"""Gate workflow-file pushes on human approval."""

from __future__ import annotations

import asyncio
import codecs
import hashlib
import json
import logging
import os
import re
import shlex
import threading
from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable, Mapping
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any

from langchain.agents.middleware.types import AgentMiddleware, AgentState
from langchain_core.messages import ToolMessage
from langgraph.config import get_config
from langgraph.prebuilt.tool_node import ToolCallRequest
from langgraph.types import Command

from ..dashboard.workflow_approval import (
    ensure_workflow_push_pending,
    find_workflow_push_approval,
    mark_workflow_push_notified,
    workflow_push_approved,
    workflow_push_rejected,
)
from ..tools.slack_thread_reply import build_workflow_approval_blocks
from ..utils.github_app import (
    BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS,
    RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS,
    WORKFLOW_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS,
)
from ..utils.github_proxy import refresh_proxy_token
from ..utils.sandbox_state import SANDBOX_BACKENDS
from ..utils.slack import post_slack_thread_reply_with_ts

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

_WORKFLOW_PREFIX = ".github/workflows/"
_SHELL_OPERATORS = {";", "|", "||", "&"}
_REF_NAME = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._/@+-]+$")
_GIT_OBJECT_ID = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{40,64}$")
_UNSAFE_RAW_COMMAND = re.compile(r"[;|`$<>\n\r]")
# Unquoted shell expansion/substitution (`$VAR`, `${...}`, `$(...)`, backticks) can produce
# a `git push` whose text we cannot see; its presence alongside a push forces fail-closed.
_EXPANSION = re.compile(r"[$`]")
# Unquoted command separators and grouping. Splitting the unquoted command skeleton on these
# yields the individual simple-commands the shell would run, each checked for a `git push`.
_SEGMENT_SPLIT = re.compile(r"[;|&(){}\n]+")
# Command wrappers that can prefix a `git` invocation (e.g. `command git push`,
# `env FOO=bar git push`, `/usr/bin/git push`). Recognized so a wrapped or path-qualified
# git push cannot slip past the guard as "not a git command".
_GIT_WRAPPERS = {"command", "env", "nice", "sudo", "stdbuf", "nohup", "time", "ionice", "setsid"}
# Git global options that consume the following token as a separate value; skipped when
# locating the git subcommand so `git -c k=v push` is still recognized as a push.
_GIT_VALUE_OPTIONS = {"-C", "-c", "--namespace", "--git-dir", "--work-tree", "--exec-path"}


class _BlockedGitPush:
    """Sentinel returned by the parser when a git push command is unsafe or unrecognized."""

    __slots__ = ("reason",)

    def __init__(self, reason: str) -> None:
        self.reason = reason


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ParsedGitPush:
    repo_dir: str | None
    remote: str
    local_ref: str
    remote_ref: str
    set_upstream: bool = False


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class WorkflowPushChange:
    fingerprint: str
    repo: str
    branch: str
    files: list[str]
    head_sha: str
    remote: str
    local_ref: str
    remote_ref: str
    fixed_command: str
    base_sha: str = ""
    blocked: bool = False
    blocked_reason: str = ""


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class GitInspectResult:
    output: str
    ok: bool


def _tool_name(request: ToolCallRequest) -> str | None:
    tool_call = getattr(request, "tool_call", None)
    if isinstance(tool_call, Mapping):
        name = tool_call.get("name")
        return name if isinstance(name, str) else None
    return None


def _tool_args(request: ToolCallRequest) -> dict[str, Any]:
    tool_call = getattr(request, "tool_call", None)
    args = tool_call.get("args") if isinstance(tool_call, Mapping) else None
    return dict(args) if isinstance(args, Mapping) else {}


def _tool_call_id(request: ToolCallRequest) -> str | None:
    tool_call = getattr(request, "tool_call", None)
    if isinstance(tool_call, Mapping):
        value = tool_call.get("id")
        return value if isinstance(value, str) else None
    return None


def _config(request: ToolCallRequest) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
    runtime_config = getattr(getattr(request, "runtime", None), "config", None)
    if isinstance(runtime_config, Mapping):
        return runtime_config
    try:
        config = get_config()
    except Exception:
        return {}
    return config if isinstance(config, Mapping) else {}


def _configurable(request: ToolCallRequest) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
    config = _config(request)
    configurable = config.get("configurable")
    return configurable if isinstance(configurable, Mapping) else {}


def _thread_id(request: ToolCallRequest) -> str | None:
    thread_id = _configurable(request).get("thread_id")
    return thread_id if isinstance(thread_id, str) and thread_id else None


def _backend(thread_id: str | None) -> Any | None:
    return SANDBOX_BACKENDS.get(thread_id) if thread_id else None


def _response_output(response: Any) -> str:
    output = getattr(response, "output", None)
    if isinstance(output, str):
        return output
    if isinstance(response, Mapping):
        value = response.get("output")
        if isinstance(value, str):
            return value
    return str(response or "")


def _response_ok(response: Any) -> bool:
    exit_code = getattr(response, "exit_code", None)
    if isinstance(exit_code, int):
        return exit_code == 0
    if isinstance(response, Mapping):
        value = response.get("exit_code")
        if isinstance(value, int):
            return value == 0
    return True


def _tokens_invoke_git_push(tokens: list[str]) -> bool:
    """True if the token stream runs `git push` as a git subcommand (not merely mentions it).

    Scans each `git` invocation (bareword or path-qualified, after any wrapper prefix),
    skips `-C <dir>` and option flags, and checks whether the first positional argument is
    `push`. This ignores the word "push" appearing inside a commit message or another
    command, so `git commit -m "push it" && ls` is not treated as a push, while a genuine
    `git ... push` anywhere in a chain is.
    """
    i = 0
    while i < len(tokens):
        if tokens[i].rsplit("/", 1)[-1] != "git":
            i += 1
            continue
        j = i + 1
        while j < len(tokens):
            tok = tokens[j]
            if tok in _SHELL_OPERATORS or tok == "&&":
                break
            if (
                tok in _GIT_VALUE_OPTIONS
                and j + 1 < len(tokens)
                and tokens[j + 1] not in _SHELL_OPERATORS
                and tokens[j + 1] != "&&"
            ):
                j += 2  # option consumes the next token as its value
                continue
            if tok.startswith("-"):
                j += 1
                continue
            if tok == "push":
                return True
            break  # first positional is a non-push subcommand
        i = j + 1
    return False


def _decode_ansi_c(body: str) -> str:
    """Best-effort ANSI-C (`$'...'`) escape decoding, so `$'\\x70ush'` / `$'\\160ush'` reveal
    the literal `push` the shell would run. Falls back to the raw body if decoding fails."""
    if "\\" not in body:
        return body
    try:
        return codecs.decode(body, "unicode_escape")
    except Exception:
        return body


def _strip_quoted(command: str) -> str:
    """Return the command with quoted spans and escaped characters blanked to spaces.

    Leaves only the unquoted shell structure, so metacharacters that are literal (inside
    quotes or backslash-escaped — e.g. a `;` or `&` inside a commit message) do not look
    like command separators. Plain `'...'`/`"..."` spans wrap arguments and are blanked;
    `$'...'`/`$"..."` (ANSI-C / locale quoting) form a literal *word* (e.g. `git $'push'` runs
    `git push`), so their content is kept — otherwise the push word would vanish. Unbalanced
    quotes blank the remainder (fail-closed shape).
    """
    out: list[str] = []
    i, n = 0, len(command)
    while i < n:
        c = command[i]
        if c in "'\"":
            # `$'...'` / `$"..."` — the preceding `$` marks a literal word, so keep content
            # and drop the `$` so adjacent pieces concatenate (`$'pus'$'h'` -> `push`).
            word_quote = bool(out) and out[-1] == "$"
            if word_quote:
                out.pop()
            if c == "'":
                j = command.find("'", i + 1)
                if j == -1:
                    return "".join(out) + " "
                out.append(_decode_ansi_c(command[i + 1 : j]) if word_quote else " ")
                i = j + 1
            else:
                k = i + 1
                buf: list[str] = []
                while k < n and command[k] != '"':
                    if command[k] == "\\" and k + 1 < n:
                        buf.append(command[k + 1])
                        k += 2
                    else:
                        buf.append(command[k])
                        k += 1
                if k >= n:
                    return "".join(out) + " "
                out.append("".join(buf) if word_quote else " ")
                i = k + 1
        elif c == "\\" and i + 1 < n:
            out.append(" ")
            i += 2
        else:
            out.append(c)
            i += 1
    return "".join(out)


def _maybe_obfuscated_git_push(command: str) -> bool:
    """True if the shell would run a `git push` that `_tokens_invoke_git_push` could not see.

    Only reached when the precise token scan found no clean push. `shlex` splits on
    whitespace and performs no expansion, so a push can hide behind a fused separator
    (`true;git push`), subshell/grouping (`(git push ...)`), or expansion (`git${IFS}push`,
    `git $(printf push)`). We work on the unquoted command skeleton so literal metacharacters
    inside a commit message are ignored (no false positive on `git commit -m "push it" && ls`
    or `git log | grep push`), then fail closed if any unquoted simple-command is a `git push`
    or if unquoted expansion could produce one.
    """
    skeleton = _strip_quoted(command)
    if "push" not in skeleton:
        # The only `push` text is inside quotes (a literal argument), so it cannot be a
        # command word. (A push spelled purely by expansion with no literal `push` anywhere
        # is left to the GitHub proxy token scope, which lacks workflows:write until approval.)
        return False
    if _EXPANSION.search(skeleton):
        return True
    return any(
        _tokens_invoke_git_push(segment.split()) for segment in _SEGMENT_SPLIT.split(skeleton)
    )


def _parse_git_push(command: str) -> ParsedGitPush | _BlockedGitPush | None:
    stripped = command.strip()
    try:
        probe = shlex.split(stripped)
    except ValueError:
        probe = None
    if probe is None or not _tokens_invoke_git_push(probe):
        # No push the token scan can normalize. Fail closed if one is hidden behind shell
        # metacharacters/expansion; otherwise leave the command untouched.
        if _maybe_obfuscated_git_push(stripped):
            return _BlockedGitPush(
                "possible git push obscured by shell metacharacters; issue it as a plain "
                "`git push origin <branch>`"
            )
        return None
    if _UNSAFE_RAW_COMMAND.search(stripped) or "&" in stripped.replace("&&", ""):
        return _BlockedGitPush("unsafe shell characters in git push command")
    tokens = probe
    if not tokens:
        return None

    if len(tokens) >= 4 and tokens[0] == "cd" and tokens[2] == "&&":
        if any(token in _SHELL_OPERATORS or token == "&&" for token in tokens[3:]):
            return _BlockedGitPush("chained shell commands in git push")
        return _parse_git_tokens(tokens[3:], repo_dir=tokens[1])

    if any(token in _SHELL_OPERATORS or token == "&&" for token in tokens):
        return _BlockedGitPush("chained shell commands")
    return _parse_git_tokens(tokens, repo_dir=None)


def _parse_git_tokens(
    tokens: list[str], *, repo_dir: str | None
) -> ParsedGitPush | _BlockedGitPush | None:
    """Parse tokens into a supported git push, a block sentinel, or None.

    Recognizes bareword `git`, path invocations (`/usr/bin/git`), and wrapper-prefixed
    forms (`command`/`env`/`nice`/... git). Anything git-push-shaped that cannot be reduced
    to `git [-C <dir>] push [-u] origin <refspec>` fails closed to a block rather than a
    silent pass-through. Non-push git commands and non-git commands return None.
    """
    git_idx = next((idx for idx, tok in enumerate(tokens) if tok.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] == "git"), None)
    if git_idx is None:
        return None
    git_args = tokens[git_idx + 1 :]
    if "push" not in git_args:
        # A non-push git command (e.g. `git status`, `git pull`).
        return None
    # Everything before the `git` executable must be a benign wrapper prefix (a known
    # wrapper, an option flag, or a NAME=VALUE assignment). An unrecognized leading token
    # (a value-taking wrapper option like the `10` in `nice -n 10`, an unknown wrapper, or
    # `git` used as an argument to another program) is ambiguous, so fail closed.
    if any(
        not (tok in _GIT_WRAPPERS or tok.startswith("-") or "=" in tok) for tok in tokens[:git_idx]
    ):
        return _BlockedGitPush(
            "unrecognized wrapper before `git push`; use `git push origin <branch>`"
        )
    i = 0
    while i < len(git_args) and git_args[i] != "push":
        if git_args[i] == "-C" and i + 1 < len(git_args):
            repo_dir = git_args[i + 1]
            i += 2
            continue
        # A git push carrying unsupported global options (e.g. `git -c k=v push`,
        # `git --git-dir=.git push`). We cannot safely normalize it, so fail closed.
        return _BlockedGitPush(
            "unsupported git options before `push`; use `git push origin <branch>`"
        )
    return _parse_push_args(git_args[i + 1 :], repo_dir=repo_dir)


def _parse_push_args(
    tokens: list[str], *, repo_dir: str | None
) -> ParsedGitPush | _BlockedGitPush | None:
    set_upstream = False
    while tokens and tokens[0] in {"-u", "--set-upstream"}:
        set_upstream = True
        tokens = tokens[1:]
    if len(tokens) != 2 or tokens[0] != "origin":
        return _BlockedGitPush("unrecognized or unsafe git push arguments")
    parsed = _parse_refspec(tokens[1])
    if parsed is None:
        return _BlockedGitPush("unrecognized or unsafe git push refspec")
    local_ref, remote_ref = parsed
    return ParsedGitPush(
        repo_dir=repo_dir,
        remote="origin",
        local_ref=local_ref,
        remote_ref=remote_ref,
        set_upstream=set_upstream,
    )


def _parse_refspec(refspec: str) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
    if refspec.startswith("-") or ".." in refspec:
        return None
    if ":" in refspec:
        parts = refspec.split(":")
        if len(parts) != 2 or not parts[0] or not parts[1]:
            return None
        local_ref, remote_ref = parts
    else:
        local_ref = remote_ref = refspec
    if not _safe_ref(local_ref, allow_head=True) or not _safe_ref(remote_ref, allow_head=False):
        return None
    return local_ref, remote_ref


def _safe_ref(ref: str, *, allow_head: bool) -> bool:
    if allow_head and ref == "HEAD":
        return True
    if ref == "HEAD" or not _REF_NAME.fullmatch(ref):
        return False
    return not any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in ref.split("/"))


def _git_command(repo_dir: str | None, args: str) -> str:
    if repo_dir:
        return f"git -C {shlex.quote(repo_dir)} {args}"
    return f"git {args}"


def _run_git(backend: Any, repo_dir: str | None, args: str) -> GitInspectResult:
    try:
        response = backend.execute(_git_command(repo_dir, args), timeout=30)
    except Exception:
        logger.debug("workflow push inspection failed for git %s", args, exc_info=True)
        return GitInspectResult("", False)
    return GitInspectResult(_response_output(response).strip(), _response_ok(response))


def _first_line(text: str) -> str:
    for line in text.splitlines():
        stripped = line.strip()
        if stripped:
            return stripped
    return ""


def _normalize_remote(remote: str) -> str:
    value = remote.strip()
    if value.endswith(".git"):
        value = value[:-4]
    value = re.sub(r"^https://[^/@]+@github\.com/", "https://github.com/", value)
    value = re.sub(r"^git@github\.com:", "https://github.com/", value)
    return value


def _fingerprint(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
    encoded = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
    return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()


def _run_coroutine_sync(coro: Awaitable[ToolMessage | Command]) -> ToolMessage | Command:
    try:
        asyncio.get_running_loop()
    except RuntimeError:
        return asyncio.run(coro)

    result: dict[str, ToolMessage | Command | BaseException] = {}

    def target() -> None:
        try:
            result["value"] = asyncio.run(coro)
        except BaseException as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
            result["value"] = exc

    thread = threading.Thread(target=target)
    thread.start()
    thread.join()
    value = result["value"]
    if isinstance(value, BaseException):
        raise value
    return value


def _parse_ls_tree(output: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
    """Parse `git ls-tree -r` output into a sorted list of (sha, path) tuples."""
    entries: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
    for line in output.splitlines():
        line = line.strip()
        if not line:
            continue
        # Format: "<mode> <type> <sha>\t<path>"
        meta, _, path = line.partition("\t")
        if not path:
            continue
        parts = meta.split()
        if len(parts) < 3:
            continue
        entries.append((parts[2], path))
    entries.sort(key=lambda item: item[1])
    return entries


def _workflow_tree_at_ref(
    backend: Any, repo_dir: str | None, ref: str
) -> tuple[list[tuple[str, str]], str] | None:
    """Return the sorted workflow tree entries and a stable hash for the given ref.

    Returns an empty list when the ref has no workflow files, so callers can detect
    additions and deletions against a base ref.
    """
    ls_tree = _run_git(backend, repo_dir, f"ls-tree -r {shlex.quote(ref)} -- .github/workflows")
    if not ls_tree.ok:
        return None
    entries = _parse_ls_tree(ls_tree.output)
    content_hash = _fingerprint({"tree": entries})
    return entries, content_hash


def _fetch_remote_base(backend: Any, repo_dir: str | None, remote: str, branch: str) -> str | None:
    """Fetch the base ref from the exact URL the push will target and return a local alias.

    The base is fetched from the remote's effective *push* URL (`git remote get-url --push`),
    not the remote name, because git honors a separate `pushurl`: an untrusted sandbox can
    point the fetch URL at attacker/local content while the push still lands on the real
    repo. Fetching the base from the push URL keeps the base and the push destination the
    same authenticated repo, so a split cannot hide a workflow change. Uses `FETCH_HEAD`
    (freshly fetched), never a local `refs/remotes/origin/*` ref the sandbox could rewrite.

    Returns None (which makes the caller require approval) if the push destination is
    ambiguous or rewritten: multiple `pushurl` entries (git pushes to ALL of them, so a
    single base cannot represent the destination) or any `insteadOf`/`pushInsteadOf` URL
    rewrite the sandbox could use to make the inspected URL differ from the push target.
    """
    rewrites = _run_git(
        backend, repo_dir, "config --get-regexp " + shlex.quote(r"url\..*\.(push)?insteadof")
    )
    if rewrites.ok and rewrites.output.strip():
        # A URL rewrite means the inspected push URL may not be the real destination.
        return None

    push_url_res = _run_git(backend, repo_dir, f"remote get-url --push --all {shlex.quote(remote)}")
    push_urls = (
        [line.strip() for line in push_url_res.output.splitlines() if line.strip()]
        if push_url_res.ok
        else []
    )
    # `git push` sends to every configured push URL; if there is not exactly one we cannot
    # represent the destination with a single base, so fail closed.
    if len(push_urls) != 1:
        return None
    push_url = push_urls[0]

    fetch = _run_git(backend, repo_dir, f"fetch {shlex.quote(push_url)} {shlex.quote(branch)}")
    if fetch.ok:
        return "FETCH_HEAD"

    default = _run_git(backend, repo_dir, f"ls-remote --symref {shlex.quote(push_url)} HEAD")
    default_branch = ""
    if default.ok:
        default_branch = _first_line(default.output).removeprefix("ref: refs/heads/").split("\t")[0]

    for fallback in (default_branch, "dev", "main"):
        if not fallback or fallback == branch:
            continue
        fetch = _run_git(
            backend, repo_dir, f"fetch {shlex.quote(push_url)} {shlex.quote(fallback)}"
        )
        if fetch.ok:
            return "FETCH_HEAD"
    return None


def _workflow_change_for_push(backend: Any, parsed: ParsedGitPush) -> WorkflowPushChange | None:
    root_result = _run_git(backend, parsed.repo_dir, "rev-parse --show-toplevel")
    if not root_result.ok:
        return None
    root = _first_line(root_result.output)
    if not root:
        return None

    branch = _run_git(backend, root, "rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD")
    branch_name = _first_line(branch.output) if branch.ok else ""
    if not branch_name or branch_name == "HEAD" or parsed.remote_ref != branch_name:
        return None
    if parsed.local_ref not in {"HEAD", branch_name}:
        return None

    target_sha = _run_git(backend, root, f"rev-parse {shlex.quote(parsed.local_ref)}")
    head = _first_line(target_sha.output) if target_sha.ok else ""
    if not head or not _GIT_OBJECT_ID.fullmatch(head):
        return None

    head_tree = _workflow_tree_at_ref(backend, root, head)
    if head_tree is None:
        # The workflow tree at head could not be read (an empty tree returns ([], hash), so
        # None means the `ls-tree` read genuinely failed). Fail closed rather than skipping
        # the guard, mirroring the base-read path.
        return WorkflowPushChange(
            fingerprint="",
            repo="",
            branch=branch_name,
            files=[],
            head_sha=head,
            remote=parsed.remote,
            local_ref=parsed.local_ref,
            remote_ref=parsed.remote_ref,
            fixed_command="",
            blocked=True,
            blocked_reason="could not read the workflow tree at the pushed head; blocking to be safe",
        )

    base_ref = _fetch_remote_base(backend, root, parsed.remote, branch_name)
    if base_ref is not None:
        base_tree = _workflow_tree_at_ref(backend, root, base_ref)
        if base_tree is not None and head_tree[0] == base_tree[0]:
            # No workflow change against the trusted remote base.
            return None

    head_entries, head_content_hash = head_tree
    files = sorted({path for _sha, path in head_entries})

    remote = _run_git(backend, root, "config --get remote.origin.url")
    repo = _normalize_remote(_first_line(remote.output)) if remote.ok else ""
    fixed_refspec = f"{head}:refs/heads/{parsed.remote_ref}"
    fixed_args = ["push"]
    if parsed.set_upstream:
        fixed_args.append("--set-upstream")
    fixed_args.extend([parsed.remote, fixed_refspec])
    fixed_command = _git_command(root, " ".join(shlex.quote(arg) for arg in fixed_args))
    content_payload = {
        "repo": repo,
        "branch": branch_name,
        "files": files,
        "content_hash": head_content_hash,
    }
    return WorkflowPushChange(
        fingerprint=_fingerprint(content_payload),
        repo=repo,
        branch=branch_name,
        files=files,
        head_sha=head,
        remote=parsed.remote,
        local_ref=parsed.local_ref,
        remote_ref=parsed.remote_ref,
        fixed_command=fixed_command,
    )


def _blocked_message(
    change: WorkflowPushChange,
    *,
    already_rejected: bool = False,
    stale: bool = False,
    blocked: bool = False,
) -> ToolMessage:
    status = "rejected" if already_rejected else "approval_required"
    if blocked:
        error = change.blocked_reason or "This git push command is not recognized as safe."
        error_type = "WorkflowPushBlocked"
    elif stale:
        error = (
            "This git push includes GitHub workflow file changes. A previous approval "
            "exists for the same branch and workflow files, but the workflow content "
            "at the pushed head has changed since that approval (for example, a rebase "
            "that changed the workflow files or an amend that edited them). The thread "
            "owner must re-approve the new fingerprint before Open SWE can push it."
        )
        error_type = "WorkflowPushApprovalRequired"
    else:
        error = (
            "This git push includes GitHub workflow file changes and requires human "
            "approval before Open SWE can push it. Retry the same standalone git push "
            "after the thread owner approves the workflow files."
        )
        error_type = "WorkflowPushApprovalRequired"
    content = {
        "status": "error",
        "error_type": error_type,
        "error": error,
        "workflow_approval_status": status if not blocked else "blocked",
        "fingerprint": change.fingerprint,
        "files": change.files,
        "repo": change.repo,
        "branch": change.branch,
    }
    return ToolMessage(content=json.dumps(content), tool_call_id="", status="error")


def _tool_message_for_request(message: ToolMessage, request: ToolCallRequest) -> ToolMessage:
    message.tool_call_id = _tool_call_id(request)
    return message


def _override_execute_command(request: ToolCallRequest, command: str) -> ToolCallRequest:
    tool_call = getattr(request, "tool_call", None)
    if not isinstance(tool_call, Mapping):
        return request
    args = dict(_tool_args(request))
    args["command"] = command
    return request.override(tool_call={**dict(tool_call), "args": args})


def _approval_slack_message(change: WorkflowPushChange) -> str:
    files = "\n".join(f"• `{path}`" for path in change.files[:10])
    if len(change.files) > 10:
        files += f"\n• …and {len(change.files) - 10} more"
    repo = change.repo or "the repository"
    branch = change.branch or "the current branch"
    return (
        "*Workflow file approval required*\n"
        f"Open SWE is trying to push the workflow files below to `{repo}` on `{branch}`.\n\n"
        f"*Files at the pushed head:*\n{files}\n\n"
        f"*Fingerprint:* `{change.fingerprint}`\n\n"
        "Approval covers the exact workflow files and content listed above at the pushed head, "
        "including future rebases or amends that replay the same workflow tree. If the set of "
        "workflow files, the branch, or the workflow-file content at the pushed head changes, "
        "a new fingerprint will be required."
    )


async def _post_slack_approval_if_needed(
    request: ToolCallRequest, change: WorkflowPushChange, record: Mapping[str, Any]
) -> None:
    if record.get("notified") is True:
        return
    configurable = _configurable(request)
    slack_thread = configurable.get("slack_thread")
    if not isinstance(slack_thread, Mapping):
        return
    channel_id = slack_thread.get("channel_id")
    thread_ts = slack_thread.get("thread_ts")
    if not isinstance(channel_id, str) or not isinstance(thread_ts, str):
        return
    message = _approval_slack_message(change)
    message_ts, error = await post_slack_thread_reply_with_ts(
        channel_id,
        thread_ts,
        message,
        blocks=build_workflow_approval_blocks(message, change.fingerprint),
    )
    if message_ts and not error:
        thread_id = _thread_id(request)
        if thread_id:
            await mark_workflow_push_notified(thread_id, change.fingerprint)


async def _approval_state(request: ToolCallRequest, change: WorkflowPushChange) -> str:
    thread_id = _thread_id(request)
    if not thread_id:
        return "missing_thread"
    try:
        if await workflow_push_approved(thread_id, change.fingerprint):
            return "approved"
        if await workflow_push_rejected(thread_id, change.fingerprint):
            return "rejected"

        # If the exact identity fingerprint is not approved, check whether a prior
        # approval covers the same (repo, branch, files) identity. If so, the workflow
        # tree at the pushed head changed underneath the prior approval (rebase/amend
        # that edited workflow files), so we surface a loud re-approval message rather
        # than a fresh silent pending record.
        prior = await find_workflow_push_approval(
            thread_id,
            repo=change.repo,
            branch=change.branch,
            files=change.files,
        )
        if prior is not None:
            return "stale_approval"

        record, _created = await ensure_workflow_push_pending(
            thread_id,
            fingerprint=change.fingerprint,
            repo=change.repo,
            branch=change.branch,
            base_sha=change.base_sha,
            head_sha=change.head_sha,
            files=change.files,
        )
        await _post_slack_approval_if_needed(request, change, record)
        return str(record.get("status") or "pending")
    except Exception:
        logger.exception("Failed to read or write workflow push approval state")
        return "approval_error"


async def _run_with_workflow_token(
    thread_id: str,
    request: ToolCallRequest,
    run: Callable[[], Awaitable[ToolMessage | Command]],
) -> ToolMessage | Command:
    sandbox_type = os.getenv("SANDBOX_TYPE", "langsmith")
    if sandbox_type != "langsmith":
        return await run()

    elevated = await refresh_proxy_token(
        thread_id, permissions=WORKFLOW_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS
    )
    if not elevated:
        logger.error(
            "Workflow push approved for thread %s, but proxy token elevation to workflows:write "
            "failed; the sandbox cannot push workflow files without an elevated token.",
            thread_id,
        )
        error_message = ToolMessage(
            content=json.dumps(
                {
                    "status": "error",
                    "error_type": "WorkflowPushElevationFailed",
                    "error": (
                        "Workflow push approved, but the sandbox could not obtain a "
                        "workflows-scoped token. Please retry the push or check the "
                        "GitHub proxy / token minting configuration."
                    ),
                }
            ),
            tool_call_id="",
            status="error",
        )
        return _tool_message_for_request(error_message, request)
    try:
        return await run()
    finally:
        restored = await refresh_proxy_token(thread_id, permissions=RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS)
        if not restored:
            await refresh_proxy_token(thread_id, permissions=BASE_RUNTIME_PROXY_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS)


class WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware(AgentMiddleware):
    """Require approval before pushing `.github/workflows` changes."""

    state_schema = AgentState

    def _change_for_request(self, request: ToolCallRequest) -> WorkflowPushChange | None:
        if _tool_name(request) != "execute":
            return None
        command = _tool_args(request).get("command")
        if not isinstance(command, str):
            return None
        parsed = _parse_git_push(command)
        if parsed is None:
            return None
        if isinstance(parsed, _BlockedGitPush):
            return WorkflowPushChange(
                fingerprint="",
                repo="",
                branch="",
                files=[],
                head_sha="",
                remote="origin",
                local_ref="",
                remote_ref="",
                fixed_command="",
                blocked=True,
                blocked_reason=parsed.reason,
            )
        backend = _backend(_thread_id(request))
        if backend is None:
            return None
        return _workflow_change_for_push(backend, parsed)

    async def _handle_change_async(
        self,
        request: ToolCallRequest,
        handler: Callable[[ToolCallRequest], Awaitable[ToolMessage | Command]],
        change: WorkflowPushChange,
    ) -> ToolMessage | Command:
        if change.blocked:
            return _tool_message_for_request(_blocked_message(change, blocked=True), request)
        thread_id = _thread_id(request)
        state = await _approval_state(request, change)
        if state == "approved" and thread_id:
            safe_request = _override_execute_command(request, change.fixed_command)
            return await _run_with_workflow_token(thread_id, request, lambda: handler(safe_request))
        if state == "stale_approval":
            record, _created = await ensure_workflow_push_pending(
                thread_id,
                fingerprint=change.fingerprint,
                repo=change.repo,
                branch=change.branch,
                base_sha=change.base_sha,
                head_sha=change.head_sha,
                files=change.files,
            )
            await _post_slack_approval_if_needed(request, change, record)
        return _tool_message_for_request(
            _blocked_message(
                change,
                already_rejected=state == "rejected",
                stale=state == "stale_approval",
            ),
            request,
        )

    def wrap_tool_call(
        self,
        request: ToolCallRequest,
        handler: Callable[[ToolCallRequest], ToolMessage | Command],
    ) -> ToolMessage | Command:
        change = self._change_for_request(request)
        if change is None:
            return handler(request)

        async def run_handler() -> ToolMessage | Command:
            return handler(request)

        return _run_coroutine_sync(
            self._handle_change_async(request, lambda _request: run_handler(), change)
        )

    async def awrap_tool_call(
        self,
        request: ToolCallRequest,
        handler: Callable[[ToolCallRequest], Awaitable[ToolMessage | Command]],
    ) -> ToolMessage | Command:
        change = self._change_for_request(request)
        if change is None:
            return await handler(request)
        return await self._handle_change_async(request, handler, change)