RETAIN + a fixed secret name means a failed FIRST create leaves empty
secret shells behind when the stack rolls back. The shells keep the
global `open-swe-<env>/<VAR>` names, so every later create fails with
`AlreadyExists`, and a plain delete-secret keeps the name reserved for
the recovery window rather than freeing it.
Record the trap and the force-delete recovery (only for empty shells)
in the config-store construct and the infra README so the next
teardown/rebuild, secret logical-id change, or new-env stand-up does
not rediscover it the hard way.
Prod's first deploy hit this on 2026-06-29: 28 orphaned shells from an
earlier failed create reserved the names and had to be force-deleted
before the stack would create.
Dev now runs against the dedicated seahaven-open-swe-dev org (repo openswe-dev-sandbox),
isolated from the real Sea Haven org. Two changes:
- config-store.ts: iacManagedSsm repo targeting is now per-env — dev =
seahaven-open-swe-dev/openswe-dev-sandbox, prod stays Sea-Haven-Industries/open-swe-pilot.
ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS tracks the env owner. Adds a dev-only SEED_USER_MAPPINGS param so the
triggering GitHub login (amoussa1229) resolves and @openswe comments aren't skipped.
- fetch-config.sh: replace the unconditional hard-pin to Sea-Haven-Industries with an owner
GUARD that HONORS the configured owner (OPENSWE_REPO_OWNER override, else the SSM value) but
forces a per-env safe org when the normalized owner is blank or the upstream langchain-ai.
Normalization (lowercase, strip whitespace, first path segment, drop dots) catches
langchain-ai/<repo>, langchain-ai., and case variants without over-blocking legit orgs
(e.g. langchain-ai-fork). Fallback org is per-env so dev can't fall back into the real org.
Reviews: GPT-4.1 cross-review APPROVE (round 1 found a path/dot bypass -> hardened, round 2 clean);
/sh-security-review authz one LOW (env-invariant fallback) -> fixed. Positive org allowlist still
enforced by the app via ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS.
Create the per-env config surface the EC2 box reads at boot via
fetch-config.sh / seed_store.sh:
- ConfigStore construct (infra/lib/constructs/config-store.ts):
- 28 value-LESS Secrets Manager shells open-swe-<env>/<VAR>
(RemovalPolicy.RETAIN, no SecretString/generateSecretString — real
values are set out-of-band by put-config.sh, never in IaC/state).
- 8 IaC-managed SSM params /open-swe-<env>/<VAR> with real,
stable/derivable values (SANDBOX_TYPE, DEFAULT_REPO_OWNER/NAME,
ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS, DASHBOARD_*_URL/ORIGINS, LLM_MODEL_ID).
- OUT_OF_BAND_SSM documents the ~30 params CDK intentionally does NOT
own (operationally-variable / env-specific-unknown).
- Wire ConfigStore into OpenSwe<Env>Stack.
- KebabNamingAspect: exempt Secrets Manager + SSM names, which carry the
literal UPPER_SNAKE env-var segment (open-swe-dev/DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET).
- deploy/seahaven/put-config.sh: out-of-band populator (placeholders only,
OPENSWE_PUT_<VAR> env indirection; no real values committed).
Synth-only; not deployed. Instance-role read grants on open-swe-<env>/*
already exist from T6 — no IAM/trust changes here.
