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* feat(open-swe): add Jira tool plane (Phase 1)
Curated Jira Cloud REST v3 toolset for the agent, mirroring the Linear
tools:
- utils/jira.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with get/
create/update issue, comments, list projects, trace comment; issue and
comment bodies normalized to markdown.
- utils/adf.py: minimal ADF <-> markdown conversion (read paths convert
Jira ADF to markdown; agent comments convert prose to ADF).
- tools/jira_{comment,get_issue,get_issue_comments,create_issue,
update_issue,list_projects}.py wired into the tool registry and the
main agent tool list.
- tests/test_jira_utils.py: ADF conversion + mocked-transport util tests.
Reads JIRA_BASE_URL / JIRA_SERVICE_EMAIL / JIRA_API_TOKEN; unset env
returns a clean error, so this is safe to land dark. Trigger plane,
prompt guidance, and config plumbing follow in Phase 2.
* feat(open-swe): add Confluence tool plane (Phase 3)
Curated Confluence Cloud REST toolset for the agent, mirroring the Jira
tools:
- utils/confluence.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with
get/create/update page, add comment, CQL search. Page bodies are XHTML
storage format (not ADF), with minimal storage<->text converters;
update_page reads the current version and bumps it, as Confluence
requires.
- tools/confluence_{get_page,create_page,update_page,comment,search}.py
registered in the tool registry.
- tests/test_confluence_utils.py: converter + mocked-transport tests
including the version-bump path.
Reads CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL / CONFLUENCE_EMAIL / CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN;
unset env returns a clean error. Activation in the agent tool list lands
with the Phase 2 server.py wiring.
* feat(open-swe): add Jira trigger plane (Phase 2)
Make an @openswe comment on a Jira issue spawn an agent run, mirroring
the Linear trigger plane:
- webhooks/jira.py: process_jira_issue clones process_linear_issue —
deterministic thread id, full-issue fetch, actor accountId->email
attribution feeding resolve_login_from_email_async (PRs open as the
human), multimodal image handling, source="jira" + jira_issue config.
- webapp.py: POST/GET /webhooks/jira, verify_jira_secret (constant-time
X-Automation-Webhook-Token check, fails closed), repo-resolution
cascade, get_repo_config_from_jira_mapping.
- utils/jira_project_repo_map.py: JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO (placeholder
entry — real project->repo mappings still needed).
- utils/jira.py: get_user_email (accountId -> email) for attribution.
- completion.py: source=="jira" failure-reply branch.
- prompt.py: Jira-triggered notify guidance + Refs:/branch key from
{jira_project_key}-{jira_issue_number}.
- server.py: read jira_issue config + pass jira key to the system
prompt; also activates the Phase 3 Confluence tools in the agent list.
Jira Automation lacks native webhook HMAC signing, so trust is a shared
secret header (decision D2); replay protection is weaker than Linear's
HMAC+timestamp. /sh-security-review + an Atlassian IP allowlist are the
outstanding gate/hardening before push.
* fix(open-swe): harden Jira webhook trust (sh-security-review)
Resolves findings from the Phase 2 security review (detector fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier). The unsigned Jira Automation webhook body was
trusted for identity, comment content, repo routing, and issue
existence; a JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET holder could forge those fields.
- Corroborate against the real Jira record: the webhook body is now only
a pointer (issue_key + required comment_id). The triggering comment's
author and text are re-fetched server-side via get_comment/fetch_jira_
comment, and identity, the @openswe check, prompt text, and project
key are derived from that authoritative record — never payload author/
body fields. An uncorroborated comment is rejected. (closes the
account-id impersonation, unsigned-body prompt injection, and
fabricated-issue findings)
- Validate issue_key against the Jira key format and percent-encode all
untrusted path segments (_seg) so a crafted key can't traverse to a
different Jira REST endpoint or inject query params. (closes the path-
traversal / query-injection findings)
- Route source=="jira" through the bot-token-default / author_prs_as_
user opt-in path in resolve_github_token, matching Linear, instead of
unconditionally resolving a per-user OAuth token from a payload email.
- Gate attribution on an active user mapping (is_login_mapped) so a
pending/unconfirmed mapping can't drive PR authorship.
Adds regression tests: server-corroboration wins over payload, malformed
issue_key rejected, uncorroborated comment rejected, path-segment
encoding, project-key derivation, active-mapping gate.
Remaining (non-blocking, deployment/hardening): set ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/
REPOS so the shared allowlist isn't fail-open; consider HMAC-over-body +
timestamp on the Automation payload to close the residual replay gap.
* harden(open-swe): opt-in Jira webhook replay/IP + fail-closed allowlist
Folds the two deployment-hardening items from the Phase 2 security review
into code (all opt-in / default-off, so existing and upstream deployments
are unaffected):
- JIRA_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE: when set, the Automation payload must
carry X-Openswe-Signature (hex HMAC-SHA256 of the raw body keyed by
JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET) plus a fresh timestamp, verified by
verify_jira_signature / _jira_timestamp_is_fresh (mirrors the Linear
HMAC+freshness model). Closes the static-token model's replay/forgery
gap when enabled.
- JIRA_WEBHOOK_IP_ALLOWLIST: optional CIDR allowlist on the webhook's
direct client IP (verify_jira_source_ip). Documented as direct-peer
only; behind a proxy/LB, allowlist Atlassian's ranges at that layer.
- REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST: makes an empty ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/REPOS fail
CLOSED instead of the back-compat allow-all, plus a startup fail-open
warning. Applies to all channels for consistency.
Documents all new vars (and a Jira section) in .env.example. Adds tests
for signature on/off + valid/missing/wrong/stale, IP allow/deny/off, and
the fail-closed allowlist.
* feat(open-swe): Confluence Atlassian Connect trigger (Phase 4)
Adds the @openswe-on-a-Confluence-comment trigger via a private Atlassian
Connect app. Designed and adversarially verified with the ultracode
workflow (3 divergent Opus designs + judge; 3 proof-or-kill Opus
skeptics on the implemented crypto).
- utils/atlassian_connect.py: hand-rolled qsh (pinned to Atlassian's
official test vector), PyJWT HS256 webhook verifier with alg-pinning,
issuer binding, and qsh-verified-last ordering; RS256 signed-install
lifecycle verifier against Atlassian's published keys; installation
store keyed by clientKey with the sharedSecret encrypted at rest
(TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY / Fernet). No new dependency (PyJWT already pinned).
- webhooks/confluence.py: install/uninstall lifecycle + comment handler.
The JWT-signed webhook body is only a pointer; the comment's real
author/text/container are re-fetched server-side via the Basic-auth
service account (Phase-2 corroboration lesson), with active-only login
attribution and the repo allowlist.
- utils/confluence.py: get_comment / get_user_email (path-encoded).
- webapp.py: GET /connect/atlassian-connect.json (served dynamically),
POST /connect/{installed,uninstalled,webhook/comment-created}, the
space->repo resolver, thread-id, and fetch helpers.
- completion.py: source=="confluence" failure-reply branch.
Security: the sh-security-review verify pass confirmed one HIGH — the
symmetric signed-install=false first-install was trust-on-first-use gated
only by the public Confluence hostname (webhook-auth bypass). Fixed by
switching to signed-install=true + RS256 verification of lifecycle
callbacks, which cryptographically authenticates the first install. All
other attack lenses (forgery/replay/alg-confusion/overwrite/uninstall
DoS/corroboration/injection) were defeated; residuals are deployment
config (REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST) or accepted-by-design (qsh cannot cover
bodies; comment-trigger prompt injection, shared with all sources).
New env (documented in .env.example): CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL/EMAIL/API_TOKEN,
CONNECT_BASE_URL, CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL (optional). Install secrets
require the durable Postgres LangGraph store in prod.
Outstanding before push: /sh-security-review on the real diff and the
GPT-4.1 cross-family review (auth boundary); README/CLAUDE.md + memory.
* docs(open-swe): Phase 5 — Confluence prompt guidance + architecture docs
- prompt.py: Confluence-triggered runs notify via confluence_comment on
the triggering page; add Confluence to the shared-base source list.
- CLAUDE.md: document the Jira + Confluence tool planes and the Atlassian
triggers (Jira Automation shared-secret webhook; Confluence Connect app
with HS256 webhook + qsh and RS256 signed-install lifecycle), plus the
server-side corroboration + encrypted install store.
Phase 5 also verified the trigger surface end-to-end against a running
uvicorn app (descriptor served; /connect/* and /webhooks/jira fail closed
without valid auth) and recorded the integration in project memory.
* fix(open-swe): resolve /sh-security-review findings on the Atlassian surface
Formal sh-security-review (detector fan-out + verifier) over the Phase-4
Connect surface (esp. the new RS256 signed-install code, unseen by the
earlier adversarial verify) and the Phase-2 opt-in hardening.
CRITICAL — cross-tenant install (origin validation, CWE-346): signed-
install proves the caller is *an* Atlassian tenant, not *ours*, and the
descriptor is served publicly, so any attacker could install the app on
their own Confluence site and drive agent runs against our allowlisted
repos. The baseUrl body field is attacker-controlled and cannot bind the
tenant; only the signature-verified clientKey (JWT iss) can. Added a
MANDATORY, fail-closed CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS allowlist checked in
process_install after signature+iss verification.
HIGH — cross-tenant thread-id collision (CWE-330/863): Confluence comment
ids are per-instance, so generate_thread_id_from_confluence_comment now
salts the hash with the verified clientKey (plumbed from the webhook JWT
iss) to prevent thread hijack across tenants.
HIGH/MEDIUM — path/query injection (CWE-22/88): get_page and update_page
interpolated page_id into the REST path unencoded (update_page on a
mutating PUT with no params= backstop). Now _seg()-encoded, matching the
rest of the module.
MEDIUM — self-trigger loop (CWE-405): process_confluence_comment had no
bot-authorship early-out. Added an optional CONFLUENCE_BOT_ACCOUNT_ID
guard mirroring the Linear botActor / Jira comment_author_is_bot checks.
LOW — corrected the CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL comment to document it as
opt-in defense-in-depth (the clientKey allowlist is the real gate).
Verified clean by the detectors: RS256/HS256 alg-pinning, aud/iss/exp,
kid-fetch SSRF (host-pinned + quote-encoded), at-rest secret encryption,
constant-time comparisons, and the Phase-2 hardening. New regression
tests for each fix; full suite green (1602).
* harden(open-swe): GPT-4.1 cross-family review follow-ups
Cross-family review (GPT-4.1 via orchestrator cross_reviewer) found no
critical/high issues and confirmed the auth boundary is fail-closed and
correct. Two low-cost defense-in-depth items applied:
- Validate the signed-install JWT 'kid' against a strict charset before
the public-key fetch, so a malformed kid fails fast with no network
call (on top of the existing fixed host + percent-encoding).
- Make JWT nbf verification explicit (verify_nbf) on both the RS256
lifecycle and HS256 webhook decodes.
Other suggestions triaged as already-handled (aud cross-app replay is
blocked by the per-tenant iss->secret lookup; documented static-token/IP/
baseUrl tradeoffs; qsh pinned to Atlassian's vector) or ops/infra
(Fernet rotation via MultiFernet; rate limiting at the gateway).
* docs(open-swe): document Jira + Confluence in installation & customization guides
- INSTALLATION.md §5: add Jira (Automation-rule webhook + shared secret,
service account, JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO) and Confluence (Atlassian Connect
app install, CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS bootstrap, durable-store note,
CONFLUENCE_SPACE_TO_REPO) trigger setup; §6: add the new env vars +
REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST.
- CUSTOMIZATION.md: jira_*/confluence_* in the tools table; repo-extraction
note covers all four sources.
- AGENTS.md: match CLAUDE.md (triggers, webhooks, tool list, auth).
- README.md: invocation section, tools table, and overview line.
256 lines
11 KiB
Python
256 lines
11 KiB
Python
"""Run-completion webhook handler — guarantees every run ends with a signal.
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The platform POSTs a run-completion payload to ``/webhooks/run-complete`` (wired
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as the ``webhook`` on every dispatched run, see ``agent.dispatch``). When a run
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ends in a failure state (``error`` / ``timeout``) we post a
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short failure reply to the originating channel, so a run that died on a server
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recycle or hit a limit never leaves the user in silence.
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This decouples "the user gets an answer" from "the agent remembered to reply."
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The reply is idempotent per run: the run id (or, for manual payloads without
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one, a run-distinguishing ``updated_at``/``created_at`` marker) is claimed in a
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bounded per-thread list *before* the post (claim-then-post), so a retried or
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concurrent completion webhook can't double-post. A payload that carries nothing
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to distinguish one run from another posts without deduping — a rare duplicate is
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preferred over silencing a later, genuinely different failed run.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hmac
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import logging
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import os
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from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
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from typing import Any
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from .utils.confluence import add_comment as add_confluence_comment
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from .utils.dashboard_links import dashboard_thread_url
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from .utils.github_app import get_github_app_installation_token
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from .utils.github_comments import post_github_comment
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from .utils.jira import comment_on_issue as comment_on_jira_issue
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from .utils.linear import comment_on_linear_issue
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from .utils.slack import post_slack_thread_reply
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from .utils.thread_ops import langgraph_client
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Run statuses that mean the user will otherwise get nothing back. "interrupted"
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# is intentionally excluded: with multitask_strategy="interrupt", a normal
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# follow-up halts the prior run (status "interrupted") while its replacement
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# carries on — that's healthy, not a failure worth a "couldn't finish" reply.
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_TERMINAL_FAILURE_STATUSES = frozenset({"error", "timeout"})
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_FAILURE_REPLY_RUN_ID = "failure_reply_posted_run_id"
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_FAILURE_REPLY_RUN_IDS = "failure_reply_posted_run_ids"
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_MAX_FAILURE_REPLY_RUN_IDS = 20
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class _ClaimFailed(Exception):
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"""Raised when the dedup key couldn't be claimed, so we skip the post."""
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# Shared-secret bearer token proving a /webhooks/run-complete call came from our
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# own dispatch (which appends ?token= when this is set) rather than from an
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# attacker hitting the public route. Fail closed when unset: the route rejects
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# every call, so completion replies stay off until the secret is configured.
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RUN_COMPLETE_WEBHOOK_SECRET = os.environ.get("RUN_COMPLETE_WEBHOOK_SECRET")
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if not RUN_COMPLETE_WEBHOOK_SECRET:
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logger.warning(
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"RUN_COMPLETE_WEBHOOK_SECRET is not set; /webhooks/run-complete is fail-closed "
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"(all calls rejected) and run-failure replies are disabled. Set it to enable them."
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)
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def verify_run_complete_token(token: str | None) -> bool:
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"""Return whether a run-completion webhook token is acceptable.
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Fail closed: with no secret configured, reject every call rather than accept
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unauthenticated requests on a publicly reachable route.
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"""
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secret = RUN_COMPLETE_WEBHOOK_SECRET
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if not secret:
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return False
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return token is not None and hmac.compare_digest(token, secret)
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def _failure_text(status: str, dashboard_url: str | None = None) -> str:
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if status == "timeout":
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reason = "timed out"
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elif status == "interrupted":
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reason = "was interrupted before it could finish"
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else:
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reason = "hit an unexpected error"
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text = (
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f"\u26a0\ufe0f I wasn't able to finish that \u2014 the run {reason}. "
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"Send another message and I'll pick it back up."
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)
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if dashboard_url:
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text += f" You can view the error in <{dashboard_url}|Open SWE Web>."
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return text
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async def _post_failure_reply(
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thread_id: str,
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metadata: dict[str, Any],
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status: str,
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*,
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claim: Callable[[], Awaitable[None]],
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) -> bool:
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"""Post a failure reply to the run's originating channel. Best-effort.
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``claim`` is awaited immediately before the network post (claim-then-post),
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only on a branch that actually delivers, so a retried/concurrent webhook
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can't double-post and threads with no reply channel never burn the claim.
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"""
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source = metadata.get("source")
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ctx = metadata.get("source_context")
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ctx = ctx if isinstance(ctx, dict) else {}
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text = _failure_text(status)
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if source == "slack":
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slack_thread = ctx.get("slack_thread")
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if isinstance(slack_thread, dict):
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channel_id = slack_thread.get("channel_id")
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thread_ts = slack_thread.get("thread_ts")
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if channel_id and thread_ts:
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await claim()
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slack_text = _failure_text(status, dashboard_thread_url(thread_id))
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return await post_slack_thread_reply(channel_id, thread_ts, slack_text)
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return False
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if source == "linear":
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linear_issue = ctx.get("linear_issue")
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if isinstance(linear_issue, dict):
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issue_id = linear_issue.get("id")
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if issue_id:
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await claim()
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return await comment_on_linear_issue(issue_id, text)
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return False
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if source == "jira":
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jira_issue = ctx.get("jira_issue")
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if isinstance(jira_issue, dict):
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issue_key = jira_issue.get("key")
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if issue_key:
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await claim()
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return await comment_on_jira_issue(issue_key, text)
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return False
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if source == "confluence":
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confluence = ctx.get("confluence")
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if isinstance(confluence, dict):
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page_id = confluence.get("page_id")
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if page_id:
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await claim()
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result = await add_confluence_comment(page_id, text)
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return bool(result.get("success"))
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return False
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if source in ("github", "github_issue"):
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repo_config = metadata.get("repo")
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number = ctx.get("pr_number")
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if number is None:
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github_issue = ctx.get("github_issue")
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if isinstance(github_issue, dict):
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number = github_issue.get("number")
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if isinstance(repo_config, dict) and isinstance(number, int):
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token = await get_github_app_installation_token()
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if token:
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await claim()
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return await post_github_comment(repo_config, number, text, token=token)
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return False
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logger.info("No failure-reply channel for thread %s (source=%s)", thread_id, source)
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return False
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def _dedup_key(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str | None:
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"""A run-distinguishing key for dedupe, or None when nothing distinguishes runs.
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Prefers the platform's ``run_id`` (always present on real completion
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webhooks). Manual/legacy payloads without one fall back to a marker built
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from ``updated_at``/``created_at`` so a retry of the *same* run still dedupes
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while a *different* failed run on the same thread still gets its reply — the
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old sticky per-thread boolean silenced every later run forever (SR160-03).
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"""
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raw = payload.get("run_id")
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if isinstance(raw, str) and raw:
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return raw
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for marker in ("updated_at", "created_at"):
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value = payload.get(marker)
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if isinstance(value, str) and value:
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return f"{marker}:{value}"
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return None
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def _posted_failure_run_ids(metadata: dict[str, Any]) -> list[str]:
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raw = metadata.get(_FAILURE_REPLY_RUN_IDS)
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ids = [item for item in raw if isinstance(item, str) and item] if isinstance(raw, list) else []
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latest = metadata.get(_FAILURE_REPLY_RUN_ID)
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if isinstance(latest, str) and latest and latest not in ids:
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ids.append(latest)
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return ids
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def _failure_reply_metadata(metadata: dict[str, Any], key: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
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ids = [item for item in _posted_failure_run_ids(metadata) if item != key]
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ids.append(key)
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return {
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_FAILURE_REPLY_RUN_ID: key,
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_FAILURE_REPLY_RUN_IDS: ids[-_MAX_FAILURE_REPLY_RUN_IDS:],
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}
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async def handle_run_completion(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Handle a platform run-completion webhook POST.
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Posts a failure reply only when the run ended in a failure state and we
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haven't already replied for this thread.
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"""
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status = payload.get("status")
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thread_id = payload.get("thread_id")
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if not isinstance(thread_id, str) or not thread_id:
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return {"status": "ignored", "reason": "missing thread_id"}
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if status not in _TERMINAL_FAILURE_STATUSES:
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return {"status": "ignored", "reason": f"non-failure status: {status}"}
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client = langgraph_client()
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try:
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thread = await client.threads.get(thread_id)
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
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logger.warning("run-complete: could not load thread %s", thread_id, exc_info=True)
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return {"status": "error", "reason": "thread fetch failed"}
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metadata = thread.get("metadata") if isinstance(thread, dict) else None
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metadata = metadata if isinstance(metadata, dict) else {}
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key = _dedup_key(payload)
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if key is not None and key in _posted_failure_run_ids(metadata):
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return {"status": "ignored", "reason": "failure reply already posted for run"}
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# Claim-then-post: record the dedup key immediately before the actual post
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# (via the claim callback) so a retried/concurrent completion webhook can't
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# double-post (SR160-02). The key is only claimed on a branch that delivers,
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# so a thread with no reply channel never burns it. If the claim itself fails
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# we raise so we skip the post, leaving the key unclaimed for a later retry
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# rather than reporting a clean success that invites a duplicate. A payload
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# with no distinguishing key can't be recorded; it posts un-deduped rather
|
|
# than being permanently suppressed.
|
|
async def _claim() -> None:
|
|
if key is None:
|
|
return
|
|
try:
|
|
await client.threads.update(
|
|
thread_id=thread_id,
|
|
metadata=_failure_reply_metadata(metadata, key),
|
|
)
|
|
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
|
logger.warning("run-complete: could not flag thread %s", thread_id, exc_info=True)
|
|
raise _ClaimFailed from exc
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
posted = await _post_failure_reply(thread_id, metadata, status, claim=_claim)
|
|
except _ClaimFailed:
|
|
return {"status": "error", "reason": "could not claim failure reply"}
|
|
if not posted:
|
|
return {"status": "ignored", "reason": "no reply posted"}
|
|
logger.info("Posted failure reply for thread %s (status=%s)", thread_id, status)
|
|
return {"status": "ok", "reason": "failure reply posted"}
|