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a33aaec495
* fix: enforce a replay window on Linear webhooks (AUTHZ-001) verify_linear_signature accepted any correctly-signed body with no freshness check, so a captured request could be replayed indefinitely. Parse the signed webhookTimestamp (Unix ms) and reject requests outside a 60s window, failing closed when the field is missing or malformed — mirroring the Slack verifier. * fix: stop leaking upstream auth-error bodies into user comments get_github_token_for_user folded the raw upstream response text into the error string that becomes a Slack/Linear comment (AUTH-RESP-LEAK-01). Log the full body server-side only and return a generic "GitHub auth failed (status <code>)". Also document the accepted shared-installation-token blast radius on the bot-token-only path (AUTHZ-003). * fix: bind sandbox and token caches to repo to prevent thread-id collision A PR head-branch name is attacker-controllable and get_thread_id_from_branch derives a thread_id from its first UUID with no repo binding (TID-COLLIDE-01). The in-memory sandbox cache and the per-thread GitHub-token cache were keyed on thread_id alone, and a cached sandbox was reused after only an echo-ping, so a different repo's webhook could bind to another thread's sandbox or token. Without changing the persistent thread-id scheme: - Persist the bound repo (owner/name) in thread metadata on sandbox creation and refuse to reuse a sandbox whose bound repo does not match the current event (SandboxRepoMismatchError); the in-memory proxy also carries the binding. - Bind the GitHub-token cache entries to their repo and evict on a cross-repo read so a colliding thread_id cannot be served another repo's token. - Thread repo through the reviewer and the webhook token resolvers. * fix: scope s3:ListBucket to the releases/ prefix (F-1/IAC-04) The instance role and the GitHub deploy app role granted s3:ListBucket on the whole assets bucket. Every caller (deploy.sh, the publish/rollback scripts) only ever lists under releases/, so add a StringLike s3:prefix=releases/* condition. GetBucketLocation has no s3:prefix in its request context, so it moves to its own unconditioned statement. Also document the accepted F-2 cross-env existence-oracle residual on BatchGetSecretValue. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive; document AUTHZ-002 Add a machine-level suppression for the fake Datadog key in the test_team_credentials encryption-roundtrip fixture (CWE-798, not a real credential). Clarify that the within-org thread-write path is intentional by design (AUTHZ-002) — comment only, no behavior change. * fix: casefold repo-binding keys to avoid spurious cross-repo mismatch GitHub owner/name are case-insensitive. Casefold the owner/name key on both the write (binding) and read (compare) sides — repo_cache_key and the metadata bound_repo read — so Org/Repo and org/repo resolve to one repo and a legitimate same-repo run cannot raise a spurious SandboxRepoMismatchError (Gap 2). * fix: stop leaking upstream auth body in unexpected-result branch The 2xx-but-missing-token/url branch echoed the parsed upstream response body into the user-facing error. Return a generic message and log response_data server-side only, mirroring the existing HTTPStatusError fix (Gap 4). * fix: fail closed for unbound-legacy sandboxes and catch repo mismatch Gap 1: a thread with a persisted sandbox_id but no in-memory cache and no recorded bound_repo (a pre-binding legacy thread, post-deploy) previously reconnected-and-served the sandbox to the current repo, then rebound it. Now fail closed: drop the stale id and recreate a fresh sandbox bound to this repo, logging a reconnect-with-missing-binding event. A sandbox is never served to a repo unless its binding is known and matches; new threads bind on first run unchanged. Gap 3: catch SandboxRepoMismatchError at the agent and reviewer run entrypoints, log it for alarming, and surface a clean sanitized error instead of letting an opaque deep-stack exception crash-loop the worker. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive in token-TTL tests Add a machine-level suppression for the fake "ghp_secret" GitHub token used by the cached-token TTL/revocation unit tests (CWE-798). Not a real credential and not a valid PAT; scoped to the unit test only.
53 lines
1.8 KiB
Python
53 lines
1.8 KiB
Python
"""Replay-window enforcement for Linear webhook signature verification (AUTHZ-001)."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import json
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from datetime import UTC, datetime
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from agent import webapp
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_SECRET = "linear-signing-secret"
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def _sign(body: bytes) -> str:
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return hmac.new(_SECRET.encode("utf-8"), body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
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def _now_ms() -> int:
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return int(datetime.now(UTC).timestamp() * 1000)
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def test_fresh_timestamp_accepted() -> None:
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body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment", "webhookTimestamp": _now_ms()}).encode()
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assert webapp.verify_linear_signature(body, _sign(body), _SECRET) is True
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def test_stale_timestamp_rejected() -> None:
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stale = _now_ms() - 10 * 60 * 1000 # 10 minutes old
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body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment", "webhookTimestamp": stale}).encode()
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# Signature is valid, but the timestamp is outside the freshness window.
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assert webapp.verify_linear_signature(body, _sign(body), _SECRET) is False
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def test_future_timestamp_rejected() -> None:
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future = _now_ms() + 10 * 60 * 1000
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body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment", "webhookTimestamp": future}).encode()
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assert webapp.verify_linear_signature(body, _sign(body), _SECRET) is False
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def test_missing_timestamp_rejected() -> None:
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body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment"}).encode()
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assert webapp.verify_linear_signature(body, _sign(body), _SECRET) is False
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def test_non_numeric_timestamp_rejected() -> None:
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body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment", "webhookTimestamp": "not-a-number"}).encode()
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assert webapp.verify_linear_signature(body, _sign(body), _SECRET) is False
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def test_bad_signature_rejected_even_when_fresh() -> None:
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body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment", "webhookTimestamp": _now_ms()}).encode()
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assert webapp.verify_linear_signature(body, "deadbeef", _SECRET) is False
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