mirror of
https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/open-swe.git
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Adam Moussa
b9c348ebba
Mention-triggered reviews that explicitly ask for a verdict now submit a real APPROVE/REQUEST_CHANGES through publish_review; auto-reviews stay advisory (COMMENT). Authorization is enforced in code: publish_review honors a verdict only when the dispatching webhook set verdict_requested, which only the explicit-mention path does. - request_pr_review gains instructions (forwarded verbatim into an escaped requester_instructions data block) and request_verdict - self-review guard downgrades verdicts on Open SWE-authored PRs; stale APPROVEs are best-effort dismissed when later findings land - new PullRequestVerdictGuardMiddleware blocks gh pr review --approve/-a/--request-changes/-r, gh api, and curl verdict fallbacks on both the coding-agent and reviewer graphs - shared escape helper moved to agent/utils/prompt_data.py
31 lines
1.1 KiB
Python
31 lines
1.1 KiB
Python
"""Escaping for untrusted text embedded in XML-wrapped prompt data blocks."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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# Closing tags of every XML wrapper used for untrusted data blocks across the
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# reviewer prompt and webhook-built run prompts. XML tolerates whitespace
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# around the tag name (e.g. `</body >`, `</ body\n>`), so a literal
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# `.replace()` of the canonical spelling alone is insufficient — we match each
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# end tag whitespace-tolerantly and rewrite it to an inert, human-readable
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# form. A shared superset is safe: escaping a closing tag that a given block
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# doesn't use only neutralizes attacker-controlled text.
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DATA_BLOCK_WRAPPER_TAGS = (
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"pr_review_threads",
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"thread",
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"comment",
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"body",
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"pr_overview",
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"title",
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"requester_instructions",
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)
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_CLOSING_TAG_RE = re.compile(
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r"</\s*(" + "|".join(DATA_BLOCK_WRAPPER_TAGS) + r")\s*>",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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def escape_for_data_block(text: str) -> str:
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"""Neutralize closing tags so an attacker-controlled body can't break out."""
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return _CLOSING_TAG_RE.sub(lambda m: f"</{m.group(1).lower()}_>", text)
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