open-swe/README.md

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<h3>Open-source framework for building your org's internal coding agent.</h3>
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Elite engineering orgs like Stripe, Ramp, and Coinbase are building their own internal coding agents — Slackbots, CLIs, and web apps that meet engineers where they already work. These agents are connected to internal systems with the right context, permissioning, and safety boundaries to operate with minimal human oversight.
feat: Jira + Confluence integration (tools + triggers) (#182) * feat(open-swe): add Jira tool plane (Phase 1) Curated Jira Cloud REST v3 toolset for the agent, mirroring the Linear tools: - utils/jira.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with get/ create/update issue, comments, list projects, trace comment; issue and comment bodies normalized to markdown. - utils/adf.py: minimal ADF <-> markdown conversion (read paths convert Jira ADF to markdown; agent comments convert prose to ADF). - tools/jira_{comment,get_issue,get_issue_comments,create_issue, update_issue,list_projects}.py wired into the tool registry and the main agent tool list. - tests/test_jira_utils.py: ADF conversion + mocked-transport util tests. Reads JIRA_BASE_URL / JIRA_SERVICE_EMAIL / JIRA_API_TOKEN; unset env returns a clean error, so this is safe to land dark. Trigger plane, prompt guidance, and config plumbing follow in Phase 2. * feat(open-swe): add Confluence tool plane (Phase 3) Curated Confluence Cloud REST toolset for the agent, mirroring the Jira tools: - utils/confluence.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with get/create/update page, add comment, CQL search. Page bodies are XHTML storage format (not ADF), with minimal storage<->text converters; update_page reads the current version and bumps it, as Confluence requires. - tools/confluence_{get_page,create_page,update_page,comment,search}.py registered in the tool registry. - tests/test_confluence_utils.py: converter + mocked-transport tests including the version-bump path. Reads CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL / CONFLUENCE_EMAIL / CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN; unset env returns a clean error. Activation in the agent tool list lands with the Phase 2 server.py wiring. * feat(open-swe): add Jira trigger plane (Phase 2) Make an @openswe comment on a Jira issue spawn an agent run, mirroring the Linear trigger plane: - webhooks/jira.py: process_jira_issue clones process_linear_issue — deterministic thread id, full-issue fetch, actor accountId->email attribution feeding resolve_login_from_email_async (PRs open as the human), multimodal image handling, source="jira" + jira_issue config. - webapp.py: POST/GET /webhooks/jira, verify_jira_secret (constant-time X-Automation-Webhook-Token check, fails closed), repo-resolution cascade, get_repo_config_from_jira_mapping. - utils/jira_project_repo_map.py: JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO (placeholder entry — real project->repo mappings still needed). - utils/jira.py: get_user_email (accountId -> email) for attribution. - completion.py: source=="jira" failure-reply branch. - prompt.py: Jira-triggered notify guidance + Refs:/branch key from {jira_project_key}-{jira_issue_number}. - server.py: read jira_issue config + pass jira key to the system prompt; also activates the Phase 3 Confluence tools in the agent list. Jira Automation lacks native webhook HMAC signing, so trust is a shared secret header (decision D2); replay protection is weaker than Linear's HMAC+timestamp. /sh-security-review + an Atlassian IP allowlist are the outstanding gate/hardening before push. * fix(open-swe): harden Jira webhook trust (sh-security-review) Resolves findings from the Phase 2 security review (detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier). The unsigned Jira Automation webhook body was trusted for identity, comment content, repo routing, and issue existence; a JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET holder could forge those fields. - Corroborate against the real Jira record: the webhook body is now only a pointer (issue_key + required comment_id). The triggering comment's author and text are re-fetched server-side via get_comment/fetch_jira_ comment, and identity, the @openswe check, prompt text, and project key are derived from that authoritative record — never payload author/ body fields. An uncorroborated comment is rejected. (closes the account-id impersonation, unsigned-body prompt injection, and fabricated-issue findings) - Validate issue_key against the Jira key format and percent-encode all untrusted path segments (_seg) so a crafted key can't traverse to a different Jira REST endpoint or inject query params. (closes the path- traversal / query-injection findings) - Route source=="jira" through the bot-token-default / author_prs_as_ user opt-in path in resolve_github_token, matching Linear, instead of unconditionally resolving a per-user OAuth token from a payload email. - Gate attribution on an active user mapping (is_login_mapped) so a pending/unconfirmed mapping can't drive PR authorship. Adds regression tests: server-corroboration wins over payload, malformed issue_key rejected, uncorroborated comment rejected, path-segment encoding, project-key derivation, active-mapping gate. Remaining (non-blocking, deployment/hardening): set ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/ REPOS so the shared allowlist isn't fail-open; consider HMAC-over-body + timestamp on the Automation payload to close the residual replay gap. * harden(open-swe): opt-in Jira webhook replay/IP + fail-closed allowlist Folds the two deployment-hardening items from the Phase 2 security review into code (all opt-in / default-off, so existing and upstream deployments are unaffected): - JIRA_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE: when set, the Automation payload must carry X-Openswe-Signature (hex HMAC-SHA256 of the raw body keyed by JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET) plus a fresh timestamp, verified by verify_jira_signature / _jira_timestamp_is_fresh (mirrors the Linear HMAC+freshness model). Closes the static-token model's replay/forgery gap when enabled. - JIRA_WEBHOOK_IP_ALLOWLIST: optional CIDR allowlist on the webhook's direct client IP (verify_jira_source_ip). Documented as direct-peer only; behind a proxy/LB, allowlist Atlassian's ranges at that layer. - REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST: makes an empty ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/REPOS fail CLOSED instead of the back-compat allow-all, plus a startup fail-open warning. Applies to all channels for consistency. Documents all new vars (and a Jira section) in .env.example. Adds tests for signature on/off + valid/missing/wrong/stale, IP allow/deny/off, and the fail-closed allowlist. * feat(open-swe): Confluence Atlassian Connect trigger (Phase 4) Adds the @openswe-on-a-Confluence-comment trigger via a private Atlassian Connect app. Designed and adversarially verified with the ultracode workflow (3 divergent Opus designs + judge; 3 proof-or-kill Opus skeptics on the implemented crypto). - utils/atlassian_connect.py: hand-rolled qsh (pinned to Atlassian's official test vector), PyJWT HS256 webhook verifier with alg-pinning, issuer binding, and qsh-verified-last ordering; RS256 signed-install lifecycle verifier against Atlassian's published keys; installation store keyed by clientKey with the sharedSecret encrypted at rest (TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY / Fernet). No new dependency (PyJWT already pinned). - webhooks/confluence.py: install/uninstall lifecycle + comment handler. The JWT-signed webhook body is only a pointer; the comment's real author/text/container are re-fetched server-side via the Basic-auth service account (Phase-2 corroboration lesson), with active-only login attribution and the repo allowlist. - utils/confluence.py: get_comment / get_user_email (path-encoded). - webapp.py: GET /connect/atlassian-connect.json (served dynamically), POST /connect/{installed,uninstalled,webhook/comment-created}, the space->repo resolver, thread-id, and fetch helpers. - completion.py: source=="confluence" failure-reply branch. Security: the sh-security-review verify pass confirmed one HIGH — the symmetric signed-install=false first-install was trust-on-first-use gated only by the public Confluence hostname (webhook-auth bypass). Fixed by switching to signed-install=true + RS256 verification of lifecycle callbacks, which cryptographically authenticates the first install. All other attack lenses (forgery/replay/alg-confusion/overwrite/uninstall DoS/corroboration/injection) were defeated; residuals are deployment config (REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST) or accepted-by-design (qsh cannot cover bodies; comment-trigger prompt injection, shared with all sources). New env (documented in .env.example): CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL/EMAIL/API_TOKEN, CONNECT_BASE_URL, CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL (optional). Install secrets require the durable Postgres LangGraph store in prod. Outstanding before push: /sh-security-review on the real diff and the GPT-4.1 cross-family review (auth boundary); README/CLAUDE.md + memory. * docs(open-swe): Phase 5 — Confluence prompt guidance + architecture docs - prompt.py: Confluence-triggered runs notify via confluence_comment on the triggering page; add Confluence to the shared-base source list. - CLAUDE.md: document the Jira + Confluence tool planes and the Atlassian triggers (Jira Automation shared-secret webhook; Confluence Connect app with HS256 webhook + qsh and RS256 signed-install lifecycle), plus the server-side corroboration + encrypted install store. Phase 5 also verified the trigger surface end-to-end against a running uvicorn app (descriptor served; /connect/* and /webhooks/jira fail closed without valid auth) and recorded the integration in project memory. * fix(open-swe): resolve /sh-security-review findings on the Atlassian surface Formal sh-security-review (detector fan-out + verifier) over the Phase-4 Connect surface (esp. the new RS256 signed-install code, unseen by the earlier adversarial verify) and the Phase-2 opt-in hardening. CRITICAL — cross-tenant install (origin validation, CWE-346): signed- install proves the caller is *an* Atlassian tenant, not *ours*, and the descriptor is served publicly, so any attacker could install the app on their own Confluence site and drive agent runs against our allowlisted repos. The baseUrl body field is attacker-controlled and cannot bind the tenant; only the signature-verified clientKey (JWT iss) can. Added a MANDATORY, fail-closed CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS allowlist checked in process_install after signature+iss verification. HIGH — cross-tenant thread-id collision (CWE-330/863): Confluence comment ids are per-instance, so generate_thread_id_from_confluence_comment now salts the hash with the verified clientKey (plumbed from the webhook JWT iss) to prevent thread hijack across tenants. HIGH/MEDIUM — path/query injection (CWE-22/88): get_page and update_page interpolated page_id into the REST path unencoded (update_page on a mutating PUT with no params= backstop). Now _seg()-encoded, matching the rest of the module. MEDIUM — self-trigger loop (CWE-405): process_confluence_comment had no bot-authorship early-out. Added an optional CONFLUENCE_BOT_ACCOUNT_ID guard mirroring the Linear botActor / Jira comment_author_is_bot checks. LOW — corrected the CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL comment to document it as opt-in defense-in-depth (the clientKey allowlist is the real gate). Verified clean by the detectors: RS256/HS256 alg-pinning, aud/iss/exp, kid-fetch SSRF (host-pinned + quote-encoded), at-rest secret encryption, constant-time comparisons, and the Phase-2 hardening. New regression tests for each fix; full suite green (1602). * harden(open-swe): GPT-4.1 cross-family review follow-ups Cross-family review (GPT-4.1 via orchestrator cross_reviewer) found no critical/high issues and confirmed the auth boundary is fail-closed and correct. Two low-cost defense-in-depth items applied: - Validate the signed-install JWT 'kid' against a strict charset before the public-key fetch, so a malformed kid fails fast with no network call (on top of the existing fixed host + percent-encoding). - Make JWT nbf verification explicit (verify_nbf) on both the RS256 lifecycle and HS256 webhook decodes. Other suggestions triaged as already-handled (aud cross-app replay is blocked by the per-tenant iss->secret lookup; documented static-token/IP/ baseUrl tradeoffs; qsh pinned to Atlassian's vector) or ops/infra (Fernet rotation via MultiFernet; rate limiting at the gateway). * docs(open-swe): document Jira + Confluence in installation & customization guides - INSTALLATION.md §5: add Jira (Automation-rule webhook + shared secret, service account, JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO) and Confluence (Atlassian Connect app install, CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS bootstrap, durable-store note, CONFLUENCE_SPACE_TO_REPO) trigger setup; §6: add the new env vars + REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST. - CUSTOMIZATION.md: jira_*/confluence_* in the tools table; repo-extraction note covers all four sources. - AGENTS.md: match CLAUDE.md (triggers, webhooks, tool list, auth). - README.md: invocation section, tools table, and overview line.
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Open SWE is the open-source version of this pattern. Built on [LangGraph](https://langchain-ai.github.io/langgraph/) and [Deep Agents](https://github.com/langchain-ai/deepagents), it gives you the same architecture those companies built internally: cloud sandboxes, Slack / Linear / Jira / Confluence / GitHub invocation, subagent orchestration, and automatic PR creation — ready to customize for your own codebase and workflows.
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> [!NOTE]
> Read the **announcement blog post [here](https://blog.langchain.com/open-swe-an-open-source-framework-for-internal-coding-agents/)**
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---
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## Architecture
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Open SWE makes the same core architectural decisions as the best internal coding agents. Here's how it maps to the patterns described in [this overview](https://x.com/kishan_dahya/status/2028971339974099317) of Stripe's Minions, Ramp's Inspect, and Coinbase's Cloudbot:
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### 1. Agent Harness — Composed on Deep Agents
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Rather than forking an existing agent or building from scratch, Open SWE **composes** on the [Deep Agents](https://github.com/langchain-ai/deepagents) framework — similar to how Ramp built on top of OpenCode. This gives you an upgrade path (pull in upstream improvements) while letting you customize the orchestration, tools, and middleware for your org.
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```python
create_deep_agent(
model="openai:gpt-5.5",
feat: stop auto-cloning and let agent manage repo setup [closes OPE-21] (#1159) * feat: authenticate git operations via sandbox proxy instead of credential files * feat: authenticate git operations via sandbox proxy instead of credential files * feat: authenticate git operations via sandbox proxy instead of credential files * removing logger.info * formatting and linting * fix: resolve lint errors in server.py (imports, unused vars, undefined names) * feat: use opaque proxy headers for GitHub auth in sandbox * linting formatting and test changes * linting * Delete .claude directory * Delete tests/evals directory * fix: address PR review — guard missing tokens, quote shell paths, add proxy auth tests * fix: restore authorship, branch_name support, and installation token for PR creation * linitng * fix: move installation token fetch before commit, clean up dead proxy validation code * feat: stop auto-cloning and let agent manage repo setup [closes OPE-21] * feat: stop auto-cloning and let agent manage repo setup [closes OPE-21] * fix: address review feedback — restore agents_md, add git user config, lint fixes * fix: drop github_token arg from sandbox creation, use generic create_sandbox factory with langsmith-only proxy config * fix: use _get_langsmith_api_key() for prod key fallback, warn when API key missing for proxy config * linting * linting * feat: add installation token auth to list_repos GitHub API call * agents.md update * linting * fix: address PR review feedback — shell precedence bug in prompt, remove dead code * linting * Apply suggestion from @bracesproul Co-authored-by: Brace Sproul <braceasproul@gmail.com> * Apply suggestion from @bracesproul Co-authored-by: Brace Sproul <braceasproul@gmail.com> * fix: address PR review feedback — restore {working_dir} in prompt, remove clone code block * fix:Extract check_or_recreate_sandbox utility from inline sandbox health check * fix: address PR review feedback — async list_repos, restore template name, fix prompt colon * fix: resolve merge conflicts with main, adopt deepagents v0.5.0a4 LangSmithSandbox * linting * yogesh/ope-21-stop-auto-cloning * Update agent/tools/list_repos.py Co-authored-by: Brace Sproul <braceasproul@gmail.com> * Update agent/prompt.py Co-authored-by: Brace Sproul <braceasproul@gmail.com> * feat: address PR review — list_repos uses GitHub API only, PR trigger includes org/repo * linting * feat: address PR review feedback — list_repos pagination, simpler return, sandbox health check * feat: support listing repos for personal user accounts via is_organization flag --------- Co-authored-by: Brace Sproul <braceasproul@gmail.com>
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system_prompt=construct_system_prompt(...),
tools=[http_request, fetch_url, linear_comment, slack_thread_reply],
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backend=sandbox_backend,
middleware=[ToolErrorMiddleware(), check_message_queue_before_model, ...],
)
```
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### 2. Sandbox — Isolated Cloud Environments
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Every task runs in its own **isolated cloud sandbox** — a remote Linux environment with full shell access. The repo is cloned in, the agent gets full permissions, and the blast radius of any mistake is fully contained. No production access, no confirmation prompts.
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Open SWE supports multiple sandbox providers out of the box — [Modal](https://modal.com/), [Daytona](https://www.daytona.io/), [Runloop](https://www.runloop.ai/), [E2B](https://e2b.dev/), and [LangSmith](https://smith.langchain.com/) — and you can plug in your own. See the [Customization Guide](docs/CUSTOMIZATION.md#1-sandbox) for details.
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This follows the principle all three companies converge on: **isolate first, then give full permissions inside the boundary.**
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- Each thread gets a persistent sandbox (reused across follow-up messages)
- Sandboxes auto-recreate if they become unreachable
- Multiple tasks run in parallel — each in its own sandbox, no queuing
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### 3. Tools — Curated, Not Accumulated
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Stripe's key insight: *tool curation matters more than tool quantity.* Open SWE follows this principle with a small, focused toolset:
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| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `execute` | Shell commands in the sandbox |
| `fetch_url` | Fetch web pages as markdown |
| `http_request` | API calls (GET, POST, etc.) |
| `linear_comment` | Post updates to Linear tickets |
| `linear_search_issues` | Search Linear issues by free text |
feat: Jira + Confluence integration (tools + triggers) (#182) * feat(open-swe): add Jira tool plane (Phase 1) Curated Jira Cloud REST v3 toolset for the agent, mirroring the Linear tools: - utils/jira.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with get/ create/update issue, comments, list projects, trace comment; issue and comment bodies normalized to markdown. - utils/adf.py: minimal ADF <-> markdown conversion (read paths convert Jira ADF to markdown; agent comments convert prose to ADF). - tools/jira_{comment,get_issue,get_issue_comments,create_issue, update_issue,list_projects}.py wired into the tool registry and the main agent tool list. - tests/test_jira_utils.py: ADF conversion + mocked-transport util tests. Reads JIRA_BASE_URL / JIRA_SERVICE_EMAIL / JIRA_API_TOKEN; unset env returns a clean error, so this is safe to land dark. Trigger plane, prompt guidance, and config plumbing follow in Phase 2. * feat(open-swe): add Confluence tool plane (Phase 3) Curated Confluence Cloud REST toolset for the agent, mirroring the Jira tools: - utils/confluence.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with get/create/update page, add comment, CQL search. Page bodies are XHTML storage format (not ADF), with minimal storage<->text converters; update_page reads the current version and bumps it, as Confluence requires. - tools/confluence_{get_page,create_page,update_page,comment,search}.py registered in the tool registry. - tests/test_confluence_utils.py: converter + mocked-transport tests including the version-bump path. Reads CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL / CONFLUENCE_EMAIL / CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN; unset env returns a clean error. Activation in the agent tool list lands with the Phase 2 server.py wiring. * feat(open-swe): add Jira trigger plane (Phase 2) Make an @openswe comment on a Jira issue spawn an agent run, mirroring the Linear trigger plane: - webhooks/jira.py: process_jira_issue clones process_linear_issue — deterministic thread id, full-issue fetch, actor accountId->email attribution feeding resolve_login_from_email_async (PRs open as the human), multimodal image handling, source="jira" + jira_issue config. - webapp.py: POST/GET /webhooks/jira, verify_jira_secret (constant-time X-Automation-Webhook-Token check, fails closed), repo-resolution cascade, get_repo_config_from_jira_mapping. - utils/jira_project_repo_map.py: JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO (placeholder entry — real project->repo mappings still needed). - utils/jira.py: get_user_email (accountId -> email) for attribution. - completion.py: source=="jira" failure-reply branch. - prompt.py: Jira-triggered notify guidance + Refs:/branch key from {jira_project_key}-{jira_issue_number}. - server.py: read jira_issue config + pass jira key to the system prompt; also activates the Phase 3 Confluence tools in the agent list. Jira Automation lacks native webhook HMAC signing, so trust is a shared secret header (decision D2); replay protection is weaker than Linear's HMAC+timestamp. /sh-security-review + an Atlassian IP allowlist are the outstanding gate/hardening before push. * fix(open-swe): harden Jira webhook trust (sh-security-review) Resolves findings from the Phase 2 security review (detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier). The unsigned Jira Automation webhook body was trusted for identity, comment content, repo routing, and issue existence; a JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET holder could forge those fields. - Corroborate against the real Jira record: the webhook body is now only a pointer (issue_key + required comment_id). The triggering comment's author and text are re-fetched server-side via get_comment/fetch_jira_ comment, and identity, the @openswe check, prompt text, and project key are derived from that authoritative record — never payload author/ body fields. An uncorroborated comment is rejected. (closes the account-id impersonation, unsigned-body prompt injection, and fabricated-issue findings) - Validate issue_key against the Jira key format and percent-encode all untrusted path segments (_seg) so a crafted key can't traverse to a different Jira REST endpoint or inject query params. (closes the path- traversal / query-injection findings) - Route source=="jira" through the bot-token-default / author_prs_as_ user opt-in path in resolve_github_token, matching Linear, instead of unconditionally resolving a per-user OAuth token from a payload email. - Gate attribution on an active user mapping (is_login_mapped) so a pending/unconfirmed mapping can't drive PR authorship. Adds regression tests: server-corroboration wins over payload, malformed issue_key rejected, uncorroborated comment rejected, path-segment encoding, project-key derivation, active-mapping gate. Remaining (non-blocking, deployment/hardening): set ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/ REPOS so the shared allowlist isn't fail-open; consider HMAC-over-body + timestamp on the Automation payload to close the residual replay gap. * harden(open-swe): opt-in Jira webhook replay/IP + fail-closed allowlist Folds the two deployment-hardening items from the Phase 2 security review into code (all opt-in / default-off, so existing and upstream deployments are unaffected): - JIRA_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE: when set, the Automation payload must carry X-Openswe-Signature (hex HMAC-SHA256 of the raw body keyed by JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET) plus a fresh timestamp, verified by verify_jira_signature / _jira_timestamp_is_fresh (mirrors the Linear HMAC+freshness model). Closes the static-token model's replay/forgery gap when enabled. - JIRA_WEBHOOK_IP_ALLOWLIST: optional CIDR allowlist on the webhook's direct client IP (verify_jira_source_ip). Documented as direct-peer only; behind a proxy/LB, allowlist Atlassian's ranges at that layer. - REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST: makes an empty ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/REPOS fail CLOSED instead of the back-compat allow-all, plus a startup fail-open warning. Applies to all channels for consistency. Documents all new vars (and a Jira section) in .env.example. Adds tests for signature on/off + valid/missing/wrong/stale, IP allow/deny/off, and the fail-closed allowlist. * feat(open-swe): Confluence Atlassian Connect trigger (Phase 4) Adds the @openswe-on-a-Confluence-comment trigger via a private Atlassian Connect app. Designed and adversarially verified with the ultracode workflow (3 divergent Opus designs + judge; 3 proof-or-kill Opus skeptics on the implemented crypto). - utils/atlassian_connect.py: hand-rolled qsh (pinned to Atlassian's official test vector), PyJWT HS256 webhook verifier with alg-pinning, issuer binding, and qsh-verified-last ordering; RS256 signed-install lifecycle verifier against Atlassian's published keys; installation store keyed by clientKey with the sharedSecret encrypted at rest (TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY / Fernet). No new dependency (PyJWT already pinned). - webhooks/confluence.py: install/uninstall lifecycle + comment handler. The JWT-signed webhook body is only a pointer; the comment's real author/text/container are re-fetched server-side via the Basic-auth service account (Phase-2 corroboration lesson), with active-only login attribution and the repo allowlist. - utils/confluence.py: get_comment / get_user_email (path-encoded). - webapp.py: GET /connect/atlassian-connect.json (served dynamically), POST /connect/{installed,uninstalled,webhook/comment-created}, the space->repo resolver, thread-id, and fetch helpers. - completion.py: source=="confluence" failure-reply branch. Security: the sh-security-review verify pass confirmed one HIGH — the symmetric signed-install=false first-install was trust-on-first-use gated only by the public Confluence hostname (webhook-auth bypass). Fixed by switching to signed-install=true + RS256 verification of lifecycle callbacks, which cryptographically authenticates the first install. All other attack lenses (forgery/replay/alg-confusion/overwrite/uninstall DoS/corroboration/injection) were defeated; residuals are deployment config (REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST) or accepted-by-design (qsh cannot cover bodies; comment-trigger prompt injection, shared with all sources). New env (documented in .env.example): CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL/EMAIL/API_TOKEN, CONNECT_BASE_URL, CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL (optional). Install secrets require the durable Postgres LangGraph store in prod. Outstanding before push: /sh-security-review on the real diff and the GPT-4.1 cross-family review (auth boundary); README/CLAUDE.md + memory. * docs(open-swe): Phase 5 — Confluence prompt guidance + architecture docs - prompt.py: Confluence-triggered runs notify via confluence_comment on the triggering page; add Confluence to the shared-base source list. - CLAUDE.md: document the Jira + Confluence tool planes and the Atlassian triggers (Jira Automation shared-secret webhook; Confluence Connect app with HS256 webhook + qsh and RS256 signed-install lifecycle), plus the server-side corroboration + encrypted install store. Phase 5 also verified the trigger surface end-to-end against a running uvicorn app (descriptor served; /connect/* and /webhooks/jira fail closed without valid auth) and recorded the integration in project memory. * fix(open-swe): resolve /sh-security-review findings on the Atlassian surface Formal sh-security-review (detector fan-out + verifier) over the Phase-4 Connect surface (esp. the new RS256 signed-install code, unseen by the earlier adversarial verify) and the Phase-2 opt-in hardening. CRITICAL — cross-tenant install (origin validation, CWE-346): signed- install proves the caller is *an* Atlassian tenant, not *ours*, and the descriptor is served publicly, so any attacker could install the app on their own Confluence site and drive agent runs against our allowlisted repos. The baseUrl body field is attacker-controlled and cannot bind the tenant; only the signature-verified clientKey (JWT iss) can. Added a MANDATORY, fail-closed CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS allowlist checked in process_install after signature+iss verification. HIGH — cross-tenant thread-id collision (CWE-330/863): Confluence comment ids are per-instance, so generate_thread_id_from_confluence_comment now salts the hash with the verified clientKey (plumbed from the webhook JWT iss) to prevent thread hijack across tenants. HIGH/MEDIUM — path/query injection (CWE-22/88): get_page and update_page interpolated page_id into the REST path unencoded (update_page on a mutating PUT with no params= backstop). Now _seg()-encoded, matching the rest of the module. MEDIUM — self-trigger loop (CWE-405): process_confluence_comment had no bot-authorship early-out. Added an optional CONFLUENCE_BOT_ACCOUNT_ID guard mirroring the Linear botActor / Jira comment_author_is_bot checks. LOW — corrected the CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL comment to document it as opt-in defense-in-depth (the clientKey allowlist is the real gate). Verified clean by the detectors: RS256/HS256 alg-pinning, aud/iss/exp, kid-fetch SSRF (host-pinned + quote-encoded), at-rest secret encryption, constant-time comparisons, and the Phase-2 hardening. New regression tests for each fix; full suite green (1602). * harden(open-swe): GPT-4.1 cross-family review follow-ups Cross-family review (GPT-4.1 via orchestrator cross_reviewer) found no critical/high issues and confirmed the auth boundary is fail-closed and correct. Two low-cost defense-in-depth items applied: - Validate the signed-install JWT 'kid' against a strict charset before the public-key fetch, so a malformed kid fails fast with no network call (on top of the existing fixed host + percent-encoding). - Make JWT nbf verification explicit (verify_nbf) on both the RS256 lifecycle and HS256 webhook decodes. Other suggestions triaged as already-handled (aud cross-app replay is blocked by the per-tenant iss->secret lookup; documented static-token/IP/ baseUrl tradeoffs; qsh pinned to Atlassian's vector) or ops/infra (Fernet rotation via MultiFernet; rate limiting at the gateway). * docs(open-swe): document Jira + Confluence in installation & customization guides - INSTALLATION.md §5: add Jira (Automation-rule webhook + shared secret, service account, JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO) and Confluence (Atlassian Connect app install, CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS bootstrap, durable-store note, CONFLUENCE_SPACE_TO_REPO) trigger setup; §6: add the new env vars + REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST. - CUSTOMIZATION.md: jira_*/confluence_* in the tools table; repo-extraction note covers all four sources. - AGENTS.md: match CLAUDE.md (triggers, webhooks, tool list, auth). - README.md: invocation section, tools table, and overview line.
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| `jira_*` | Read/comment/create/update Jira issues |
| `confluence_*` | Read/write Confluence pages + comments |
| `slack_add_reaction` | React to Slack messages |
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| `slack_thread_reply` | Reply in Slack threads |
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GitHub operations are performed with `GH_TOKEN=dummy gh` inside the sandbox, backed by the LangSmith proxy. Plus the built-in Deep Agents tools: `read_file`, `write_file`, `edit_file`, `ls`, `glob`, `grep`, `write_todos`, and `task` (subagent spawning).
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**Optional observability tools (server-side):** Admins can connect Datadog and LangSmith from team settings (Admin → Observability credentials). When connected, the agent gains Datadog tools (via Datadog's hosted MCP server, default `toolsets=core`) and read-only LangSmith tools (`langsmith_get_trace`, `langsmith_list_runs`). These run in the LangGraph server process using credentials encrypted at rest — the sandbox never holds Datadog or LangSmith keys. They are loaded **only for runs triggered by an authorized user** (admins, plus any emails in `OBSERVABILITY_AUTHORIZED_EMAILS`), so a prompt-injected run from an untrusted contributor cannot reach team observability data. Use scoped, read-oriented keys regardless: observability data (logs, traces) is attacker-influenced content that can carry prompt injection, and the agent has network egress — the same residual-risk class as `web_search` / `fetch_url`.
**Optional Corridor guardrails (server-side MCP):** Set `CORRIDOR_API_TOKEN` (or `CORRIDOR_MCP_TOKEN` / `CORRIDOR_TOKEN`) to load Corridor's hosted MCP server for each agent run. Open SWE exposes only Corridor's `analyzePlan` tool. `CORRIDOR_MCP_URL` defaults to `https://app.corridor.dev/api/mcp`; if set explicitly, Open SWE only accepts the same HTTPS host and `/api/mcp` path. Tokens are sent via `Authorization: Bearer ...` from the LangGraph server process and are never placed in the sandbox. A legacy `?token=...` URL is accepted and normalized into the header form.
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### 4. Context Engineering — AGENTS.md + Source Context
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Open SWE gathers context from two sources:
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- **`AGENTS.md`** — If the repo contains an `AGENTS.md` file at the root, it's read from the sandbox and injected into the system prompt. This is your repo-level equivalent of Stripe's rule files: encoding conventions, testing requirements, and architectural decisions that every agent run should follow. Reference templates for stack-specific conventions (AWS, SAM, CDK, EC2) live in [`docs/repo-conventions/`](docs/repo-conventions/).
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- **Source context** — The full Linear issue (title, description, comments) or Slack thread history is assembled and passed to the agent, so it starts with rich context rather than discovering everything through tool calls.
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### 5. Orchestration — Subagents + Middleware
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Open SWE's orchestration has two layers:
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**Subagents:** The Deep Agents framework natively supports spawning child agents via the `task` tool. The main agent can fan out independent subtasks to isolated subagents — each with its own middleware stack, todo list, and file operations. This is similar to Ramp's child sessions for parallel work.
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**Middleware:** Deterministic middleware hooks run around the agent loop:
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- **`check_message_queue_before_model`** — Injects follow-up messages (Linear comments or Slack messages that arrive mid-run) before the next model call. You can message the agent while it's working and it'll pick up your input at its next step.
- **`notify_step_limit_reached`** — After-agent hook that posts a Slack reply when the agent hits the model-call limit, so users get a clear signal instead of silence.
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- **`ToolErrorMiddleware`** — Catches and handles tool errors gracefully.
feat: Jira + Confluence integration (tools + triggers) (#182) * feat(open-swe): add Jira tool plane (Phase 1) Curated Jira Cloud REST v3 toolset for the agent, mirroring the Linear tools: - utils/jira.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with get/ create/update issue, comments, list projects, trace comment; issue and comment bodies normalized to markdown. - utils/adf.py: minimal ADF <-> markdown conversion (read paths convert Jira ADF to markdown; agent comments convert prose to ADF). - tools/jira_{comment,get_issue,get_issue_comments,create_issue, update_issue,list_projects}.py wired into the tool registry and the main agent tool list. - tests/test_jira_utils.py: ADF conversion + mocked-transport util tests. Reads JIRA_BASE_URL / JIRA_SERVICE_EMAIL / JIRA_API_TOKEN; unset env returns a clean error, so this is safe to land dark. Trigger plane, prompt guidance, and config plumbing follow in Phase 2. * feat(open-swe): add Confluence tool plane (Phase 3) Curated Confluence Cloud REST toolset for the agent, mirroring the Jira tools: - utils/confluence.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with get/create/update page, add comment, CQL search. Page bodies are XHTML storage format (not ADF), with minimal storage<->text converters; update_page reads the current version and bumps it, as Confluence requires. - tools/confluence_{get_page,create_page,update_page,comment,search}.py registered in the tool registry. - tests/test_confluence_utils.py: converter + mocked-transport tests including the version-bump path. Reads CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL / CONFLUENCE_EMAIL / CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN; unset env returns a clean error. Activation in the agent tool list lands with the Phase 2 server.py wiring. * feat(open-swe): add Jira trigger plane (Phase 2) Make an @openswe comment on a Jira issue spawn an agent run, mirroring the Linear trigger plane: - webhooks/jira.py: process_jira_issue clones process_linear_issue — deterministic thread id, full-issue fetch, actor accountId->email attribution feeding resolve_login_from_email_async (PRs open as the human), multimodal image handling, source="jira" + jira_issue config. - webapp.py: POST/GET /webhooks/jira, verify_jira_secret (constant-time X-Automation-Webhook-Token check, fails closed), repo-resolution cascade, get_repo_config_from_jira_mapping. - utils/jira_project_repo_map.py: JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO (placeholder entry — real project->repo mappings still needed). - utils/jira.py: get_user_email (accountId -> email) for attribution. - completion.py: source=="jira" failure-reply branch. - prompt.py: Jira-triggered notify guidance + Refs:/branch key from {jira_project_key}-{jira_issue_number}. - server.py: read jira_issue config + pass jira key to the system prompt; also activates the Phase 3 Confluence tools in the agent list. Jira Automation lacks native webhook HMAC signing, so trust is a shared secret header (decision D2); replay protection is weaker than Linear's HMAC+timestamp. /sh-security-review + an Atlassian IP allowlist are the outstanding gate/hardening before push. * fix(open-swe): harden Jira webhook trust (sh-security-review) Resolves findings from the Phase 2 security review (detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier). The unsigned Jira Automation webhook body was trusted for identity, comment content, repo routing, and issue existence; a JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET holder could forge those fields. - Corroborate against the real Jira record: the webhook body is now only a pointer (issue_key + required comment_id). The triggering comment's author and text are re-fetched server-side via get_comment/fetch_jira_ comment, and identity, the @openswe check, prompt text, and project key are derived from that authoritative record — never payload author/ body fields. An uncorroborated comment is rejected. (closes the account-id impersonation, unsigned-body prompt injection, and fabricated-issue findings) - Validate issue_key against the Jira key format and percent-encode all untrusted path segments (_seg) so a crafted key can't traverse to a different Jira REST endpoint or inject query params. (closes the path- traversal / query-injection findings) - Route source=="jira" through the bot-token-default / author_prs_as_ user opt-in path in resolve_github_token, matching Linear, instead of unconditionally resolving a per-user OAuth token from a payload email. - Gate attribution on an active user mapping (is_login_mapped) so a pending/unconfirmed mapping can't drive PR authorship. Adds regression tests: server-corroboration wins over payload, malformed issue_key rejected, uncorroborated comment rejected, path-segment encoding, project-key derivation, active-mapping gate. Remaining (non-blocking, deployment/hardening): set ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/ REPOS so the shared allowlist isn't fail-open; consider HMAC-over-body + timestamp on the Automation payload to close the residual replay gap. * harden(open-swe): opt-in Jira webhook replay/IP + fail-closed allowlist Folds the two deployment-hardening items from the Phase 2 security review into code (all opt-in / default-off, so existing and upstream deployments are unaffected): - JIRA_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE: when set, the Automation payload must carry X-Openswe-Signature (hex HMAC-SHA256 of the raw body keyed by JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET) plus a fresh timestamp, verified by verify_jira_signature / _jira_timestamp_is_fresh (mirrors the Linear HMAC+freshness model). Closes the static-token model's replay/forgery gap when enabled. - JIRA_WEBHOOK_IP_ALLOWLIST: optional CIDR allowlist on the webhook's direct client IP (verify_jira_source_ip). Documented as direct-peer only; behind a proxy/LB, allowlist Atlassian's ranges at that layer. - REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST: makes an empty ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/REPOS fail CLOSED instead of the back-compat allow-all, plus a startup fail-open warning. Applies to all channels for consistency. Documents all new vars (and a Jira section) in .env.example. Adds tests for signature on/off + valid/missing/wrong/stale, IP allow/deny/off, and the fail-closed allowlist. * feat(open-swe): Confluence Atlassian Connect trigger (Phase 4) Adds the @openswe-on-a-Confluence-comment trigger via a private Atlassian Connect app. Designed and adversarially verified with the ultracode workflow (3 divergent Opus designs + judge; 3 proof-or-kill Opus skeptics on the implemented crypto). - utils/atlassian_connect.py: hand-rolled qsh (pinned to Atlassian's official test vector), PyJWT HS256 webhook verifier with alg-pinning, issuer binding, and qsh-verified-last ordering; RS256 signed-install lifecycle verifier against Atlassian's published keys; installation store keyed by clientKey with the sharedSecret encrypted at rest (TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY / Fernet). No new dependency (PyJWT already pinned). - webhooks/confluence.py: install/uninstall lifecycle + comment handler. The JWT-signed webhook body is only a pointer; the comment's real author/text/container are re-fetched server-side via the Basic-auth service account (Phase-2 corroboration lesson), with active-only login attribution and the repo allowlist. - utils/confluence.py: get_comment / get_user_email (path-encoded). - webapp.py: GET /connect/atlassian-connect.json (served dynamically), POST /connect/{installed,uninstalled,webhook/comment-created}, the space->repo resolver, thread-id, and fetch helpers. - completion.py: source=="confluence" failure-reply branch. Security: the sh-security-review verify pass confirmed one HIGH — the symmetric signed-install=false first-install was trust-on-first-use gated only by the public Confluence hostname (webhook-auth bypass). Fixed by switching to signed-install=true + RS256 verification of lifecycle callbacks, which cryptographically authenticates the first install. All other attack lenses (forgery/replay/alg-confusion/overwrite/uninstall DoS/corroboration/injection) were defeated; residuals are deployment config (REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST) or accepted-by-design (qsh cannot cover bodies; comment-trigger prompt injection, shared with all sources). New env (documented in .env.example): CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL/EMAIL/API_TOKEN, CONNECT_BASE_URL, CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL (optional). Install secrets require the durable Postgres LangGraph store in prod. Outstanding before push: /sh-security-review on the real diff and the GPT-4.1 cross-family review (auth boundary); README/CLAUDE.md + memory. * docs(open-swe): Phase 5 — Confluence prompt guidance + architecture docs - prompt.py: Confluence-triggered runs notify via confluence_comment on the triggering page; add Confluence to the shared-base source list. - CLAUDE.md: document the Jira + Confluence tool planes and the Atlassian triggers (Jira Automation shared-secret webhook; Confluence Connect app with HS256 webhook + qsh and RS256 signed-install lifecycle), plus the server-side corroboration + encrypted install store. Phase 5 also verified the trigger surface end-to-end against a running uvicorn app (descriptor served; /connect/* and /webhooks/jira fail closed without valid auth) and recorded the integration in project memory. * fix(open-swe): resolve /sh-security-review findings on the Atlassian surface Formal sh-security-review (detector fan-out + verifier) over the Phase-4 Connect surface (esp. the new RS256 signed-install code, unseen by the earlier adversarial verify) and the Phase-2 opt-in hardening. CRITICAL — cross-tenant install (origin validation, CWE-346): signed- install proves the caller is *an* Atlassian tenant, not *ours*, and the descriptor is served publicly, so any attacker could install the app on their own Confluence site and drive agent runs against our allowlisted repos. The baseUrl body field is attacker-controlled and cannot bind the tenant; only the signature-verified clientKey (JWT iss) can. Added a MANDATORY, fail-closed CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS allowlist checked in process_install after signature+iss verification. HIGH — cross-tenant thread-id collision (CWE-330/863): Confluence comment ids are per-instance, so generate_thread_id_from_confluence_comment now salts the hash with the verified clientKey (plumbed from the webhook JWT iss) to prevent thread hijack across tenants. HIGH/MEDIUM — path/query injection (CWE-22/88): get_page and update_page interpolated page_id into the REST path unencoded (update_page on a mutating PUT with no params= backstop). Now _seg()-encoded, matching the rest of the module. MEDIUM — self-trigger loop (CWE-405): process_confluence_comment had no bot-authorship early-out. Added an optional CONFLUENCE_BOT_ACCOUNT_ID guard mirroring the Linear botActor / Jira comment_author_is_bot checks. LOW — corrected the CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL comment to document it as opt-in defense-in-depth (the clientKey allowlist is the real gate). Verified clean by the detectors: RS256/HS256 alg-pinning, aud/iss/exp, kid-fetch SSRF (host-pinned + quote-encoded), at-rest secret encryption, constant-time comparisons, and the Phase-2 hardening. New regression tests for each fix; full suite green (1602). * harden(open-swe): GPT-4.1 cross-family review follow-ups Cross-family review (GPT-4.1 via orchestrator cross_reviewer) found no critical/high issues and confirmed the auth boundary is fail-closed and correct. Two low-cost defense-in-depth items applied: - Validate the signed-install JWT 'kid' against a strict charset before the public-key fetch, so a malformed kid fails fast with no network call (on top of the existing fixed host + percent-encoding). - Make JWT nbf verification explicit (verify_nbf) on both the RS256 lifecycle and HS256 webhook decodes. Other suggestions triaged as already-handled (aud cross-app replay is blocked by the per-tenant iss->secret lookup; documented static-token/IP/ baseUrl tradeoffs; qsh pinned to Atlassian's vector) or ops/infra (Fernet rotation via MultiFernet; rate limiting at the gateway). * docs(open-swe): document Jira + Confluence in installation & customization guides - INSTALLATION.md §5: add Jira (Automation-rule webhook + shared secret, service account, JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO) and Confluence (Atlassian Connect app install, CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS bootstrap, durable-store note, CONFLUENCE_SPACE_TO_REPO) trigger setup; §6: add the new env vars + REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST. - CUSTOMIZATION.md: jira_*/confluence_* in the tools table; repo-extraction note covers all four sources. - AGENTS.md: match CLAUDE.md (triggers, webhooks, tool list, auth). - README.md: invocation section, tools table, and overview line.
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### 6. Invocation — Slack, Linear, Jira, Confluence, and GitHub
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All three companies in the article converge on **Slack as the primary invocation surface**. Open SWE does the same:
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- **Slack** — Mention the bot in any thread. Supports `repo:owner/name` syntax to specify which repo to work on. The agent replies in-thread with status updates and PR links.
- **Linear** — Comment `@openswe` on any issue. The agent reacts with 👀 to acknowledge, reads the full issue context, and posts results back as comments.
feat: Jira + Confluence integration (tools + triggers) (#182) * feat(open-swe): add Jira tool plane (Phase 1) Curated Jira Cloud REST v3 toolset for the agent, mirroring the Linear tools: - utils/jira.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with get/ create/update issue, comments, list projects, trace comment; issue and comment bodies normalized to markdown. - utils/adf.py: minimal ADF <-> markdown conversion (read paths convert Jira ADF to markdown; agent comments convert prose to ADF). - tools/jira_{comment,get_issue,get_issue_comments,create_issue, update_issue,list_projects}.py wired into the tool registry and the main agent tool list. - tests/test_jira_utils.py: ADF conversion + mocked-transport util tests. Reads JIRA_BASE_URL / JIRA_SERVICE_EMAIL / JIRA_API_TOKEN; unset env returns a clean error, so this is safe to land dark. Trigger plane, prompt guidance, and config plumbing follow in Phase 2. * feat(open-swe): add Confluence tool plane (Phase 3) Curated Confluence Cloud REST toolset for the agent, mirroring the Jira tools: - utils/confluence.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with get/create/update page, add comment, CQL search. Page bodies are XHTML storage format (not ADF), with minimal storage<->text converters; update_page reads the current version and bumps it, as Confluence requires. - tools/confluence_{get_page,create_page,update_page,comment,search}.py registered in the tool registry. - tests/test_confluence_utils.py: converter + mocked-transport tests including the version-bump path. Reads CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL / CONFLUENCE_EMAIL / CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN; unset env returns a clean error. Activation in the agent tool list lands with the Phase 2 server.py wiring. * feat(open-swe): add Jira trigger plane (Phase 2) Make an @openswe comment on a Jira issue spawn an agent run, mirroring the Linear trigger plane: - webhooks/jira.py: process_jira_issue clones process_linear_issue — deterministic thread id, full-issue fetch, actor accountId->email attribution feeding resolve_login_from_email_async (PRs open as the human), multimodal image handling, source="jira" + jira_issue config. - webapp.py: POST/GET /webhooks/jira, verify_jira_secret (constant-time X-Automation-Webhook-Token check, fails closed), repo-resolution cascade, get_repo_config_from_jira_mapping. - utils/jira_project_repo_map.py: JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO (placeholder entry — real project->repo mappings still needed). - utils/jira.py: get_user_email (accountId -> email) for attribution. - completion.py: source=="jira" failure-reply branch. - prompt.py: Jira-triggered notify guidance + Refs:/branch key from {jira_project_key}-{jira_issue_number}. - server.py: read jira_issue config + pass jira key to the system prompt; also activates the Phase 3 Confluence tools in the agent list. Jira Automation lacks native webhook HMAC signing, so trust is a shared secret header (decision D2); replay protection is weaker than Linear's HMAC+timestamp. /sh-security-review + an Atlassian IP allowlist are the outstanding gate/hardening before push. * fix(open-swe): harden Jira webhook trust (sh-security-review) Resolves findings from the Phase 2 security review (detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier). The unsigned Jira Automation webhook body was trusted for identity, comment content, repo routing, and issue existence; a JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET holder could forge those fields. - Corroborate against the real Jira record: the webhook body is now only a pointer (issue_key + required comment_id). The triggering comment's author and text are re-fetched server-side via get_comment/fetch_jira_ comment, and identity, the @openswe check, prompt text, and project key are derived from that authoritative record — never payload author/ body fields. An uncorroborated comment is rejected. (closes the account-id impersonation, unsigned-body prompt injection, and fabricated-issue findings) - Validate issue_key against the Jira key format and percent-encode all untrusted path segments (_seg) so a crafted key can't traverse to a different Jira REST endpoint or inject query params. (closes the path- traversal / query-injection findings) - Route source=="jira" through the bot-token-default / author_prs_as_ user opt-in path in resolve_github_token, matching Linear, instead of unconditionally resolving a per-user OAuth token from a payload email. - Gate attribution on an active user mapping (is_login_mapped) so a pending/unconfirmed mapping can't drive PR authorship. Adds regression tests: server-corroboration wins over payload, malformed issue_key rejected, uncorroborated comment rejected, path-segment encoding, project-key derivation, active-mapping gate. Remaining (non-blocking, deployment/hardening): set ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/ REPOS so the shared allowlist isn't fail-open; consider HMAC-over-body + timestamp on the Automation payload to close the residual replay gap. * harden(open-swe): opt-in Jira webhook replay/IP + fail-closed allowlist Folds the two deployment-hardening items from the Phase 2 security review into code (all opt-in / default-off, so existing and upstream deployments are unaffected): - JIRA_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE: when set, the Automation payload must carry X-Openswe-Signature (hex HMAC-SHA256 of the raw body keyed by JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET) plus a fresh timestamp, verified by verify_jira_signature / _jira_timestamp_is_fresh (mirrors the Linear HMAC+freshness model). Closes the static-token model's replay/forgery gap when enabled. - JIRA_WEBHOOK_IP_ALLOWLIST: optional CIDR allowlist on the webhook's direct client IP (verify_jira_source_ip). Documented as direct-peer only; behind a proxy/LB, allowlist Atlassian's ranges at that layer. - REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST: makes an empty ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/REPOS fail CLOSED instead of the back-compat allow-all, plus a startup fail-open warning. Applies to all channels for consistency. Documents all new vars (and a Jira section) in .env.example. Adds tests for signature on/off + valid/missing/wrong/stale, IP allow/deny/off, and the fail-closed allowlist. * feat(open-swe): Confluence Atlassian Connect trigger (Phase 4) Adds the @openswe-on-a-Confluence-comment trigger via a private Atlassian Connect app. Designed and adversarially verified with the ultracode workflow (3 divergent Opus designs + judge; 3 proof-or-kill Opus skeptics on the implemented crypto). - utils/atlassian_connect.py: hand-rolled qsh (pinned to Atlassian's official test vector), PyJWT HS256 webhook verifier with alg-pinning, issuer binding, and qsh-verified-last ordering; RS256 signed-install lifecycle verifier against Atlassian's published keys; installation store keyed by clientKey with the sharedSecret encrypted at rest (TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY / Fernet). No new dependency (PyJWT already pinned). - webhooks/confluence.py: install/uninstall lifecycle + comment handler. The JWT-signed webhook body is only a pointer; the comment's real author/text/container are re-fetched server-side via the Basic-auth service account (Phase-2 corroboration lesson), with active-only login attribution and the repo allowlist. - utils/confluence.py: get_comment / get_user_email (path-encoded). - webapp.py: GET /connect/atlassian-connect.json (served dynamically), POST /connect/{installed,uninstalled,webhook/comment-created}, the space->repo resolver, thread-id, and fetch helpers. - completion.py: source=="confluence" failure-reply branch. Security: the sh-security-review verify pass confirmed one HIGH — the symmetric signed-install=false first-install was trust-on-first-use gated only by the public Confluence hostname (webhook-auth bypass). Fixed by switching to signed-install=true + RS256 verification of lifecycle callbacks, which cryptographically authenticates the first install. All other attack lenses (forgery/replay/alg-confusion/overwrite/uninstall DoS/corroboration/injection) were defeated; residuals are deployment config (REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST) or accepted-by-design (qsh cannot cover bodies; comment-trigger prompt injection, shared with all sources). New env (documented in .env.example): CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL/EMAIL/API_TOKEN, CONNECT_BASE_URL, CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL (optional). Install secrets require the durable Postgres LangGraph store in prod. Outstanding before push: /sh-security-review on the real diff and the GPT-4.1 cross-family review (auth boundary); README/CLAUDE.md + memory. * docs(open-swe): Phase 5 — Confluence prompt guidance + architecture docs - prompt.py: Confluence-triggered runs notify via confluence_comment on the triggering page; add Confluence to the shared-base source list. - CLAUDE.md: document the Jira + Confluence tool planes and the Atlassian triggers (Jira Automation shared-secret webhook; Confluence Connect app with HS256 webhook + qsh and RS256 signed-install lifecycle), plus the server-side corroboration + encrypted install store. Phase 5 also verified the trigger surface end-to-end against a running uvicorn app (descriptor served; /connect/* and /webhooks/jira fail closed without valid auth) and recorded the integration in project memory. * fix(open-swe): resolve /sh-security-review findings on the Atlassian surface Formal sh-security-review (detector fan-out + verifier) over the Phase-4 Connect surface (esp. the new RS256 signed-install code, unseen by the earlier adversarial verify) and the Phase-2 opt-in hardening. CRITICAL — cross-tenant install (origin validation, CWE-346): signed- install proves the caller is *an* Atlassian tenant, not *ours*, and the descriptor is served publicly, so any attacker could install the app on their own Confluence site and drive agent runs against our allowlisted repos. The baseUrl body field is attacker-controlled and cannot bind the tenant; only the signature-verified clientKey (JWT iss) can. Added a MANDATORY, fail-closed CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS allowlist checked in process_install after signature+iss verification. HIGH — cross-tenant thread-id collision (CWE-330/863): Confluence comment ids are per-instance, so generate_thread_id_from_confluence_comment now salts the hash with the verified clientKey (plumbed from the webhook JWT iss) to prevent thread hijack across tenants. HIGH/MEDIUM — path/query injection (CWE-22/88): get_page and update_page interpolated page_id into the REST path unencoded (update_page on a mutating PUT with no params= backstop). Now _seg()-encoded, matching the rest of the module. MEDIUM — self-trigger loop (CWE-405): process_confluence_comment had no bot-authorship early-out. Added an optional CONFLUENCE_BOT_ACCOUNT_ID guard mirroring the Linear botActor / Jira comment_author_is_bot checks. LOW — corrected the CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL comment to document it as opt-in defense-in-depth (the clientKey allowlist is the real gate). Verified clean by the detectors: RS256/HS256 alg-pinning, aud/iss/exp, kid-fetch SSRF (host-pinned + quote-encoded), at-rest secret encryption, constant-time comparisons, and the Phase-2 hardening. New regression tests for each fix; full suite green (1602). * harden(open-swe): GPT-4.1 cross-family review follow-ups Cross-family review (GPT-4.1 via orchestrator cross_reviewer) found no critical/high issues and confirmed the auth boundary is fail-closed and correct. Two low-cost defense-in-depth items applied: - Validate the signed-install JWT 'kid' against a strict charset before the public-key fetch, so a malformed kid fails fast with no network call (on top of the existing fixed host + percent-encoding). - Make JWT nbf verification explicit (verify_nbf) on both the RS256 lifecycle and HS256 webhook decodes. Other suggestions triaged as already-handled (aud cross-app replay is blocked by the per-tenant iss->secret lookup; documented static-token/IP/ baseUrl tradeoffs; qsh pinned to Atlassian's vector) or ops/infra (Fernet rotation via MultiFernet; rate limiting at the gateway). * docs(open-swe): document Jira + Confluence in installation & customization guides - INSTALLATION.md §5: add Jira (Automation-rule webhook + shared secret, service account, JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO) and Confluence (Atlassian Connect app install, CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS bootstrap, durable-store note, CONFLUENCE_SPACE_TO_REPO) trigger setup; §6: add the new env vars + REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST. - CUSTOMIZATION.md: jira_*/confluence_* in the tools table; repo-extraction note covers all four sources. - AGENTS.md: match CLAUDE.md (triggers, webhooks, tool list, auth). - README.md: invocation section, tools table, and overview line.
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- **Jira** — Comment `@openswe` on any issue (fronted by a Jira Automation rule → `/webhooks/jira`). The agent reads the issue and posts results back as a comment.
- **Confluence** — Comment `@openswe` on a page. A private Atlassian Connect app delivers the `comment_created` event; the agent acts and replies on the page.
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- **GitHub** — Tag `@openswe` in PR comments on agent-created PRs to have it address review feedback and push fixes to the same branch.
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See **[INSTALLATION.md](./docs/INSTALLATION.md) §5** for per-surface trigger setup.
feat: Jira + Confluence integration (tools + triggers) (#182) * feat(open-swe): add Jira tool plane (Phase 1) Curated Jira Cloud REST v3 toolset for the agent, mirroring the Linear tools: - utils/jira.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with get/ create/update issue, comments, list projects, trace comment; issue and comment bodies normalized to markdown. - utils/adf.py: minimal ADF <-> markdown conversion (read paths convert Jira ADF to markdown; agent comments convert prose to ADF). - tools/jira_{comment,get_issue,get_issue_comments,create_issue, update_issue,list_projects}.py wired into the tool registry and the main agent tool list. - tests/test_jira_utils.py: ADF conversion + mocked-transport util tests. Reads JIRA_BASE_URL / JIRA_SERVICE_EMAIL / JIRA_API_TOKEN; unset env returns a clean error, so this is safe to land dark. Trigger plane, prompt guidance, and config plumbing follow in Phase 2. * feat(open-swe): add Confluence tool plane (Phase 3) Curated Confluence Cloud REST toolset for the agent, mirroring the Jira tools: - utils/confluence.py: service-account REST client (Basic auth) with get/create/update page, add comment, CQL search. Page bodies are XHTML storage format (not ADF), with minimal storage<->text converters; update_page reads the current version and bumps it, as Confluence requires. - tools/confluence_{get_page,create_page,update_page,comment,search}.py registered in the tool registry. - tests/test_confluence_utils.py: converter + mocked-transport tests including the version-bump path. Reads CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL / CONFLUENCE_EMAIL / CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN; unset env returns a clean error. Activation in the agent tool list lands with the Phase 2 server.py wiring. * feat(open-swe): add Jira trigger plane (Phase 2) Make an @openswe comment on a Jira issue spawn an agent run, mirroring the Linear trigger plane: - webhooks/jira.py: process_jira_issue clones process_linear_issue — deterministic thread id, full-issue fetch, actor accountId->email attribution feeding resolve_login_from_email_async (PRs open as the human), multimodal image handling, source="jira" + jira_issue config. - webapp.py: POST/GET /webhooks/jira, verify_jira_secret (constant-time X-Automation-Webhook-Token check, fails closed), repo-resolution cascade, get_repo_config_from_jira_mapping. - utils/jira_project_repo_map.py: JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO (placeholder entry — real project->repo mappings still needed). - utils/jira.py: get_user_email (accountId -> email) for attribution. - completion.py: source=="jira" failure-reply branch. - prompt.py: Jira-triggered notify guidance + Refs:/branch key from {jira_project_key}-{jira_issue_number}. - server.py: read jira_issue config + pass jira key to the system prompt; also activates the Phase 3 Confluence tools in the agent list. Jira Automation lacks native webhook HMAC signing, so trust is a shared secret header (decision D2); replay protection is weaker than Linear's HMAC+timestamp. /sh-security-review + an Atlassian IP allowlist are the outstanding gate/hardening before push. * fix(open-swe): harden Jira webhook trust (sh-security-review) Resolves findings from the Phase 2 security review (detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier). The unsigned Jira Automation webhook body was trusted for identity, comment content, repo routing, and issue existence; a JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET holder could forge those fields. - Corroborate against the real Jira record: the webhook body is now only a pointer (issue_key + required comment_id). The triggering comment's author and text are re-fetched server-side via get_comment/fetch_jira_ comment, and identity, the @openswe check, prompt text, and project key are derived from that authoritative record — never payload author/ body fields. An uncorroborated comment is rejected. (closes the account-id impersonation, unsigned-body prompt injection, and fabricated-issue findings) - Validate issue_key against the Jira key format and percent-encode all untrusted path segments (_seg) so a crafted key can't traverse to a different Jira REST endpoint or inject query params. (closes the path- traversal / query-injection findings) - Route source=="jira" through the bot-token-default / author_prs_as_ user opt-in path in resolve_github_token, matching Linear, instead of unconditionally resolving a per-user OAuth token from a payload email. - Gate attribution on an active user mapping (is_login_mapped) so a pending/unconfirmed mapping can't drive PR authorship. Adds regression tests: server-corroboration wins over payload, malformed issue_key rejected, uncorroborated comment rejected, path-segment encoding, project-key derivation, active-mapping gate. Remaining (non-blocking, deployment/hardening): set ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/ REPOS so the shared allowlist isn't fail-open; consider HMAC-over-body + timestamp on the Automation payload to close the residual replay gap. * harden(open-swe): opt-in Jira webhook replay/IP + fail-closed allowlist Folds the two deployment-hardening items from the Phase 2 security review into code (all opt-in / default-off, so existing and upstream deployments are unaffected): - JIRA_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE: when set, the Automation payload must carry X-Openswe-Signature (hex HMAC-SHA256 of the raw body keyed by JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET) plus a fresh timestamp, verified by verify_jira_signature / _jira_timestamp_is_fresh (mirrors the Linear HMAC+freshness model). Closes the static-token model's replay/forgery gap when enabled. - JIRA_WEBHOOK_IP_ALLOWLIST: optional CIDR allowlist on the webhook's direct client IP (verify_jira_source_ip). Documented as direct-peer only; behind a proxy/LB, allowlist Atlassian's ranges at that layer. - REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST: makes an empty ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS/REPOS fail CLOSED instead of the back-compat allow-all, plus a startup fail-open warning. Applies to all channels for consistency. Documents all new vars (and a Jira section) in .env.example. Adds tests for signature on/off + valid/missing/wrong/stale, IP allow/deny/off, and the fail-closed allowlist. * feat(open-swe): Confluence Atlassian Connect trigger (Phase 4) Adds the @openswe-on-a-Confluence-comment trigger via a private Atlassian Connect app. Designed and adversarially verified with the ultracode workflow (3 divergent Opus designs + judge; 3 proof-or-kill Opus skeptics on the implemented crypto). - utils/atlassian_connect.py: hand-rolled qsh (pinned to Atlassian's official test vector), PyJWT HS256 webhook verifier with alg-pinning, issuer binding, and qsh-verified-last ordering; RS256 signed-install lifecycle verifier against Atlassian's published keys; installation store keyed by clientKey with the sharedSecret encrypted at rest (TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY / Fernet). No new dependency (PyJWT already pinned). - webhooks/confluence.py: install/uninstall lifecycle + comment handler. The JWT-signed webhook body is only a pointer; the comment's real author/text/container are re-fetched server-side via the Basic-auth service account (Phase-2 corroboration lesson), with active-only login attribution and the repo allowlist. - utils/confluence.py: get_comment / get_user_email (path-encoded). - webapp.py: GET /connect/atlassian-connect.json (served dynamically), POST /connect/{installed,uninstalled,webhook/comment-created}, the space->repo resolver, thread-id, and fetch helpers. - completion.py: source=="confluence" failure-reply branch. Security: the sh-security-review verify pass confirmed one HIGH — the symmetric signed-install=false first-install was trust-on-first-use gated only by the public Confluence hostname (webhook-auth bypass). Fixed by switching to signed-install=true + RS256 verification of lifecycle callbacks, which cryptographically authenticates the first install. All other attack lenses (forgery/replay/alg-confusion/overwrite/uninstall DoS/corroboration/injection) were defeated; residuals are deployment config (REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST) or accepted-by-design (qsh cannot cover bodies; comment-trigger prompt injection, shared with all sources). New env (documented in .env.example): CONFLUENCE_BASE_URL/EMAIL/API_TOKEN, CONNECT_BASE_URL, CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL (optional). Install secrets require the durable Postgres LangGraph store in prod. Outstanding before push: /sh-security-review on the real diff and the GPT-4.1 cross-family review (auth boundary); README/CLAUDE.md + memory. * docs(open-swe): Phase 5 — Confluence prompt guidance + architecture docs - prompt.py: Confluence-triggered runs notify via confluence_comment on the triggering page; add Confluence to the shared-base source list. - CLAUDE.md: document the Jira + Confluence tool planes and the Atlassian triggers (Jira Automation shared-secret webhook; Confluence Connect app with HS256 webhook + qsh and RS256 signed-install lifecycle), plus the server-side corroboration + encrypted install store. Phase 5 also verified the trigger surface end-to-end against a running uvicorn app (descriptor served; /connect/* and /webhooks/jira fail closed without valid auth) and recorded the integration in project memory. * fix(open-swe): resolve /sh-security-review findings on the Atlassian surface Formal sh-security-review (detector fan-out + verifier) over the Phase-4 Connect surface (esp. the new RS256 signed-install code, unseen by the earlier adversarial verify) and the Phase-2 opt-in hardening. CRITICAL — cross-tenant install (origin validation, CWE-346): signed- install proves the caller is *an* Atlassian tenant, not *ours*, and the descriptor is served publicly, so any attacker could install the app on their own Confluence site and drive agent runs against our allowlisted repos. The baseUrl body field is attacker-controlled and cannot bind the tenant; only the signature-verified clientKey (JWT iss) can. Added a MANDATORY, fail-closed CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS allowlist checked in process_install after signature+iss verification. HIGH — cross-tenant thread-id collision (CWE-330/863): Confluence comment ids are per-instance, so generate_thread_id_from_confluence_comment now salts the hash with the verified clientKey (plumbed from the webhook JWT iss) to prevent thread hijack across tenants. HIGH/MEDIUM — path/query injection (CWE-22/88): get_page and update_page interpolated page_id into the REST path unencoded (update_page on a mutating PUT with no params= backstop). Now _seg()-encoded, matching the rest of the module. MEDIUM — self-trigger loop (CWE-405): process_confluence_comment had no bot-authorship early-out. Added an optional CONFLUENCE_BOT_ACCOUNT_ID guard mirroring the Linear botActor / Jira comment_author_is_bot checks. LOW — corrected the CONNECT_EXPECTED_BASE_URL comment to document it as opt-in defense-in-depth (the clientKey allowlist is the real gate). Verified clean by the detectors: RS256/HS256 alg-pinning, aud/iss/exp, kid-fetch SSRF (host-pinned + quote-encoded), at-rest secret encryption, constant-time comparisons, and the Phase-2 hardening. New regression tests for each fix; full suite green (1602). * harden(open-swe): GPT-4.1 cross-family review follow-ups Cross-family review (GPT-4.1 via orchestrator cross_reviewer) found no critical/high issues and confirmed the auth boundary is fail-closed and correct. Two low-cost defense-in-depth items applied: - Validate the signed-install JWT 'kid' against a strict charset before the public-key fetch, so a malformed kid fails fast with no network call (on top of the existing fixed host + percent-encoding). - Make JWT nbf verification explicit (verify_nbf) on both the RS256 lifecycle and HS256 webhook decodes. Other suggestions triaged as already-handled (aud cross-app replay is blocked by the per-tenant iss->secret lookup; documented static-token/IP/ baseUrl tradeoffs; qsh pinned to Atlassian's vector) or ops/infra (Fernet rotation via MultiFernet; rate limiting at the gateway). * docs(open-swe): document Jira + Confluence in installation & customization guides - INSTALLATION.md §5: add Jira (Automation-rule webhook + shared secret, service account, JIRA_PROJECT_TO_REPO) and Confluence (Atlassian Connect app install, CONNECT_EXPECTED_CLIENT_KEYS bootstrap, durable-store note, CONFLUENCE_SPACE_TO_REPO) trigger setup; §6: add the new env vars + REQUIRE_REPO_ALLOWLIST. - CUSTOMIZATION.md: jira_*/confluence_* in the tools table; repo-extraction note covers all four sources. - AGENTS.md: match CLAUDE.md (triggers, webhooks, tool list, auth). - README.md: invocation section, tools table, and overview line.
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Each invocation creates a deterministic thread ID, so follow-up messages on the same issue or thread route to the same running agent.
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**Trigger tags (Sea Haven fork):** a mention is a case-insensitive substring match on the comment body — `@openswe`, `@open-swe`, `@openswe-dev`, or `@seahaven-openswe` (the deployed App slug). GitHub won't linkify `@seahaven-openswe` (App `[bot]` accounts aren't user-mentionable), but the text still fires a run.
**Engineering conventions & attribution (Sea Haven fork):** the main agent's system prompt is tuned to the Sea Haven engineering handbook — branch names are `feature|bug|hotfix/<kebab-desc>` (optional resolvable `<KEY>-` prefix), PR bodies use `## Summary / Validation / Tests / Notes`, and commit messages follow the handbook format (≤50-char imperative subject, *why* over *what*). The **PR title rule is repo-aware**: when the target repo enforces a conventional-commit title (an `amannn/action-semantic-pull-request` workflow, a `commitlint` config, or a documented requirement in `AGENTS.md` / `CONTRIBUTING.md`), the agent emits a conforming `type(scope): …` title that reads the action's allowed types/scopes — this lets it pass gates like this repo's own `PR Title Lint` and upstream `langchain-ai/open-swe` without manual retitling; otherwise it falls back to the Sea Haven imperative style with no `type:` prefix. PRs that resolve a GitHub issue **auto-link it** in the body (`Closes #<n>` for full fixes, `Refs #<n>`/`Part of #<n>` for partial work, `Closes owner/repo#<n>` cross-repo); because the Sea Haven flow targets `dev` rather than the default branch, the issue closes when `dev` is promoted, not at dev-merge. **No agent/AI attribution is added to any artifact** — no `Co-authored-by` bot trailer, no `Made by [Open SWE]` footer, no "generated by an agent" notes. Commits are currently authored as the **triggering user** (the upstream behavior, which keeps Vercel preview deploys resolvable); flipping authorship to the bot account is tracked separately in issue #11 pending the Vercel-resolvability decision.
### 7. Validation — Prompt-Driven
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The agent is instructed to run linters, formatters, and tests before committing, and is responsible end-to-end for committing, pushing, opening/updating the draft PR, and replying in the source channel.
This is an area where you can extend Open SWE for your org: add deterministic CI checks, visual verification, or review gates as additional middleware. See the [Customization Guide](docs/CUSTOMIZATION.md#6-middleware) for how.
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---
## Comparison
| Decision | Open SWE | Stripe (Minions) | Ramp (Inspect) | Coinbase (Cloudbot) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Harness** | Composed (Deep Agents/LangGraph) | Forked (Goose) | Composed (OpenCode) | Built from scratch |
| **Sandbox** | Pluggable (Modal, Daytona, Runloop, etc.) | AWS EC2 devboxes (pre-warmed) | Modal containers (pre-warmed) | In-house |
| **Tools** | ~15, curated | ~500, curated per-agent | OpenCode SDK + extensions | MCPs + custom Skills |
| **Context** | AGENTS.md + issue/thread | Rule files + pre-hydration | OpenCode built-in | Linear-first + MCPs |
| **Orchestration** | Subagents + middleware | Blueprints (deterministic + agentic) | Sessions + child sessions | Three modes |
| **Invocation** | Slack, Linear, GitHub | Slack + embedded buttons | Slack + web + Chrome extension | Slack-native |
| **Validation** | Prompt-driven | 3-layer (local + CI + 1 retry) | Visual DOM verification | Agent councils + auto-merge |
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---
## Features
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- **Trigger from Linear, Slack, or GitHub** — mention `@openswe` in a comment to kick off a task
- **Instant acknowledgement** — acknowledges the moment it picks up your message
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- **Message it while it's running** — send follow-up messages mid-task and it'll pick them up before its next step
- **Run multiple tasks in parallel** — each task runs in its own isolated cloud sandbox
- **GitHub OAuth built-in** — authenticates with your GitHub account automatically
- **Opens PRs automatically** — commits changes and opens a draft PR when done, linked back to your ticket
- **Subagent support** — the agent can spawn child agents for parallel subtasks
- **Web dashboard** — a companion app (in `ui/`) for GitHub login, per-user model/profile settings, team defaults, enabled-repo and review-style management, user mappings, and an Agents chat UI
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---
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## Getting Started
- **[Installation Guide](docs/INSTALLATION.md)** — local dev (backend + dashboard), GitHub App creation, LangSmith, Linear/Slack/GitHub triggers, and production deployment
- **[Customization Guide](docs/CUSTOMIZATION.md)** — swap the sandbox, model, tools, triggers, system prompt, and middleware for your org
## Deployment (Sea Haven fork)
chore: decommission self-hosted AWS LangGraph stack (#64) * chore: decommission self-hosted AWS LangGraph stack Removes the now-dead self-host IaC and AWS-only CI/CD after destroying the dev + prod CloudFormation stacks (open-swe-dev, open-swe-prod, open-swe-iam, and the dev-exclusive CDKToolkit-oswedev bootstrap) in account 328440206208, us-east-1. The deployment is now managed (LangGraph Cloud + Vercel). - remove infra/ (CDK app: app + IAM stacks, constructs, aspects, tests) - remove deploy/ami (Packer AMI build) and deploy/seahaven (boot/config scripts, DEPLOYMENT/ROTATION runbooks) - remove AWS-only workflows: cd-infra, ci-infra, build-artifacts, rollback - README: rewrite the Deployment section to the managed LangGraph Cloud + Vercel view; drop dead links to infra/ and deploy/seahaven Preserved: the shared default CDKToolkit bootstrap and promote-dev-to-prod.yml. The RETAIN'd Secrets Manager shells and open-swe-<env>-assets S3 buckets survive cdk destroy by design (orphaned) and need a separate deliberate cleanup. * chore: clean up dangling references left by the AWS decommission Folds in the FIX-level items from the #64 review gates (GPT-4.1 cross-review + /sh-security-review), none of which were blockers: - delete orphaned .github/scripts/{package-artifacts,publish-and-deploy,roll-box, rollback}.sh — their only callers were the removed AWS deploy workflows - drop the deleted /infra dir from dependabot.yml npm directories (was producing a recurring Dependabot config error) - remove the stale OSWE-IAC-SECRETS-LIST-01 suppression (referenced the deleted infra/lib/constructs/instance-role.ts) - repoint the README promotion link to promote-to-main.yml (renamed in #63) The promote-dev-to-prod.yml comment in check-dev-green.sh is intentionally left to #63, which rewrites that same line.
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This fork runs on a **managed deployment**: the backend (all three graphs + the
FastAPI webapp) runs on
[LangGraph Cloud / Platform](https://langchain-ai.github.io/langgraph/cloud/),
and the `ui/` dashboard deploys to [Vercel](https://vercel.com/). Configuration
and secrets live in the LangGraph deployment config and Vercel environment
variables. Promotion from `dev` to `prod` (`main`) is handled by
[`.github/workflows/promote-to-main.yml`](.github/workflows/promote-to-main.yml).
See **[INSTALLATION.md § 10 "Production deployment"](docs/INSTALLATION.md#10-production-deployment)**
chore: decommission self-hosted AWS LangGraph stack (#64) * chore: decommission self-hosted AWS LangGraph stack Removes the now-dead self-host IaC and AWS-only CI/CD after destroying the dev + prod CloudFormation stacks (open-swe-dev, open-swe-prod, open-swe-iam, and the dev-exclusive CDKToolkit-oswedev bootstrap) in account 328440206208, us-east-1. The deployment is now managed (LangGraph Cloud + Vercel). - remove infra/ (CDK app: app + IAM stacks, constructs, aspects, tests) - remove deploy/ami (Packer AMI build) and deploy/seahaven (boot/config scripts, DEPLOYMENT/ROTATION runbooks) - remove AWS-only workflows: cd-infra, ci-infra, build-artifacts, rollback - README: rewrite the Deployment section to the managed LangGraph Cloud + Vercel view; drop dead links to infra/ and deploy/seahaven Preserved: the shared default CDKToolkit bootstrap and promote-dev-to-prod.yml. The RETAIN'd Secrets Manager shells and open-swe-<env>-assets S3 buckets survive cdk destroy by design (orphaned) and need a separate deliberate cleanup. * chore: clean up dangling references left by the AWS decommission Folds in the FIX-level items from the #64 review gates (GPT-4.1 cross-review + /sh-security-review), none of which were blockers: - delete orphaned .github/scripts/{package-artifacts,publish-and-deploy,roll-box, rollback}.sh — their only callers were the removed AWS deploy workflows - drop the deleted /infra dir from dependabot.yml npm directories (was producing a recurring Dependabot config error) - remove the stale OSWE-IAC-SECRETS-LIST-01 suppression (referenced the deleted infra/lib/constructs/instance-role.ts) - repoint the README promotion link to promote-to-main.yml (renamed in #63) The promote-dev-to-prod.yml comment in check-dev-green.sh is intentionally left to #63, which rewrites that same line.
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for the full backend + dashboard setup.
> The earlier self-hosted AWS stack (CDK under `infra/`, an ARM64 EC2 box + nginx
> behind the shared ALB, and the `cd-infra` / `build-artifacts` release pipelines)
> was **decommissioned** in favor of the managed deployment above.
2026-03-07 13:24:10 -08:00
## License
2026-03-07 13:24:10 -08:00
MIT