open-swe/agent/middleware/pr_creation_guard.py
seahaven-openswe[bot] 0651de2ebf
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feat: surface attributed PR creation failures (#180)
* feat: surface attributed PR creation failures

Port upstream #1659: adds PullRequestCreationGuardMiddleware that
blocks shell fallbacks (gh pr create, gh api /pulls, curl) when
open_pull_request fails, keeping failures visible. Also adds preflight
branch/repo visibility checks in open_pull_request with structured
failure payloads, and updates the prompt to forbid PR creation
fallbacks.

Refs: #134

* fix: fall back to core GitHub App scope when optional grants missing (#1701)

* fix: fall back to core GitHub App scope when optional grants missing

Proxy-token minting requested workflows:write and actions:read in the
permission set used for every sandbox. GitHub 422s a token request that
asks for a permission the installation hasn't granted, so any install
without workflows:write failed to mint a token and every run died in
before-agent setup with "GitHub App installation token is unavailable".

_resolve_proxy_token now walks a permission ladder (full -> +workflows ->
core) and returns the first scope that mints, recording the granted scope
so hourly proxy refreshes stay consistent. A missing optional grant now
degrades to the install-time core scope instead of failing the run;
workflow-file HITL pushes still require workflows:write and fail at push
time when it is absent.

* refactor: flatten proxy-token ladder loop with continue

---------

Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot] <open-swe@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit f53caff1aa24a7b29d851b267aa3bdfe62c1e935)

Sea Haven fork deviation: upstream #1701 folds workflows:write into the
standing BASE/RUNTIME scope. This fork deliberately keeps workflows:write
OUT of the standing permission ladder (RUNTIME = core + actions:read;
LADDER = (RUNTIME, CORE)) so the sandbox proxy token cannot push
.github/workflows/* during normal operation. workflows:write is minted only
transiently by WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware for an approved HITL push and
dropped on restore, preserving token scope as a backstop for the workflow-
push approval control. Security-reviewed (agentic fan-out + GPT-4.1 cross
review); the standing-scope-carries-workflows:write bypass was blocked.

* fix(open-swe): harden proxy-token restore and mint error handling

Two low-severity follow-ups from the security review of the #1701 port.

Restore the recorded baseline scope after a workflow-push elevation instead
of a hardcoded RUNTIME. An install granted workflows:write but not actions:read
resolves its standing token to core; hardcoding RUNTIME on restore requested the
ungranted actions:read, 422'd, and fired a false "SECURITY: failed to downscope"
error on every approved workflow push before the core fallback recovered. The
guard now captures the run's recorded scope before elevating (via the new
get_recorded_proxy_permissions) and restores exactly that, falling back to the
guaranteed core scope only when the baseline restore fails.

Classify installation-token mint failures. get_github_app_installation_token_
with_expiry now treats HTTP 422 (a permission the installation hasn't granted)
as the ladder's expected descend signal and keeps it at debug, while a non-422
failure (network/5xx/timeout) is surfaced at WARNING even when errors are
otherwise suppressed — so a transient blip no longer silently downscopes a whole
run under a debug-only trace. The reduced-scope warning no longer asserts a
missing grant as the sole cause.

* chore(triage): mark upstream #1701 landed on this branch

Ported via PR #181 as Option A (workflows:write kept out of the standing
proxy-token scope). Regenerated triage.md from triage.jsonl.

* fix: restructure PR creation to POST-first with diagnose-on-failure

Move preflight checks from an authoritative gate (before POST) to a
diagnostic run after POST failure. This avoids false-positive failures
when a just-pushed head branch is momentarily invisible to GitHub ref
endpoints, and eliminates 2-3 extra serial API round-trips on the happy
path.

Also drop unused _PR_CREATED_FALSE indirection and add a docstring to
pr_creation_guard acknowledging the fail-open detection design.

---------

Co-authored-by: amoussa1229 <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ramon Nogueira <ramon.nogueira@langchain.dev>
Co-authored-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
2026-07-13 14:45:19 -04:00

249 lines
8.2 KiB
Python

"""Block shell fallbacks that create pull requests outside open_pull_request."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import re
import shlex
from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable, Mapping
from typing import Any
from langchain.agents.middleware.types import AgentMiddleware, AgentState
from langchain_core.messages import ToolMessage
from langgraph.prebuilt.tool_node import ToolCallRequest
from langgraph.types import Command
_SHELL_SEPARATORS = {";", "&&", "||", "|", "&"}
_GITHUB_PULLS_ENDPOINT = re.compile(r"(?:^|/)repos/[^/\s]+/[^/\s]+/pulls/?$")
_GITHUB_PULLS_URL = re.compile(r"https://api\.github\.com/repos/[^/\s]+/[^/\s]+/pulls/?")
_BLOCK_ERROR = (
"New pull requests must be opened with the open_pull_request tool so the PR is "
"attributed to the triggering user. If open_pull_request failed, surface that "
"failure instead of falling back to gh pr create, gh api /pulls, curl, or another "
"direct PR creation path."
)
def _tool_name(request: ToolCallRequest) -> str | None:
tool_call = getattr(request, "tool_call", None)
if isinstance(tool_call, Mapping):
name = tool_call.get("name")
return name if isinstance(name, str) else None
return None
def _tool_args(request: ToolCallRequest) -> dict[str, Any]:
tool_call = getattr(request, "tool_call", None)
args = tool_call.get("args") if isinstance(tool_call, Mapping) else None
return dict(args) if isinstance(args, Mapping) else {}
def _tool_call_id(request: ToolCallRequest) -> str | None:
tool_call = getattr(request, "tool_call", None)
if isinstance(tool_call, Mapping):
value = tool_call.get("id")
return value if isinstance(value, str) else None
return None
def _shell_tokens(command: str) -> list[str]:
try:
return shlex.split(command, posix=True)
except ValueError:
return command.split()
def _is_assignment(token: str) -> bool:
name, sep, _value = token.partition("=")
return bool(sep and name and re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*", name))
def _gh_subtokens(tokens: list[str], index: int) -> list[str]:
subtokens: list[str] = []
for token in tokens[index + 1 :]:
if token in _SHELL_SEPARATORS:
break
subtokens.append(token)
return subtokens
def _contains_gh_pr_create(tokens: list[str]) -> bool:
for index, token in enumerate(tokens):
if token != "gh":
continue
subtokens = _gh_subtokens(tokens, index)
for offset, subtoken in enumerate(subtokens[:-1]):
if subtoken == "pr" and subtokens[offset + 1] == "create":
return True
return False
_GH_API_VALUE_FLAGS = {
"-X",
"--method",
"-H",
"--header",
"-F",
"--field",
"-f",
"--raw-field",
"--hostname",
"--input",
"-q",
"--jq",
"-p",
"--preview",
"--cache",
"-t",
"--template",
}
def _gh_api_endpoint(subtokens: list[str]) -> str | None:
for index, token in enumerate(subtokens):
if token != "api":
continue
skip_next = False
for candidate in subtokens[index + 1 :]:
if skip_next:
skip_next = False
continue
if candidate.startswith("-"):
if "=" not in candidate and candidate in _GH_API_VALUE_FLAGS:
skip_next = True
continue
if _is_assignment(candidate):
continue
return candidate.strip("'\"")
return None
def _gh_api_uses_post_or_body(subtokens: list[str]) -> bool:
body_flags = {"-f", "--field", "-F", "--raw-field", "--input"}
for index, token in enumerate(subtokens):
upper = token.upper()
if upper in {"-XPOST", "--METHOD=POST"}:
return True
if token in {"-X", "--method"} and index + 1 < len(subtokens):
if subtokens[index + 1].upper() == "POST":
return True
if token.startswith("--method=") and token.split("=", 1)[1].upper() == "POST":
return True
if token in body_flags or any(token.startswith(f"{flag}=") for flag in body_flags):
return True
return False
def _contains_gh_api_pull_create(tokens: list[str]) -> bool:
for index, token in enumerate(tokens):
if token != "gh":
continue
subtokens = _gh_subtokens(tokens, index)
if "api" not in subtokens:
continue
endpoint = _gh_api_endpoint(subtokens)
if (
endpoint
and _GITHUB_PULLS_ENDPOINT.search(endpoint)
and _gh_api_uses_post_or_body(subtokens)
):
return True
return False
def _contains_direct_pull_create(tokens: list[str]) -> bool:
for index, token in enumerate(tokens):
if token != "curl":
continue
subtokens: list[str] = []
for candidate in tokens[index + 1 :]:
if candidate in _SHELL_SEPARATORS:
break
subtokens.append(candidate)
if not any(_GITHUB_PULLS_URL.search(candidate) for candidate in subtokens):
continue
has_post = any(
token.upper() in {"-XPOST", "--REQUEST=POST"}
or (
token in {"-X", "--request"}
and idx + 1 < len(subtokens)
and subtokens[idx + 1].upper() == "POST"
)
or (token.startswith("--request=") and token.split("=", 1)[1].upper() == "POST")
for idx, token in enumerate(subtokens)
)
has_body = any(token in {"-d", "--data", "--data-raw", "--json"} for token in subtokens)
if has_post or has_body:
return True
return False
def is_pr_creation_fallback_command(command: str) -> bool:
"""Return True when *command* is a known PR-creation shell fallback.
Detection is literal-token matching — it catches the primary vectors
(``gh pr create``, ``gh api repos/.../pulls -X POST``, ``curl`` to
``/pulls``) but is intentionally fail-open: shell aliases, ``gh``
aliases (``gh prc`` set via ``gh alias set``), flags between ``pr`` and
``create`` (``gh pr --repo x create``), and non-curl HTTP clients
(``python -c …``, ``wget``, etc.) will not be blocked. This is
acceptable because the threat model is an honest agent papering over an
``open_pull_request`` failure, not an adversary trying to bypass the
guardrail.
"""
tokens = _shell_tokens(command)
return (
_contains_gh_pr_create(tokens)
or _contains_gh_api_pull_create(tokens)
or _contains_direct_pull_create(tokens)
)
def _blocked_tool_message(request: ToolCallRequest, command: str) -> ToolMessage:
content = {
"status": "error",
"error_type": "PullRequestCreationFallbackBlocked",
"code": "pr_creation_fallback_blocked",
"recoverable_by_agent": False,
"error": _BLOCK_ERROR,
"blocked_command": command,
}
return ToolMessage(
content=json.dumps(content),
tool_call_id=_tool_call_id(request),
status="error",
)
class PullRequestCreationGuardMiddleware(AgentMiddleware):
"""Prevent attributed-PR failures from being hidden by shell fallbacks."""
state_schema = AgentState
def _blocked_message_for_request(self, request: ToolCallRequest) -> ToolMessage | None:
if _tool_name(request) != "execute":
return None
command = _tool_args(request).get("command")
if not isinstance(command, str) or not is_pr_creation_fallback_command(command):
return None
return _blocked_tool_message(request, command)
def wrap_tool_call(
self,
request: ToolCallRequest,
handler: Callable[[ToolCallRequest], ToolMessage | Command],
) -> ToolMessage | Command:
blocked = self._blocked_message_for_request(request)
if blocked is not None:
return blocked
return handler(request)
async def awrap_tool_call(
self,
request: ToolCallRequest,
handler: Callable[[ToolCallRequest], Awaitable[ToolMessage | Command]],
) -> ToolMessage | Command:
blocked = self._blocked_message_for_request(request)
if blocked is not None:
return blocked
return await handler(request)