open-swe/agent/dashboard/oauth.py
Johannes du Plessis cb4c643e43
feat: open Slack-triggered PRs as the triggering user (#1375)
* feat: open Slack-triggered PRs as the triggering user

Route the Slack per-user GitHub token through the dashboard OAuth store
(the backend the self-service link prompt populates) and block runs that
lack a valid user token, prompting the user to (re-)link. Per-user OAuth
now wins over bot-token-only mode for mapped Slack/dashboard users.

Flip commit/PR authorship across all sources: the triggering user is the
commit author (via repo-local git identity using their resolvable GitHub
noreply email) and open-swe[bot] is the Co-authored-by collaborator.

* fix: address PR review — shell-escape commit identity, fix token cache impersonation

- Shell-escape the triggering user's name/email with shlex.quote before
  embedding them in the repo-setup `git config` command, so a name like
  O'Connor (or a crafted one) can't break or inject into the command.
- Stop consulting the shared thread-metadata token cache in
  _resolve_dashboard_user_token. Slack thread ids are shared across the
  conversation, so a cached token from a prior triggering user could be
  returned for the current github_login. Always resolve by login from the
  dashboard OAuth store instead.

* feat: dashboard self-service user mapping + UI cleanup

- Add session-scoped GET/PUT /dashboard/api/my-mapping so users can set their
  own work email / Slack member ID (keyed by their GitHub login, source=self).
- Slack account-link prompt now redirects to Profile Settings after auth.
- Rename "My Settings" -> "Profile Settings" and "Cloud Agents" -> "Open SWE
  Agent"; remove the Integrations tab/section (folded out, low value for now)
  and redirect /integrations to Profile Settings.
- Add a "User mapping" section to Profile Settings (work email used by Slack
  and Linear, optional Slack member ID).
- Make dashboard auth cookies scheme-aware: Secure;SameSite=None over HTTPS,
  non-Secure;SameSite=Lax over http://localhost so local login works.

* feat: self-service Slack account linking via Sign in with Slack (OIDC)

Replace the spoofable manual work-email/Slack-ID form with a verified
"Sign in with Slack" flow so a logged-in GitHub user can only ever link
their own Slack identity.

- New agent/dashboard/slack_oauth.py: OIDC authorize URL, code exchange,
  userInfo identity parse, optional workspace gate, configured check.
- routes.py: session-gated GET /slack/login and /slack/callback that upsert
  the mapping from Slack-verified user_id + email (source=slack_oauth).
  Remove the spoofable PUT /my-mapping; expose slack_oauth_enabled on /me.
- UI: drop the editable inputs; add a Connect Slack button + status to the
  User mapping section.

Admin-managed mappings are unaffected and still resolve at trigger time.
2026-06-02 15:04:20 -07:00

310 lines
10 KiB
Python

"""GitHub App OAuth code-exchange and signed-JWT session cookie."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import logging
import os
import secrets
import time
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from typing import Any
from urllib.parse import quote, urlparse
import httpx
import jwt
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from agent.utils.github_org_membership import is_user_active_org_member
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
COOKIE_NAME = "osw_session"
STATE_COOKIE_NAME = "osw_oauth_state"
SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60
STATE_TTL_SECONDS = 600
JWT_ALG = "HS256"
GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID = os.environ.get("GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID", "")
GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET = os.environ.get("GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET", "")
def _secret() -> str:
s = os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET", "")
if not s:
raise HTTPException(500, "DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET not configured")
return s
def _allowed_redirect_origins() -> set[str]:
"""Origins permitted for the post-login redirect.
Built from DASHBOARD_BASE_URL plus any DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_ORIGINS entries
so the dashboard itself and its preview deploys can all be redirect
targets — but nothing else.
"""
origins: set[str] = set()
base = os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_BASE_URL", "").strip()
if base:
origins.add(_origin_of(base))
for entry in os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", "").split(","):
entry = entry.strip()
if entry:
origins.add(_origin_of(entry))
origins.discard("")
return origins
def _origin_of(url: str) -> str:
parsed = urlparse(url)
if not parsed.scheme or not parsed.netloc:
return ""
return f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}"
def sanitize_redirect_to(redirect_to: str | None) -> str:
"""Return a safe post-login redirect URL.
Falls back to DASHBOARD_BASE_URL when the supplied URL's origin isn't
explicitly allowed. This blocks the open-redirect / phishing primitive
where an attacker drops their own URL into `?redirect_to=`.
"""
fallback = os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_BASE_URL", "").strip()
if not redirect_to:
return fallback
candidate_origin = _origin_of(redirect_to)
if not candidate_origin:
return fallback
if candidate_origin in _allowed_redirect_origins():
return redirect_to
logger.warning("Rejected redirect_to=%r — origin not in allowlist", redirect_to)
return fallback
def _allowed_login_orgs() -> frozenset[str]:
"""Orgs whose members may log in to the dashboard.
Reuses the webhook-side ``ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS`` allowlist so deployments
configure a single org gate. When empty the dashboard login gate is
disabled (fail-open) to preserve existing deployments.
"""
return frozenset(
org.strip().lower()
for org in os.environ.get("ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS", "").split(",")
if org.strip()
)
async def enforce_org_login_gate(login: str) -> None:
"""Reject dashboard login for users outside the allowed GitHub org(s).
No-op when ``ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS`` is unset. Otherwise the user must be an
active member of at least one configured org; membership is checked with
the GitHub App installation token (fail-closed on any API error).
"""
orgs = _allowed_login_orgs()
if not orgs:
return
for org in orgs:
if await is_user_active_org_member(login, org):
return
logger.warning("Rejected dashboard login for %r — not in allowed org(s)", login)
raise HTTPException(403, "your GitHub account is not a member of an authorized organization")
def issue_session(*, login: str, email: str | None, avatar_url: str | None) -> str:
now = int(time.time())
payload = {
"sub": login,
"email": email,
"avatar_url": avatar_url,
"iat": now,
"exp": now + SESSION_TTL_SECONDS,
}
return jwt.encode(payload, _secret(), algorithm=JWT_ALG)
def decode_session(token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
try:
return jwt.decode(token, _secret(), algorithms=[JWT_ALG])
except jwt.PyJWTError as e:
raise HTTPException(401, f"invalid session: {e}") from e
def new_state_nonce() -> str:
"""A fresh random nonce used to bind state JWT ↔ browser cookie."""
return secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
def hash_state_nonce(nonce: str) -> str:
"""HMAC the nonce so the value stored on the wire isn't reversible.
We compare ``hash_state_nonce(cookie_nonce) == state.nonce_hash`` at
callback time. Using HMAC over a constant-time digest also gives us
timing-attack resistance via :func:`hmac.compare_digest` at the call
site.
"""
return hmac.new(_secret().encode(), nonce.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def issue_state(*, redirect_to: str, nonce_hash: str, link: str | None = None) -> str:
now = int(time.time())
payload: dict[str, Any] = {
"nonce_hash": nonce_hash,
"redirect_to": redirect_to,
"iat": now,
"exp": now + STATE_TTL_SECONDS,
}
if link:
payload["link"] = link
return jwt.encode(payload, _secret(), algorithm=JWT_ALG)
def decode_state(state: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
try:
return jwt.decode(state, _secret(), algorithms=[JWT_ALG])
except jwt.PyJWTError as e:
raise HTTPException(400, f"invalid state: {e}") from e
LINK_TTL_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60
# Dashboard route where users manage their GitHub↔Slack link.
PROFILE_SETTINGS_PATH = "/my-settings"
def issue_account_link(*, slack_user_id: str | None, work_email: str | None) -> str:
"""Sign a short-lived token carrying the Slack identity to map after login.
Threaded through the OAuth ``state`` so the callback can attach the
resolved ``github_login`` to the originating Slack user/email in one step.
"""
now = int(time.time())
payload = {
"kind": "account_link",
"slack_user_id": slack_user_id or None,
"work_email": work_email or None,
"iat": now,
"exp": now + LINK_TTL_SECONDS,
}
return jwt.encode(payload, _secret(), algorithm=JWT_ALG)
def decode_account_link(token: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Decode an account-link token; return ``None`` if absent/invalid/expired."""
if not token:
return None
try:
payload = jwt.decode(token, _secret(), algorithms=[JWT_ALG])
except jwt.PyJWTError as e:
logger.warning("invalid account-link token: %s", e)
return None
if payload.get("kind") != "account_link":
return None
return payload
def build_account_link_url(*, slack_user_id: str | None, work_email: str | None) -> str | None:
"""Return the dashboard login URL that links a Slack identity on completion.
Returns ``None`` when ``DASHBOARD_API_BASE_URL`` isn't configured (login
can't be initiated), so callers can skip the prompt cleanly.
"""
api_base = os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_API_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/")
if not api_base:
return None
token = issue_account_link(slack_user_id=slack_user_id, work_email=work_email)
url = f"{api_base}/dashboard/api/auth/login?link={quote(token, safe='')}"
# Land the user on the Profile Settings page so they can review/complete
# their GitHub↔Slack link after re-authenticating.
frontend_base = os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/")
if frontend_base:
redirect_to = f"{frontend_base}{PROFILE_SETTINGS_PATH}"
url += f"&redirect_to={quote(redirect_to, safe='')}"
return url
def require_session(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
token = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME)
if not token:
raise HTTPException(401, "not authenticated")
return decode_session(token)
def expires_at_from_github_response(data: dict[str, Any], *, field: str) -> str | None:
"""Convert GitHub ``expires_in`` / ``refresh_token_expires_in`` to an ISO timestamp."""
raw = data.get(field)
if not isinstance(raw, int | float) or raw <= 0:
return None
return (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=int(raw))).isoformat()
async def _request_github_tokens(body: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID or not GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET:
raise HTTPException(500, "GitHub App OAuth not configured")
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
resp = await client.post(
"https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token",
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
data=body,
)
resp.raise_for_status()
data = resp.json()
if not isinstance(data, dict):
raise HTTPException(502, "unexpected GitHub OAuth response")
if data.get("error"):
raise HTTPException(
400, f"github oauth error: {data.get('error_description') or data['error']}"
)
return data
async def exchange_code(code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Exchange an OAuth authorization code for user-to-server tokens."""
data = await _request_github_tokens(
{
"client_id": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID,
"client_secret": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
"code": code,
}
)
if not data.get("access_token"):
raise HTTPException(400, f"oauth exchange failed: {data}")
return data
async def refresh_user_access_token(refresh_token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Rotate an expiring user access token using its refresh token."""
data = await _request_github_tokens(
{
"client_id": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID,
"client_secret": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
"grant_type": "refresh_token",
"refresh_token": refresh_token,
}
)
if not data.get("access_token"):
raise HTTPException(400, f"oauth refresh failed: {data}")
return data
async def fetch_github_user(access_token: str) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str | None]:
"""Return ``(user, primary_email)`` for the authenticated user."""
headers = {
"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}",
"Accept": "application/vnd.github+json",
"X-GitHub-Api-Version": "2022-11-28",
}
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
u = await client.get("https://api.github.com/user", headers=headers)
u.raise_for_status()
user = u.json()
email = user.get("email")
if not email:
e = await client.get("https://api.github.com/user/emails", headers=headers)
if e.status_code == 200:
primary = next((x for x in e.json() if x.get("primary")), None)
if primary:
email = primary.get("email")
return user, email