open-swe/infra/lib/constructs/instance-role.ts
Adam Moussa 92fd886076
feat(infra): add /infra CDK scaffold + per-env OIDC/instance IAM role defs (#6)
PR#1 of the AWS migration. CDK TypeScript app under /infra: stacks open-swe-iam
(four per-env GitHub-OIDC deploy roles) + open-swe-dev/-prod (per-env EC2 instance
role + AMI cache). aws-cdk-lib pinned exact 2.260.0; kebab naming Aspect + 15 tests.

IAM is synth-only (NOT deployed). Cleared the Phase-1 security gates:
- T4 GPT-4.1 IAM cross-review (StringEquals trust; cdk-hnb659fds-* wildcard kept as
  org convention; AWS-RunShellScript timeboxed to T19).
- T5 /sh-security-review: deploy roles split PER-ENV with env-scoped OIDC trust
  (dev=branch ref+tag dev, prod=environment:prod+tag prod) so a dev token cannot
  reach prod; re-verified block:false.
2026-06-26 15:06:30 -04:00

93 lines
3.5 KiB
TypeScript

import * as iam from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-iam";
import { Construct } from "constructs";
import { ACCOUNT, EnvName, REGION, prefix } from "../config";
/**
* Least-privilege EC2 instance role for the open-swe box (one per env).
*
* Grants exactly what the boot/runtime flow needs and NOTHING ELSE — no admin,
* no `*` resources except where the AWS action genuinely has no resource-level
* scoping. Per-env so the dev box can never read prod secrets/config and vice
* versa. Reviewed at T4 (GPT-4.1 IAM cross-review) / T5 (/sh-security-review)
* before it is ever deployed (T6).
*/
export class InstanceRole extends Construct {
public readonly role: iam.Role;
constructor(scope: Construct, id: string, env: EnvName) {
super(scope, id);
const p = prefix(env);
this.role = new iam.Role(this, "Role", {
roleName: `${p}-instance-role`,
assumedBy: new iam.ServicePrincipal("ec2.amazonaws.com"),
description: `EC2 instance role for the ${p} open-swe box (least-privilege).`,
});
// AWS-managed: lets the SSM agent register the instance and RECEIVE the
// app-deploy `ssm:SendCommand` from githubdeploy-open-swe-app. This is the
// standard Session-Manager / RunCommand grant and is the only managed
// policy on the role. DELIBERATE — flag for T4 confirmation.
this.role.addManagedPolicy(
iam.ManagedPolicy.fromAwsManagedPolicyName("AmazonSSMManagedInstanceCore"),
);
// Read the build artifact from the env's S3 asset bucket (deploy = pull).
this.role.addToPolicy(
new iam.PolicyStatement({
sid: "ReadArtifactObjects",
actions: ["s3:GetObject"],
resources: [`arn:aws:s3:::${p}-assets/*`],
}),
);
this.role.addToPolicy(
new iam.PolicyStatement({
sid: "ListArtifactBucket",
actions: ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
resources: [`arn:aws:s3:::${p}-assets`],
}),
);
// Read non-sensitive config from SSM Parameter Store under /open-swe-<env>/*.
this.role.addToPolicy(
new iam.PolicyStatement({
sid: "ReadSsmConfig",
actions: ["ssm:GetParameter", "ssm:GetParameters", "ssm:GetParametersByPath"],
resources: [`arn:aws:ssm:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT}:parameter/${p}/*`],
}),
);
// Read secrets from Secrets Manager under open-swe-<env>/*. Secret ARNs carry
// a random 6-char suffix, hence the trailing `*`.
this.role.addToPolicy(
new iam.PolicyStatement({
sid: "ReadSecrets",
actions: ["secretsmanager:GetSecretValue", "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret"],
resources: [`arn:aws:secretsmanager:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT}:secret:${p}/*`],
}),
);
// NOTE (T11): SSM SecureString + Secrets Manager here are assumed to use the
// AWS-managed keys (alias/aws/ssm, alias/aws/secretsmanager) for which the
// service grants Decrypt implicitly — so NO kms:Decrypt is granted. If T11
// moves these to a customer CMK, add a scoped `kms:Decrypt` on that key ARN
// ONLY (not `*`).
// Ship application logs to CloudWatch Logs under /open-swe/<env>/*.
this.role.addToPolicy(
new iam.PolicyStatement({
sid: "PutAppLogs",
actions: [
"logs:CreateLogGroup",
"logs:CreateLogStream",
"logs:PutLogEvents",
"logs:DescribeLogStreams",
],
resources: [
`arn:aws:logs:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT}:log-group:/open-swe/${env}/*`,
`arn:aws:logs:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT}:log-group:/open-swe/${env}/*:*`,
],
}),
);
}
}