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404b3f6f75
* feat(infra): build + pin the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (T12 AMI / item 3)
Packer-build the custom base image and repoint AppService off the AL2023
placeholder onto it.
deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl — fix two bugs that blocked the first real
`packer build` (the config had only ever been `packer validate`'d at T8):
- the file provisioner failed uploading the templates dir ('scp: …: Is a
directory') — a trailing-slash contents-upload needs the dest dir to exist;
added a 'mkdir -p /tmp/open-swe-templates' shell provisioner + dropped the
dest trailing slash.
- the shell provisioner's custom execute_command omitted {{ .Vars }}, so the
environment_vars never reached provision.sh (which runs under set -u and
aborted on CLOUDWATCH_AGENT_DEB_URL). Added {{ .Vars }}.
infra:
- ami-cache.ts: BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID = ami-0545363bb147229ff (built 2026-06-26
from open-swe-base-arm64-20260626-201929) + bakedOpenSweArm64() pinning it by
exact id via MachineImage.genericLinux (offline, deterministic). Dropped the
now-dead AL2023 cachedInContext helper + context key; kept the EBS/replacement
discipline docs.
- app-service.ts: machineImage → bakedOpenSweArm64().
- open-swe-stack.ts: output BakedAmiId (was the AL2023 PinnedAmiId guard).
- cdk.context.json → {} (AMI is a static id pin; no context lookups remain).
- README: Baked AMI + EBS-replacement-discipline section.
tsc + cdk synth(dev+prod) + jest(16) clean; template ImageId = the baked AMI.
NOTE: held — do NOT merge until the open-swe-dev secret values are populated
(put-config.sh). The infra CD is live, so merging this to dev auto-deploys
OpenSweDevStack; without secrets the box boots but fetch-config fail-fasts →
unhealthy ALB target on the shared prod ALB. Merge once secrets are set (T14).
* fix(ami): ASCII-only AMI description + re-pin to ami-00080084502093021
Third packer bug: ami_description had an em-dash (non-ASCII); AWS rejects
non-ASCII in the AMI Description attribute, so packer registered then
DEREGISTERED the first AMI (ami-0545…) on the ModifyImageAttribute error.
Replaced with an ASCII '-'. Rebuilt clean → ami-00080084502093021 (available).
Re-pinned BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID.
* fix(deploy): GitHub App + Slack required for prod only, not dev
Per the migration decision: do NOT create/duplicate a separate dev GitHub App or
Slack app — only prod owns the single shared app. So fetch-config.sh no longer
hard-requires the GitHub App quintet (ID/PRIVATE_KEY/INSTALLATION_ID/CLIENT_ID/
CLIENT_SECRET) + Slack/webhook secrets for dev; they move into the prod-only
block alongside the existing GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET/SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET.
Dev now boots with just DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET + TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY + the active
provider key(s) + the langsmith sandbox keys. Dev is a deployment-validation env
(boot/health/boundary) with no GitHub/Slack/webhook integration; prod parity is
unchanged (prod still requires everything).
* feat: stand up dev properly — S3 assets bucket + artifact CD + on-box uv sync (T7+T19)
Make the dev/prod box deployable end-to-end: a real artifact pipeline and a
re-runnable on-box deploy, so OpenSweDevStack can come up genuinely healthy.
Infra (T7):
- assets-bucket.ts: open-swe-<env>-assets S3 bucket — BLOCK_ALL public access,
SSE-S3, enforceSSL (deny non-TLS), versioned, lifecycle (expire noncurrent +
abort MPU), RETAIN. Wired into OpenSweStack + CfnOutput.
- app-service.ts: open-swe-<env>-deploy SSM document that runs the baked
/opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh (tag-scoped roll-the-box). machineImage is the
baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (folds in the held #16).
IAM (app deploy role — cross-review gated):
- github-deploy-roles.ts: app role gains s3:PutObject/DeleteObject scoped to
open-swe-<env>-assets/releases/* (CI uploads releases). Drops the generic
AWS-RunShellScript grant now that the dedicated open-swe-<env>-deploy document
is the only SendCommand path — closes the T4 BLOCK#3 arbitrary-shell timebox.
Boot/deploy (T19):
- deploy/ami/deploy.sh: single, re-runnable app-deploy procedure — pull
app.tar.gz/spa.tar.gz from S3, `uv sync --frozen --no-dev` (native ARM64 venv
at the real path, py3.12 pre-baked), restart open-swe.service + reload nginx.
- user-data.sh: nginx starts BEFORE the app deploy (static /healthz -> the ALB
target is healthy even before the first release); deploy.sh is base64-rendered
by CDK into user-data (a normal reviewable repo file, not a heredoc) and the
first-boot deploy is NON-FATAL (no release yet -> wait for the first SSM deploy).
CI (T7+T19):
- build-artifacts.yml (+ .github/scripts): build the SPA with bun (vite ->
ui/.output/public -> spa.tar.gz), package the Python source via git archive
(app.tar.gz, no ui/ no .venv), upload to releases/<sha>/ + releases/latest/ via
the githubdeploy-open-swe-app-<env> OIDC role, then fire open-swe-<env>-deploy.
push dev -> dev (auto); push main -> prod (env "prod" approval gate).
Local: ruff/shellcheck clean, tsc clean, jest 16/16, cdk synth offline OK,
deploy.sh base64 round-trips exact.
* harden(sec-review): tar extraction, deploy gating, least-privilege, secret guard
Address the /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier pass. Only one
confirmed-high surfaced and it is PRE-EXISTING and out-of-diff (OSWE-IAC-AUDIT-01,
the account-wide CDK cfn-exec residual already documented in config.ts; recorded in
.security-review/suppressions.json with justification + flagged for the per-env
bootstrap-qualifier follow-up). The rest were verifier-downgraded to unverified;
these are the cheap defense-in-depth fixes worth taking regardless:
- deploy.sh: extract tarballs with --no-same-owner --no-same-permissions (root
never honors an archive's uid/mode → no setuid/foreign-owned file can land); and
treat "no release in S3 yet" as a benign exit 0, distinct from a real deploy
failure (set -e stays loud once a release exists).
- publish-and-deploy.sh: gate on the AGGREGATE SSM Command.Status (+ TargetCount),
not CommandInvocations[0], so a partial failure across the brief 2-instance
replacement window can't be reported as success.
- instance-role.ts: scope the box's s3:GetObject to releases/* (mirrors the app
role's write scope) instead of the whole bucket.
- package-artifacts.sh: fail-closed secret-shaped-file guard on app.tar.gz
(defense in depth over .gitignore; scoped to data extensions so *_credentials.py
source is not a false positive — verified against the real tree).
Deferred as documented follow-ups (verifier: unverified, supply-chain-gated to the
CI OIDC writer; bucket is BLOCK_ALL + enforceSSL + versioned): SHA-pinned immutable
releases/<sha>/ pulls + signed checksum (vs mutable latest/), single-tarball release
to remove the torn-read window, and app-aware ALB health (vs static nginx /healthz).
shellcheck/tsc/jest(16) clean; both stacks synth offline.
* fix(infra): ASCII-only EC2 SecurityGroup descriptions + synth-time guard
The instance-SG GroupDescription + ingress/egress rule descriptions carried an
em-dash / arrow (—, →). `tsc` and `cdk synth` accept them, but the EC2 API rejects
non-ASCII in GroupDescription ("Character sets beyond ASCII are not supported"),
so OpenSweDevStack's first deploy failed at the SG and rolled back. (Pre-existing
from #14; same class as the AMI-description ASCII bug.)
- app-service.ts: replace —/→ with ASCII (- / ->) in the SG GroupDescription, the
ingress/egress rule descriptions, and the Route53 comment.
- test/ascii-aws-fields.test.ts: synth-time guard asserting EC2 SecurityGroup
GroupDescription + rule descriptions are pure ASCII, so this fails the build
instead of a deploy next time.
jest 18/18; tsc clean.
* fix(infra): SG rule descriptions use ASCII-charset-safe text (no `>`)
The first ASCII fix replaced the arrow with `->`, but EC2 SecurityGroup *rule*
descriptions allow a stricter set than ASCII — `a-zA-Z0-9. _-:/()#,@[]+=&;{}!$*`,
which EXCLUDES `<`/`>`. So OpenSweDevStack's second deploy still failed at the
ingress rule. Use "to" instead of "->", and tighten the guard test from "ASCII
only" to the exact EC2 allowed charset so it catches `>` (and `<`) too.
jest 18/18; tsc clean.
* fix(infra): minify embedded deploy.sh so user-data fits EC2's 25.6 KB limit
The base64 deploy.sh embedded in user-data pushed the encoded boot script to
27184 bytes, over EC2's 25600-byte cap, so OpenSweDevStack's instance failed with
"Encoded User data is limited to 25600 bytes". Strip full-line comments + blank
lines from deploy.sh before base64-embedding it (repo file keeps comments; only
the on-box copy is minified; the script is opaque base64 so user-data heredocs are
unaffected) -> rendered user-data drops to 16424 bytes (9 KB margin). Add a
synth-time guard test asserting EC2 user-data stays under 25600 bytes encoded.
jest 19/19; minified deploy.sh passes bash -n + shellcheck.
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