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* wip(rebuild): core reliability spine
- remove PR-babysitting (ci_autofix + ci_monitor graph + webhook wiring)
- dispatch core: agent/dispatch.py with multitask_strategy=interrupt +
durability=sync + completion webhook; reroute all webhook + plan triggers;
drop the racy in-process lock + is_thread_active busy-check
- completion webhook: agent/completion.py + /webhooks/run-complete loopback
route for failure/timeout replies (idempotent)
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* feat(rebuild): async tools, reconcile, shared http timeouts, assembly tuning
Parallel batch on top of the reliability spine:
- async-ify all 24 tools (drop asyncio.run; requests->httpx); re-implement the
http_request/fetch_url SSRF + DNS-rebinding defense httpx-natively and harden
the IP check to 'not is_global' (+ IPv4-mapped unwrap)
- reconcile.py: stale pending-run sweep (threads.search -> per-thread runs.list
-> cancel_many), wired into the scheduler graph via task='reconcile'
- shared DEFAULT_HTTP_TIMEOUT (agent/utils/http.py) on every bare
httpx.AsyncClient() across utils/dashboard/webapp/middleware
- run budget: MODEL_CALL_RECURSION_LIMIT 5000->250
- fix stale OpenAI->Anthropic fallback id (claude-opus-4-5 -> 4-8)
- drop redundant custom repair middleware (deepagents auto-adds PatchToolCalls)
- confirm tool-result eviction + summarization auto-wired via backend
- slim system prompt ~8% (full harness-profile rewrite deferred)
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* feat(rebuild): harness-profile prompt + split webhooks out of webapp
- prompt.py: own the system prompt via a registered harness profile
(OPEN_SWE_SHARED_BASE, kept neutral so the read-only reviewer/analyzer that
share it stay safe), registered across all 4 providers; per-thread values
stay in construct_system_prompt. Assembled main-agent prompt ~6.8k -> ~3.1k
tokens (~55% smaller); de-duped PR/commit/suite/force-push guidance; dropped
ALL-CAPS markers.
- webapp.py 3325 -> 1890 LOC: moved 14 per-source handlers into
agent/webhooks/{linear,slack,github}.py; webapp re-exports them for the
routes + tests; moved handlers reach shared helpers via the webapp namespace
to preserve the test suite's monkeypatch targets.
Full suite: 1168 passing, lint clean.
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* Restore MODEL_CALL_RECURSION_LIMIT to 5000 for long-running tasks
Reverts the 250 cap from the run-budget change — long-running tasks legitimately
need many model calls. The notify_step_limit_reached safety net still fires if a
run does hit the cap, so runs end with a signal either way.
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* fix: address PR review (auth, SSRF, interrupted status, redirect headers)
- completion.py: drop `interrupted` from failure statuses — with
multitask_strategy=interrupt a follow-up ends the prior run as interrupted,
which is healthy, not a failure to report. [open-swe]
- /webhooks/run-complete: shared-secret auth — dispatch appends ?token= when
RUN_COMPLETE_WEBHOOK_SECRET is set; route verifies via hmac.compare_digest.
[corridor-security]
- SSRF: extract the URL validator to agent/utils/url_safety.py and apply it
before server-side image fetches in multimodal.fetch_image_block.
[corridor-security]
- http_request: preserve caller headers/extensions across redirect hops instead
of dropping them on the first hop. [open-swe]
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* chore: remove REBUILD_PLAN.md (planning doc, not needed in the repo)
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
* fix: fail closed on run-complete webhook auth when secret unset
Corridor follow-up: verify_run_complete_token returns False (not True) when
RUN_COMPLETE_WEBHOOK_SECRET is unset, so the public route is never
unauthenticated. Logs a startup warning when the secret is absent, and dispatch
skips registering the webhook when there's no secret (no rejected callbacks).
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot]
---------
Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot] <open-swe@users.noreply.github.com>
118 lines
4 KiB
Python
118 lines
4 KiB
Python
"""Utilities for building multimodal content blocks."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import base64
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import logging
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import mimetypes
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import os
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import re
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from typing import Any
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from urllib.parse import urlparse
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import httpx
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from langchain_core.messages.content import create_image_block
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from .url_safety import is_url_safe
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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IMAGE_MARKDOWN_RE = re.compile(r"!\[[^\]]*\]\((https?://[^\s)]+)\)")
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IMAGE_URL_RE = re.compile(
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r"(https?://[^\s)]+\.(?:png|jpe?g|gif|webp|bmp|tiff)(?:\?[^\s)]+)?)",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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def extract_image_urls(text: str) -> list[str]:
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"""Extract image URLs from markdown image syntax and direct image links."""
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if not text:
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return []
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urls: list[str] = []
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urls.extend(IMAGE_MARKDOWN_RE.findall(text))
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urls.extend(IMAGE_URL_RE.findall(text))
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deduped = dedupe_urls(urls)
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if deduped:
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logger.debug("Extracted %d image URL(s)", len(deduped))
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return deduped
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def vision_not_supported_warning(model_id: str, image_count: int) -> str:
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"""Build a prompt-visible warning when images are sent to a text-only model."""
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return (
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f"\n\n**Note:** {image_count} image(s) were attached but the current model "
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f"({model_id}) does not support image input. The images were not included. "
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"Please switch to a vision-enabled model to process images."
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)
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async def fetch_image_block(
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image_url: str,
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client: httpx.AsyncClient,
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) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
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"""Fetch image bytes and build an image content block."""
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try:
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safe, reason = is_url_safe(image_url)
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if not safe:
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logger.warning("Refusing to fetch image (SSRF guard) %s: %s", image_url, reason)
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return None
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logger.debug("Fetching image from %s", image_url)
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headers = None
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host = (urlparse(image_url).hostname or "").lower()
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if host == "uploads.linear.app" or host.endswith(".uploads.linear.app"):
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linear_api_key = os.environ.get("LINEAR_API_KEY", "")
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if linear_api_key:
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headers = {"Authorization": linear_api_key}
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else:
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logger.warning(
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"LINEAR_API_KEY not set; cannot authenticate image fetch for %s",
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image_url,
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)
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elif host == "files.slack.com" or host.endswith(".files.slack.com"):
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slack_bot_token = os.environ.get("SLACK_BOT_TOKEN", "")
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if slack_bot_token:
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headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {slack_bot_token}"}
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else:
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logger.warning(
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"SLACK_BOT_TOKEN not set; cannot authenticate image fetch for %s",
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image_url,
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)
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response = await client.get(image_url, headers=headers, follow_redirects=True)
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response.raise_for_status()
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content_type = response.headers.get("Content-Type", "").split(";")[0].strip()
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if not content_type:
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guessed, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(image_url)
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if not guessed:
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logger.warning(
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"Could not determine content type for %s; skipping image",
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image_url,
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)
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return None
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content_type = guessed
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supported_types = {"image/jpeg", "image/png", "image/gif", "image/webp"}
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if content_type not in supported_types:
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logger.warning(
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"Unsupported content type '%s' for %s; skipping image",
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content_type,
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image_url,
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)
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return None
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encoded = base64.b64encode(response.content).decode("ascii")
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logger.info(
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"Fetched image %s (%s, %d bytes)",
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image_url,
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content_type,
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len(response.content),
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)
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return create_image_block(base64=encoded, mime_type=content_type)
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except Exception:
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logger.exception("Failed to fetch image from %s", image_url)
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return None
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def dedupe_urls(urls: list[str]) -> list[str]:
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return list(dict.fromkeys(urls))
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