mirror of
https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/open-swe.git
synced 2026-09-30 09:13:14 +00:00
feat: Loosen workflow push approval fingerprint to repo/branch/files identity (#101)
This commit is contained in:
seahaven-openswe[bot]
GitHub
parent
421290d066
commit
47a9a1ba89
5 changed files with 1110 additions and 98 deletions
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@ -44,6 +44,33 @@ async def workflow_push_approved(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
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return approvals.get(fingerprint, {}).get("status") == WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_APPROVED
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async def workflow_push_rejected(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
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approvals = await get_workflow_push_approvals(thread_id)
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return approvals.get(fingerprint, {}).get("status") == WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_REJECTED
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async def find_workflow_push_approval(
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thread_id: str,
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*,
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repo: str,
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branch: str,
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files: list[str],
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) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
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"""Return the most recent approved record matching identity-level keys, if any."""
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approvals = await get_workflow_push_approvals(thread_id)
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identity = (repo, branch, tuple(sorted(files)))
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matches = [
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r
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for r in approvals.values()
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if r.get("status") == WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_APPROVED
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and (r.get("repo"), r.get("branch"), tuple(sorted(r.get("files", [])))) == identity
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]
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if not matches:
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return None
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matches.sort(key=lambda r: str(r.get("decided_at", "")), reverse=True)
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return matches[0]
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async def ensure_workflow_push_pending(
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thread_id: str,
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*,
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@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import codecs
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import hashlib
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import json
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import logging
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@ -22,8 +23,10 @@ from langgraph.types import Command
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from ..dashboard.workflow_approval import (
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ensure_workflow_push_pending,
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find_workflow_push_approval,
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mark_workflow_push_notified,
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workflow_push_approved,
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workflow_push_rejected,
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)
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from ..tools.slack_thread_reply import build_workflow_approval_blocks
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from ..utils.github_app import (
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@ -42,6 +45,28 @@ _SHELL_OPERATORS = {";", "|", "||", "&"}
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_REF_NAME = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._/@+-]+$")
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_GIT_OBJECT_ID = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{40,64}$")
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_UNSAFE_RAW_COMMAND = re.compile(r"[;|`$<>\n\r]")
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# Unquoted shell expansion/substitution (`$VAR`, `${...}`, `$(...)`, backticks) can produce
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# a `git push` whose text we cannot see; its presence alongside a push forces fail-closed.
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_EXPANSION = re.compile(r"[$`]")
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# Unquoted command separators and grouping. Splitting the unquoted command skeleton on these
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# yields the individual simple-commands the shell would run, each checked for a `git push`.
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_SEGMENT_SPLIT = re.compile(r"[;|&(){}\n]+")
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# Command wrappers that can prefix a `git` invocation (e.g. `command git push`,
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# `env FOO=bar git push`, `/usr/bin/git push`). Recognized so a wrapped or path-qualified
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# git push cannot slip past the guard as "not a git command".
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_GIT_WRAPPERS = {"command", "env", "nice", "sudo", "stdbuf", "nohup", "time", "ionice", "setsid"}
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# Git global options that consume the following token as a separate value; skipped when
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# locating the git subcommand so `git -c k=v push` is still recognized as a push.
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_GIT_VALUE_OPTIONS = {"-C", "-c", "--namespace", "--git-dir", "--work-tree", "--exec-path"}
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class _BlockedGitPush:
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"""Sentinel returned by the parser when a git push command is unsafe or unrecognized."""
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__slots__ = ("reason",)
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def __init__(self, reason: str) -> None:
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self.reason = reason
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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@ -58,13 +83,15 @@ class WorkflowPushChange:
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fingerprint: str
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repo: str
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branch: str
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base_sha: str
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head_sha: str
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files: list[str]
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head_sha: str
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remote: str
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local_ref: str
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remote_ref: str
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fixed_command: str
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base_sha: str = ""
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blocked: bool = False
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blocked_reason: str = ""
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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@ -143,52 +170,211 @@ def _response_ok(response: Any) -> bool:
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return True
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def _parse_git_push(command: str) -> ParsedGitPush | None:
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stripped = command.strip()
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if _UNSAFE_RAW_COMMAND.search(stripped) or "&" in stripped.replace("&&", ""):
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return None
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def _tokens_invoke_git_push(tokens: list[str]) -> bool:
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"""True if the token stream runs `git push` as a git subcommand (not merely mentions it).
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Scans each `git` invocation (bareword or path-qualified, after any wrapper prefix),
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skips `-C <dir>` and option flags, and checks whether the first positional argument is
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`push`. This ignores the word "push" appearing inside a commit message or another
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command, so `git commit -m "push it" && ls` is not treated as a push, while a genuine
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`git ... push` anywhere in a chain is.
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"""
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i = 0
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while i < len(tokens):
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if tokens[i].rsplit("/", 1)[-1] != "git":
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i += 1
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continue
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j = i + 1
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while j < len(tokens):
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tok = tokens[j]
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if tok in _SHELL_OPERATORS or tok == "&&":
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break
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if (
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tok in _GIT_VALUE_OPTIONS
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and j + 1 < len(tokens)
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and tokens[j + 1] not in _SHELL_OPERATORS
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and tokens[j + 1] != "&&"
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):
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j += 2 # option consumes the next token as its value
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continue
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if tok.startswith("-"):
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j += 1
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continue
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if tok == "push":
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return True
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break # first positional is a non-push subcommand
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i = j + 1
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return False
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def _decode_ansi_c(body: str) -> str:
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"""Best-effort ANSI-C (`$'...'`) escape decoding, so `$'\\x70ush'` / `$'\\160ush'` reveal
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the literal `push` the shell would run. Falls back to the raw body if decoding fails."""
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if "\\" not in body:
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return body
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try:
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tokens = shlex.split(stripped)
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return codecs.decode(body, "unicode_escape")
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except Exception:
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return body
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def _strip_quoted(command: str) -> str:
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"""Return the command with quoted spans and escaped characters blanked to spaces.
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Leaves only the unquoted shell structure, so metacharacters that are literal (inside
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quotes or backslash-escaped — e.g. a `;` or `&` inside a commit message) do not look
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like command separators. Plain `'...'`/`"..."` spans wrap arguments and are blanked;
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`$'...'`/`$"..."` (ANSI-C / locale quoting) form a literal *word* (e.g. `git $'push'` runs
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`git push`), so their content is kept — otherwise the push word would vanish. Unbalanced
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quotes blank the remainder (fail-closed shape).
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"""
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out: list[str] = []
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i, n = 0, len(command)
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while i < n:
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c = command[i]
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if c in "'\"":
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# `$'...'` / `$"..."` — the preceding `$` marks a literal word, so keep content
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# and drop the `$` so adjacent pieces concatenate (`$'pus'$'h'` -> `push`).
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word_quote = bool(out) and out[-1] == "$"
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if word_quote:
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out.pop()
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if c == "'":
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j = command.find("'", i + 1)
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if j == -1:
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return "".join(out) + " "
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out.append(_decode_ansi_c(command[i + 1 : j]) if word_quote else " ")
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i = j + 1
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else:
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k = i + 1
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buf: list[str] = []
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while k < n and command[k] != '"':
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if command[k] == "\\" and k + 1 < n:
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buf.append(command[k + 1])
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k += 2
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else:
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buf.append(command[k])
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k += 1
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if k >= n:
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return "".join(out) + " "
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out.append("".join(buf) if word_quote else " ")
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i = k + 1
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elif c == "\\" and i + 1 < n:
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out.append(" ")
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i += 2
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else:
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out.append(c)
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i += 1
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return "".join(out)
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def _maybe_obfuscated_git_push(command: str) -> bool:
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"""True if the shell would run a `git push` that `_tokens_invoke_git_push` could not see.
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Only reached when the precise token scan found no clean push. `shlex` splits on
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whitespace and performs no expansion, so a push can hide behind a fused separator
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(`true;git push`), subshell/grouping (`(git push ...)`), or expansion (`git${IFS}push`,
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`git $(printf push)`). We work on the unquoted command skeleton so literal metacharacters
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inside a commit message are ignored (no false positive on `git commit -m "push it" && ls`
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or `git log | grep push`), then fail closed if any unquoted simple-command is a `git push`
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or if unquoted expansion could produce one.
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"""
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skeleton = _strip_quoted(command)
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if "push" not in skeleton:
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# The only `push` text is inside quotes (a literal argument), so it cannot be a
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# command word. (A push spelled purely by expansion with no literal `push` anywhere
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# is left to the GitHub proxy token scope, which lacks workflows:write until approval.)
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return False
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if _EXPANSION.search(skeleton):
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return True
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return any(
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_tokens_invoke_git_push(segment.split()) for segment in _SEGMENT_SPLIT.split(skeleton)
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)
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def _parse_git_push(command: str) -> ParsedGitPush | _BlockedGitPush | None:
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stripped = command.strip()
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try:
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probe = shlex.split(stripped)
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except ValueError:
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probe = None
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if probe is None or not _tokens_invoke_git_push(probe):
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# No push the token scan can normalize. Fail closed if one is hidden behind shell
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# metacharacters/expansion; otherwise leave the command untouched.
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if _maybe_obfuscated_git_push(stripped):
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return _BlockedGitPush(
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"possible git push obscured by shell metacharacters; issue it as a plain "
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"`git push origin <branch>`"
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)
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return None
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if _UNSAFE_RAW_COMMAND.search(stripped) or "&" in stripped.replace("&&", ""):
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return _BlockedGitPush("unsafe shell characters in git push command")
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tokens = probe
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if not tokens:
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return None
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if len(tokens) >= 4 and tokens[0] == "cd" and tokens[2] == "&&":
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if any(token in _SHELL_OPERATORS or token == "&&" for token in tokens[3:]):
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return None
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return _BlockedGitPush("chained shell commands in git push")
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return _parse_git_tokens(tokens[3:], repo_dir=tokens[1])
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if any(token in _SHELL_OPERATORS or token == "&&" for token in tokens):
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return None
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return _BlockedGitPush("chained shell commands")
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return _parse_git_tokens(tokens, repo_dir=None)
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def _parse_git_tokens(tokens: list[str], *, repo_dir: str | None) -> ParsedGitPush | None:
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if not tokens or tokens[0] != "git":
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def _parse_git_tokens(
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tokens: list[str], *, repo_dir: str | None
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) -> ParsedGitPush | _BlockedGitPush | None:
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"""Parse tokens into a supported git push, a block sentinel, or None.
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Recognizes bareword `git`, path invocations (`/usr/bin/git`), and wrapper-prefixed
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forms (`command`/`env`/`nice`/... git). Anything git-push-shaped that cannot be reduced
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to `git [-C <dir>] push [-u] origin <refspec>` fails closed to a block rather than a
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silent pass-through. Non-push git commands and non-git commands return None.
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"""
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git_idx = next((idx for idx, tok in enumerate(tokens) if tok.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] == "git"), None)
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if git_idx is None:
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return None
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i = 1
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while i < len(tokens) and tokens[i] != "push":
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if tokens[i] == "-C" and i + 1 < len(tokens):
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repo_dir = tokens[i + 1]
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git_args = tokens[git_idx + 1 :]
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if "push" not in git_args:
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# A non-push git command (e.g. `git status`, `git pull`).
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return None
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# Everything before the `git` executable must be a benign wrapper prefix (a known
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# wrapper, an option flag, or a NAME=VALUE assignment). An unrecognized leading token
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# (a value-taking wrapper option like the `10` in `nice -n 10`, an unknown wrapper, or
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# `git` used as an argument to another program) is ambiguous, so fail closed.
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if any(
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not (tok in _GIT_WRAPPERS or tok.startswith("-") or "=" in tok) for tok in tokens[:git_idx]
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):
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return _BlockedGitPush(
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"unrecognized wrapper before `git push`; use `git push origin <branch>`"
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)
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i = 0
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while i < len(git_args) and git_args[i] != "push":
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if git_args[i] == "-C" and i + 1 < len(git_args):
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repo_dir = git_args[i + 1]
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i += 2
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continue
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return None
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if i >= len(tokens) or tokens[i] != "push":
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return None
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return _parse_push_args(tokens[i + 1 :], repo_dir=repo_dir)
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# A git push carrying unsupported global options (e.g. `git -c k=v push`,
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# `git --git-dir=.git push`). We cannot safely normalize it, so fail closed.
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return _BlockedGitPush(
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"unsupported git options before `push`; use `git push origin <branch>`"
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)
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return _parse_push_args(git_args[i + 1 :], repo_dir=repo_dir)
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def _parse_push_args(tokens: list[str], *, repo_dir: str | None) -> ParsedGitPush | None:
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def _parse_push_args(
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tokens: list[str], *, repo_dir: str | None
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) -> ParsedGitPush | _BlockedGitPush | None:
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set_upstream = False
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while tokens and tokens[0] in {"-u", "--set-upstream"}:
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set_upstream = True
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tokens = tokens[1:]
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if len(tokens) != 2 or tokens[0] != "origin":
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return None
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return _BlockedGitPush("unrecognized or unsafe git push arguments")
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parsed = _parse_refspec(tokens[1])
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if parsed is None:
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return None
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return _BlockedGitPush("unrecognized or unsafe git push refspec")
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local_ref, remote_ref = parsed
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return ParsedGitPush(
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repo_dir=repo_dir,
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@ -282,6 +468,95 @@ def _run_coroutine_sync(coro: Awaitable[ToolMessage | Command]) -> ToolMessage |
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return value
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def _parse_ls_tree(output: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
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"""Parse `git ls-tree -r` output into a sorted list of (sha, path) tuples."""
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entries: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
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for line in output.splitlines():
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line = line.strip()
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if not line:
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continue
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# Format: "<mode> <type> <sha>\t<path>"
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meta, _, path = line.partition("\t")
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if not path:
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continue
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parts = meta.split()
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if len(parts) < 3:
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continue
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entries.append((parts[2], path))
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entries.sort(key=lambda item: item[1])
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return entries
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def _workflow_tree_at_ref(
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backend: Any, repo_dir: str | None, ref: str
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) -> tuple[list[tuple[str, str]], str] | None:
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"""Return the sorted workflow tree entries and a stable hash for the given ref.
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Returns an empty list when the ref has no workflow files, so callers can detect
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additions and deletions against a base ref.
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"""
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ls_tree = _run_git(backend, repo_dir, f"ls-tree -r {shlex.quote(ref)} -- .github/workflows")
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if not ls_tree.ok:
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return None
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entries = _parse_ls_tree(ls_tree.output)
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content_hash = _fingerprint({"tree": entries})
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return entries, content_hash
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def _fetch_remote_base(backend: Any, repo_dir: str | None, remote: str, branch: str) -> str | None:
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"""Fetch the base ref from the exact URL the push will target and return a local alias.
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The base is fetched from the remote's effective *push* URL (`git remote get-url --push`),
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not the remote name, because git honors a separate `pushurl`: an untrusted sandbox can
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point the fetch URL at attacker/local content while the push still lands on the real
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repo. Fetching the base from the push URL keeps the base and the push destination the
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same authenticated repo, so a split cannot hide a workflow change. Uses `FETCH_HEAD`
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(freshly fetched), never a local `refs/remotes/origin/*` ref the sandbox could rewrite.
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Returns None (which makes the caller require approval) if the push destination is
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ambiguous or rewritten: multiple `pushurl` entries (git pushes to ALL of them, so a
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single base cannot represent the destination) or any `insteadOf`/`pushInsteadOf` URL
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rewrite the sandbox could use to make the inspected URL differ from the push target.
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"""
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rewrites = _run_git(
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backend, repo_dir, "config --get-regexp " + shlex.quote(r"url\..*\.(push)?insteadof")
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)
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if rewrites.ok and rewrites.output.strip():
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# A URL rewrite means the inspected push URL may not be the real destination.
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return None
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push_url_res = _run_git(backend, repo_dir, f"remote get-url --push --all {shlex.quote(remote)}")
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push_urls = (
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[line.strip() for line in push_url_res.output.splitlines() if line.strip()]
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if push_url_res.ok
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else []
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)
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# `git push` sends to every configured push URL; if there is not exactly one we cannot
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# represent the destination with a single base, so fail closed.
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if len(push_urls) != 1:
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return None
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push_url = push_urls[0]
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fetch = _run_git(backend, repo_dir, f"fetch {shlex.quote(push_url)} {shlex.quote(branch)}")
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if fetch.ok:
|
||||
return "FETCH_HEAD"
|
||||
|
||||
default = _run_git(backend, repo_dir, f"ls-remote --symref {shlex.quote(push_url)} HEAD")
|
||||
default_branch = ""
|
||||
if default.ok:
|
||||
default_branch = _first_line(default.output).removeprefix("ref: refs/heads/").split("\t")[0]
|
||||
|
||||
for fallback in (default_branch, "dev", "main"):
|
||||
if not fallback or fallback == branch:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
fetch = _run_git(
|
||||
backend, repo_dir, f"fetch {shlex.quote(push_url)} {shlex.quote(fallback)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if fetch.ok:
|
||||
return "FETCH_HEAD"
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _workflow_change_for_push(backend: Any, parsed: ParsedGitPush) -> WorkflowPushChange | None:
|
||||
root_result = _run_git(backend, parsed.repo_dir, "rev-parse --show-toplevel")
|
||||
if not root_result.ok:
|
||||
|
|
@ -302,42 +577,34 @@ def _workflow_change_for_push(backend: Any, parsed: ParsedGitPush) -> WorkflowPu
|
|||
if not head or not _GIT_OBJECT_ID.fullmatch(head):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
remote_branch = f"refs/remotes/{parsed.remote}/{parsed.remote_ref}"
|
||||
remote_branch_exists = _run_git(
|
||||
backend, root, f"rev-parse --verify {shlex.quote(remote_branch)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if remote_branch_exists.ok and _first_line(remote_branch_exists.output):
|
||||
base_ref = remote_branch
|
||||
range_expr = f"{shlex.quote(base_ref)}..{shlex.quote(head)}"
|
||||
base_sha = _first_line(_run_git(backend, root, f"rev-parse {shlex.quote(base_ref)}").output)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
origin_head = _run_git(backend, root, "symbolic-ref --short refs/remotes/origin/HEAD")
|
||||
base_ref = _first_line(origin_head.output) if origin_head.ok else "origin/main"
|
||||
range_expr = f"{shlex.quote(base_ref)}...{shlex.quote(head)}"
|
||||
base_sha = _first_line(
|
||||
_run_git(
|
||||
backend, root, f"merge-base {shlex.quote(head)} {shlex.quote(base_ref)}"
|
||||
).output
|
||||
head_tree = _workflow_tree_at_ref(backend, root, head)
|
||||
if head_tree is None:
|
||||
# The workflow tree at head could not be read (an empty tree returns ([], hash), so
|
||||
# None means the `ls-tree` read genuinely failed). Fail closed rather than skipping
|
||||
# the guard, mirroring the base-read path.
|
||||
return WorkflowPushChange(
|
||||
fingerprint="",
|
||||
repo="",
|
||||
branch=branch_name,
|
||||
files=[],
|
||||
head_sha=head,
|
||||
remote=parsed.remote,
|
||||
local_ref=parsed.local_ref,
|
||||
remote_ref=parsed.remote_ref,
|
||||
fixed_command="",
|
||||
blocked=True,
|
||||
blocked_reason="could not read the workflow tree at the pushed head; blocking to be safe",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
names = _run_git(
|
||||
backend,
|
||||
root,
|
||||
f"diff --name-only --diff-filter=ACMRTD {range_expr} -- .github/workflows",
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not names.ok:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
files = sorted(
|
||||
line.strip()
|
||||
for line in names.output.splitlines()
|
||||
if line.strip().startswith(_WORKFLOW_PREFIX)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not files:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
base_ref = _fetch_remote_base(backend, root, parsed.remote, branch_name)
|
||||
if base_ref is not None:
|
||||
base_tree = _workflow_tree_at_ref(backend, root, base_ref)
|
||||
if base_tree is not None and head_tree[0] == base_tree[0]:
|
||||
# No workflow change against the trusted remote base.
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
diff = _run_git(backend, root, f"diff --binary --full-index {range_expr} -- .github/workflows")
|
||||
if not diff.ok or not diff.output:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
head_entries, head_content_hash = head_tree
|
||||
files = sorted({path for _sha, path in head_entries})
|
||||
|
||||
remote = _run_git(backend, root, "config --get remote.origin.url")
|
||||
repo = _normalize_remote(_first_line(remote.output)) if remote.ok else ""
|
||||
|
|
@ -347,25 +614,18 @@ def _workflow_change_for_push(backend: Any, parsed: ParsedGitPush) -> WorkflowPu
|
|||
fixed_args.append("--set-upstream")
|
||||
fixed_args.extend([parsed.remote, fixed_refspec])
|
||||
fixed_command = _git_command(root, " ".join(shlex.quote(arg) for arg in fixed_args))
|
||||
payload = {
|
||||
content_payload = {
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"branch": branch_name,
|
||||
"base_sha": base_sha,
|
||||
"head_sha": head,
|
||||
"files": files,
|
||||
"diff": diff.output,
|
||||
"remote": parsed.remote,
|
||||
"local_ref": parsed.local_ref,
|
||||
"remote_ref": parsed.remote_ref,
|
||||
"fixed_refspec": fixed_refspec,
|
||||
"content_hash": head_content_hash,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return WorkflowPushChange(
|
||||
fingerprint=_fingerprint(payload),
|
||||
fingerprint=_fingerprint(content_payload),
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
branch=branch_name,
|
||||
base_sha=base_sha,
|
||||
head_sha=head,
|
||||
files=files,
|
||||
head_sha=head,
|
||||
remote=parsed.remote,
|
||||
local_ref=parsed.local_ref,
|
||||
remote_ref=parsed.remote_ref,
|
||||
|
|
@ -373,17 +633,38 @@ def _workflow_change_for_push(backend: Any, parsed: ParsedGitPush) -> WorkflowPu
|
|||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _blocked_message(change: WorkflowPushChange, *, already_rejected: bool = False) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
def _blocked_message(
|
||||
change: WorkflowPushChange,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
already_rejected: bool = False,
|
||||
stale: bool = False,
|
||||
blocked: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
status = "rejected" if already_rejected else "approval_required"
|
||||
content = {
|
||||
"status": "error",
|
||||
"error_type": "WorkflowPushApprovalRequired",
|
||||
"error": (
|
||||
if blocked:
|
||||
error = change.blocked_reason or "This git push command is not recognized as safe."
|
||||
error_type = "WorkflowPushBlocked"
|
||||
elif stale:
|
||||
error = (
|
||||
"This git push includes GitHub workflow file changes. A previous approval "
|
||||
"exists for the same branch and workflow files, but the workflow content "
|
||||
"at the pushed head has changed since that approval (for example, a rebase "
|
||||
"that changed the workflow files or an amend that edited them). The thread "
|
||||
"owner must re-approve the new fingerprint before Open SWE can push it."
|
||||
)
|
||||
error_type = "WorkflowPushApprovalRequired"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
error = (
|
||||
"This git push includes GitHub workflow file changes and requires human "
|
||||
"approval before Open SWE can push it. Retry the same standalone git push "
|
||||
"after the thread owner approves the workflow diff."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"workflow_approval_status": status,
|
||||
"after the thread owner approves the workflow files."
|
||||
)
|
||||
error_type = "WorkflowPushApprovalRequired"
|
||||
content = {
|
||||
"status": "error",
|
||||
"error_type": error_type,
|
||||
"error": error,
|
||||
"workflow_approval_status": status if not blocked else "blocked",
|
||||
"fingerprint": change.fingerprint,
|
||||
"files": change.files,
|
||||
"repo": change.repo,
|
||||
|
|
@ -414,10 +695,12 @@ def _approval_slack_message(change: WorkflowPushChange) -> str:
|
|||
branch = change.branch or "the current branch"
|
||||
return (
|
||||
"*Workflow file approval required*\n"
|
||||
f"Open SWE is trying to push changes to GitHub workflow files in `{repo}` on `{branch}`.\n\n"
|
||||
f"*Files:*\n{files}\n\n"
|
||||
f"Open SWE is trying to push the workflow files below to `{repo}` on `{branch}`.\n\n"
|
||||
f"*Files at the pushed head:*\n{files}\n\n"
|
||||
f"*Fingerprint:* `{change.fingerprint}`\n\n"
|
||||
"Approve only if this exact workflow diff is expected. If the workflow files change, "
|
||||
"Approval covers the exact workflow files and content listed above at the pushed head, "
|
||||
"including future rebases or amends that replay the same workflow tree. If the set of "
|
||||
"workflow files, the branch, or the workflow-file content at the pushed head changes, "
|
||||
"a new fingerprint will be required."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -455,6 +738,23 @@ async def _approval_state(request: ToolCallRequest, change: WorkflowPushChange)
|
|||
try:
|
||||
if await workflow_push_approved(thread_id, change.fingerprint):
|
||||
return "approved"
|
||||
if await workflow_push_rejected(thread_id, change.fingerprint):
|
||||
return "rejected"
|
||||
|
||||
# If the exact identity fingerprint is not approved, check whether a prior
|
||||
# approval covers the same (repo, branch, files) identity. If so, the workflow
|
||||
# tree at the pushed head changed underneath the prior approval (rebase/amend
|
||||
# that edited workflow files), so we surface a loud re-approval message rather
|
||||
# than a fresh silent pending record.
|
||||
prior = await find_workflow_push_approval(
|
||||
thread_id,
|
||||
repo=change.repo,
|
||||
branch=change.branch,
|
||||
files=change.files,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if prior is not None:
|
||||
return "stale_approval"
|
||||
|
||||
record, _created = await ensure_workflow_push_pending(
|
||||
thread_id,
|
||||
fingerprint=change.fingerprint,
|
||||
|
|
@ -527,6 +827,20 @@ class WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware(AgentMiddleware):
|
|||
parsed = _parse_git_push(command)
|
||||
if parsed is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if isinstance(parsed, _BlockedGitPush):
|
||||
return WorkflowPushChange(
|
||||
fingerprint="",
|
||||
repo="",
|
||||
branch="",
|
||||
files=[],
|
||||
head_sha="",
|
||||
remote="origin",
|
||||
local_ref="",
|
||||
remote_ref="",
|
||||
fixed_command="",
|
||||
blocked=True,
|
||||
blocked_reason=parsed.reason,
|
||||
)
|
||||
backend = _backend(_thread_id(request))
|
||||
if backend is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
|
@ -538,13 +852,31 @@ class WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware(AgentMiddleware):
|
|||
handler: Callable[[ToolCallRequest], Awaitable[ToolMessage | Command]],
|
||||
change: WorkflowPushChange,
|
||||
) -> ToolMessage | Command:
|
||||
if change.blocked:
|
||||
return _tool_message_for_request(_blocked_message(change, blocked=True), request)
|
||||
thread_id = _thread_id(request)
|
||||
state = await _approval_state(request, change)
|
||||
if state == "approved" and thread_id:
|
||||
safe_request = _override_execute_command(request, change.fixed_command)
|
||||
return await _run_with_workflow_token(thread_id, request, lambda: handler(safe_request))
|
||||
if state == "stale_approval":
|
||||
record, _created = await ensure_workflow_push_pending(
|
||||
thread_id,
|
||||
fingerprint=change.fingerprint,
|
||||
repo=change.repo,
|
||||
branch=change.branch,
|
||||
base_sha=change.base_sha,
|
||||
head_sha=change.head_sha,
|
||||
files=change.files,
|
||||
)
|
||||
await _post_slack_approval_if_needed(request, change, record)
|
||||
return _tool_message_for_request(
|
||||
_blocked_message(change, already_rejected=state == "rejected"), request
|
||||
_blocked_message(
|
||||
change,
|
||||
already_rejected=state == "rejected",
|
||||
stale=state == "stale_approval",
|
||||
),
|
||||
request,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def wrap_tool_call(
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ Steps, in order:
|
|||
|
||||
**IMPORTANT: If `git push` or `gh` returns "403", "Permission denied", or another permanent authorization failure, do not retry. Report the error to the user immediately and stop.**
|
||||
|
||||
**IMPORTANT: Workflow files (`.github/workflows/`) may be changed only when explicitly requested. Any push that includes workflow-file changes requires human approval of the exact workflow diff fingerprint before it can proceed — do not attempt to bypass it.**
|
||||
**IMPORTANT: Workflow files (`.github/workflows/`) may be changed only when explicitly requested. Any push that includes workflow files at the pushed head requires human approval before it can proceed. Approval is keyed to the repo, branch, and the exact workflow files and content present at the pushed head, so rebases or amends that replay the same workflow tree do not require a fresh approval; changing the branch, the set of workflow files, or the workflow-file content at the pushed head does require a new approval. Do not attempt to bypass it.**
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Notify the source** immediately after pushing and, when applicable, PR creation/update succeeds. Include a brief summary plus the PR link or branch URL:
|
||||
- Linear-triggered: use `linear_comment` with an `@mention` of the user who triggered the task
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -28,8 +28,11 @@ from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel
|
|||
from langchain_core.messages import AIMessage, BaseMessage, HumanMessage, ToolMessage
|
||||
from langchain_core.outputs import ChatGeneration, ChatResult
|
||||
|
||||
# One shell command that does the whole git workflow. Each execute() runs in a
|
||||
# fresh shell rooted at the sandbox dir, so the clone+commit+push is bundled.
|
||||
# One shell command that clones, implements, and commits. Each execute() runs in a
|
||||
# fresh shell rooted at the sandbox dir, and the `repo` checkout persists on disk
|
||||
# between calls. The push is a separate, standalone step: the workflow-push guard only
|
||||
# inspects (and gates) pushes issued as a plain `git push origin <branch>`, so bundling
|
||||
# the push inside this heredoc would trip its fail-closed check.
|
||||
_IMPLEMENT_SCRIPT = f"""
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
rm -rf repo
|
||||
|
|
@ -44,10 +47,12 @@ def greet(name):
|
|||
EOF
|
||||
git add -A
|
||||
git commit -m "{PR_TITLE}"
|
||||
git push origin {FEATURE_BRANCH}
|
||||
echo PUSHED_OK
|
||||
echo IMPLEMENTED_OK
|
||||
""".strip()
|
||||
|
||||
# Standalone push in the inspectable form the workflow-push guard expects.
|
||||
_PUSH_SCRIPT = f"cd repo && git push origin {FEATURE_BRANCH}"
|
||||
|
||||
_PLAN_URL_RE = re.compile(r"https?://[^\s\"'<>)\]|]+/plan\b")
|
||||
_ATTRIBUTION_RE = re.compile(r"@([A-Za-z0-9-]+):")
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -281,6 +286,12 @@ SCRIPT_LIBRARY: dict[str, tuple[StepSpec, ...]] = {
|
|||
{"command": _IMPLEMENT_SCRIPT},
|
||||
"call-impl",
|
||||
),
|
||||
_tool_step(
|
||||
"Pushing the branch.",
|
||||
"execute",
|
||||
{"command": _PUSH_SCRIPT},
|
||||
"call-push",
|
||||
),
|
||||
_tool_step(
|
||||
"Opening a pull request.",
|
||||
"open_pull_request",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -20,25 +20,83 @@ class _Response:
|
|||
class _Backend:
|
||||
id = "sandbox-id"
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, *, workflow_files: str = ".github/workflows/ci.yml") -> None:
|
||||
def __init__(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
workflow_files: str = ".github/workflows/ci.yml",
|
||||
tree_entries: dict[str, str] | None = None,
|
||||
base_tree_entries: dict[str, str] | None = None,
|
||||
remote_branches: set[str] | None = None,
|
||||
default_branch: str = "main",
|
||||
push_url: str = "https://github.com/langchain-ai/open-swe.git",
|
||||
push_urls: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
url_rewrites: str = "",
|
||||
ls_tree_head_ok: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
self.workflow_files = workflow_files
|
||||
self.tree_entries = tree_entries
|
||||
# Default base tree is empty so any head workflow file is treated as a change.
|
||||
self.base_tree_entries = base_tree_entries if base_tree_entries is not None else {}
|
||||
self.remote_branches = remote_branches or {"feature"}
|
||||
self.default_branch = default_branch
|
||||
self.push_url = push_url
|
||||
# Effective push URLs (`git remote get-url --push --all`); defaults to [push_url].
|
||||
self.push_urls = push_urls if push_urls is not None else ([push_url] if push_url else [])
|
||||
self.url_rewrites = url_rewrites
|
||||
self.ls_tree_head_ok = ls_tree_head_ok
|
||||
self.commands: list[str] = []
|
||||
self.head = "a" * 40
|
||||
self.base_sha = "b" * 40
|
||||
|
||||
def _head_tree(self) -> str:
|
||||
if self.tree_entries is not None:
|
||||
return "".join(
|
||||
f"100644 blob {sha}\t{path}\n" for path, sha in sorted(self.tree_entries.items())
|
||||
)
|
||||
files = [path for path in self.workflow_files.split("\n") if path.strip()]
|
||||
return "".join(f"100644 blob {self.head}\t{path}\n" for path in files)
|
||||
|
||||
def _base_tree(self) -> str:
|
||||
if self.base_tree_entries is not None:
|
||||
return "".join(
|
||||
f"100644 blob {sha}\t{path}\n"
|
||||
for path, sha in sorted(self.base_tree_entries.items())
|
||||
)
|
||||
return self._head_tree()
|
||||
|
||||
def _fetch_branch(self, command: str) -> _Response:
|
||||
# Format: "git [-C /repo] fetch <url> <branch>"
|
||||
idx = command.find(" fetch ")
|
||||
if idx == -1:
|
||||
return _Response("", 1)
|
||||
parts = command[idx + len(" fetch ") :].split()
|
||||
if len(parts) < 2:
|
||||
return _Response("", 1)
|
||||
branch = parts[-1]
|
||||
if branch in self.remote_branches:
|
||||
return _Response("")
|
||||
return _Response("", 1)
|
||||
|
||||
def execute(self, command: str, *, timeout: int | None = None) -> _Response:
|
||||
self.commands.append(command)
|
||||
if "rev-parse --show-toplevel" in command:
|
||||
return _Response("/repo\n")
|
||||
if "rev-parse --verify refs/remotes/origin/feature" in command:
|
||||
return _Response("", 1)
|
||||
if "symbolic-ref --short refs/remotes/origin/HEAD" in command:
|
||||
return _Response("origin/main\n")
|
||||
if f"merge-base {self.head} origin/main" in command:
|
||||
return _Response("base-sha\n")
|
||||
if "diff --name-only" in command:
|
||||
return _Response(f"{self.workflow_files}\n" if self.workflow_files else "")
|
||||
if "diff --binary --full-index" in command:
|
||||
return _Response("diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml\n")
|
||||
if "config --get-regexp" in command:
|
||||
return _Response(f"{self.url_rewrites}\n") if self.url_rewrites else _Response("", 1)
|
||||
if "remote get-url --push" in command:
|
||||
if not self.push_urls:
|
||||
return _Response("", 1)
|
||||
return _Response("".join(f"{url}\n" for url in self.push_urls))
|
||||
if "ls-tree -r" in command:
|
||||
if "FETCH_HEAD" in command:
|
||||
return _Response(self._base_tree())
|
||||
return _Response(self._head_tree()) if self.ls_tree_head_ok else _Response("", 1)
|
||||
if " fetch " in command:
|
||||
return self._fetch_branch(command)
|
||||
if "ls-remote --symref" in command:
|
||||
return _Response(
|
||||
f"ref: refs/heads/{self.default_branch}\tHEAD\n{self.base_sha}\tHEAD\n"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if "config --get remote.origin.url" in command:
|
||||
return _Response("git@github.com:langchain-ai/open-swe.git\n")
|
||||
if "rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD" in command:
|
||||
|
|
@ -93,11 +151,101 @@ def test_parse_git_push_supports_git_c_and_cd() -> None:
|
|||
remote_ref="feature",
|
||||
set_upstream=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("git status && git push") is None
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("git push origin feature; git push origin evil:feature") is None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_workflow_change_for_push_fingerprints_workflow_diff() -> None:
|
||||
def test_parse_git_push_blocks_unsafe_and_unrecognized_forms() -> None:
|
||||
assert isinstance(guard._parse_git_push("git status && git push"), guard._BlockedGitPush)
|
||||
assert isinstance(
|
||||
guard._parse_git_push("git push origin feature; git push origin evil:feature"),
|
||||
guard._BlockedGitPush,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert isinstance(
|
||||
guard._parse_git_push("git push --force origin feature"), guard._BlockedGitPush
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert isinstance(guard._parse_git_push("git push origin"), guard._BlockedGitPush)
|
||||
assert isinstance(
|
||||
guard._parse_git_push("git push origin HEAD~1:feature"), guard._BlockedGitPush
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("git status") is None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_parse_git_push_ignores_commands_without_a_push() -> None:
|
||||
# Chained or heredoc commands that never `git push` are not our concern — the
|
||||
# fail-closed blocking is reserved for commands that actually push.
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("echo planning && ls") is None
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("git add -A && git commit -m 'x'") is None
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("cat > f <<'EOF'\nhi\nEOF") is None
|
||||
# "push" inside a commit message is not a push subcommand.
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("git commit -m 'push it real good' && ls") is None
|
||||
# A standalone `cd <dir> && git push origin <branch>` stays inspectable, not blocked.
|
||||
parsed = guard._parse_git_push("cd repo && git push origin feature")
|
||||
assert isinstance(parsed, guard.ParsedGitPush)
|
||||
assert parsed.repo_dir == "repo"
|
||||
assert parsed.remote_ref == "feature"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_parse_git_push_still_catches_quote_obfuscated_push() -> None:
|
||||
# Shell-quoting that the shell would run as a real `git push` must not slip past the
|
||||
# guard just because the raw string lacks a literal "push" token: it is detected and
|
||||
# inspected, never passed through as None.
|
||||
parsed = guard._parse_git_push('git "pu""sh" origin feature')
|
||||
assert isinstance(parsed, guard.ParsedGitPush)
|
||||
assert parsed.remote_ref == "feature"
|
||||
assert guard._tokens_invoke_git_push(["git", "status", "&&", "git", "push"]) is True
|
||||
assert guard._tokens_invoke_git_push(["command", "git", "push", "origin", "x"]) is True
|
||||
assert guard._tokens_invoke_git_push(["git", "-c", "protocol.version=2", "push"]) is True
|
||||
assert guard._tokens_invoke_git_push(["git", "commit", "-m", "push"]) is False
|
||||
# A value-option must not swallow a shell operator as its "value" and thereby hide the
|
||||
# real `git push` that follows the operator.
|
||||
assert guard._tokens_invoke_git_push(["git", "-c", ";", "git", "push"]) is True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_parse_git_push_fails_closed_on_metachar_obfuscated_push() -> None:
|
||||
# `shlex` splits only on whitespace and performs no expansion, so a push can hide behind
|
||||
# a fused separator or a variable/command expansion. Each of these is a real push the
|
||||
# sandbox shell would run, and must fail closed rather than pass through unguarded.
|
||||
for command in (
|
||||
"true;git push origin HEAD",
|
||||
"echo hi|git push origin HEAD",
|
||||
"git${IFS}push origin HEAD",
|
||||
"$(echo git) push origin HEAD",
|
||||
"git $(printf push) origin main",
|
||||
"cmd=push; git ${cmd} origin main",
|
||||
"git -c ; git push origin main",
|
||||
"git -c | git push origin main",
|
||||
"(git push origin main)",
|
||||
"(git push -u origin HEAD)",
|
||||
"{ git push origin main; }",
|
||||
"git $'push' origin main",
|
||||
"git $'pus'$'h' origin main",
|
||||
r"git $'\x70ush' origin main",
|
||||
r"git $'\160ush' origin main",
|
||||
):
|
||||
assert isinstance(guard._parse_git_push(command), guard._BlockedGitPush), command
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_parse_git_push_allows_legitimate_metachar_commands() -> None:
|
||||
# Standalone operators / redirects around a non-push git command (or a push mentioned in
|
||||
# a commit message) are common and must not be over-blocked. Metacharacters that are
|
||||
# literal because they sit inside a quoted commit message must not read as separators.
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("git commit -m 'push it real good' && ls") is None
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push('git commit -m "push & shove (v2)" && ls') is None
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push('git commit -m "$MSG about push" && npm test') is None
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("git log | grep push") is None
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("git diff > push.txt") is None
|
||||
# A non-push git command with an unquoted variable must not be blocked just for the `$`.
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("git checkout $BRANCH") is None
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("git log --grep=$PATTERN | head") is None
|
||||
# Legitimate ANSI-C quoting (a tab/newline in a git format or message) is not a push.
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push(r"git log --pretty=$'%h\t%s'") is None
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push(r"git commit -m $'line1\nline2'") is None
|
||||
# The standard `cd <dir> && git push` form is recognized, not blocked as obfuscation.
|
||||
parsed = guard._parse_git_push("cd repo && git push origin feature")
|
||||
assert isinstance(parsed, guard.ParsedGitPush)
|
||||
assert parsed.remote_ref == "feature"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_workflow_change_for_push_fingerprints_head_workflow_tree() -> None:
|
||||
backend = _Backend()
|
||||
change = guard._workflow_change_for_push(
|
||||
backend,
|
||||
|
|
@ -154,6 +302,12 @@ async def test_unapproved_workflow_push_blocks_and_posts_slack(
|
|||
async def fake_approved(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_rejected(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_find_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_pending(thread_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
|
||||
return {"fingerprint": kwargs["fingerprint"], "status": "pending", "notified": False}, True
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -169,6 +323,8 @@ async def test_unapproved_workflow_push_blocks_and_posts_slack(
|
|||
posted["notified"] = fingerprint
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fake_approved)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_rejected", fake_rejected)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "find_workflow_push_approval", fake_find_approval)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "ensure_workflow_push_pending", fake_pending)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "post_slack_thread_reply_with_ts", fake_post)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "mark_workflow_push_notified", fake_notified)
|
||||
|
|
@ -205,7 +361,11 @@ async def test_approved_workflow_push_elevates_and_restores(
|
|||
refreshed.append(dict(permissions))
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_find_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fake_approved)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "find_workflow_push_approval", fake_find_approval)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "refresh_proxy_token", fake_refresh)
|
||||
|
||||
pushed_command = ""
|
||||
|
|
@ -241,7 +401,11 @@ async def test_workflow_push_restoration_falls_back_when_actions_read_unavailabl
|
|||
refreshed.append(dict(permissions))
|
||||
return "actions" not in permissions
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_find_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fake_approved)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "find_workflow_push_approval", fake_find_approval)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "refresh_proxy_token", fake_refresh)
|
||||
|
||||
async def handler(_request: Any) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
|
|
@ -256,7 +420,13 @@ async def test_workflow_push_restoration_falls_back_when_actions_read_unavailabl
|
|||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_non_workflow_push_runs_without_approval(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
|
||||
guard.SANDBOX_BACKENDS["thread-1"] = _Backend(workflow_files="")
|
||||
# Head contains workflow files, but they are identical to the trusted remote base,
|
||||
# so no approval is required for a code-only change.
|
||||
backend = _Backend(
|
||||
tree_entries={".github/workflows/ci.yml": "blob-sha-1"},
|
||||
base_tree_entries={".github/workflows/ci.yml": "blob-sha-1"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
guard.SANDBOX_BACKENDS["thread-1"] = backend
|
||||
called = False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fail_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> bool:
|
||||
|
|
@ -274,6 +444,270 @@ async def test_non_workflow_push_runs_without_approval(monkeypatch: pytest.Monke
|
|||
assert called is True
|
||||
assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
|
||||
assert result.content == "pushed"
|
||||
# The base is fetched from the effective push URL, not the `origin` remote name.
|
||||
assert any("remote get-url --push" in cmd for cmd in backend.commands)
|
||||
assert any(f" fetch {backend.push_url}" in cmd for cmd in backend.commands)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_stale_workflow_approval_is_loud_and_blocks(
|
||||
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
guard.SANDBOX_BACKENDS["thread-1"] = _Backend()
|
||||
posted: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_approved(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_rejected(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_find_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return {"fingerprint": "old-fp", "status": "approved", "decided_at": "2024-01-01T00:00:00"}
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_pending(thread_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
|
||||
return {"fingerprint": kwargs["fingerprint"], "status": "pending", "notified": False}, True
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_post(
|
||||
channel_id: str, thread_ts: str, message: str, **kwargs: Any
|
||||
) -> tuple[str, None]:
|
||||
posted.update(
|
||||
channel_id=channel_id, thread_ts=thread_ts, message=message, blocks=kwargs["blocks"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
return "1700000000.000300", None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_notified(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> None:
|
||||
posted["notified"] = fingerprint
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fake_approved)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_rejected", fake_rejected)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "find_workflow_push_approval", fake_find_approval)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "ensure_workflow_push_pending", fake_pending)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "post_slack_thread_reply_with_ts", fake_post)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "mark_workflow_push_notified", fake_notified)
|
||||
|
||||
async def handler(_request: Any) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
return ToolMessage(content="pushed", tool_call_id="call-1")
|
||||
|
||||
result = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
|
||||
assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
|
||||
assert result.status == "error"
|
||||
payload = json.loads(str(result.content))
|
||||
assert payload["workflow_approval_status"] == "approval_required"
|
||||
assert "changed since that approval" in payload["error"]
|
||||
assert posted["channel_id"] == "C123"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_rebased_workflow_push_keeps_fingerprint_for_same_tree(
|
||||
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
# Fingerprint is based on the workflow tree at head, not on a diff against origin.
|
||||
backend = _Backend(
|
||||
tree_entries={".github/workflows/ci.yml": "blob-sha-1"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
backend.head = "b" * 40
|
||||
guard.SANDBOX_BACKENDS["thread-1"] = backend
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_approved(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_rejected(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_find_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_pending(thread_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
|
||||
return {"fingerprint": kwargs["fingerprint"], "status": "pending", "notified": False}, True
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_post(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[str, None]:
|
||||
return "1700000000.000300", None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_notified(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fake_approved)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_rejected", fake_rejected)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "find_workflow_push_approval", fake_find_approval)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "ensure_workflow_push_pending", fake_pending)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "post_slack_thread_reply_with_ts", fake_post)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "mark_workflow_push_notified", fake_notified)
|
||||
|
||||
async def handler(_request: Any) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
return ToolMessage(content="pushed", tool_call_id="call-1")
|
||||
|
||||
result = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
|
||||
assert result.status == "error"
|
||||
payload = json.loads(str(result.content))
|
||||
assert payload["fingerprint"]
|
||||
assert payload["files"] == [".github/workflows/ci.yml"]
|
||||
|
||||
# Rebase with a new head but the same workflow tree -> fingerprint stays stable.
|
||||
backend.head = "c" * 40
|
||||
result2 = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
assert isinstance(result2, ToolMessage)
|
||||
payload2 = json.loads(str(result2.content))
|
||||
assert payload2["fingerprint"] == payload["fingerprint"]
|
||||
|
||||
# A content change to the same workflow file produces a different fingerprint.
|
||||
backend.tree_entries = {".github/workflows/ci.yml": "blob-sha-2"}
|
||||
result3 = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
assert isinstance(result3, ToolMessage)
|
||||
payload3 = json.loads(str(result3.content))
|
||||
assert payload3["fingerprint"] != payload["fingerprint"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_deleted_workflow_file_requires_approval(
|
||||
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
# Deleting a workflow file means it is no longer in the head workflow tree. The
|
||||
# guard should still trigger if there are other workflow files at head; if the last
|
||||
# workflow file is deleted, the push is no longer workflow-guarded.
|
||||
backend = _Backend(
|
||||
tree_entries={
|
||||
".github/workflows/ci.yml": "blob-sha-1",
|
||||
".github/workflows/other.yml": "blob-sha-2",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
guard.SANDBOX_BACKENDS["thread-1"] = backend
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_approved(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_rejected(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_find_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_pending(thread_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
|
||||
return {"fingerprint": kwargs["fingerprint"], "status": "pending", "notified": False}, True
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_post(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[str, None]:
|
||||
return "1700000000.000300", None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_notified(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fake_approved)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_rejected", fake_rejected)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "find_workflow_push_approval", fake_find_approval)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "ensure_workflow_push_pending", fake_pending)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "post_slack_thread_reply_with_ts", fake_post)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "mark_workflow_push_notified", fake_notified)
|
||||
|
||||
async def handler(_request: Any) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
return ToolMessage(content="pushed", tool_call_id="call-1")
|
||||
|
||||
# Push with the full workflow tree present requires approval.
|
||||
result = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
|
||||
assert result.status == "error"
|
||||
payload = json.loads(str(result.content))
|
||||
assert payload["workflow_approval_status"] == "approval_required"
|
||||
assert ".github/workflows/ci.yml" in payload["files"]
|
||||
|
||||
# A push whose head tree has deleted ci.yml but still contains other.yml still
|
||||
# requires approval, with a different fingerprint.
|
||||
backend.tree_entries = {".github/workflows/other.yml": "blob-sha-2"}
|
||||
result2 = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
assert isinstance(result2, ToolMessage)
|
||||
payload2 = json.loads(str(result2.content))
|
||||
assert payload2["workflow_approval_status"] == "approval_required"
|
||||
assert payload2["files"] == [".github/workflows/other.yml"]
|
||||
assert payload2["fingerprint"] != payload["fingerprint"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_base_poisoning_does_not_bypass_guard(
|
||||
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
# The sandbox can rewrite refs/remotes/origin/*; the guard must use the workflow
|
||||
# tree at the pushed head, not a diff against a remote ref. This backend records
|
||||
# whether any command touches the remote-tracking ref.
|
||||
backend = _Backend(
|
||||
tree_entries={
|
||||
".github/workflows/ci.yml": "blob-sha-1",
|
||||
".github/workflows/evil.yml": "blob-sha-evil",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
guard.SANDBOX_BACKENDS["thread-1"] = backend
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_approved(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_rejected(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_find_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_pending(thread_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
|
||||
return {"fingerprint": kwargs["fingerprint"], "status": "pending", "notified": False}, True
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_post(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[str, None]:
|
||||
return "1700000000.000300", None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_notified(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fake_approved)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_rejected", fake_rejected)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "find_workflow_push_approval", fake_find_approval)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "ensure_workflow_push_pending", fake_pending)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "post_slack_thread_reply_with_ts", fake_post)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "mark_workflow_push_notified", fake_notified)
|
||||
|
||||
async def handler(_request: Any) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
return ToolMessage(content="pushed", tool_call_id="call-1")
|
||||
|
||||
result = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
|
||||
assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
|
||||
assert result.status == "error"
|
||||
payload = json.loads(str(result.content))
|
||||
assert payload["workflow_approval_status"] == "approval_required"
|
||||
# The evil workflow file present at head must appear in the approval list.
|
||||
assert ".github/workflows/evil.yml" in payload["files"]
|
||||
# No remote-tracking ref should have been consulted.
|
||||
assert not any("refs/remotes/origin" in cmd for cmd in backend.commands)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_exact_rejection_checked_before_stale_approval(
|
||||
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
backend = _Backend()
|
||||
guard.SANDBOX_BACKENDS["thread-1"] = backend
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_approved(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_rejected(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
# A prior approval for the same repo/branch/files exists; the stale path would
|
||||
# normally match. But because the exact fingerprint is rejected, we must return
|
||||
# "rejected", not "stale_approval".
|
||||
async def fake_find_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return {"fingerprint": "old-fp", "status": "approved", "decided_at": "2024-01-01T00:00:00"}
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_pending(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
|
||||
raise AssertionError("should not create a new pending record")
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fake_approved)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_rejected", fake_rejected)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "find_workflow_push_approval", fake_find_approval)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "ensure_workflow_push_pending", fake_pending)
|
||||
|
||||
async def handler(_request: Any) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
return ToolMessage(content="pushed", tool_call_id="call-1")
|
||||
|
||||
result = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
|
||||
assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
|
||||
assert result.status == "error"
|
||||
payload = json.loads(str(result.content))
|
||||
assert payload["workflow_approval_status"] == "rejected"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_approved_workflow_push_aborts_when_elevation_fails(
|
||||
|
|
@ -348,3 +782,211 @@ async def test_approved_workflow_push_runs_on_non_langsmith_providers(
|
|||
assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
|
||||
assert result.content == "pushed"
|
||||
assert refresh_calls == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_parse_git_push_guards_wrapped_and_optioned_forms() -> None:
|
||||
# Path-qualified and wrapped git invocations must still be recognized as pushes
|
||||
# (so the guard engages), not passed through as "not a git command".
|
||||
for command in (
|
||||
"/usr/bin/git push origin feature",
|
||||
"command git push origin feature",
|
||||
"env FOO=bar git push origin feature",
|
||||
):
|
||||
parsed = guard._parse_git_push(command)
|
||||
assert isinstance(parsed, guard.ParsedGitPush), command
|
||||
assert parsed.remote_ref == "feature"
|
||||
|
||||
# A push carrying unsupported global options, an unknown wrapper, or a value-taking
|
||||
# wrapper option cannot be normalized, so it is blocked (fail closed) rather than run
|
||||
# unguarded. None of these may return None.
|
||||
for command in (
|
||||
"git -c protocol.version=2 push origin feature",
|
||||
"git --git-dir=.git push origin feature",
|
||||
"git --no-pager push origin feature",
|
||||
"nice -n 10 git push origin feature",
|
||||
"sudo -u ci git push origin feature",
|
||||
"timeout 5 git push origin feature",
|
||||
"ionice -c 2 git push origin feature",
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = guard._parse_git_push(command)
|
||||
assert result is not None, command
|
||||
assert isinstance(result, guard._BlockedGitPush), command
|
||||
|
||||
# A non-push git command is still ignored.
|
||||
assert guard._parse_git_push("/usr/bin/git status") is None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_base_fetched_from_push_url_not_origin_remote(
|
||||
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
# A changed workflow file at head (vs the trusted base fetched from the push URL) must
|
||||
# require approval, and the base must be fetched from the push URL, never the bare
|
||||
# `origin` remote name (which the sandbox can repoint via `remote set-url --push`).
|
||||
backend = _Backend(
|
||||
tree_entries={".github/workflows/ci.yml": "head-sha"},
|
||||
base_tree_entries={".github/workflows/ci.yml": "base-sha"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
guard.SANDBOX_BACKENDS["thread-1"] = backend
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_approved(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_rejected(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_find_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_pending(thread_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
|
||||
return {"fingerprint": kwargs["fingerprint"], "status": "pending", "notified": False}, True
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_post(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[str, None]:
|
||||
return "1700000000.000300", None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_notified(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fake_approved)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_rejected", fake_rejected)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "find_workflow_push_approval", fake_find_approval)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "ensure_workflow_push_pending", fake_pending)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "post_slack_thread_reply_with_ts", fake_post)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "mark_workflow_push_notified", fake_notified)
|
||||
|
||||
async def handler(_request: Any) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
return ToolMessage(content="pushed", tool_call_id="call-1")
|
||||
|
||||
result = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
|
||||
assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
|
||||
assert result.status == "error"
|
||||
payload = json.loads(str(result.content))
|
||||
assert payload["workflow_approval_status"] == "approval_required"
|
||||
assert any("remote get-url --push" in cmd for cmd in backend.commands)
|
||||
assert any(f" fetch {backend.push_url}" in cmd for cmd in backend.commands)
|
||||
assert not any(" fetch origin " in cmd for cmd in backend.commands)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_multiple_push_urls_fail_closed(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
|
||||
# `git push` sends to ALL configured push URLs, but `get-url --push` shows only the
|
||||
# first. If the head workflow tree matches the base fetched from the first (benign)
|
||||
# URL, the guard must still require approval rather than skip, because a second push
|
||||
# URL could land the change on the real repo. Head == base here, but multiple push
|
||||
# URLs force fail-closed (approval required).
|
||||
backend = _Backend(
|
||||
tree_entries={".github/workflows/ci.yml": "same-sha"},
|
||||
base_tree_entries={".github/workflows/ci.yml": "same-sha"},
|
||||
push_urls=[
|
||||
"https://github.com/attacker/local.git",
|
||||
"https://github.com/langchain-ai/open-swe.git",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
guard.SANDBOX_BACKENDS["thread-1"] = backend
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_approved(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_rejected(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_find_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_pending(thread_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
|
||||
return {"fingerprint": kwargs["fingerprint"], "status": "pending", "notified": False}, True
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_post(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[str, None]:
|
||||
return "1700000000.000300", None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_notified(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fake_approved)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_rejected", fake_rejected)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "find_workflow_push_approval", fake_find_approval)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "ensure_workflow_push_pending", fake_pending)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "post_slack_thread_reply_with_ts", fake_post)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "mark_workflow_push_notified", fake_notified)
|
||||
|
||||
async def handler(_request: Any) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
raise AssertionError("push must not run without approval when push URLs are ambiguous")
|
||||
|
||||
result = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
|
||||
assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
|
||||
assert result.status == "error"
|
||||
payload = json.loads(str(result.content))
|
||||
assert payload["workflow_approval_status"] == "approval_required"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_url_rewrite_fails_closed(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
|
||||
# An insteadOf/pushInsteadOf rewrite means the inspected push URL may not be the real
|
||||
# destination, so the guard must require approval (never auto-skip).
|
||||
backend = _Backend(
|
||||
tree_entries={".github/workflows/ci.yml": "same-sha"},
|
||||
base_tree_entries={".github/workflows/ci.yml": "same-sha"},
|
||||
url_rewrites="url.https://evil.example/.insteadof https://github.com/",
|
||||
)
|
||||
guard.SANDBOX_BACKENDS["thread-1"] = backend
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_approved(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_rejected(thread_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_find_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_pending(thread_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
|
||||
return {"fingerprint": kwargs["fingerprint"], "status": "pending", "notified": False}, True
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_post(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[str, None]:
|
||||
return "1700000000.000300", None
|
||||
|
||||
async def fake_notified(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fake_approved)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_rejected", fake_rejected)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "find_workflow_push_approval", fake_find_approval)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "ensure_workflow_push_pending", fake_pending)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "post_slack_thread_reply_with_ts", fake_post)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "mark_workflow_push_notified", fake_notified)
|
||||
|
||||
async def handler(_request: Any) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
raise AssertionError("push must not run without approval when a URL rewrite exists")
|
||||
|
||||
result = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
|
||||
assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
|
||||
assert result.status == "error"
|
||||
payload = json.loads(str(result.content))
|
||||
assert payload["workflow_approval_status"] == "approval_required"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_unreadable_head_tree_blocks(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
|
||||
# If `ls-tree` on the head cannot be read, the guard must fail closed (block), not
|
||||
# skip the guard and run the original push.
|
||||
backend = _Backend(ls_tree_head_ok=False)
|
||||
guard.SANDBOX_BACKENDS["thread-1"] = backend
|
||||
|
||||
async def fail_approval(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> bool:
|
||||
raise AssertionError("approval should not be checked for a blocked push")
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(guard, "workflow_push_approved", fail_approval)
|
||||
|
||||
called = False
|
||||
|
||||
async def handler(_request: Any) -> ToolMessage:
|
||||
nonlocal called
|
||||
called = True
|
||||
return ToolMessage(content="pushed", tool_call_id="call-1")
|
||||
|
||||
result = await guard.WorkflowPushGuardMiddleware().awrap_tool_call(_Request(), handler)
|
||||
|
||||
assert called is False
|
||||
assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
|
||||
assert result.status == "error"
|
||||
payload = json.loads(str(result.content))
|
||||
assert payload["error_type"] == "WorkflowPushBlocked"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue