: pluggable IngestStore seam (in-memory default preserved for
tests/one-off; durable build_ledger_ingest_store for production). Record is
after start_task succeeds, so a failed intake stays retryable.
- run-team.py intake-github wires the ledger store keyed by github:owner/repo,
making a scheduled timer idempotent across runs.
978 tests pass (ruff clean).
* fix(agent-team): harden github intake per /sh-security-review (CWE-918, idempotency)
Fixes from the high-recall detector fan-out on the durable-dedup change:
- INTAKE-LOGIC-01 (idempotency): switch the IngestStore seam from
check-then-record (seen/mark) to claim-then-do (claim/release). The id is
now reserved BEFORE the non-idempotent start_task side effect, so a crash in
that window cannot re-spawn a duplicate task on the next run; a raising
start_task releases the claim so transient failures stay retryable. Adds
delete_issue_ingested to the schema layer for the release path.
- INTAKE-SSRF-001 / INTAKE-PATHSPLICE-002 (CWE-918) in build_default_issue_client:
drop the caller-overridable api_root (hardcode GITHUB_API_ROOT) and validate
owner/repo against an anchored charset before splicing them into the
token-bearing API URL — mirrors the sibling ci_fetcher BLOCK-3/FIX-3 fixes.
Tests cover cross-process duplicate prevention, release-on-failure retry, and
the owner/repo + api_root rejection. 982 tests pass, ruff clean.
Follow-up (pre-existing, not introduced here): the label-only intake has no
author allowlist (cf. AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_OWNER_IDS on the Slack listener); the
Slack answer gate bounds the blast radius. Track as separate hardening.
2026-06-22 17:20:43 -04:00
|
|
|
operator (or a cron) re-runs the command on a cadence; de-dup is DURABLE
|
|
|
|
|
(the ``ingested_issues`` ledger table), so re-running over a still-open
|
|
|
|
|
labeled issue never starts a second task — safe for a scheduled timer.
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPT-IN and INERT: this only reads labeled issues and calls the committed
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator intake entry — no CI, OIDC, git/patch apply, or GitHub-Actions
|
|
|
|
|
network. Owner/repo/label come from CLI flags; the token comes from
|
|
|
|
|
``GITHUB_TOKEN``. Prints the issue ids ingested on this pass (one per line).
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.transport.github_intake import (
|
|
|
|
|
GithubIntake,
|
|
|
|
|
build_default_issue_client,
|
feat(agent-team): durable GitHub-issue intake de-dup + intake hardening (#32)
* feat(agent-team): durable GitHub-issue intake de-dup (schema v2)
The intake poller de-duped ingested issues in an in-memory set that does
not survive a process restart. A scheduled/cron intake (each run a fresh
process) would therefore re-ingest every still-open labeled issue on every
run and spawn duplicate pipeline tasks. Since the box is read-only (no write
token to remove the intake label), durable de-dup is the only correct guard.
- schema v2: new ingested_issues(source, issue_id, ingested_at) table +
issue_already_ingested / record_issue_ingested helpers; migrate() adds the
table to a legacy v1 DB and restamps; init_db creates it.
- github_intake: pluggable IngestStore seam (in-memory default preserved for
tests/one-off; durable build_ledger_ingest_store for production). Record is
after start_task succeeds, so a failed intake stays retryable.
- run-team.py intake-github wires the ledger store keyed by github:owner/repo,
making a scheduled timer idempotent across runs.
978 tests pass (ruff clean).
* fix(agent-team): harden github intake per /sh-security-review (CWE-918, idempotency)
Fixes from the high-recall detector fan-out on the durable-dedup change:
- INTAKE-LOGIC-01 (idempotency): switch the IngestStore seam from
check-then-record (seen/mark) to claim-then-do (claim/release). The id is
now reserved BEFORE the non-idempotent start_task side effect, so a crash in
that window cannot re-spawn a duplicate task on the next run; a raising
start_task releases the claim so transient failures stay retryable. Adds
delete_issue_ingested to the schema layer for the release path.
- INTAKE-SSRF-001 / INTAKE-PATHSPLICE-002 (CWE-918) in build_default_issue_client:
drop the caller-overridable api_root (hardcode GITHUB_API_ROOT) and validate
owner/repo against an anchored charset before splicing them into the
token-bearing API URL — mirrors the sibling ci_fetcher BLOCK-3/FIX-3 fixes.
Tests cover cross-process duplicate prevention, release-on-failure retry, and
the owner/repo + api_root rejection. 982 tests pass, ruff clean.
Follow-up (pre-existing, not introduced here): the label-only intake has no
author allowlist (cf. AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_OWNER_IDS on the Slack listener); the
Slack answer gate bounds the blast radius. Track as separate hardening.
2026-06-22 17:20:43 -04:00
|
|
|
build_ledger_ingest_store,
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator = _build_coordinator(args)
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator.setup()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
client = build_default_issue_client(owner=args.owner, repo=args.repo)
|
feat(agent-team): durable GitHub-issue intake de-dup + intake hardening (#32)
* feat(agent-team): durable GitHub-issue intake de-dup (schema v2)
The intake poller de-duped ingested issues in an in-memory set that does
not survive a process restart. A scheduled/cron intake (each run a fresh
process) would therefore re-ingest every still-open labeled issue on every
run and spawn duplicate pipeline tasks. Since the box is read-only (no write
token to remove the intake label), durable de-dup is the only correct guard.
- schema v2: new ingested_issues(source, issue_id, ingested_at) table +
issue_already_ingested / record_issue_ingested helpers; migrate() adds the
table to a legacy v1 DB and restamps; init_db creates it.
- github_intake: pluggable IngestStore seam (in-memory default preserved for
tests/one-off; durable build_ledger_ingest_store for production). Record is
after start_task succeeds, so a failed intake stays retryable.
- run-team.py intake-github wires the ledger store keyed by github:owner/repo,
making a scheduled timer idempotent across runs.
978 tests pass (ruff clean).
* fix(agent-team): harden github intake per /sh-security-review (CWE-918, idempotency)
Fixes from the high-recall detector fan-out on the durable-dedup change:
- INTAKE-LOGIC-01 (idempotency): switch the IngestStore seam from
check-then-record (seen/mark) to claim-then-do (claim/release). The id is
now reserved BEFORE the non-idempotent start_task side effect, so a crash in
that window cannot re-spawn a duplicate task on the next run; a raising
start_task releases the claim so transient failures stay retryable. Adds
delete_issue_ingested to the schema layer for the release path.
- INTAKE-SSRF-001 / INTAKE-PATHSPLICE-002 (CWE-918) in build_default_issue_client:
drop the caller-overridable api_root (hardcode GITHUB_API_ROOT) and validate
owner/repo against an anchored charset before splicing them into the
token-bearing API URL — mirrors the sibling ci_fetcher BLOCK-3/FIX-3 fixes.
Tests cover cross-process duplicate prevention, release-on-failure retry, and
the owner/repo + api_root rejection. 982 tests pass, ruff clean.
Follow-up (pre-existing, not introduced here): the label-only intake has no
author allowlist (cf. AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_OWNER_IDS on the Slack listener); the
Slack answer gate bounds the blast radius. Track as separate hardening.
2026-06-22 17:20:43 -04:00
|
|
|
# Durable de-dup: a scheduled/cron intake runs as a fresh process each time,
|
|
|
|
|
# so the in-memory default would re-ingest every still-open labeled issue and
|
|
|
|
|
# spawn duplicate tasks. The ledger store keys on (source, issue_id) in the
|
|
|
|
|
# same SQLite DB the coordinator uses, making intake idempotent across runs.
|
|
|
|
|
store = build_ledger_ingest_store(
|
|
|
|
|
db_path=args.db, source=f"github:{args.owner}/{args.repo}"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
intake = GithubIntake(
|
|
|
|
|
client=client,
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator=coordinator,
|
|
|
|
|
label=args.label,
|
feat(agent-team): durable GitHub-issue intake de-dup + intake hardening (#32)
* feat(agent-team): durable GitHub-issue intake de-dup (schema v2)
The intake poller de-duped ingested issues in an in-memory set that does
not survive a process restart. A scheduled/cron intake (each run a fresh
process) would therefore re-ingest every still-open labeled issue on every
run and spawn duplicate pipeline tasks. Since the box is read-only (no write
token to remove the intake label), durable de-dup is the only correct guard.
- schema v2: new ingested_issues(source, issue_id, ingested_at) table +
issue_already_ingested / record_issue_ingested helpers; migrate() adds the
table to a legacy v1 DB and restamps; init_db creates it.
- github_intake: pluggable IngestStore seam (in-memory default preserved for
tests/one-off; durable build_ledger_ingest_store for production). Record is
after start_task succeeds, so a failed intake stays retryable.
- run-team.py intake-github wires the ledger store keyed by github:owner/repo,
making a scheduled timer idempotent across runs.
978 tests pass (ruff clean).
* fix(agent-team): harden github intake per /sh-security-review (CWE-918, idempotency)
Fixes from the high-recall detector fan-out on the durable-dedup change:
- INTAKE-LOGIC-01 (idempotency): switch the IngestStore seam from
check-then-record (seen/mark) to claim-then-do (claim/release). The id is
now reserved BEFORE the non-idempotent start_task side effect, so a crash in
that window cannot re-spawn a duplicate task on the next run; a raising
start_task releases the claim so transient failures stay retryable. Adds
delete_issue_ingested to the schema layer for the release path.
- INTAKE-SSRF-001 / INTAKE-PATHSPLICE-002 (CWE-918) in build_default_issue_client:
drop the caller-overridable api_root (hardcode GITHUB_API_ROOT) and validate
owner/repo against an anchored charset before splicing them into the
token-bearing API URL — mirrors the sibling ci_fetcher BLOCK-3/FIX-3 fixes.
Tests cover cross-process duplicate prevention, release-on-failure retry, and
the owner/repo + api_root rejection. 982 tests pass, ruff clean.
Follow-up (pre-existing, not introduced here): the label-only intake has no
author allowlist (cf. AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_OWNER_IDS on the Slack listener); the
Slack answer gate bounds the blast radius. Track as separate hardening.
2026-06-22 17:20:43 -04:00
|
|
|
store=store,
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
ingested = intake.poll_once()
|
|
|
|
|
for issue_id in ingested:
|
|
|
|
|
print(issue_id, file=out)
|
|
|
|
|
if not ingested:
|
|
|
|
|
print("github-intake: no new labeled issues to ingest", file=sys.stderr)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-18 15:56:52 -04:00
|
|
|
def _cmd_intake_checker(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Read checker reports and start one task per confirmed eligible finding.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Plane-1 -> Plane-2 cross-plane front door (P5): builds a
|
|
|
|
|
:class:`Coordinator` (transport from the lazy factory; ``--dry-run`` posts
|
|
|
|
|
nowhere), runs ``setup``, then constructs a
|
|
|
|
|
:class:`agent_team.transport.checker_intake.CheckerFindingIntake` and runs
|
|
|
|
|
ONE :meth:`~agent_team.transport.checker_intake.CheckerFindingIntake.ingest_reports`
|
|
|
|
|
over the report paths. Each ``--report`` may be a checker report JSON file or
|
|
|
|
|
a directory of ``*.json`` reports.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPT-IN and INERT: this only reads local report JSON and calls the committed
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator intake entry — no CI, OIDC, git/patch apply, or network. The
|
|
|
|
|
severity threshold (default ``high``) and transport come from CLI flags.
|
|
|
|
|
De-dup is in-memory per process, so each run is a single pass. Prints the
|
|
|
|
|
finding identities ingested on this pass (one per line).
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.transport.checker_intake import CheckerFindingIntake
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator = _build_coordinator(args)
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator.setup()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
intake = CheckerFindingIntake(
|
|
|
|
|
coordinator=coordinator,
|
|
|
|
|
threshold=args.threshold,
|
|
|
|
|
transport_name=args.transport,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
ingested = intake.ingest_reports([Path(p) for p in args.report])
|
|
|
|
|
for identity in ingested:
|
|
|
|
|
print(identity, file=out)
|
|
|
|
|
if not ingested:
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
"checker-intake: no new confirmed at/above-threshold findings to ingest",
|
|
|
|
|
file=sys.stderr,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(agent-team): Plane-1 fixer — finding→patch→CI draft-PR (dep-bumps, opt-in/inert) (#21)
* feat(agent-team): Plane-1 Tier-3 fixer — dependency-cve finding -> patch + CI dispatch (opt-in/inert)
The fixer (design §4 fixer row, §7 Phase 5, §3.3.2) takes a CONFIRMED,
low-risk dependency-cve finding (the narrowest fix class) and produces:
* a fix SPEC (Claude, via the §3.1 billing seam), and
* a minimal bump PATCH (DeepSeek fast_coder, via the orchestrator run.py
path that builders_llm uses),
records the candidate diff + its content-hash, and emits the org-CI
workflow_dispatch inputs (task_id / diff_artifact_name / expected_diff_hash /
declared_scope) for the gate-passed P3-live apply/verify surface.
INERT / opt-in / fail-safe, mirroring build_verify_wiring:
* plan_fix dispatches NOTHING; dispatch_fix has NO default dispatcher
(the box holds no write token, D2) so an un-wired call can never fire a
workflow.
* no git/patch/subprocess/fs-write in executable code — the patch is emitted
as diff TEXT only; CI applies it and opens a DRAFT PR, the box never
applies/pushes/merges.
* untrusted-patch hygiene: the generated diff is confined box-side to the
single dependency manifest (declared_scope) and rejected via
ci_gate.denylist_violations if it escapes scope or touches the
trust-control surface — defense-in-depth with the CI guard.
* bad/ambiguous findings (wrong check/status/category, missing
package/fixed_version, ambiguous fixed_version, unparseable/empty diff)
yield a FAILED no-op plan, never a fabricated fix.
29 new pytest tests under agent-team/tests/test_fixer.py.
* feat(agent-team): run-team.py 'fix --dry-run' subcommand for the Plane-1 fixer
Adds the fixer front door to the operator CLI: load one confirmed
dependency-cve finding from a dependency-cve.json report (--report
--finding-id), plan the fix, and in --dry-run print the spec + patch + the
org-CI workflow_dispatch inputs WITHOUT dispatching anything.
Opt-in/inert: the command binds NO workflow dispatcher and holds no write
token, so even an ok plan only prints; live dispatch is provisioning-gated
(refuses to run without --dry-run). A non-fixable finding prints the
fail-safe reason and exits 1.
4 new pytest tests under agent-team/tests/test_run_team.py.
2026-06-18 16:17:33 -04:00
|
|
|
def _load_finding_for_fix(args: argparse.Namespace) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Load the single confirmed dependency-cve finding to fix from a report file.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Reads the ``dependency-cve.json`` report (the checker's output shape) at
|
|
|
|
|
``--report`` and selects the finding by ``--finding-id``. Returns the finding
|
|
|
|
|
mapping. Raises :class:`SystemExit` on any load/selection error so the CLI
|
|
|
|
|
fails loudly rather than dispatching against a half-resolved finding. Pure
|
|
|
|
|
read; no network, no CI, no git.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
report_path = Path(args.report)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
raw = report_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
|
|
|
|
except OSError as exc:
|
|
|
|
|
raise SystemExit(f"cannot read finding report {report_path}: {exc}") from exc
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
report = json.loads(raw)
|
|
|
|
|
except ValueError as exc:
|
|
|
|
|
raise SystemExit(
|
|
|
|
|
f"finding report {report_path} is not valid JSON: {exc}"
|
|
|
|
|
) from exc
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
findings = report.get("findings") if isinstance(report, dict) else None
|
|
|
|
|
if not isinstance(findings, list):
|
|
|
|
|
raise SystemExit(
|
|
|
|
|
f"finding report {report_path} has no 'findings' array (got "
|
|
|
|
|
f"{type(report).__name__})"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
matches = [
|
|
|
|
|
f for f in findings if isinstance(f, dict) and f.get("id") == args.finding_id
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
if not matches:
|
|
|
|
|
raise SystemExit(f"no finding with id {args.finding_id!r} in {report_path}")
|
|
|
|
|
if len(matches) > 1:
|
|
|
|
|
raise SystemExit(
|
|
|
|
|
f"ambiguous: {len(matches)} findings share id {args.finding_id!r} in "
|
|
|
|
|
f"{report_path}"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return matches[0]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cmd_fix(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Plan a Plane-1 dep-bump fix and show what it WOULD dispatch (§7 Phase 5).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Tier-3 fixer front door (design §4 fixer row, §3.3.2). Loads ONE confirmed
|
|
|
|
|
``dependency-cve`` finding from the report, asks the fixer to produce a fix
|
|
|
|
|
spec (Claude) + a minimal bump patch (DeepSeek via the orchestrator) + the CI
|
|
|
|
|
``workflow_dispatch`` inputs, and — in ``--dry-run`` (the only mode wired
|
|
|
|
|
here) — PRINTS the spec, patch, and dispatch inputs without dispatching
|
|
|
|
|
anything.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPT-IN / INERT: this command never dispatches. It binds NO workflow dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
(the box holds no write token, D2), so even an ``ok`` plan only prints. Live
|
|
|
|
|
dispatch is a provisioning-time wiring of the trusted apply path's dispatcher,
|
|
|
|
|
deliberately not reachable from this CLI. A non-fixable finding prints the
|
|
|
|
|
fail-safe reason and exits non-zero.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Returns ``0`` when a fix plan was produced (dry-run printed), ``1`` when the
|
|
|
|
|
finding is not fixable (fail-safe; nothing planned).
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.nodes.fixer import describe_plan, plan_fix
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if not args.dry_run:
|
|
|
|
|
# Live dispatch is provisioning-gated and not wired into the CLI; refuse
|
|
|
|
|
# to run without --dry-run rather than silently doing nothing.
|
|
|
|
|
raise SystemExit(
|
|
|
|
|
"fix supports only --dry-run in this build (live dispatch is "
|
|
|
|
|
"provisioning-gated; the box holds no write token, D2). Re-run with "
|
|
|
|
|
"--dry-run to see what it WOULD dispatch."
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
finding = _load_finding_for_fix(args)
|
|
|
|
|
plan = plan_fix(finding, task_id=args.task_id)
|
|
|
|
|
print(describe_plan(plan), file=out)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0 if plan.ok else 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
def _cmd_force_resume(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Force-resume a parked task's question (destructive; audit-logged).
|
|
|
|
|
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
The design-named operator verb (§3.3.1 / §6.6 "an operator can force-resume
|
|
|
|
|
... a parked task via the CLI"). A task parks when its clarifier question
|
|
|
|
|
EXPIRES with no answer, so the un-park action is to RE-OPEN that expired
|
|
|
|
|
question (:func:`agent_team.db.schema.reopen_question`) so the normal
|
|
|
|
|
delivery → answer → resume flow can proceed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Crucially this does NOT ``supersede`` the row: superseding an ``answered``
|
|
|
|
|
row would flip it out of the state the recovery sweep resumes from, making a
|
|
|
|
|
stuck-but-answered task permanently un-resumable — the opposite of
|
|
|
|
|
force-resume. So:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* ``expired`` (the parked case) → reopened; returns 0.
|
|
|
|
|
* ``answered`` (answered but not yet resumed) → already eligible for the
|
|
|
|
|
recovery resume sweep; intent is recorded and we report that, no mutation.
|
|
|
|
|
* ``open`` / ``superseded`` / absent → nothing to force; reported as a no-op.
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
"""
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
_require_confirm("force-resume", confirm=args.confirm)
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
_audit_attempt(
|
|
|
|
|
args.audit_log,
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
"force-resume",
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
question_id=args.question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
operator=args.operator,
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
detail={"resume_requested": True},
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
conn = connect(args.db)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
row = _fetch_question(conn, args.question_id)
|
|
|
|
|
status = None if row is None else row["status"]
|
|
|
|
|
reopened = False
|
|
|
|
|
if status == "expired":
|
|
|
|
|
reopened = reopen_question(conn, question_id=args.question_id)
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
finally:
|
|
|
|
|
conn.close()
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
_audit_outcome(
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
args.audit_log,
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
"force-resume",
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
question_id=args.question_id,
|
|
|
|
|
operator=args.operator,
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
applied=reopened,
|
|
|
|
|
detail={"resume_requested": True, "prior_status": status},
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
if reopened:
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
print(
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
f"force-resume: reopened expired question {args.question_id}; "
|
|
|
|
|
"it will be re-delivered for an answer",
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
file=out,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
if status == "answered":
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
print(
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
f"force-resume: question {args.question_id} is answered and pending "
|
|
|
|
|
"resume; the recovery sweep will resume it (intent recorded)",
|
|
|
|
|
file=out,
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
f"force-resume no-op: question {args.question_id} "
|
|
|
|
|
f"({'absent' if status is None else f'status={status}'}) is not parked",
|
|
|
|
|
file=sys.stderr,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return 1
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-23 20:49:09 -04:00
|
|
|
def _cmd_dispatch(args: argparse.Namespace, *, out: Any) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Operator-initiated dispatch of a built diff into org CI (P3, option-b).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The box holds NO write token (read-only by design), so its in-graph DISPATCH
|
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|
|
node fail-closes/parks. This is the operator verb that completes the dispatch
|
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|
|
with WRITE creds: it reads the task's ``candidate_diff`` + declared scope
|
|
|
|
|
(from the ledger checkpoint, or from ``--diff``/``--scope`` files), pushes the
|
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|
|
head branch and fires the apply/verify ``workflow_dispatch`` via
|
|
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|
|
:func:`agent_team.dispatcher.dispatch_apply_verify`, then prints the located
|
|
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|
|
run id. Run it where a WRITE-capable ``GH_TOKEN`` is available — the operator
|
|
|
|
|
host, or the box with a JUST-IN-TIME operator token in the env (never stored
|
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|
|
in ``secrev.env``); the box stays read-only at rest.
|
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|
|
Owner/repo/base resolve from ``--owner``/``--repo``/``--base`` or the
|
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|
|
``AGENT_TEAM_REPO_OWNER``/``_NAME``/``_BASE_BRANCH`` env vars. With
|
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|
``--write-back`` the located ``run_id`` is written into the task checkpoint so
|
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|
the box's VERIFY can bind to it.
|
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|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
import os
|
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|
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|
|
from agent_team.dispatcher import dispatch_apply_verify
|
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|
|
owner = args.owner or os.environ.get("AGENT_TEAM_REPO_OWNER", "")
|
|
|
|
|
repo = args.repo or os.environ.get("AGENT_TEAM_REPO_NAME", "")
|
|
|
|
|
base = args.base or os.environ.get("AGENT_TEAM_BASE_BRANCH") or "main"
|
|
|
|
|
if not owner or not repo:
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
"dispatch: owner/repo required (pass --owner/--repo or set "
|
|
|
|
|
"AGENT_TEAM_REPO_OWNER/_NAME)",
|
|
|
|
|
file=sys.stderr,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return 2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Resolve the diff + declared scope: explicit files win; else read the task's
|
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|
|
|
# checkpointed PipelineState (candidate_diff + plan.scope).
|
|
|
|
|
diff_text: str | None = (
|
|
|
|
|
Path(args.diff).read_text(encoding="utf-8") if args.diff else None
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
declared_scope: str | None = (
|
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|
|
|
Path(args.scope).read_text(encoding="utf-8") if args.scope else None
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
if diff_text is None or declared_scope is None:
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.graph import (
|
|
|
|
|
build_graph,
|
|
|
|
|
build_sqlite_checkpointer,
|
|
|
|
|
thread_config,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with build_sqlite_checkpointer(args.db) as saver:
|
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|
|
|
graph = build_graph(saver)
|
|
|
|
|
snap = graph.get_state(thread_config(args.thread_id))
|
|
|
|
|
state = dict(snap.values or {})
|
|
|
|
|
if diff_text is None:
|
|
|
|
|
diff_text = state.get("candidate_diff")
|
|
|
|
|
if declared_scope is None:
|
|
|
|
|
plan = state.get("plan") or {}
|
|
|
|
|
scope_list = plan.get("scope") or [] if isinstance(plan, dict) else []
|
|
|
|
|
declared_scope = "\n".join(str(s) for s in scope_list if s)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if not diff_text or not str(diff_text).strip():
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
f"dispatch: no candidate_diff for task {args.thread_id} "
|
|
|
|
|
"(pass --diff, or the task has not built a diff yet)",
|
|
|
|
|
file=sys.stderr,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = dispatch_apply_verify(
|
|
|
|
|
owner=owner,
|
|
|
|
|
repo=repo,
|
|
|
|
|
task_id=args.thread_id,
|
|
|
|
|
diff_text=diff_text,
|
|
|
|
|
declared_scope=declared_scope or "",
|
|
|
|
|
base=base,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
f"dispatched task {args.thread_id} -> {owner}/{repo} "
|
|
|
|
|
f"(head={result.inputs.head_branch}, run_id={result.run_id}, "
|
|
|
|
|
f"dispatched_at={result.dispatched_at})",
|
|
|
|
|
file=out,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
if result.run_id is None:
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
"dispatch: workflow fired but run_id could not be correlated; "
|
|
|
|
|
"VERIFY fails closed until a run_id is set",
|
|
|
|
|
file=sys.stderr,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
elif args.write_back:
|
|
|
|
|
from agent_team.graph import (
|
|
|
|
|
build_graph,
|
|
|
|
|
build_sqlite_checkpointer,
|
|
|
|
|
thread_config,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with build_sqlite_checkpointer(args.db) as saver:
|
|
|
|
|
graph = build_graph(saver)
|
|
|
|
|
graph.update_state(
|
|
|
|
|
thread_config(args.thread_id),
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
"run_id": result.run_id,
|
|
|
|
|
"dispatched_at": result.dispatched_at,
|
|
|
|
|
"ci_correlation_tag": result.correlation_tag,
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
|
|
|
f"dispatch: wrote run_id={result.run_id} into the task checkpoint "
|
|
|
|
|
"(--write-back)",
|
|
|
|
|
file=out,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0 if result.run_id is not None else 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
# Statuses an operator treats as "parked context": a task whose only pending
|
|
|
|
|
# question is no longer open may be parked (answered-but-unresumed, expired, or
|
|
|
|
|
# superseded). ``open`` is excluded — that is the live-waiting view (default
|
|
|
|
|
# ``list``). Derived from the foundation QUESTION_STATES so it stays in sync.
|
|
|
|
|
_PARKED_STATES: tuple[str, ...] = tuple(s for s in QUESTION_STATES if s != "open")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Construct the argparse parser for ``run-team.py`` (no side effects)."""
|
|
|
|
|
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
|
|
|
|
|
prog="run-team.py",
|
|
|
|
|
description=(
|
|
|
|
|
"R720 agent-team operator CLI — manual path over the durable "
|
|
|
|
|
"pending_questions ledger (design §3.3.1)."
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--db",
|
|
|
|
|
type=Path,
|
|
|
|
|
default=_DEFAULT_DB,
|
|
|
|
|
help=f"path to the agent-team SQLite ledger (default: {_DEFAULT_DB})",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--audit-log",
|
|
|
|
|
type=Path,
|
|
|
|
|
default=_DEFAULT_AUDIT_LOG,
|
|
|
|
|
dest="audit_log",
|
|
|
|
|
help=(
|
|
|
|
|
"append-only JSONL audit log for destructive actions "
|
|
|
|
|
f"(default: {_DEFAULT_AUDIT_LOG})"
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--operator",
|
Resolve security-review BLOCK: CI-guard bypasses, denylist parity, force-resume
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
2026-06-17 15:15:50 -04:00
|
|
|
default=_default_operator(),
|
|
|
|
|
help="operator identity recorded in the audit log for destructive actions "
|
|
|
|
|
"(defaults to the OS login so the trail is always attributable)",
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p_init = sub.add_parser("init-db", help="create/upgrade the ledger tables")
|
|
|
|
|
p_init.set_defaults(func=_cmd_init_db)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p_list = sub.add_parser("list", help="list pending questions (read-only)")
|
|
|
|
|
list_filter = p_list.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
|
|
|
|
|
list_filter.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--status",
|
|
|
|
|
choices=QUESTION_STATES,
|
|
|
|
|
default="open",
|
|
|
|
|
help="lifecycle status to list (default: open)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
list_filter.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--all",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
help="list questions in every lifecycle status",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
list_filter.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--parked",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
help="list non-open questions (parked-task context)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_list.set_defaults(func=_cmd_list)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p_show = sub.add_parser("show", help="print one question row (read-only)")
|
|
|
|
|
p_show.add_argument("question_id", help="the question_id to show")
|
|
|
|
|
p_show.set_defaults(func=_cmd_show)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
p_redeliver = sub.add_parser(
|
|
|
|
|
"redeliver",
|
|
|
|
|
help="clear an open question's channel_ref so it is re-posted",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_redeliver.add_argument("question_id", help="the question_id to re-deliver")
|
|
|
|
|
p_redeliver.set_defaults(func=_cmd_redeliver)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
p_expire = sub.add_parser(
|
|
|
|
|
"expire", help="force-expire an open question (destructive)"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_expire.add_argument("question_id", help="the question_id to expire")
|
|
|
|
|
p_expire.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--confirm",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
help="required: confirm this destructive, audit-logged action",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_expire.set_defaults(func=_cmd_expire)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p_answer = sub.add_parser(
|
|
|
|
|
"answer", help="answer a question on a task's behalf (destructive)"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_answer.add_argument("question_id", help="the question_id to answer")
|
|
|
|
|
p_answer.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--answer",
|
|
|
|
|
required=True,
|
|
|
|
|
help="the answer payload (stored verbatim as answer_json)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_answer.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--via",
|
|
|
|
|
default="",
|
|
|
|
|
help="answering identity for answered_via (default: cli:<operator>)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_answer.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--confirm",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
help="required: confirm this destructive, audit-logged action",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_answer.set_defaults(func=_cmd_answer)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p_supersede = sub.add_parser(
|
|
|
|
|
"supersede", help="mark a stale question superseded (destructive)"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_supersede.add_argument("question_id", help="the question_id to supersede")
|
|
|
|
|
p_supersede.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--confirm",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
help="required: confirm this destructive, audit-logged action",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_supersede.set_defaults(func=_cmd_supersede)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
|
|
|
p_resume = sub.add_parser(
|
|
|
|
|
"force-resume",
|
|
|
|
|
help="force-resume a parked task's question (destructive)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_resume.add_argument("question_id", help="the question_id to force-resume")
|
|
|
|
|
p_resume.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--confirm",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
help="required: confirm this destructive, audit-logged action",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_resume.set_defaults(func=_cmd_force_resume)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-23 20:49:09 -04:00
|
|
|
p_dispatch = sub.add_parser(
|
|
|
|
|
"dispatch",
|
|
|
|
|
help=(
|
|
|
|
|
"operator-initiated dispatch of a task's built diff into org CI (P3, "
|
|
|
|
|
"option-b) — needs a WRITE-capable GH_TOKEN in the env"
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_dispatch.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"thread_id", help="the task thread_id whose candidate_diff to dispatch"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_dispatch.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--owner", default=None, help="repo owner (default $AGENT_TEAM_REPO_OWNER)"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_dispatch.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--repo", default=None, help="repo name (default $AGENT_TEAM_REPO_NAME)"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_dispatch.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--base",
|
|
|
|
|
default=None,
|
|
|
|
|
help="base branch (default $AGENT_TEAM_BASE_BRANCH or main)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_dispatch.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--diff",
|
|
|
|
|
default=None,
|
|
|
|
|
help="path to a unified-diff file (overrides the ledger candidate_diff)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_dispatch.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--scope",
|
|
|
|
|
default=None,
|
|
|
|
|
help="path to a newline-separated declared-scope file (overrides plan.scope)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_dispatch.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--write-back",
|
|
|
|
|
dest="write_back",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
help="write the located run_id into the task checkpoint so VERIFY binds to it",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_dispatch.set_defaults(func=_cmd_dispatch)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-18 12:56:42 -04:00
|
|
|
p_start = sub.add_parser(
|
|
|
|
|
"start",
|
|
|
|
|
help="intake: start one task and run it to the first human gate",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_start.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--task",
|
|
|
|
|
required=True,
|
|
|
|
|
help="the task description (intake text) to run through the pipeline",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_start.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--transport",
|
|
|
|
|
choices=_TRANSPORT_CHOICES,
|
|
|
|
|
default="slack",
|
|
|
|
|
help="channel for delivering clarifier questions (default: slack)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_start.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--dry-run",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
dest="dry_run",
|
|
|
|
|
help="use a non-posting transport (no token needed; ledger still written)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_start.set_defaults(func=_cmd_start)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p_serve = sub.add_parser(
|
|
|
|
|
"serve",
|
|
|
|
|
help="run the coordinator daemon (binds invoker, runs the loop)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_serve.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--transport",
|
|
|
|
|
choices=_TRANSPORT_CHOICES,
|
|
|
|
|
default="slack",
|
|
|
|
|
help="channel for delivering clarifier questions (default: slack)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_serve.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--dry-run",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
dest="dry_run",
|
|
|
|
|
help="use a non-posting transport (no token needed)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_serve.set_defaults(func=_cmd_serve)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-18 13:23:02 -04:00
|
|
|
p_intake = sub.add_parser(
|
|
|
|
|
"intake-github",
|
|
|
|
|
help="poll a repo for labeled issues and start one task per new issue",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_intake.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--owner",
|
|
|
|
|
required=True,
|
|
|
|
|
help="GitHub repository owner / org login to poll for intake issues",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_intake.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--repo",
|
|
|
|
|
required=True,
|
|
|
|
|
help="GitHub repository name to poll for intake issues",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_intake.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--label",
|
|
|
|
|
required=True,
|
|
|
|
|
help="issue label that flags an issue as pipeline intake (non-empty)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_intake.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--transport",
|
|
|
|
|
choices=_TRANSPORT_CHOICES,
|
|
|
|
|
default="github",
|
|
|
|
|
help="channel for delivering clarifier questions (default: github)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_intake.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--dry-run",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
dest="dry_run",
|
|
|
|
|
help="use a non-posting transport (no token needed; ingest still runs)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_intake.set_defaults(func=_cmd_intake_github)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-18 15:56:52 -04:00
|
|
|
p_intake_checker = sub.add_parser(
|
|
|
|
|
"intake-checker",
|
|
|
|
|
help=(
|
|
|
|
|
"read checker reports and start one remediation task per confirmed "
|
|
|
|
|
"at/above-threshold finding (P5 cross-plane loop)"
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_intake_checker.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--report",
|
|
|
|
|
required=True,
|
|
|
|
|
action="append",
|
|
|
|
|
metavar="PATH",
|
|
|
|
|
help=(
|
|
|
|
|
"checker report JSON file or directory of *.json reports; repeatable "
|
|
|
|
|
"to ingest several reports in one pass"
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_intake_checker.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--threshold",
|
|
|
|
|
default="high",
|
|
|
|
|
choices=("low", "medium", "high", "critical"),
|
|
|
|
|
help=(
|
|
|
|
|
"minimum severity a confirmed finding must reach to spawn a task "
|
|
|
|
|
"(default: high)"
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_intake_checker.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--transport",
|
|
|
|
|
choices=_TRANSPORT_CHOICES,
|
|
|
|
|
default="github",
|
|
|
|
|
help="channel for delivering clarifier questions (default: github)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_intake_checker.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--dry-run",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
dest="dry_run",
|
|
|
|
|
help="use a non-posting transport (no token needed; ingest still runs)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_intake_checker.set_defaults(func=_cmd_intake_checker)
|
feat(agent-team): Plane-1 fixer — finding→patch→CI draft-PR (dep-bumps, opt-in/inert) (#21)
* feat(agent-team): Plane-1 Tier-3 fixer — dependency-cve finding -> patch + CI dispatch (opt-in/inert)
The fixer (design §4 fixer row, §7 Phase 5, §3.3.2) takes a CONFIRMED,
low-risk dependency-cve finding (the narrowest fix class) and produces:
* a fix SPEC (Claude, via the §3.1 billing seam), and
* a minimal bump PATCH (DeepSeek fast_coder, via the orchestrator run.py
path that builders_llm uses),
records the candidate diff + its content-hash, and emits the org-CI
workflow_dispatch inputs (task_id / diff_artifact_name / expected_diff_hash /
declared_scope) for the gate-passed P3-live apply/verify surface.
INERT / opt-in / fail-safe, mirroring build_verify_wiring:
* plan_fix dispatches NOTHING; dispatch_fix has NO default dispatcher
(the box holds no write token, D2) so an un-wired call can never fire a
workflow.
* no git/patch/subprocess/fs-write in executable code — the patch is emitted
as diff TEXT only; CI applies it and opens a DRAFT PR, the box never
applies/pushes/merges.
* untrusted-patch hygiene: the generated diff is confined box-side to the
single dependency manifest (declared_scope) and rejected via
ci_gate.denylist_violations if it escapes scope or touches the
trust-control surface — defense-in-depth with the CI guard.
* bad/ambiguous findings (wrong check/status/category, missing
package/fixed_version, ambiguous fixed_version, unparseable/empty diff)
yield a FAILED no-op plan, never a fabricated fix.
29 new pytest tests under agent-team/tests/test_fixer.py.
* feat(agent-team): run-team.py 'fix --dry-run' subcommand for the Plane-1 fixer
Adds the fixer front door to the operator CLI: load one confirmed
dependency-cve finding from a dependency-cve.json report (--report
--finding-id), plan the fix, and in --dry-run print the spec + patch + the
org-CI workflow_dispatch inputs WITHOUT dispatching anything.
Opt-in/inert: the command binds NO workflow dispatcher and holds no write
token, so even an ok plan only prints; live dispatch is provisioning-gated
(refuses to run without --dry-run). A non-fixable finding prints the
fail-safe reason and exits 1.
4 new pytest tests under agent-team/tests/test_run_team.py.
2026-06-18 16:17:33 -04:00
|
|
|
p_fix = sub.add_parser(
|
|
|
|
|
"fix",
|
|
|
|
|
help=(
|
|
|
|
|
"plan a Plane-1 dep-bump fix for a confirmed dependency-cve finding "
|
|
|
|
|
"and (dry-run) show what it WOULD dispatch to org CI"
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_fix.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--report",
|
|
|
|
|
required=True,
|
|
|
|
|
help="path to the dependency-cve.json finding report to read the finding from",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_fix.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--finding-id",
|
|
|
|
|
required=True,
|
|
|
|
|
dest="finding_id",
|
|
|
|
|
help="the finding id (report findings[].id) to fix",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_fix.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--task-id",
|
|
|
|
|
required=True,
|
|
|
|
|
dest="task_id",
|
|
|
|
|
help="pipeline task id (provenance; becomes the CI dispatch task_id)",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_fix.add_argument(
|
|
|
|
|
"--dry-run",
|
|
|
|
|
action="store_true",
|
|
|
|
|
dest="dry_run",
|
|
|
|
|
help=(
|
|
|
|
|
"show the spec + patch + dispatch inputs WITHOUT dispatching "
|
|
|
|
|
"(the only supported mode; live dispatch is provisioning-gated)"
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
p_fix.set_defaults(func=_cmd_fix)
|
2026-06-18 15:56:52 -04:00
|
|
|
|
Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
|
|
|
return parser
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None, *, out: Any = None) -> int:
|
|
|
|
|
"""CLI entry point. Returns a process exit code.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
``argv`` defaults to ``sys.argv[1:]``; ``out`` defaults to ``sys.stdout``
|
|
|
|
|
(injectable for tests). Operational failures return ``1``; a missing
|
|
|
|
|
``--confirm`` on a destructive action raises :class:`PermissionError`,
|
|
|
|
|
surfaced as exit code ``1`` with a stderr message.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
out = out if out is not None else sys.stdout
|
|
|
|
|
parser = build_parser()
|
|
|
|
|
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
return int(args.func(args, out=out))
|
|
|
|
|
except PermissionError as exc:
|
Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
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# A refused destructive action (no --confirm) or an unwritable audit
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# path. The attempt-before-mutate ordering means nothing was mutated.
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Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
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print(f"error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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Fix verified P1 findings: denylist bypasses, CAS concurrency, operator CLI
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
2026-06-17 14:35:51 -04:00
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except OSError as exc:
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# Any other audit-log / filesystem failure (e.g. the audit append could
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# not be written). Surfaced cleanly instead of as an uncaught traceback;
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# if the attempt record was written, the action is on the trail.
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print(f"error: audit/IO failure: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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Add Plane-2 leaf scaffold (pipeline graph, nodes, HITL, transports, CI)
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto
the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean.
Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled):
- LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable)
- nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier
- §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder
- transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters
- ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness
- ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled
KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up):
- builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete)
- §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency
- operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap
- ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.)
- P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven
Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning,
/sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
2026-06-17 14:17:44 -04:00
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if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover
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raise SystemExit(main())
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