mirror of
https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/open-swe.git
synced 2026-10-07 16:19:09 +00:00
Adam Moussa
179867d120
The standing GitHub-App proxy token (BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS) is ALWAYS-ON, so carrying workflows:write on it made the fork's HITL workflow-push guard the sole control over unapproved workflow pushes. The guard's git-push parser has gaps (obfuscated-expansion push, `gh api` REST contents PUT, fully-qualified cross-branch refspecs); with a permanently workflows-scoped token those gaps become live unapproved-workflow-push exploits (1 critical, 2 high — security review BLOCK on #159). Restore dev's transient-elevation model: - Drop workflows:write from BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS; re-add the WORKFLOW_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS constant (base + workflows:write). - Re-introduce _run_with_workflow_token in the guard: it mints the workflows-scoped token via refresh_proxy_token around the approved, guard-normalized fixed_command, then downscopes to RUNTIME then BASE in a finally. Route the approval branch through it. - Restore the dev token/elevation tests. The standing token no longer carries workflows:write, so the three parser bypasses hit GitHub 403 again; an approved push still succeeds because the elevation grants workflows:write only around the normalized command. Keeps all of #159's diff-preview / approval-URL / Slack-card guard additions. |
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| .. | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| check_message_queue.py | ||
| ensure_no_empty_msg.py | ||
| exclude_tools.py | ||
| model_fallback.py | ||
| notify_step_limit.py | ||
| plan_mode.py | ||
| refresh_github_proxy.py | ||
| refresh_slack_status.py | ||
| repair_orphaned_tool_calls.py | ||
| sandbox_circuit_breaker.py | ||
| sanitize_fireworks_messages.py | ||
| sanitize_openai_responses.py | ||
| sanitize_thinking_blocks.py | ||
| sanitize_tool_inputs.py | ||
| settle_review_check.py | ||
| subdir_agents.py | ||
| tool_artifact.py | ||
| tool_error_handler.py | ||
| workflow_push_guard.py | ||