open-swe/deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl

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# Open SWE base AMI — ARM64 (Graviton) Ubuntu 24.04 LTS.
#
# Builds the immutable base image for the single EC2 instance per env
# (open-swe-dev / open-swe-prod) in seahaven-vpc. The image bakes the runtime
# (uv + Python 3.12, nginx, awscli v2, CloudWatch agent) and the service-user /
# systemd / nginx TEMPLATES. It bakes NO secrets and NO env-specific values —
# those are materialized at first boot by user-data + deploy/seahaven/fetch-config.sh
# (Secrets Manager + SSM -> root-only tmpfs .env, fail-fast).
#
# Build: packer init . && packer build open-swe-base.pkr.hcl
# The resulting AMI id is pinned in infra/cdk.context.json (CDK cachedInContext:true);
# see README.md "AMI -> cdk.context.json pinning contract".
packer {
required_version = ">= 1.11.0, < 2.0.0"
required_plugins {
amazon = {
source = "github.com/hashicorp/amazon"
version = "1.3.6"
}
}
}
variable "aws_region" {
type = string
default = "us-east-1"
}
variable "instance_type" {
type = string
default = "t4g.medium" # ARM64 (Graviton) build host; runtime instances are ~t4g.large
}
variable "ami_name_prefix" {
type = string
default = "open-swe-base-arm64"
}
# Versions baked into the image. Pin and bump deliberately.
variable "python_version" {
type = string
default = "3.12"
}
variable "node_major" {
type = string
default = "24"
}
variable "uv_version" {
type = string
default = "0.11.24"
}
variable "cloudwatch_agent_deb_url" {
type = string
default = "https://amazoncloudwatch-agent.s3.amazonaws.com/ubuntu/arm64/latest/amazon-cloudwatch-agent.deb"
}
variable "awscli_zip_url" {
type = string
default = "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/awscli-exe-linux-aarch64.zip"
}
locals {
timestamp = formatdate("YYYYMMDD-hhmmss", timestamp())
}
# Latest Canonical Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble) arm64 server image.
source "amazon-ebs" "open-swe" {
region = var.aws_region
instance_type = var.instance_type
ssh_username = "ubuntu"
ami_name = "${var.ami_name_prefix}-${local.timestamp}"
feat: stand up dev properly — assets bucket + artifact CD + baked AMI + on-box uv sync (T7+T19+T14) (#18) * feat(infra): build + pin the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (T12 AMI / item 3) Packer-build the custom base image and repoint AppService off the AL2023 placeholder onto it. deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl — fix two bugs that blocked the first real `packer build` (the config had only ever been `packer validate`'d at T8): - the file provisioner failed uploading the templates dir ('scp: …: Is a directory') — a trailing-slash contents-upload needs the dest dir to exist; added a 'mkdir -p /tmp/open-swe-templates' shell provisioner + dropped the dest trailing slash. - the shell provisioner's custom execute_command omitted {{ .Vars }}, so the environment_vars never reached provision.sh (which runs under set -u and aborted on CLOUDWATCH_AGENT_DEB_URL). Added {{ .Vars }}. infra: - ami-cache.ts: BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID = ami-0545363bb147229ff (built 2026-06-26 from open-swe-base-arm64-20260626-201929) + bakedOpenSweArm64() pinning it by exact id via MachineImage.genericLinux (offline, deterministic). Dropped the now-dead AL2023 cachedInContext helper + context key; kept the EBS/replacement discipline docs. - app-service.ts: machineImage → bakedOpenSweArm64(). - open-swe-stack.ts: output BakedAmiId (was the AL2023 PinnedAmiId guard). - cdk.context.json → {} (AMI is a static id pin; no context lookups remain). - README: Baked AMI + EBS-replacement-discipline section. tsc + cdk synth(dev+prod) + jest(16) clean; template ImageId = the baked AMI. NOTE: held — do NOT merge until the open-swe-dev secret values are populated (put-config.sh). The infra CD is live, so merging this to dev auto-deploys OpenSweDevStack; without secrets the box boots but fetch-config fail-fasts → unhealthy ALB target on the shared prod ALB. Merge once secrets are set (T14). * fix(ami): ASCII-only AMI description + re-pin to ami-00080084502093021 Third packer bug: ami_description had an em-dash (non-ASCII); AWS rejects non-ASCII in the AMI Description attribute, so packer registered then DEREGISTERED the first AMI (ami-0545…) on the ModifyImageAttribute error. Replaced with an ASCII '-'. Rebuilt clean → ami-00080084502093021 (available). Re-pinned BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID. * fix(deploy): GitHub App + Slack required for prod only, not dev Per the migration decision: do NOT create/duplicate a separate dev GitHub App or Slack app — only prod owns the single shared app. So fetch-config.sh no longer hard-requires the GitHub App quintet (ID/PRIVATE_KEY/INSTALLATION_ID/CLIENT_ID/ CLIENT_SECRET) + Slack/webhook secrets for dev; they move into the prod-only block alongside the existing GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET/SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET. Dev now boots with just DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET + TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY + the active provider key(s) + the langsmith sandbox keys. Dev is a deployment-validation env (boot/health/boundary) with no GitHub/Slack/webhook integration; prod parity is unchanged (prod still requires everything). * feat: stand up dev properly — S3 assets bucket + artifact CD + on-box uv sync (T7+T19) Make the dev/prod box deployable end-to-end: a real artifact pipeline and a re-runnable on-box deploy, so OpenSweDevStack can come up genuinely healthy. Infra (T7): - assets-bucket.ts: open-swe-<env>-assets S3 bucket — BLOCK_ALL public access, SSE-S3, enforceSSL (deny non-TLS), versioned, lifecycle (expire noncurrent + abort MPU), RETAIN. Wired into OpenSweStack + CfnOutput. - app-service.ts: open-swe-<env>-deploy SSM document that runs the baked /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh (tag-scoped roll-the-box). machineImage is the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (folds in the held #16). IAM (app deploy role — cross-review gated): - github-deploy-roles.ts: app role gains s3:PutObject/DeleteObject scoped to open-swe-<env>-assets/releases/* (CI uploads releases). Drops the generic AWS-RunShellScript grant now that the dedicated open-swe-<env>-deploy document is the only SendCommand path — closes the T4 BLOCK#3 arbitrary-shell timebox. Boot/deploy (T19): - deploy/ami/deploy.sh: single, re-runnable app-deploy procedure — pull app.tar.gz/spa.tar.gz from S3, `uv sync --frozen --no-dev` (native ARM64 venv at the real path, py3.12 pre-baked), restart open-swe.service + reload nginx. - user-data.sh: nginx starts BEFORE the app deploy (static /healthz -> the ALB target is healthy even before the first release); deploy.sh is base64-rendered by CDK into user-data (a normal reviewable repo file, not a heredoc) and the first-boot deploy is NON-FATAL (no release yet -> wait for the first SSM deploy). CI (T7+T19): - build-artifacts.yml (+ .github/scripts): build the SPA with bun (vite -> ui/.output/public -> spa.tar.gz), package the Python source via git archive (app.tar.gz, no ui/ no .venv), upload to releases/<sha>/ + releases/latest/ via the githubdeploy-open-swe-app-<env> OIDC role, then fire open-swe-<env>-deploy. push dev -> dev (auto); push main -> prod (env "prod" approval gate). Local: ruff/shellcheck clean, tsc clean, jest 16/16, cdk synth offline OK, deploy.sh base64 round-trips exact. * harden(sec-review): tar extraction, deploy gating, least-privilege, secret guard Address the /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier pass. Only one confirmed-high surfaced and it is PRE-EXISTING and out-of-diff (OSWE-IAC-AUDIT-01, the account-wide CDK cfn-exec residual already documented in config.ts; recorded in .security-review/suppressions.json with justification + flagged for the per-env bootstrap-qualifier follow-up). The rest were verifier-downgraded to unverified; these are the cheap defense-in-depth fixes worth taking regardless: - deploy.sh: extract tarballs with --no-same-owner --no-same-permissions (root never honors an archive's uid/mode → no setuid/foreign-owned file can land); and treat "no release in S3 yet" as a benign exit 0, distinct from a real deploy failure (set -e stays loud once a release exists). - publish-and-deploy.sh: gate on the AGGREGATE SSM Command.Status (+ TargetCount), not CommandInvocations[0], so a partial failure across the brief 2-instance replacement window can't be reported as success. - instance-role.ts: scope the box's s3:GetObject to releases/* (mirrors the app role's write scope) instead of the whole bucket. - package-artifacts.sh: fail-closed secret-shaped-file guard on app.tar.gz (defense in depth over .gitignore; scoped to data extensions so *_credentials.py source is not a false positive — verified against the real tree). Deferred as documented follow-ups (verifier: unverified, supply-chain-gated to the CI OIDC writer; bucket is BLOCK_ALL + enforceSSL + versioned): SHA-pinned immutable releases/<sha>/ pulls + signed checksum (vs mutable latest/), single-tarball release to remove the torn-read window, and app-aware ALB health (vs static nginx /healthz). shellcheck/tsc/jest(16) clean; both stacks synth offline. * fix(infra): ASCII-only EC2 SecurityGroup descriptions + synth-time guard The instance-SG GroupDescription + ingress/egress rule descriptions carried an em-dash / arrow (—, →). `tsc` and `cdk synth` accept them, but the EC2 API rejects non-ASCII in GroupDescription ("Character sets beyond ASCII are not supported"), so OpenSweDevStack's first deploy failed at the SG and rolled back. (Pre-existing from #14; same class as the AMI-description ASCII bug.) - app-service.ts: replace —/→ with ASCII (- / ->) in the SG GroupDescription, the ingress/egress rule descriptions, and the Route53 comment. - test/ascii-aws-fields.test.ts: synth-time guard asserting EC2 SecurityGroup GroupDescription + rule descriptions are pure ASCII, so this fails the build instead of a deploy next time. jest 18/18; tsc clean. * fix(infra): SG rule descriptions use ASCII-charset-safe text (no `>`) The first ASCII fix replaced the arrow with `->`, but EC2 SecurityGroup *rule* descriptions allow a stricter set than ASCII — `a-zA-Z0-9. _-:/()#,@[]+=&;{}!$*`, which EXCLUDES `<`/`>`. So OpenSweDevStack's second deploy still failed at the ingress rule. Use "to" instead of "->", and tighten the guard test from "ASCII only" to the exact EC2 allowed charset so it catches `>` (and `<`) too. jest 18/18; tsc clean. * fix(infra): minify embedded deploy.sh so user-data fits EC2's 25.6 KB limit The base64 deploy.sh embedded in user-data pushed the encoded boot script to 27184 bytes, over EC2's 25600-byte cap, so OpenSweDevStack's instance failed with "Encoded User data is limited to 25600 bytes". Strip full-line comments + blank lines from deploy.sh before base64-embedding it (repo file keeps comments; only the on-box copy is minified; the script is opaque base64 so user-data heredocs are unaffected) -> rendered user-data drops to 16424 bytes (9 KB margin). Add a synth-time guard test asserting EC2 user-data stays under 25600 bytes encoded. jest 19/19; minified deploy.sh passes bash -n + shellcheck.
2026-06-26 18:49:09 -04:00
# ASCII only — AWS rejects non-ASCII in the AMI Description attribute.
ami_description = "Open SWE base - Ubuntu 24.04 arm64 + uv/py3.12 + nginx + CW agent (templates only, no secrets)"
source_ami_filter {
filters = {
name = "ubuntu/images/hvm-ssd*/ubuntu-noble-24.04-arm64-server-*"
architecture = "arm64"
root-device-type = "ebs"
virtualization-type = "hvm"
}
owners = ["099720109477"] # Canonical
most_recent = true
}
# IMDSv2 required on the build host.
metadata_options {
http_endpoint = "enabled"
http_tokens = "required"
http_put_response_hop_limit = 1
}
# gp3 root, encrypted. Runtime root size is set by CDK; this is just the build host.
launch_block_device_mappings {
device_name = "/dev/sda1"
volume_size = 20
volume_type = "gp3"
encrypted = true
delete_on_termination = true
}
tags = {
Name = "open-swe-base-arm64"
Purpose = "open-swe-runtime-base"
ManagedBy = "packer"
}
}
build {
name = "open-swe-base"
sources = ["source.amazon-ebs.open-swe"]
feat: stand up dev properly — assets bucket + artifact CD + baked AMI + on-box uv sync (T7+T19+T14) (#18) * feat(infra): build + pin the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (T12 AMI / item 3) Packer-build the custom base image and repoint AppService off the AL2023 placeholder onto it. deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl — fix two bugs that blocked the first real `packer build` (the config had only ever been `packer validate`'d at T8): - the file provisioner failed uploading the templates dir ('scp: …: Is a directory') — a trailing-slash contents-upload needs the dest dir to exist; added a 'mkdir -p /tmp/open-swe-templates' shell provisioner + dropped the dest trailing slash. - the shell provisioner's custom execute_command omitted {{ .Vars }}, so the environment_vars never reached provision.sh (which runs under set -u and aborted on CLOUDWATCH_AGENT_DEB_URL). Added {{ .Vars }}. infra: - ami-cache.ts: BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID = ami-0545363bb147229ff (built 2026-06-26 from open-swe-base-arm64-20260626-201929) + bakedOpenSweArm64() pinning it by exact id via MachineImage.genericLinux (offline, deterministic). Dropped the now-dead AL2023 cachedInContext helper + context key; kept the EBS/replacement discipline docs. - app-service.ts: machineImage → bakedOpenSweArm64(). - open-swe-stack.ts: output BakedAmiId (was the AL2023 PinnedAmiId guard). - cdk.context.json → {} (AMI is a static id pin; no context lookups remain). - README: Baked AMI + EBS-replacement-discipline section. tsc + cdk synth(dev+prod) + jest(16) clean; template ImageId = the baked AMI. NOTE: held — do NOT merge until the open-swe-dev secret values are populated (put-config.sh). The infra CD is live, so merging this to dev auto-deploys OpenSweDevStack; without secrets the box boots but fetch-config fail-fasts → unhealthy ALB target on the shared prod ALB. Merge once secrets are set (T14). * fix(ami): ASCII-only AMI description + re-pin to ami-00080084502093021 Third packer bug: ami_description had an em-dash (non-ASCII); AWS rejects non-ASCII in the AMI Description attribute, so packer registered then DEREGISTERED the first AMI (ami-0545…) on the ModifyImageAttribute error. Replaced with an ASCII '-'. Rebuilt clean → ami-00080084502093021 (available). Re-pinned BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID. * fix(deploy): GitHub App + Slack required for prod only, not dev Per the migration decision: do NOT create/duplicate a separate dev GitHub App or Slack app — only prod owns the single shared app. So fetch-config.sh no longer hard-requires the GitHub App quintet (ID/PRIVATE_KEY/INSTALLATION_ID/CLIENT_ID/ CLIENT_SECRET) + Slack/webhook secrets for dev; they move into the prod-only block alongside the existing GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET/SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET. Dev now boots with just DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET + TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY + the active provider key(s) + the langsmith sandbox keys. Dev is a deployment-validation env (boot/health/boundary) with no GitHub/Slack/webhook integration; prod parity is unchanged (prod still requires everything). * feat: stand up dev properly — S3 assets bucket + artifact CD + on-box uv sync (T7+T19) Make the dev/prod box deployable end-to-end: a real artifact pipeline and a re-runnable on-box deploy, so OpenSweDevStack can come up genuinely healthy. Infra (T7): - assets-bucket.ts: open-swe-<env>-assets S3 bucket — BLOCK_ALL public access, SSE-S3, enforceSSL (deny non-TLS), versioned, lifecycle (expire noncurrent + abort MPU), RETAIN. Wired into OpenSweStack + CfnOutput. - app-service.ts: open-swe-<env>-deploy SSM document that runs the baked /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh (tag-scoped roll-the-box). machineImage is the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (folds in the held #16). IAM (app deploy role — cross-review gated): - github-deploy-roles.ts: app role gains s3:PutObject/DeleteObject scoped to open-swe-<env>-assets/releases/* (CI uploads releases). Drops the generic AWS-RunShellScript grant now that the dedicated open-swe-<env>-deploy document is the only SendCommand path — closes the T4 BLOCK#3 arbitrary-shell timebox. Boot/deploy (T19): - deploy/ami/deploy.sh: single, re-runnable app-deploy procedure — pull app.tar.gz/spa.tar.gz from S3, `uv sync --frozen --no-dev` (native ARM64 venv at the real path, py3.12 pre-baked), restart open-swe.service + reload nginx. - user-data.sh: nginx starts BEFORE the app deploy (static /healthz -> the ALB target is healthy even before the first release); deploy.sh is base64-rendered by CDK into user-data (a normal reviewable repo file, not a heredoc) and the first-boot deploy is NON-FATAL (no release yet -> wait for the first SSM deploy). CI (T7+T19): - build-artifacts.yml (+ .github/scripts): build the SPA with bun (vite -> ui/.output/public -> spa.tar.gz), package the Python source via git archive (app.tar.gz, no ui/ no .venv), upload to releases/<sha>/ + releases/latest/ via the githubdeploy-open-swe-app-<env> OIDC role, then fire open-swe-<env>-deploy. push dev -> dev (auto); push main -> prod (env "prod" approval gate). Local: ruff/shellcheck clean, tsc clean, jest 16/16, cdk synth offline OK, deploy.sh base64 round-trips exact. * harden(sec-review): tar extraction, deploy gating, least-privilege, secret guard Address the /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier pass. Only one confirmed-high surfaced and it is PRE-EXISTING and out-of-diff (OSWE-IAC-AUDIT-01, the account-wide CDK cfn-exec residual already documented in config.ts; recorded in .security-review/suppressions.json with justification + flagged for the per-env bootstrap-qualifier follow-up). The rest were verifier-downgraded to unverified; these are the cheap defense-in-depth fixes worth taking regardless: - deploy.sh: extract tarballs with --no-same-owner --no-same-permissions (root never honors an archive's uid/mode → no setuid/foreign-owned file can land); and treat "no release in S3 yet" as a benign exit 0, distinct from a real deploy failure (set -e stays loud once a release exists). - publish-and-deploy.sh: gate on the AGGREGATE SSM Command.Status (+ TargetCount), not CommandInvocations[0], so a partial failure across the brief 2-instance replacement window can't be reported as success. - instance-role.ts: scope the box's s3:GetObject to releases/* (mirrors the app role's write scope) instead of the whole bucket. - package-artifacts.sh: fail-closed secret-shaped-file guard on app.tar.gz (defense in depth over .gitignore; scoped to data extensions so *_credentials.py source is not a false positive — verified against the real tree). Deferred as documented follow-ups (verifier: unverified, supply-chain-gated to the CI OIDC writer; bucket is BLOCK_ALL + enforceSSL + versioned): SHA-pinned immutable releases/<sha>/ pulls + signed checksum (vs mutable latest/), single-tarball release to remove the torn-read window, and app-aware ALB health (vs static nginx /healthz). shellcheck/tsc/jest(16) clean; both stacks synth offline. * fix(infra): ASCII-only EC2 SecurityGroup descriptions + synth-time guard The instance-SG GroupDescription + ingress/egress rule descriptions carried an em-dash / arrow (—, →). `tsc` and `cdk synth` accept them, but the EC2 API rejects non-ASCII in GroupDescription ("Character sets beyond ASCII are not supported"), so OpenSweDevStack's first deploy failed at the SG and rolled back. (Pre-existing from #14; same class as the AMI-description ASCII bug.) - app-service.ts: replace —/→ with ASCII (- / ->) in the SG GroupDescription, the ingress/egress rule descriptions, and the Route53 comment. - test/ascii-aws-fields.test.ts: synth-time guard asserting EC2 SecurityGroup GroupDescription + rule descriptions are pure ASCII, so this fails the build instead of a deploy next time. jest 18/18; tsc clean. * fix(infra): SG rule descriptions use ASCII-charset-safe text (no `>`) The first ASCII fix replaced the arrow with `->`, but EC2 SecurityGroup *rule* descriptions allow a stricter set than ASCII — `a-zA-Z0-9. _-:/()#,@[]+=&;{}!$*`, which EXCLUDES `<`/`>`. So OpenSweDevStack's second deploy still failed at the ingress rule. Use "to" instead of "->", and tighten the guard test from "ASCII only" to the exact EC2 allowed charset so it catches `>` (and `<`) too. jest 18/18; tsc clean. * fix(infra): minify embedded deploy.sh so user-data fits EC2's 25.6 KB limit The base64 deploy.sh embedded in user-data pushed the encoded boot script to 27184 bytes, over EC2's 25600-byte cap, so OpenSweDevStack's instance failed with "Encoded User data is limited to 25600 bytes". Strip full-line comments + blank lines from deploy.sh before base64-embedding it (repo file keeps comments; only the on-box copy is minified; the script is opaque base64 so user-data heredocs are unaffected) -> rendered user-data drops to 16424 bytes (9 KB margin). Add a synth-time guard test asserting EC2 user-data stays under 25600 bytes encoded. jest 19/19; minified deploy.sh passes bash -n + shellcheck.
2026-06-26 18:49:09 -04:00
# Stage the boot-time templates into the image. The destination dir must exist
# BEFORE a trailing-slash (contents-only) file upload — packer's file provisioner
# does not create it, and uploading the directory itself trips scp ("Is a
# directory"). So mkdir first, then upload the contents into it.
provisioner "shell" {
inline = ["mkdir -p /tmp/open-swe-templates"]
}
provisioner "file" {
source = "${path.root}/templates/"
feat: stand up dev properly — assets bucket + artifact CD + baked AMI + on-box uv sync (T7+T19+T14) (#18) * feat(infra): build + pin the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (T12 AMI / item 3) Packer-build the custom base image and repoint AppService off the AL2023 placeholder onto it. deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl — fix two bugs that blocked the first real `packer build` (the config had only ever been `packer validate`'d at T8): - the file provisioner failed uploading the templates dir ('scp: …: Is a directory') — a trailing-slash contents-upload needs the dest dir to exist; added a 'mkdir -p /tmp/open-swe-templates' shell provisioner + dropped the dest trailing slash. - the shell provisioner's custom execute_command omitted {{ .Vars }}, so the environment_vars never reached provision.sh (which runs under set -u and aborted on CLOUDWATCH_AGENT_DEB_URL). Added {{ .Vars }}. infra: - ami-cache.ts: BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID = ami-0545363bb147229ff (built 2026-06-26 from open-swe-base-arm64-20260626-201929) + bakedOpenSweArm64() pinning it by exact id via MachineImage.genericLinux (offline, deterministic). Dropped the now-dead AL2023 cachedInContext helper + context key; kept the EBS/replacement discipline docs. - app-service.ts: machineImage → bakedOpenSweArm64(). - open-swe-stack.ts: output BakedAmiId (was the AL2023 PinnedAmiId guard). - cdk.context.json → {} (AMI is a static id pin; no context lookups remain). - README: Baked AMI + EBS-replacement-discipline section. tsc + cdk synth(dev+prod) + jest(16) clean; template ImageId = the baked AMI. NOTE: held — do NOT merge until the open-swe-dev secret values are populated (put-config.sh). The infra CD is live, so merging this to dev auto-deploys OpenSweDevStack; without secrets the box boots but fetch-config fail-fasts → unhealthy ALB target on the shared prod ALB. Merge once secrets are set (T14). * fix(ami): ASCII-only AMI description + re-pin to ami-00080084502093021 Third packer bug: ami_description had an em-dash (non-ASCII); AWS rejects non-ASCII in the AMI Description attribute, so packer registered then DEREGISTERED the first AMI (ami-0545…) on the ModifyImageAttribute error. Replaced with an ASCII '-'. Rebuilt clean → ami-00080084502093021 (available). Re-pinned BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID. * fix(deploy): GitHub App + Slack required for prod only, not dev Per the migration decision: do NOT create/duplicate a separate dev GitHub App or Slack app — only prod owns the single shared app. So fetch-config.sh no longer hard-requires the GitHub App quintet (ID/PRIVATE_KEY/INSTALLATION_ID/CLIENT_ID/ CLIENT_SECRET) + Slack/webhook secrets for dev; they move into the prod-only block alongside the existing GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET/SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET. Dev now boots with just DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET + TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY + the active provider key(s) + the langsmith sandbox keys. Dev is a deployment-validation env (boot/health/boundary) with no GitHub/Slack/webhook integration; prod parity is unchanged (prod still requires everything). * feat: stand up dev properly — S3 assets bucket + artifact CD + on-box uv sync (T7+T19) Make the dev/prod box deployable end-to-end: a real artifact pipeline and a re-runnable on-box deploy, so OpenSweDevStack can come up genuinely healthy. Infra (T7): - assets-bucket.ts: open-swe-<env>-assets S3 bucket — BLOCK_ALL public access, SSE-S3, enforceSSL (deny non-TLS), versioned, lifecycle (expire noncurrent + abort MPU), RETAIN. Wired into OpenSweStack + CfnOutput. - app-service.ts: open-swe-<env>-deploy SSM document that runs the baked /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh (tag-scoped roll-the-box). machineImage is the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (folds in the held #16). IAM (app deploy role — cross-review gated): - github-deploy-roles.ts: app role gains s3:PutObject/DeleteObject scoped to open-swe-<env>-assets/releases/* (CI uploads releases). Drops the generic AWS-RunShellScript grant now that the dedicated open-swe-<env>-deploy document is the only SendCommand path — closes the T4 BLOCK#3 arbitrary-shell timebox. Boot/deploy (T19): - deploy/ami/deploy.sh: single, re-runnable app-deploy procedure — pull app.tar.gz/spa.tar.gz from S3, `uv sync --frozen --no-dev` (native ARM64 venv at the real path, py3.12 pre-baked), restart open-swe.service + reload nginx. - user-data.sh: nginx starts BEFORE the app deploy (static /healthz -> the ALB target is healthy even before the first release); deploy.sh is base64-rendered by CDK into user-data (a normal reviewable repo file, not a heredoc) and the first-boot deploy is NON-FATAL (no release yet -> wait for the first SSM deploy). CI (T7+T19): - build-artifacts.yml (+ .github/scripts): build the SPA with bun (vite -> ui/.output/public -> spa.tar.gz), package the Python source via git archive (app.tar.gz, no ui/ no .venv), upload to releases/<sha>/ + releases/latest/ via the githubdeploy-open-swe-app-<env> OIDC role, then fire open-swe-<env>-deploy. push dev -> dev (auto); push main -> prod (env "prod" approval gate). Local: ruff/shellcheck clean, tsc clean, jest 16/16, cdk synth offline OK, deploy.sh base64 round-trips exact. * harden(sec-review): tar extraction, deploy gating, least-privilege, secret guard Address the /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier pass. Only one confirmed-high surfaced and it is PRE-EXISTING and out-of-diff (OSWE-IAC-AUDIT-01, the account-wide CDK cfn-exec residual already documented in config.ts; recorded in .security-review/suppressions.json with justification + flagged for the per-env bootstrap-qualifier follow-up). The rest were verifier-downgraded to unverified; these are the cheap defense-in-depth fixes worth taking regardless: - deploy.sh: extract tarballs with --no-same-owner --no-same-permissions (root never honors an archive's uid/mode → no setuid/foreign-owned file can land); and treat "no release in S3 yet" as a benign exit 0, distinct from a real deploy failure (set -e stays loud once a release exists). - publish-and-deploy.sh: gate on the AGGREGATE SSM Command.Status (+ TargetCount), not CommandInvocations[0], so a partial failure across the brief 2-instance replacement window can't be reported as success. - instance-role.ts: scope the box's s3:GetObject to releases/* (mirrors the app role's write scope) instead of the whole bucket. - package-artifacts.sh: fail-closed secret-shaped-file guard on app.tar.gz (defense in depth over .gitignore; scoped to data extensions so *_credentials.py source is not a false positive — verified against the real tree). Deferred as documented follow-ups (verifier: unverified, supply-chain-gated to the CI OIDC writer; bucket is BLOCK_ALL + enforceSSL + versioned): SHA-pinned immutable releases/<sha>/ pulls + signed checksum (vs mutable latest/), single-tarball release to remove the torn-read window, and app-aware ALB health (vs static nginx /healthz). shellcheck/tsc/jest(16) clean; both stacks synth offline. * fix(infra): ASCII-only EC2 SecurityGroup descriptions + synth-time guard The instance-SG GroupDescription + ingress/egress rule descriptions carried an em-dash / arrow (—, →). `tsc` and `cdk synth` accept them, but the EC2 API rejects non-ASCII in GroupDescription ("Character sets beyond ASCII are not supported"), so OpenSweDevStack's first deploy failed at the SG and rolled back. (Pre-existing from #14; same class as the AMI-description ASCII bug.) - app-service.ts: replace —/→ with ASCII (- / ->) in the SG GroupDescription, the ingress/egress rule descriptions, and the Route53 comment. - test/ascii-aws-fields.test.ts: synth-time guard asserting EC2 SecurityGroup GroupDescription + rule descriptions are pure ASCII, so this fails the build instead of a deploy next time. jest 18/18; tsc clean. * fix(infra): SG rule descriptions use ASCII-charset-safe text (no `>`) The first ASCII fix replaced the arrow with `->`, but EC2 SecurityGroup *rule* descriptions allow a stricter set than ASCII — `a-zA-Z0-9. _-:/()#,@[]+=&;{}!$*`, which EXCLUDES `<`/`>`. So OpenSweDevStack's second deploy still failed at the ingress rule. Use "to" instead of "->", and tighten the guard test from "ASCII only" to the exact EC2 allowed charset so it catches `>` (and `<`) too. jest 18/18; tsc clean. * fix(infra): minify embedded deploy.sh so user-data fits EC2's 25.6 KB limit The base64 deploy.sh embedded in user-data pushed the encoded boot script to 27184 bytes, over EC2's 25600-byte cap, so OpenSweDevStack's instance failed with "Encoded User data is limited to 25600 bytes". Strip full-line comments + blank lines from deploy.sh before base64-embedding it (repo file keeps comments; only the on-box copy is minified; the script is opaque base64 so user-data heredocs are unaffected) -> rendered user-data drops to 16424 bytes (9 KB margin). Add a synth-time guard test asserting EC2 user-data stays under 25600 bytes encoded. jest 19/19; minified deploy.sh passes bash -n + shellcheck.
2026-06-26 18:49:09 -04:00
destination = "/tmp/open-swe-templates"
}
provisioner "shell" {
environment_vars = [
"PYTHON_VERSION=${var.python_version}",
"NODE_MAJOR=${var.node_major}",
"UV_VERSION=${var.uv_version}",
"CLOUDWATCH_AGENT_DEB_URL=${var.cloudwatch_agent_deb_url}",
"AWSCLI_ZIP_URL=${var.awscli_zip_url}",
]
feat: stand up dev properly — assets bucket + artifact CD + baked AMI + on-box uv sync (T7+T19+T14) (#18) * feat(infra): build + pin the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (T12 AMI / item 3) Packer-build the custom base image and repoint AppService off the AL2023 placeholder onto it. deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl — fix two bugs that blocked the first real `packer build` (the config had only ever been `packer validate`'d at T8): - the file provisioner failed uploading the templates dir ('scp: …: Is a directory') — a trailing-slash contents-upload needs the dest dir to exist; added a 'mkdir -p /tmp/open-swe-templates' shell provisioner + dropped the dest trailing slash. - the shell provisioner's custom execute_command omitted {{ .Vars }}, so the environment_vars never reached provision.sh (which runs under set -u and aborted on CLOUDWATCH_AGENT_DEB_URL). Added {{ .Vars }}. infra: - ami-cache.ts: BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID = ami-0545363bb147229ff (built 2026-06-26 from open-swe-base-arm64-20260626-201929) + bakedOpenSweArm64() pinning it by exact id via MachineImage.genericLinux (offline, deterministic). Dropped the now-dead AL2023 cachedInContext helper + context key; kept the EBS/replacement discipline docs. - app-service.ts: machineImage → bakedOpenSweArm64(). - open-swe-stack.ts: output BakedAmiId (was the AL2023 PinnedAmiId guard). - cdk.context.json → {} (AMI is a static id pin; no context lookups remain). - README: Baked AMI + EBS-replacement-discipline section. tsc + cdk synth(dev+prod) + jest(16) clean; template ImageId = the baked AMI. NOTE: held — do NOT merge until the open-swe-dev secret values are populated (put-config.sh). The infra CD is live, so merging this to dev auto-deploys OpenSweDevStack; without secrets the box boots but fetch-config fail-fasts → unhealthy ALB target on the shared prod ALB. Merge once secrets are set (T14). * fix(ami): ASCII-only AMI description + re-pin to ami-00080084502093021 Third packer bug: ami_description had an em-dash (non-ASCII); AWS rejects non-ASCII in the AMI Description attribute, so packer registered then DEREGISTERED the first AMI (ami-0545…) on the ModifyImageAttribute error. Replaced with an ASCII '-'. Rebuilt clean → ami-00080084502093021 (available). Re-pinned BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID. * fix(deploy): GitHub App + Slack required for prod only, not dev Per the migration decision: do NOT create/duplicate a separate dev GitHub App or Slack app — only prod owns the single shared app. So fetch-config.sh no longer hard-requires the GitHub App quintet (ID/PRIVATE_KEY/INSTALLATION_ID/CLIENT_ID/ CLIENT_SECRET) + Slack/webhook secrets for dev; they move into the prod-only block alongside the existing GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET/SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET. Dev now boots with just DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET + TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY + the active provider key(s) + the langsmith sandbox keys. Dev is a deployment-validation env (boot/health/boundary) with no GitHub/Slack/webhook integration; prod parity is unchanged (prod still requires everything). * feat: stand up dev properly — S3 assets bucket + artifact CD + on-box uv sync (T7+T19) Make the dev/prod box deployable end-to-end: a real artifact pipeline and a re-runnable on-box deploy, so OpenSweDevStack can come up genuinely healthy. Infra (T7): - assets-bucket.ts: open-swe-<env>-assets S3 bucket — BLOCK_ALL public access, SSE-S3, enforceSSL (deny non-TLS), versioned, lifecycle (expire noncurrent + abort MPU), RETAIN. Wired into OpenSweStack + CfnOutput. - app-service.ts: open-swe-<env>-deploy SSM document that runs the baked /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh (tag-scoped roll-the-box). machineImage is the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (folds in the held #16). IAM (app deploy role — cross-review gated): - github-deploy-roles.ts: app role gains s3:PutObject/DeleteObject scoped to open-swe-<env>-assets/releases/* (CI uploads releases). Drops the generic AWS-RunShellScript grant now that the dedicated open-swe-<env>-deploy document is the only SendCommand path — closes the T4 BLOCK#3 arbitrary-shell timebox. Boot/deploy (T19): - deploy/ami/deploy.sh: single, re-runnable app-deploy procedure — pull app.tar.gz/spa.tar.gz from S3, `uv sync --frozen --no-dev` (native ARM64 venv at the real path, py3.12 pre-baked), restart open-swe.service + reload nginx. - user-data.sh: nginx starts BEFORE the app deploy (static /healthz -> the ALB target is healthy even before the first release); deploy.sh is base64-rendered by CDK into user-data (a normal reviewable repo file, not a heredoc) and the first-boot deploy is NON-FATAL (no release yet -> wait for the first SSM deploy). CI (T7+T19): - build-artifacts.yml (+ .github/scripts): build the SPA with bun (vite -> ui/.output/public -> spa.tar.gz), package the Python source via git archive (app.tar.gz, no ui/ no .venv), upload to releases/<sha>/ + releases/latest/ via the githubdeploy-open-swe-app-<env> OIDC role, then fire open-swe-<env>-deploy. push dev -> dev (auto); push main -> prod (env "prod" approval gate). Local: ruff/shellcheck clean, tsc clean, jest 16/16, cdk synth offline OK, deploy.sh base64 round-trips exact. * harden(sec-review): tar extraction, deploy gating, least-privilege, secret guard Address the /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier pass. Only one confirmed-high surfaced and it is PRE-EXISTING and out-of-diff (OSWE-IAC-AUDIT-01, the account-wide CDK cfn-exec residual already documented in config.ts; recorded in .security-review/suppressions.json with justification + flagged for the per-env bootstrap-qualifier follow-up). The rest were verifier-downgraded to unverified; these are the cheap defense-in-depth fixes worth taking regardless: - deploy.sh: extract tarballs with --no-same-owner --no-same-permissions (root never honors an archive's uid/mode → no setuid/foreign-owned file can land); and treat "no release in S3 yet" as a benign exit 0, distinct from a real deploy failure (set -e stays loud once a release exists). - publish-and-deploy.sh: gate on the AGGREGATE SSM Command.Status (+ TargetCount), not CommandInvocations[0], so a partial failure across the brief 2-instance replacement window can't be reported as success. - instance-role.ts: scope the box's s3:GetObject to releases/* (mirrors the app role's write scope) instead of the whole bucket. - package-artifacts.sh: fail-closed secret-shaped-file guard on app.tar.gz (defense in depth over .gitignore; scoped to data extensions so *_credentials.py source is not a false positive — verified against the real tree). Deferred as documented follow-ups (verifier: unverified, supply-chain-gated to the CI OIDC writer; bucket is BLOCK_ALL + enforceSSL + versioned): SHA-pinned immutable releases/<sha>/ pulls + signed checksum (vs mutable latest/), single-tarball release to remove the torn-read window, and app-aware ALB health (vs static nginx /healthz). shellcheck/tsc/jest(16) clean; both stacks synth offline. * fix(infra): ASCII-only EC2 SecurityGroup descriptions + synth-time guard The instance-SG GroupDescription + ingress/egress rule descriptions carried an em-dash / arrow (—, →). `tsc` and `cdk synth` accept them, but the EC2 API rejects non-ASCII in GroupDescription ("Character sets beyond ASCII are not supported"), so OpenSweDevStack's first deploy failed at the SG and rolled back. (Pre-existing from #14; same class as the AMI-description ASCII bug.) - app-service.ts: replace —/→ with ASCII (- / ->) in the SG GroupDescription, the ingress/egress rule descriptions, and the Route53 comment. - test/ascii-aws-fields.test.ts: synth-time guard asserting EC2 SecurityGroup GroupDescription + rule descriptions are pure ASCII, so this fails the build instead of a deploy next time. jest 18/18; tsc clean. * fix(infra): SG rule descriptions use ASCII-charset-safe text (no `>`) The first ASCII fix replaced the arrow with `->`, but EC2 SecurityGroup *rule* descriptions allow a stricter set than ASCII — `a-zA-Z0-9. _-:/()#,@[]+=&;{}!$*`, which EXCLUDES `<`/`>`. So OpenSweDevStack's second deploy still failed at the ingress rule. Use "to" instead of "->", and tighten the guard test from "ASCII only" to the exact EC2 allowed charset so it catches `>` (and `<`) too. jest 18/18; tsc clean. * fix(infra): minify embedded deploy.sh so user-data fits EC2's 25.6 KB limit The base64 deploy.sh embedded in user-data pushed the encoded boot script to 27184 bytes, over EC2's 25600-byte cap, so OpenSweDevStack's instance failed with "Encoded User data is limited to 25600 bytes". Strip full-line comments + blank lines from deploy.sh before base64-embedding it (repo file keeps comments; only the on-box copy is minified; the script is opaque base64 so user-data heredocs are unaffected) -> rendered user-data drops to 16424 bytes (9 KB margin). Add a synth-time guard test asserting EC2 user-data stays under 25600 bytes encoded. jest 19/19; minified deploy.sh passes bash -n + shellcheck.
2026-06-26 18:49:09 -04:00
# {{ .Vars }} MUST be included or the environment_vars above never reach the
# script (provision.sh runs under `set -u` and fails on the first reference).
execute_command = "chmod +x {{ .Path }}; {{ .Vars }} sudo -E bash '{{ .Path }}'"
script = "${path.root}/scripts/provision.sh"
}
}