AppService construct wires the per-env EC2 box and its internet path. The
seahaven-vpc and the internet-facing seahaven-com ALB are SHARED with the
on-prem seahaven-site stack, so everything VPC/ALB/zone-side is IMPORTED and
never owned/mutated; open-swe only ADDS its own resources.
Per env (open-swe-stack.ts → AppService):
- ARM64 EC2 box (t4g.medium dev / t4g.large prod) in private1 (us-east-1a,
in-AZ NAT egress). requireImdsv2, gp3-encrypted root, deleteOnTermination
(no RETAIN volume — replacement-tolerant; see ami-cache.ts).
userDataCausesReplacement; user-data rendered from deploy/ami/user-data.sh.
- Standalone instance SG: ingress ONLY from the shared ALB SG on :80; egress
via NAT. The ALB SG is opened to the box via a STANDALONE CfnSecurityGroupEgress
(the imported, on-prem-owned SG is never mutated).
- Target group → instance:80 (nginx is sole ingress; LangGraph :2024 stays
loopback). Health check GET /healthz.
- Two rules on the imported :443 listener, both → the TG:
* webhooks (priority 2 dev / 3 prod): host∈{openswe,hooks}-<env> AND /webhooks/*
* site (priority 10 dev / 11 prod): host=openswe-<env> (dashboard SPA + api)
Webhooks MUST sit below the on-prem host-agnostic /webhooks/* rule (priority 5)
or it would steal every webhook — first-match-by-ascending-priority.
- Route53 alias records (openswe[-dev] + hooks[-dev]) → shared ALB.
- 4 CloudWatch log groups at 30-day retention (IaC-owned; mirrors CW-agent config).
Security (/sh-security-review T12): iac-iam pass clean. Logic pass → 1 confirmed
medium fixed (OSWE-T12-01: nginx 1MB default client_max_body_size would 413 large
GitHub webhooks pre-signature-verification → set 25m on /webhooks/, 10m on
/dashboard/api/); hooks host scoped to /webhooks/* only (OSWE-T12-02 hygiene);
XFF-spoof candidate killed (no code trusts leftmost XFF). No confirmed
critical/high.
Synth-only; not deployed. AMI is the cdk.context.json placeholder until the baked
open-swe-base-arm64 id is pinned pre-deploy. tsc/synth(dev+prod)/jest(16) clean.
Next: T13 GPT-4.1 cross-review of the SG/listener diff before any deploy.
Create the per-env config surface the EC2 box reads at boot via
fetch-config.sh / seed_store.sh:
- ConfigStore construct (infra/lib/constructs/config-store.ts):
- 28 value-LESS Secrets Manager shells open-swe-<env>/<VAR>
(RemovalPolicy.RETAIN, no SecretString/generateSecretString — real
values are set out-of-band by put-config.sh, never in IaC/state).
- 8 IaC-managed SSM params /open-swe-<env>/<VAR> with real,
stable/derivable values (SANDBOX_TYPE, DEFAULT_REPO_OWNER/NAME,
ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS, DASHBOARD_*_URL/ORIGINS, LLM_MODEL_ID).
- OUT_OF_BAND_SSM documents the ~30 params CDK intentionally does NOT
own (operationally-variable / env-specific-unknown).
- Wire ConfigStore into OpenSwe<Env>Stack.
- KebabNamingAspect: exempt Secrets Manager + SSM names, which carry the
literal UPPER_SNAKE env-var segment (open-swe-dev/DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET).
- deploy/seahaven/put-config.sh: out-of-band populator (placeholders only,
OPENSWE_PUT_<VAR> env indirection; no real values committed).
Synth-only; not deployed. Instance-role read grants on open-swe-<env>/*
already exist from T6 — no IAM/trust changes here.
PR#7 of the AWS migration. deploy/seahaven/: fetch-config.sh materializes a
service-user-owned 0600 tmpfs .env from Secrets Manager + SSM (fail-fast);
seed_store.sh reseeds the in-memory store; ROTATION.md.
Incorporates T5 /sh-security-review fixes:
- seed_store no longer bash-sources the .env (closes the SH-INJ-001 RCE); uses a
non-eval reader, jq --arg JSON bodies, and a loopback-pinned BASE.
- fetch-config: .env owned by the openswe service user (app no longer runs as
root); DEFAULT_REPO_OWNER hard-pinned; key-identifier validation + flat-namespace
collision detection; dropped SSM --recursive.
shellcheck + bash -n clean.
PR#2 of the AWS migration. deploy/ami/: Packer template (Ubuntu 24.04 arm64,
uv+py3.12, nginx, awscli v2, CW agent; no swapfile), provisioning-only user-data
(userDataCausesReplacement rationale), systemd unit + nginx + CW templates.
Incorporates T5 /sh-security-review fixes: langgraph binds 127.0.0.1 (not 0.0.0.0);
nginx is the sole ingress proxying only /dashboard/api/ + /webhooks/; ExecStartPre
runs fetch-config as root (+) and passes the env arg; the app runs as the
unprivileged openswe user reading an openswe-owned 0600 .env. packer validate clean.
* ci: promote dev to prod via fast-forward instead of force-pushing main
Repoints the daily promotion workflow to feed prod from the dev integration
trunk (prod <- dev) rather than force-pushing the upstream mirror (main).
Uses a fast-forward push so a release can never rewrite prod history.
* fix: sort imports in aegra_entry.py to unblock dev CI
The Sea Haven deployment commit left aegra_entry.py with an unsorted import
block (ruff I001), which fails the required 'Agent lint' check and blocks all
merges into dev. Apply the import-sort autofix.
Captures the stock-LangGraph deployment of this fork at Sea Haven:
- systemd/open-swe.service: langgraph dev (:2024) + store seed ExecStartPost
- seed_store.sh: re-seeds team_settings + user_mappings (in-memory store
resets on restart); env-parameterized, no secrets
- nginx/openswe.conf: dashboard SPA + scoped /dashboard/api proxy (security
boundary; agent API not exposed)
- aegra/: deferred self-hosted-runtime alternative (not active on stock)
- DEPLOYMENT.md: full runbook (models, build, ingress, OAuth callback)
Secrets and internal infra identifiers are intentionally excluded (public
fork); real values live in private IT docs.
