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* wip(rebuild): core reliability spine
- remove PR-babysitting (ci_autofix + ci_monitor graph + webhook wiring)
- dispatch core: agent/dispatch.py with multitask_strategy=interrupt +
durability=sync + completion webhook; reroute all webhook + plan triggers;
drop the racy in-process lock + is_thread_active busy-check
- completion webhook: agent/completion.py + /webhooks/run-complete loopback
route for failure/timeout replies (idempotent)
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* feat(rebuild): async tools, reconcile, shared http timeouts, assembly tuning
Parallel batch on top of the reliability spine:
- async-ify all 24 tools (drop asyncio.run; requests->httpx); re-implement the
http_request/fetch_url SSRF + DNS-rebinding defense httpx-natively and harden
the IP check to 'not is_global' (+ IPv4-mapped unwrap)
- reconcile.py: stale pending-run sweep (threads.search -> per-thread runs.list
-> cancel_many), wired into the scheduler graph via task='reconcile'
- shared DEFAULT_HTTP_TIMEOUT (agent/utils/http.py) on every bare
httpx.AsyncClient() across utils/dashboard/webapp/middleware
- run budget: MODEL_CALL_RECURSION_LIMIT 5000->250
- fix stale OpenAI->Anthropic fallback id (claude-opus-4-5 -> 4-8)
- drop redundant custom repair middleware (deepagents auto-adds PatchToolCalls)
- confirm tool-result eviction + summarization auto-wired via backend
- slim system prompt ~8% (full harness-profile rewrite deferred)
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* feat(rebuild): harness-profile prompt + split webhooks out of webapp
- prompt.py: own the system prompt via a registered harness profile
(OPEN_SWE_SHARED_BASE, kept neutral so the read-only reviewer/analyzer that
share it stay safe), registered across all 4 providers; per-thread values
stay in construct_system_prompt. Assembled main-agent prompt ~6.8k -> ~3.1k
tokens (~55% smaller); de-duped PR/commit/suite/force-push guidance; dropped
ALL-CAPS markers.
- webapp.py 3325 -> 1890 LOC: moved 14 per-source handlers into
agent/webhooks/{linear,slack,github}.py; webapp re-exports them for the
routes + tests; moved handlers reach shared helpers via the webapp namespace
to preserve the test suite's monkeypatch targets.
Full suite: 1168 passing, lint clean.
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* Restore MODEL_CALL_RECURSION_LIMIT to 5000 for long-running tasks
Reverts the 250 cap from the run-budget change — long-running tasks legitimately
need many model calls. The notify_step_limit_reached safety net still fires if a
run does hit the cap, so runs end with a signal either way.
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* fix: address PR review (auth, SSRF, interrupted status, redirect headers)
- completion.py: drop `interrupted` from failure statuses — with
multitask_strategy=interrupt a follow-up ends the prior run as interrupted,
which is healthy, not a failure to report. [open-swe]
- /webhooks/run-complete: shared-secret auth — dispatch appends ?token= when
RUN_COMPLETE_WEBHOOK_SECRET is set; route verifies via hmac.compare_digest.
[corridor-security]
- SSRF: extract the URL validator to agent/utils/url_safety.py and apply it
before server-side image fetches in multimodal.fetch_image_block.
[corridor-security]
- http_request: preserve caller headers/extensions across redirect hops instead
of dropping them on the first hop. [open-swe]
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* chore: remove REBUILD_PLAN.md (planning doc, not needed in the repo)
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* fix: fail closed on run-complete webhook auth when secret unset
Corridor follow-up: verify_run_complete_token returns False (not True) when
RUN_COMPLETE_WEBHOOK_SECRET is unset, so the public route is never
unauthenticated. Logs a startup warning when the secret is absent, and dispatch
skips registering the webhook when there's no secret (no rejected callbacks).
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
---------
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot] <open-swe@users.noreply.github.com>
173 lines
5.5 KiB
Python
173 lines
5.5 KiB
Python
from typing import Any
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from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse, urlunparse
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import httpx
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from ..utils.url_safety import resolve_and_validate as _resolve_and_validate
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_MAX_REDIRECTS = 5
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_REDIRECT_CODES = {301, 302, 303, 307, 308}
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def _blocked_response(url: str, reason: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
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return {
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"success": False,
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"status_code": 0,
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"headers": {},
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"content": f"Request blocked: {reason}",
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"url": url,
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}
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def _pinned_url(url: str, ip: str) -> str:
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"""Rewrite ``url`` so the connection targets ``ip`` while keeping the path/query.
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The original hostname is preserved separately for the ``Host`` header and TLS
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SNI/cert verification (via httpx's ``sni_hostname`` request extension).
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"""
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parsed = urlparse(url)
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host_literal = f"[{ip}]" if ":" in ip else ip
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netloc = f"{host_literal}:{parsed.port}" if parsed.port else host_literal
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return urlunparse(parsed._replace(netloc=netloc))
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async def _request_with_safe_redirects(
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client: httpx.AsyncClient,
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method: str,
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url: str,
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**kwargs: Any,
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) -> tuple[httpx.Response | None, dict[str, Any] | None]:
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"""Issue a request while validating every redirect target before following it.
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The hostname is resolved once per hop and the connection is pinned to the
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validated IP, closing the DNS-rebinding race where a controlled resolver
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returns a public IP at validation time and a private IP at connect time.
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"""
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current_method = method.upper()
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current_url = url
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request_kwargs = dict(kwargs)
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# Pop caller headers/extensions ONCE so they're reused on every redirect hop
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# (the per-hop Host + SNI are layered on top each time). Popping inside the
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# loop dropped the caller's Authorization/Accept/etc. on the first redirect.
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caller_headers = dict(request_kwargs.pop("headers", None) or {})
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caller_extensions = dict(request_kwargs.pop("extensions", None) or {})
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for redirect_count in range(_MAX_REDIRECTS + 1):
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is_safe, reason, hostname, addr_infos = _resolve_and_validate(current_url)
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if not is_safe or hostname is None or addr_infos is None:
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return None, _blocked_response(current_url, reason)
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pinned_ip = addr_infos[0][4][0]
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parsed = urlparse(current_url)
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headers = {**caller_headers, "Host": parsed.netloc}
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extensions = {**caller_extensions, "sni_hostname": hostname}
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response = await client.request(
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current_method,
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_pinned_url(current_url, pinned_ip),
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follow_redirects=False,
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headers=headers,
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extensions=extensions,
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**request_kwargs,
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)
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if response.status_code not in _REDIRECT_CODES:
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return response, None
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location = response.headers.get("Location")
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if not location:
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return response, None
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if redirect_count == _MAX_REDIRECTS:
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return None, _blocked_response(current_url, "Too many redirects")
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current_url = urljoin(current_url, location)
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if response.status_code == 303 or (
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response.status_code in {301, 302} and current_method not in {"GET", "HEAD"}
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):
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current_method = "GET"
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request_kwargs.pop("data", None)
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request_kwargs.pop("content", None)
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request_kwargs.pop("json", None)
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return None, _blocked_response(current_url, "Too many redirects")
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async def http_request(
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url: str,
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method: str = "GET",
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headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
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data: str | dict | None = None,
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params: dict[str, str] | None = None,
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timeout: int = 30,
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) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Make HTTP requests to APIs and web services.
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Do not use this tool for GitHub API calls. Use `GH_TOKEN=dummy gh` in the
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sandbox so GitHub authentication is handled by the sandbox proxy.
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Args:
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url: Target URL
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method: HTTP method (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, etc.)
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headers: HTTP headers to include
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data: Request body data (string or dict)
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params: URL query parameters
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timeout: Request timeout in seconds
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Returns:
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Dictionary with response data including status, headers, and content
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"""
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try:
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kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {}
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if headers:
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kwargs["headers"] = headers
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if params:
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kwargs["params"] = params
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if data:
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if isinstance(data, dict):
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kwargs["json"] = data
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else:
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kwargs["content"] = data
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=timeout) as client:
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response, blocked = await _request_with_safe_redirects(
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client,
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method,
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url,
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**kwargs,
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)
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if blocked:
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return blocked
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try:
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content = response.json()
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except ValueError:
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content = response.text
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return {
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"success": response.status_code < 400,
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"status_code": response.status_code,
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"headers": dict(response.headers),
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"content": content,
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"url": str(response.url),
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}
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except httpx.TimeoutException:
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return {
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"success": False,
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"status_code": 0,
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"headers": {},
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"content": f"Request timed out after {timeout} seconds",
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"url": url,
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}
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except httpx.HTTPError as e:
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return {
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"success": False,
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"status_code": 0,
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"headers": {},
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"content": f"Request error: {e!s}",
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"url": url,
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}
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