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* feat: port plan-review & workflow-approval UX (#135)
Port six upstream commits onto dev:
- c03a6be7 (already ported): keep plan guidance high-level
- 546042a4: add workflow approval UI with diff preview, approval URLs,
web review links, and polling for approval status during active runs
- 216cf181: remove workflow token elevation; approved pushes pass
through directly without proxy token rewriting
- 3dbc0282: preserve plan redirects after login by accepting relative
same-origin redirect_to values and rejecting blocked paths
- bb104d93: submit plan comments with cmd+enter
- 90cb6caa: terse Slack replies, shared content via save_plan outside
plan mode (PLAN_STATUS_SHARED), reject shared-content mutations
Refs: #135
* fix: restore login page render and clear CI lint/format
The plan-review port removed the authRedirectUrl import from login.tsx
but left its call site, crashing the login page at runtime (blank page,
no 'Sign in to open-swe'). Pass the relative path straight to loginUrl,
matching the plan route and the backend relative-redirect handling.
Also drop an unused os import in the guard test and reformat
workflow_push_guard.py to satisfy ruff.
* fix: carry workflows:write on the standing proxy token
Complete the half-ported upstream 216cf181 cascade. The port dropped
_run_with_workflow_token from the guard but missed the paired github_app
change, so an approved .github/workflows push ran with the base token
(no workflows:write) and GitHub 403'd it.
Add workflows:write to BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS and delete the
now-orphaned WORKFLOW_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS constant; update the
github_app and proxy_auth tests to match. The HITL approval gate in
workflow_push_guard.py is unchanged — this only lets the standing token
push once a human approves.
* fix: restore transient workflow-token elevation (revert standing workflows:write)
The standing GitHub-App proxy token (BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS) is
ALWAYS-ON, so carrying workflows:write on it made the fork's HITL workflow-push
guard the sole control over unapproved workflow pushes. The guard's git-push
parser has gaps (obfuscated-expansion push, `gh api` REST contents PUT,
fully-qualified cross-branch refspecs); with a permanently workflows-scoped
token those gaps become live unapproved-workflow-push exploits (1 critical, 2
high — security review BLOCK on #159).
Restore dev's transient-elevation model:
- Drop workflows:write from BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS; re-add the
WORKFLOW_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS constant (base + workflows:write).
- Re-introduce _run_with_workflow_token in the guard: it mints the
workflows-scoped token via refresh_proxy_token around the approved,
guard-normalized fixed_command, then downscopes to RUNTIME then BASE in a
finally. Route the approval branch through it.
- Restore the dev token/elevation tests.
The standing token no longer carries workflows:write, so the three parser
bypasses hit GitHub 403 again; an approved push still succeeds because the
elevation grants workflows:write only around the normalized command. Keeps all
of #159's diff-preview / approval-URL / Slack-card guard additions.
* fix: reject protocol-relative path from sanitizeAuthRedirect (open redirect)
sanitizeAuthRedirect returned parsed.pathname+search+hash, which `new URL` can
resolve to a protocol-relative `//host` (e.g. input `/..//evil.com` normalizes
same-origin, passing the origin check, but yields a path starting with `//`).
ClientRedirect / login.tsx feed that path to window.location.replace, so it
navigates cross-origin — an open redirect. Reject any resolved path that is not
a single-leading-slash path (`^/[^/]`), falling back to the default. Adds
coverage for `/..//evil.com`, `/.//evil.com`, and `//evil.com`.
* fix: log SECURITY error when workflow-token downscope fails
The elevate->push->downscope finally block was silent on failure. If both
refresh_proxy_token calls fail, the sandbox retains workflows:write for the
rest of the run with no signal. Log a SECURITY error on the partial and full
downscope-failure paths so the retention is observable.
Addresses the GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the token-scope remediation.
---------
Co-authored-by: amoussa1229 <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
75 lines
2.9 KiB
Python
75 lines
2.9 KiB
Python
"""REST API for approving workflow-file pushes."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import Any
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
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from .oauth import require_same_origin_for_mutations, require_session
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from .plan_api import _dispatch_followup, _thread_metadata
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from .thread_api import _thread_is_readable, _user_owns_thread
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from .workflow_approval import (
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decide_workflow_push_approval,
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get_workflow_push_approvals,
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workflow_push_approval_responses,
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)
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workflow_approval_router = APIRouter(
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prefix="/dashboard/api/workflow-approval",
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tags=["workflow-approval"],
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dependencies=[Depends(require_same_origin_for_mutations)],
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)
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_SESSION_DEP = Depends(require_session)
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@workflow_approval_router.get("/{thread_id}")
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async def list_workflow_push_approvals(
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thread_id: str, session: dict[str, Any] = _SESSION_DEP
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) -> dict[str, Any]:
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metadata = await _thread_metadata(thread_id)
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if not _thread_is_readable(metadata):
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raise HTTPException(404, "thread not found")
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is_owner = _user_owns_thread(metadata, session["sub"], session.get("email"))
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approvals = await get_workflow_push_approvals(thread_id)
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return {
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"threadId": thread_id,
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"isOwner": is_owner,
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"approvals": workflow_push_approval_responses(approvals),
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}
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@workflow_approval_router.post("/{thread_id}/{fingerprint}/approve")
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async def approve_workflow_push(
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thread_id: str, fingerprint: str, session: dict[str, Any] = _SESSION_DEP
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) -> dict[str, Any]:
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metadata = await _thread_metadata(thread_id)
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if not _user_owns_thread(metadata, session["sub"], session.get("email")):
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raise HTTPException(403, "only the thread owner can approve workflow pushes")
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record = await decide_workflow_push_approval(
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thread_id, fingerprint, approved=True, actor=session["sub"]
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)
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if record is None:
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raise HTTPException(404, "workflow push approval not found")
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await _dispatch_followup(
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thread_id,
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metadata,
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"The workflow-file push approval was approved. Retry the blocked git push now; do not alter workflow files before pushing.",
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plan_mode=False,
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)
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return {"status": "approved", "fingerprint": fingerprint}
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@workflow_approval_router.post("/{thread_id}/{fingerprint}/reject")
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async def reject_workflow_push(
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thread_id: str, fingerprint: str, session: dict[str, Any] = _SESSION_DEP
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) -> dict[str, Any]:
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metadata = await _thread_metadata(thread_id)
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if not _user_owns_thread(metadata, session["sub"], session.get("email")):
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raise HTTPException(403, "only the thread owner can reject workflow pushes")
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record = await decide_workflow_push_approval(
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thread_id, fingerprint, approved=False, actor=session["sub"]
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)
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if record is None:
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raise HTTPException(404, "workflow push approval not found")
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return {"status": "rejected", "fingerprint": fingerprint}
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