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* feat: port plan-review & workflow-approval UX (#135)
Port six upstream commits onto dev:
- c03a6be7 (already ported): keep plan guidance high-level
- 546042a4: add workflow approval UI with diff preview, approval URLs,
web review links, and polling for approval status during active runs
- 216cf181: remove workflow token elevation; approved pushes pass
through directly without proxy token rewriting
- 3dbc0282: preserve plan redirects after login by accepting relative
same-origin redirect_to values and rejecting blocked paths
- bb104d93: submit plan comments with cmd+enter
- 90cb6caa: terse Slack replies, shared content via save_plan outside
plan mode (PLAN_STATUS_SHARED), reject shared-content mutations
Refs: #135
* fix: restore login page render and clear CI lint/format
The plan-review port removed the authRedirectUrl import from login.tsx
but left its call site, crashing the login page at runtime (blank page,
no 'Sign in to open-swe'). Pass the relative path straight to loginUrl,
matching the plan route and the backend relative-redirect handling.
Also drop an unused os import in the guard test and reformat
workflow_push_guard.py to satisfy ruff.
* fix: carry workflows:write on the standing proxy token
Complete the half-ported upstream 216cf181 cascade. The port dropped
_run_with_workflow_token from the guard but missed the paired github_app
change, so an approved .github/workflows push ran with the base token
(no workflows:write) and GitHub 403'd it.
Add workflows:write to BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS and delete the
now-orphaned WORKFLOW_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS constant; update the
github_app and proxy_auth tests to match. The HITL approval gate in
workflow_push_guard.py is unchanged — this only lets the standing token
push once a human approves.
* fix: restore transient workflow-token elevation (revert standing workflows:write)
The standing GitHub-App proxy token (BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS) is
ALWAYS-ON, so carrying workflows:write on it made the fork's HITL workflow-push
guard the sole control over unapproved workflow pushes. The guard's git-push
parser has gaps (obfuscated-expansion push, `gh api` REST contents PUT,
fully-qualified cross-branch refspecs); with a permanently workflows-scoped
token those gaps become live unapproved-workflow-push exploits (1 critical, 2
high — security review BLOCK on #159).
Restore dev's transient-elevation model:
- Drop workflows:write from BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS; re-add the
WORKFLOW_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS constant (base + workflows:write).
- Re-introduce _run_with_workflow_token in the guard: it mints the
workflows-scoped token via refresh_proxy_token around the approved,
guard-normalized fixed_command, then downscopes to RUNTIME then BASE in a
finally. Route the approval branch through it.
- Restore the dev token/elevation tests.
The standing token no longer carries workflows:write, so the three parser
bypasses hit GitHub 403 again; an approved push still succeeds because the
elevation grants workflows:write only around the normalized command. Keeps all
of #159's diff-preview / approval-URL / Slack-card guard additions.
* fix: reject protocol-relative path from sanitizeAuthRedirect (open redirect)
sanitizeAuthRedirect returned parsed.pathname+search+hash, which `new URL` can
resolve to a protocol-relative `//host` (e.g. input `/..//evil.com` normalizes
same-origin, passing the origin check, but yields a path starting with `//`).
ClientRedirect / login.tsx feed that path to window.location.replace, so it
navigates cross-origin — an open redirect. Reject any resolved path that is not
a single-leading-slash path (`^/[^/]`), falling back to the default. Adds
coverage for `/..//evil.com`, `/.//evil.com`, and `//evil.com`.
* fix: log SECURITY error when workflow-token downscope fails
The elevate->push->downscope finally block was silent on failure. If both
refresh_proxy_token calls fail, the sandbox retains workflows:write for the
rest of the run with no signal. Log a SECURITY error on the partial and full
downscope-failure paths so the retention is observable.
Addresses the GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the token-scope remediation.
---------
Co-authored-by: amoussa1229 <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
84 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
84 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
/** @vitest-environment jsdom */
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import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest"
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import { loginUrl } from "./api"
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import {
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AUTH_REDIRECT_STORAGE_KEY,
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DEFAULT_AUTH_REDIRECT,
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authRedirectPathFromLocation,
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authRedirectUrl,
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consumeAuthRedirect,
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currentAuthRedirectPath,
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getRememberedAuthRedirect,
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rememberAuthRedirect,
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sanitizeAuthRedirect,
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} from "./auth-redirect-core"
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beforeEach(() => {
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window.sessionStorage.clear()
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window.history.pushState({}, "", "/")
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})
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describe("auth redirect helpers", () => {
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it("captures protected route targets as relative paths", () => {
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const path = authRedirectPathFromLocation({
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pathname: "/agents/thread-1/plan",
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search: "?from=slack",
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hash: "#review",
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})
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expect(path).toBe("/agents/thread-1/plan?from=slack#review")
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expect(rememberAuthRedirect(path)).toBe(path)
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expect(window.sessionStorage.getItem(AUTH_REDIRECT_STORAGE_KEY)).toBe(path)
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})
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it("resolves login targets to absolute same-origin URLs", () => {
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const path = rememberAuthRedirect("/agents/thread-1/plan?from=slack#review")
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const target = `${window.location.origin}/agents/thread-1/plan?from=slack#review`
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expect(authRedirectUrl(path)).toBe(target)
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expect(loginUrl(authRedirectUrl(path))).toContain(
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encodeURIComponent(target)
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)
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})
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it("consumes remembered targets and clears session storage", () => {
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rememberAuthRedirect("/agents/thread-1/plan")
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expect(consumeAuthRedirect()).toBe("/agents/thread-1/plan")
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expect(getRememberedAuthRedirect()).toBeNull()
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})
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it("falls back for unsafe targets", () => {
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expect(
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sanitizeAuthRedirect("https://evil.example/agents/thread-1/plan")
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).toBe(DEFAULT_AUTH_REDIRECT)
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expect(sanitizeAuthRedirect("//evil.example/agents/thread-1/plan")).toBe(
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DEFAULT_AUTH_REDIRECT
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)
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expect(sanitizeAuthRedirect("/login?redirect=/agents/thread-1/plan")).toBe(
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DEFAULT_AUTH_REDIRECT
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)
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})
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it("rejects inputs that resolve to a protocol-relative path", () => {
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// These resolve same-origin (passing the origin check) but yield a `//host`
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// path that would navigate cross-origin via window.location.replace.
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expect(sanitizeAuthRedirect("/..//evil.com")).toBe(DEFAULT_AUTH_REDIRECT)
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expect(sanitizeAuthRedirect("/.//evil.com")).toBe(DEFAULT_AUTH_REDIRECT)
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expect(sanitizeAuthRedirect("//evil.com")).toBe(DEFAULT_AUTH_REDIRECT)
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})
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it("builds a plan sign-in target for the current plan URL", () => {
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window.history.pushState({}, "", "/agents/thread-1/plan?from=slack")
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expect(currentAuthRedirectPath()).toBe("/agents/thread-1/plan?from=slack")
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expect(loginUrl(authRedirectUrl(currentAuthRedirectPath()))).toContain(
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encodeURIComponent(
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`${window.location.origin}/agents/thread-1/plan?from=slack`
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)
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)
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})
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})
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