diff --git a/agent/middleware/workflow_push_guard.py b/agent/middleware/workflow_push_guard.py
index c0124b83..42f1ee7a 100644
--- a/agent/middleware/workflow_push_guard.py
+++ b/agent/middleware/workflow_push_guard.py
@@ -42,6 +42,13 @@ from ..utils.slack import post_slack_thread_reply_with_ts
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 _WORKFLOW_PREFIX = ".github/workflows/"
+# Appended to every block reason so the agent always sees how to recover. The guard blocks
+# because it cannot inspect the push, not because the command is dangerous; re-issuing it as a
+# single plain git command makes it inspectable and lets it through.
+_BLOCK_REMEDY = (
+    " Re-issue it as a single plain command with no shell operators (no &&, ;, |, (), etc.) — "
+    "`git push origin <branch>`, or `git -C <dir> push origin <branch>` to target a subdirectory."
+)
 _SHELL_OPERATORS = {";", "|", "||", "&"}
 _REF_NAME = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._/@+-]+$")
 _GIT_OBJECT_ID = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{40,64}$")
@@ -307,10 +314,7 @@ def _parse_git_push(command: str) -> ParsedGitPush | _BlockedGitPush | None:
         # No push the token scan can normalize. Fail closed if one is hidden behind shell
         # metacharacters/expansion; otherwise leave the command untouched.
         if _maybe_obfuscated_git_push(stripped):
-            return _BlockedGitPush(
-                "possible git push obscured by shell metacharacters; issue it as a plain "
-                "`git push origin <branch>`"
-            )
+            return _BlockedGitPush("possible git push obscured by shell metacharacters")
         return None
     if _UNSAFE_RAW_COMMAND.search(stripped) or "&" in stripped.replace("&&", ""):
         return _BlockedGitPush("unsafe shell characters in git push command")
@@ -714,7 +718,13 @@ def _blocked_message(
 ) -> ToolMessage:
     status = "rejected" if already_rejected else "approval_required"
     if blocked:
-        error = change.blocked_reason or "This git push command is not recognized as safe."
+        error = (
+            (change.blocked_reason or "This git push command is not recognized as safe.").rstrip(
+                "."
+            )
+            + "."
+            + _BLOCK_REMEDY
+        )
         error_type = "WorkflowPushBlocked"
     elif stale:
         error = (
diff --git a/tests/test_workflow_push_guard.py b/tests/test_workflow_push_guard.py
index ac38e1ea..a471bdf0 100644
--- a/tests/test_workflow_push_guard.py
+++ b/tests/test_workflow_push_guard.py
@@ -990,3 +990,30 @@ async def test_unreadable_head_tree_blocks(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> N
     assert result.status == "error"
     payload = json.loads(str(result.content))
     assert payload["error_type"] == "WorkflowPushBlocked"
+    # The block must tell the agent how to recover, or it just retries other chained forms.
+    assert "git push origin <branch>" in payload["error"]
+    assert "git -C <dir> push" in payload["error"]
+
+
+def test_blocked_message_appends_actionable_remedy() -> None:
+    change = guard.WorkflowPushChange(
+        fingerprint="fp",
+        repo="acme/app",
+        branch="feature",
+        files=[],
+        head_sha="deadbeef",
+        remote="origin",
+        local_ref="feature",
+        remote_ref="feature",
+        fixed_command="",
+        blocked=True,
+        blocked_reason="chained shell commands",
+    )
+    message = guard._blocked_message(change, blocked=True)
+    payload = json.loads(str(message.content))
+    error = payload["error"]
+    # Original reason is preserved, and the remedy is appended exactly once.
+    assert error.startswith("chained shell commands.")
+    assert "git push origin <branch>" in error
+    assert "git -C <dir> push" in error
+    assert error.count("Re-issue it as a single plain command") == 1