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* wip(rebuild): core reliability spine
- remove PR-babysitting (ci_autofix + ci_monitor graph + webhook wiring)
- dispatch core: agent/dispatch.py with multitask_strategy=interrupt +
durability=sync + completion webhook; reroute all webhook + plan triggers;
drop the racy in-process lock + is_thread_active busy-check
- completion webhook: agent/completion.py + /webhooks/run-complete loopback
route for failure/timeout replies (idempotent)
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* feat(rebuild): async tools, reconcile, shared http timeouts, assembly tuning
Parallel batch on top of the reliability spine:
- async-ify all 24 tools (drop asyncio.run; requests->httpx); re-implement the
http_request/fetch_url SSRF + DNS-rebinding defense httpx-natively and harden
the IP check to 'not is_global' (+ IPv4-mapped unwrap)
- reconcile.py: stale pending-run sweep (threads.search -> per-thread runs.list
-> cancel_many), wired into the scheduler graph via task='reconcile'
- shared DEFAULT_HTTP_TIMEOUT (agent/utils/http.py) on every bare
httpx.AsyncClient() across utils/dashboard/webapp/middleware
- run budget: MODEL_CALL_RECURSION_LIMIT 5000->250
- fix stale OpenAI->Anthropic fallback id (claude-opus-4-5 -> 4-8)
- drop redundant custom repair middleware (deepagents auto-adds PatchToolCalls)
- confirm tool-result eviction + summarization auto-wired via backend
- slim system prompt ~8% (full harness-profile rewrite deferred)
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* feat(rebuild): harness-profile prompt + split webhooks out of webapp
- prompt.py: own the system prompt via a registered harness profile
(OPEN_SWE_SHARED_BASE, kept neutral so the read-only reviewer/analyzer that
share it stay safe), registered across all 4 providers; per-thread values
stay in construct_system_prompt. Assembled main-agent prompt ~6.8k -> ~3.1k
tokens (~55% smaller); de-duped PR/commit/suite/force-push guidance; dropped
ALL-CAPS markers.
- webapp.py 3325 -> 1890 LOC: moved 14 per-source handlers into
agent/webhooks/{linear,slack,github}.py; webapp re-exports them for the
routes + tests; moved handlers reach shared helpers via the webapp namespace
to preserve the test suite's monkeypatch targets.
Full suite: 1168 passing, lint clean.
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* Restore MODEL_CALL_RECURSION_LIMIT to 5000 for long-running tasks
Reverts the 250 cap from the run-budget change — long-running tasks legitimately
need many model calls. The notify_step_limit_reached safety net still fires if a
run does hit the cap, so runs end with a signal either way.
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* fix: address PR review (auth, SSRF, interrupted status, redirect headers)
- completion.py: drop `interrupted` from failure statuses — with
multitask_strategy=interrupt a follow-up ends the prior run as interrupted,
which is healthy, not a failure to report. [open-swe]
- /webhooks/run-complete: shared-secret auth — dispatch appends ?token= when
RUN_COMPLETE_WEBHOOK_SECRET is set; route verifies via hmac.compare_digest.
[corridor-security]
- SSRF: extract the URL validator to agent/utils/url_safety.py and apply it
before server-side image fetches in multimodal.fetch_image_block.
[corridor-security]
- http_request: preserve caller headers/extensions across redirect hops instead
of dropping them on the first hop. [open-swe]
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* chore: remove REBUILD_PLAN.md (planning doc, not needed in the repo)
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* fix: fail closed on run-complete webhook auth when secret unset
Corridor follow-up: verify_run_complete_token returns False (not True) when
RUN_COMPLETE_WEBHOOK_SECRET is unset, so the public route is never
unauthenticated. Logs a startup warning when the secret is absent, and dispatch
skips registering the webhook when there's no secret (no rejected callbacks).
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
---------
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot] <open-swe@users.noreply.github.com>
63 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
63 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
"""Shared SSRF guard: resolve a URL's host and confirm it is publicly routable.
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Used by the ``http_request`` tool (which additionally pins the connection and
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re-validates every redirect hop) and by server-side image fetching, so an
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untrusted URL can't reach internal services or the cloud metadata endpoint.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import ipaddress
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import socket
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from urllib.parse import urlparse
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def resolve_and_validate(url: str) -> tuple[bool, str, str | None, list | None]:
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"""Resolve a URL's hostname and check every address is safe to contact.
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Returns (is_safe, reason, hostname, addr_infos). When safe, the caller pins
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the connection to one of ``addr_infos`` so the request cannot pick up a
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different (e.g. DNS-rebound) address after validation.
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"""
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try:
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parsed = urlparse(url)
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if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"}:
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return False, f"Unsupported URL scheme: {parsed.scheme or '<missing>'}", None, None
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hostname = parsed.hostname
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if not hostname:
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return False, "Could not parse hostname from URL", None, None
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try:
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addr_infos = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)
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except socket.gaierror:
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return False, f"Could not resolve hostname: {hostname}", hostname, None
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if not addr_infos:
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return False, f"Could not resolve hostname: {hostname}", hostname, None
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for addr_info in addr_infos:
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ip_str = addr_info[4][0]
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try:
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ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
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except ValueError:
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return False, f"Could not parse resolved address: {ip_str}", hostname, None
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# Unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 (e.g. ::ffff:127.0.0.1) so a mapped private
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# address can't slip past the check, then block anything that isn't
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# publicly routable (covers private/loopback/link-local/reserved/
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# unspecified/multicast and the cloud metadata 169.254.0.0/16 range).
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if isinstance(ip, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and ip.ipv4_mapped is not None:
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ip = ip.ipv4_mapped
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if not ip.is_global:
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return False, f"URL resolves to blocked address: {ip_str}", hostname, None
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return True, "", hostname, addr_infos
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except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
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return False, f"URL validation error: {e}", None, None
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def is_url_safe(url: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
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"""Check if a URL is safe to request (not targeting private/internal networks)."""
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is_safe, reason, _, _ = resolve_and_validate(url)
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return is_safe, reason
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