Those three providers were dropped in the Bedrock/Fireworks migration and their keys
revoked; the live Secrets Manager objects (open-swe-{dev,prod}/{OPENAI,GOOGLE,GROQ}_API_KEY)
were deleted (7-day recovery). Remove them from the IaC so a future cdk deploy does not
recreate the shells, and from fetch-config's mirror array so boot stops requesting them:
- config-store.ts SECRET_VARS + descriptions (28 -> 25 shells)
- fetch-config.sh SECRET_VARS array (kept in lockstep)
- put-config.sh: drop the put_secret lines; ANTHROPIC_API_KEY re-labelled optional
(eval judge only — Bedrock builder/reviewer auth via the host IAM role).
REQUIRED_PROVIDER_KEYS is not set in SSM, so it uses the FIREWORKS_API_KEY default.
Deployment-readiness for the Bedrock migration (PR #62):
- instance-role.ts: least-privilege bedrock:InvokeModel[WithResponseStream] on the
us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8 inference-profile ARN + the foundation-model ARN in
each routed region (us-east-1/2, us-west-2). The model runs in the server process
on the box, so the EC2 instance role is the principal. Simulator-verified (allowed
for opus-4-8, implicitDeny for other models) and synth-verified. Passed the
mandatory GPT-4.1 IAM cross-review (no blockers, least-privilege confirmed).
- config-store.ts: IaC SSM LLM_MODEL_ID anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 ->
bedrock_converse:us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8. This SSM value overrides
seed_store.sh's default via pick precedence, so the seed-script fix alone was
insufficient — both sources now point at the supported Bedrock id.
- infra/README.md + evals/reviewer/config.toml: repoint stale anthropic:/google_genai:
ids to the Bedrock id (config.toml's model_id was an active, now-broken value).
AWS_REGION is already wired via user-data.sh (IMDS -> boot.env), so no change needed there.
RETAIN + a fixed secret name means a failed FIRST create leaves empty
secret shells behind when the stack rolls back. The shells keep the
global `open-swe-<env>/<VAR>` names, so every later create fails with
`AlreadyExists`, and a plain delete-secret keeps the name reserved for
the recovery window rather than freeing it.
Record the trap and the force-delete recovery (only for empty shells)
in the config-store construct and the infra README so the next
teardown/rebuild, secret logical-id change, or new-env stand-up does
not rediscover it the hard way.
Prod's first deploy hit this on 2026-06-29: 28 orphaned shells from an
earlier failed create reserved the names and had to be force-deleted
before the stack would create.
Dev now runs against the dedicated seahaven-open-swe-dev org (repo openswe-dev-sandbox),
isolated from the real Sea Haven org. Two changes:
- config-store.ts: iacManagedSsm repo targeting is now per-env — dev =
seahaven-open-swe-dev/openswe-dev-sandbox, prod stays Sea-Haven-Industries/open-swe-pilot.
ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS tracks the env owner. Adds a dev-only SEED_USER_MAPPINGS param so the
triggering GitHub login (amoussa1229) resolves and @openswe comments aren't skipped.
- fetch-config.sh: replace the unconditional hard-pin to Sea-Haven-Industries with an owner
GUARD that HONORS the configured owner (OPENSWE_REPO_OWNER override, else the SSM value) but
forces a per-env safe org when the normalized owner is blank or the upstream langchain-ai.
Normalization (lowercase, strip whitespace, first path segment, drop dots) catches
langchain-ai/<repo>, langchain-ai., and case variants without over-blocking legit orgs
(e.g. langchain-ai-fork). Fallback org is per-env so dev can't fall back into the real org.
Reviews: GPT-4.1 cross-review APPROVE (round 1 found a path/dot bypass -> hardened, round 2 clean);
/sh-security-review authz one LOW (env-invariant fallback) -> fixed. Positive org allowlist still
enforced by the app via ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS.
Create the per-env config surface the EC2 box reads at boot via
fetch-config.sh / seed_store.sh:
- ConfigStore construct (infra/lib/constructs/config-store.ts):
- 28 value-LESS Secrets Manager shells open-swe-<env>/<VAR>
(RemovalPolicy.RETAIN, no SecretString/generateSecretString — real
values are set out-of-band by put-config.sh, never in IaC/state).
- 8 IaC-managed SSM params /open-swe-<env>/<VAR> with real,
stable/derivable values (SANDBOX_TYPE, DEFAULT_REPO_OWNER/NAME,
ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS, DASHBOARD_*_URL/ORIGINS, LLM_MODEL_ID).
- OUT_OF_BAND_SSM documents the ~30 params CDK intentionally does NOT
own (operationally-variable / env-specific-unknown).
- Wire ConfigStore into OpenSwe<Env>Stack.
- KebabNamingAspect: exempt Secrets Manager + SSM names, which carry the
literal UPPER_SNAKE env-var segment (open-swe-dev/DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET).
- deploy/seahaven/put-config.sh: out-of-band populator (placeholders only,
OPENSWE_PUT_<VAR> env indirection; no real values committed).
Synth-only; not deployed. Instance-role read grants on open-swe-<env>/*
already exist from T6 — no IAM/trust changes here.
