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* feat: surface attributed PR creation failures Port upstream #1659: adds PullRequestCreationGuardMiddleware that blocks shell fallbacks (gh pr create, gh api /pulls, curl) when open_pull_request fails, keeping failures visible. Also adds preflight branch/repo visibility checks in open_pull_request with structured failure payloads, and updates the prompt to forbid PR creation fallbacks. Refs: #134 * fix: fall back to core GitHub App scope when optional grants missing (#1701) * fix: fall back to core GitHub App scope when optional grants missing Proxy-token minting requested workflows:write and actions:read in the permission set used for every sandbox. GitHub 422s a token request that asks for a permission the installation hasn't granted, so any install without workflows:write failed to mint a token and every run died in before-agent setup with "GitHub App installation token is unavailable". _resolve_proxy_token now walks a permission ladder (full -> +workflows -> core) and returns the first scope that mints, recording the granted scope so hourly proxy refreshes stay consistent. A missing optional grant now degrades to the install-time core scope instead of failing the run; workflow-file HITL pushes still require workflows:write and fail at push time when it is absent. * refactor: flatten proxy-token ladder loop with continue --------- Co-authored-by: open-swe[bot] <open-swe@users.noreply.github.com> (cherry picked from commit f53caff1aa24a7b29d851b267aa3bdfe62c1e935) Sea Haven fork deviation: upstream #1701 folds workflows:write into the standing BASE/RUNTIME scope. This fork deliberately keeps workflows:write OUT of the standing permission ladder (RUNTIME = core + actions:read; LADDER = (RUNTIME, CORE)) so the sandbox proxy token cannot push .github/workflows/* during normal operation. workflows:write is minted only transiently by WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware for an approved HITL push and dropped on restore, preserving token scope as a backstop for the workflow- push approval control. Security-reviewed (agentic fan-out + GPT-4.1 cross review); the standing-scope-carries-workflows:write bypass was blocked. * fix(open-swe): harden proxy-token restore and mint error handling Two low-severity follow-ups from the security review of the #1701 port. Restore the recorded baseline scope after a workflow-push elevation instead of a hardcoded RUNTIME. An install granted workflows:write but not actions:read resolves its standing token to core; hardcoding RUNTIME on restore requested the ungranted actions:read, 422'd, and fired a false "SECURITY: failed to downscope" error on every approved workflow push before the core fallback recovered. The guard now captures the run's recorded scope before elevating (via the new get_recorded_proxy_permissions) and restores exactly that, falling back to the guaranteed core scope only when the baseline restore fails. Classify installation-token mint failures. get_github_app_installation_token_ with_expiry now treats HTTP 422 (a permission the installation hasn't granted) as the ladder's expected descend signal and keeps it at debug, while a non-422 failure (network/5xx/timeout) is surfaced at WARNING even when errors are otherwise suppressed — so a transient blip no longer silently downscopes a whole run under a debug-only trace. The reduced-scope warning no longer asserts a missing grant as the sole cause. * chore(triage): mark upstream #1701 landed on this branch Ported via PR #181 as Option A (workflows:write kept out of the standing proxy-token scope). Regenerated triage.md from triage.jsonl. * fix: restructure PR creation to POST-first with diagnose-on-failure Move preflight checks from an authoritative gate (before POST) to a diagnostic run after POST failure. This avoids false-positive failures when a just-pushed head branch is momentarily invisible to GitHub ref endpoints, and eliminates 2-3 extra serial API round-trips on the happy path. Also drop unused _PR_CREATED_FALSE indirection and add a docstring to pr_creation_guard acknowledging the fail-open detection design. --------- Co-authored-by: amoussa1229 <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ramon Nogueira <ramon.nogueira@langchain.dev> Co-authored-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com> |
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| .. | ||
| dashboard | ||
| integrations | ||
| middleware | ||
| skills | ||
| tools | ||
| utils | ||
| webhooks | ||
| analyzer.py | ||
| chat.py | ||
| ci_autofix.py | ||
| ci_monitor.py | ||
| completion.py | ||
| dispatch.py | ||
| encryption.py | ||
| prompt.py | ||
| reconcile.py | ||
| review_style_collector.py | ||
| review_style_guidance.py | ||
| reviewer.py | ||
| reviewer_diff.py | ||
| reviewer_eval_store.py | ||
| reviewer_findings.py | ||
| reviewer_groups.py | ||
| reviewer_publish.py | ||
| reviewer_reconcile.py | ||
| reviewer_trace_context.py | ||
| scheduler.py | ||
| server.py | ||
| webapp.py | ||