open-swe/ui/src/lib/plan.ts
seahaven-openswe[bot] f87847baa4
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feat: port plan-review & workflow-approval UX (#159)
* feat: port plan-review & workflow-approval UX (#135)

Port six upstream commits onto dev:

- c03a6be7 (already ported): keep plan guidance high-level
- 546042a4: add workflow approval UI with diff preview, approval URLs,
  web review links, and polling for approval status during active runs
- 216cf181: remove workflow token elevation; approved pushes pass
  through directly without proxy token rewriting
- 3dbc0282: preserve plan redirects after login by accepting relative
  same-origin redirect_to values and rejecting blocked paths
- bb104d93: submit plan comments with cmd+enter
- 90cb6caa: terse Slack replies, shared content via save_plan outside
  plan mode (PLAN_STATUS_SHARED), reject shared-content mutations

Refs: #135

* fix: restore login page render and clear CI lint/format

The plan-review port removed the authRedirectUrl import from login.tsx
but left its call site, crashing the login page at runtime (blank page,
no 'Sign in to open-swe'). Pass the relative path straight to loginUrl,
matching the plan route and the backend relative-redirect handling.

Also drop an unused os import in the guard test and reformat
workflow_push_guard.py to satisfy ruff.

* fix: carry workflows:write on the standing proxy token

Complete the half-ported upstream 216cf181 cascade. The port dropped
_run_with_workflow_token from the guard but missed the paired github_app
change, so an approved .github/workflows push ran with the base token
(no workflows:write) and GitHub 403'd it.

Add workflows:write to BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS and delete the
now-orphaned WORKFLOW_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS constant; update the
github_app and proxy_auth tests to match. The HITL approval gate in
workflow_push_guard.py is unchanged — this only lets the standing token
push once a human approves.

* fix: restore transient workflow-token elevation (revert standing workflows:write)

The standing GitHub-App proxy token (BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS) is
ALWAYS-ON, so carrying workflows:write on it made the fork's HITL workflow-push
guard the sole control over unapproved workflow pushes. The guard's git-push
parser has gaps (obfuscated-expansion push, `gh api` REST contents PUT,
fully-qualified cross-branch refspecs); with a permanently workflows-scoped
token those gaps become live unapproved-workflow-push exploits (1 critical, 2
high — security review BLOCK on #159).

Restore dev's transient-elevation model:
- Drop workflows:write from BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS; re-add the
  WORKFLOW_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS constant (base + workflows:write).
- Re-introduce _run_with_workflow_token in the guard: it mints the
  workflows-scoped token via refresh_proxy_token around the approved,
  guard-normalized fixed_command, then downscopes to RUNTIME then BASE in a
  finally. Route the approval branch through it.
- Restore the dev token/elevation tests.

The standing token no longer carries workflows:write, so the three parser
bypasses hit GitHub 403 again; an approved push still succeeds because the
elevation grants workflows:write only around the normalized command. Keeps all
of #159's diff-preview / approval-URL / Slack-card guard additions.

* fix: reject protocol-relative path from sanitizeAuthRedirect (open redirect)

sanitizeAuthRedirect returned parsed.pathname+search+hash, which `new URL` can
resolve to a protocol-relative `//host` (e.g. input `/..//evil.com` normalizes
same-origin, passing the origin check, but yields a path starting with `//`).
ClientRedirect / login.tsx feed that path to window.location.replace, so it
navigates cross-origin — an open redirect. Reject any resolved path that is not
a single-leading-slash path (`^/[^/]`), falling back to the default. Adds
coverage for `/..//evil.com`, `/.//evil.com`, and `//evil.com`.

* fix: log SECURITY error when workflow-token downscope fails

The elevate->push->downscope finally block was silent on failure. If both
refresh_proxy_token calls fail, the sandbox retains workflows:write for the
rest of the run with no signal. Log a SECURITY error on the partial and full
downscope-failure paths so the retention is observable.

Addresses the GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the token-scope remediation.

---------

Co-authored-by: amoussa1229 <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
2026-07-09 16:03:13 -04:00

132 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Client for the plan-review API — plain HTTP, no realtime transport.
*
* The agent publishes the plan markdown; reviewers read it and leave
* whole-document comments. On approve/reject the server reads those comments and
* hands them to the agent as the instruction for the follow-up run.
*/
const API_BASE = (import.meta.env.VITE_DASHBOARD_API_BASE_URL ?? "").replace(
/\/$/,
""
)
function apiBase(): string {
if (API_BASE) return API_BASE
return typeof window !== "undefined" ? window.location.origin : ""
}
export interface PlanUser {
id: string
login: string
email: string | null
name: string
}
export type PlanStatus =
"planning" | "ready" | "shared" | "revising" | "approved" | "cancelled"
export interface PlanData {
threadId: string
status: PlanStatus
markdown: string
isOwner: boolean
user: PlanUser
}
export interface PlanComment {
id: string
author: string
author_login: string
body: string
created_at: string
}
export class PlanApiError extends Error {
constructor(
public readonly status: number,
message: string
) {
super(message)
this.name = "PlanApiError"
}
}
async function req<T>(path: string, init: RequestInit = {}): Promise<T> {
const res = await fetch(`${apiBase()}/dashboard/api${path}`, {
...init,
credentials: "include",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", ...(init.headers ?? {}) },
})
if (!res.ok) {
let message = res.statusText
try {
const body = await res.json()
if (body?.detail)
message =
typeof body.detail === "string"
? body.detail
: JSON.stringify(body.detail)
} catch {
/* ignore */
}
throw new PlanApiError(res.status, message)
}
if (res.status === 204) return undefined as T
return (await res.json()) as T
}
export function getPlan(threadId: string): Promise<PlanData> {
return req<PlanData>(`/plan/${encodeURIComponent(threadId)}`)
}
export async function getPlanComments(
threadId: string
): Promise<Array<PlanComment>> {
const { comments } = await req<{ comments: Array<PlanComment> }>(
`/plan/${encodeURIComponent(threadId)}/comments`
)
return comments
}
export function addPlanComment(
threadId: string,
body: string
): Promise<PlanComment> {
return req(`/plan/${encodeURIComponent(threadId)}/comments`, {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify({ body }),
})
}
export function deletePlanComment(
threadId: string,
commentId: string
): Promise<{ ok: boolean }> {
return req(
`/plan/${encodeURIComponent(threadId)}/comments/${encodeURIComponent(commentId)}`,
{ method: "DELETE" }
)
}
export function updatePlan(
threadId: string,
markdown: string
): Promise<{ status: PlanStatus; markdown: string }> {
return req(`/plan/${encodeURIComponent(threadId)}`, {
method: "PUT",
body: JSON.stringify({ markdown }),
})
}
export function approvePlan(threadId: string): Promise<{ status: string }> {
return req(`/plan/${encodeURIComponent(threadId)}/approve`, {
method: "POST",
})
}
export function rejectPlan(threadId: string): Promise<{ status: string }> {
return req(`/plan/${encodeURIComponent(threadId)}/reject`, {
method: "POST",
})
}