open-swe/tests/webhooks/test_linear_webhook_replay.py

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fix: resolve security-review findings (sandbox isolation, IAM list scope, webhook replay, info-leak) (#54) * fix: enforce a replay window on Linear webhooks (AUTHZ-001) verify_linear_signature accepted any correctly-signed body with no freshness check, so a captured request could be replayed indefinitely. Parse the signed webhookTimestamp (Unix ms) and reject requests outside a 60s window, failing closed when the field is missing or malformed — mirroring the Slack verifier. * fix: stop leaking upstream auth-error bodies into user comments get_github_token_for_user folded the raw upstream response text into the error string that becomes a Slack/Linear comment (AUTH-RESP-LEAK-01). Log the full body server-side only and return a generic "GitHub auth failed (status <code>)". Also document the accepted shared-installation-token blast radius on the bot-token-only path (AUTHZ-003). * fix: bind sandbox and token caches to repo to prevent thread-id collision A PR head-branch name is attacker-controllable and get_thread_id_from_branch derives a thread_id from its first UUID with no repo binding (TID-COLLIDE-01). The in-memory sandbox cache and the per-thread GitHub-token cache were keyed on thread_id alone, and a cached sandbox was reused after only an echo-ping, so a different repo's webhook could bind to another thread's sandbox or token. Without changing the persistent thread-id scheme: - Persist the bound repo (owner/name) in thread metadata on sandbox creation and refuse to reuse a sandbox whose bound repo does not match the current event (SandboxRepoMismatchError); the in-memory proxy also carries the binding. - Bind the GitHub-token cache entries to their repo and evict on a cross-repo read so a colliding thread_id cannot be served another repo's token. - Thread repo through the reviewer and the webhook token resolvers. * fix: scope s3:ListBucket to the releases/ prefix (F-1/IAC-04) The instance role and the GitHub deploy app role granted s3:ListBucket on the whole assets bucket. Every caller (deploy.sh, the publish/rollback scripts) only ever lists under releases/, so add a StringLike s3:prefix=releases/* condition. GetBucketLocation has no s3:prefix in its request context, so it moves to its own unconditioned statement. Also document the accepted F-2 cross-env existence-oracle residual on BatchGetSecretValue. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive; document AUTHZ-002 Add a machine-level suppression for the fake Datadog key in the test_team_credentials encryption-roundtrip fixture (CWE-798, not a real credential). Clarify that the within-org thread-write path is intentional by design (AUTHZ-002) — comment only, no behavior change. * fix: casefold repo-binding keys to avoid spurious cross-repo mismatch GitHub owner/name are case-insensitive. Casefold the owner/name key on both the write (binding) and read (compare) sides — repo_cache_key and the metadata bound_repo read — so Org/Repo and org/repo resolve to one repo and a legitimate same-repo run cannot raise a spurious SandboxRepoMismatchError (Gap 2). * fix: stop leaking upstream auth body in unexpected-result branch The 2xx-but-missing-token/url branch echoed the parsed upstream response body into the user-facing error. Return a generic message and log response_data server-side only, mirroring the existing HTTPStatusError fix (Gap 4). * fix: fail closed for unbound-legacy sandboxes and catch repo mismatch Gap 1: a thread with a persisted sandbox_id but no in-memory cache and no recorded bound_repo (a pre-binding legacy thread, post-deploy) previously reconnected-and-served the sandbox to the current repo, then rebound it. Now fail closed: drop the stale id and recreate a fresh sandbox bound to this repo, logging a reconnect-with-missing-binding event. A sandbox is never served to a repo unless its binding is known and matches; new threads bind on first run unchanged. Gap 3: catch SandboxRepoMismatchError at the agent and reviewer run entrypoints, log it for alarming, and surface a clean sanitized error instead of letting an opaque deep-stack exception crash-loop the worker. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive in token-TTL tests Add a machine-level suppression for the fake "ghp_secret" GitHub token used by the cached-token TTL/revocation unit tests (CWE-798). Not a real credential and not a valid PAT; scoped to the unit test only.
2026-06-29 12:21:19 -04:00
"""Replay-window enforcement for Linear webhook signature verification (AUTHZ-001)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
from datetime import UTC, datetime
refactor: split webapp.py into api/ + per-source webhook routes Plan step C4 (docs/upstream-sync/domain-reorg/reorg-build-plan.md, approved decisions 1-2): split the 2,590-line agent/webapp.py monolith into agent/webhooks/common.py (shared verify/dispatch helpers), agent/api/app.py (composition), agent/api/health.py (/health + /webhooks/run-complete), and per-source {github,linear,slack,jira,confluence}_routes.py. Atlassian Connect lifecycle + descriptor routes (/connect/*) fold into confluence_routes.py; webapp.py becomes the upstream-shaped compatibility shim (from .api.app import app). langgraph.json http.app stays agent.webapp:app via the shim. Fork content, upstream layout: linear/slack route files verified content-identical to upstream 8356eb34 and taken verbatim; github_routes is upstream + the fork's CI auto-fix trigger wiring; jira/confluence routes are fork-only, transformed to the same common.X / service.X module-attribute style. All signature verification (GitHub HMAC, Slack, Linear timestamp-freshness, verify_jira_secret + opt-in HMAC/timestamp/IP allowlist, Connect JWT/qsh), token-attribution gating, TID-COLLIDE-01 repo binding, _is_repo_auto_review_enabled gates, and public-repo org gate move unchanged. Handlers rewired from webapp.X to common.X; test monkeypatch sites across 26 files + conftest.py + e2e/harness.py retargeted to webhook_common/handler/route modules per upstream's pattern. Residual agent.webapp importers: only the shim, langgraph.json http.app, Makefile uvicorn target, and docs (doc-path updates land in C7). Gates: ruff check + format, pytest --co, full unit (1637 passed), full Playwright E2E vs real langgraph dev (9/9), residual-importer sweep.
2026-07-17 14:30:05 -04:00
from agent.webhooks import common as webhook_common
fix: resolve security-review findings (sandbox isolation, IAM list scope, webhook replay, info-leak) (#54) * fix: enforce a replay window on Linear webhooks (AUTHZ-001) verify_linear_signature accepted any correctly-signed body with no freshness check, so a captured request could be replayed indefinitely. Parse the signed webhookTimestamp (Unix ms) and reject requests outside a 60s window, failing closed when the field is missing or malformed — mirroring the Slack verifier. * fix: stop leaking upstream auth-error bodies into user comments get_github_token_for_user folded the raw upstream response text into the error string that becomes a Slack/Linear comment (AUTH-RESP-LEAK-01). Log the full body server-side only and return a generic "GitHub auth failed (status <code>)". Also document the accepted shared-installation-token blast radius on the bot-token-only path (AUTHZ-003). * fix: bind sandbox and token caches to repo to prevent thread-id collision A PR head-branch name is attacker-controllable and get_thread_id_from_branch derives a thread_id from its first UUID with no repo binding (TID-COLLIDE-01). The in-memory sandbox cache and the per-thread GitHub-token cache were keyed on thread_id alone, and a cached sandbox was reused after only an echo-ping, so a different repo's webhook could bind to another thread's sandbox or token. Without changing the persistent thread-id scheme: - Persist the bound repo (owner/name) in thread metadata on sandbox creation and refuse to reuse a sandbox whose bound repo does not match the current event (SandboxRepoMismatchError); the in-memory proxy also carries the binding. - Bind the GitHub-token cache entries to their repo and evict on a cross-repo read so a colliding thread_id cannot be served another repo's token. - Thread repo through the reviewer and the webhook token resolvers. * fix: scope s3:ListBucket to the releases/ prefix (F-1/IAC-04) The instance role and the GitHub deploy app role granted s3:ListBucket on the whole assets bucket. Every caller (deploy.sh, the publish/rollback scripts) only ever lists under releases/, so add a StringLike s3:prefix=releases/* condition. GetBucketLocation has no s3:prefix in its request context, so it moves to its own unconditioned statement. Also document the accepted F-2 cross-env existence-oracle residual on BatchGetSecretValue. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive; document AUTHZ-002 Add a machine-level suppression for the fake Datadog key in the test_team_credentials encryption-roundtrip fixture (CWE-798, not a real credential). Clarify that the within-org thread-write path is intentional by design (AUTHZ-002) — comment only, no behavior change. * fix: casefold repo-binding keys to avoid spurious cross-repo mismatch GitHub owner/name are case-insensitive. Casefold the owner/name key on both the write (binding) and read (compare) sides — repo_cache_key and the metadata bound_repo read — so Org/Repo and org/repo resolve to one repo and a legitimate same-repo run cannot raise a spurious SandboxRepoMismatchError (Gap 2). * fix: stop leaking upstream auth body in unexpected-result branch The 2xx-but-missing-token/url branch echoed the parsed upstream response body into the user-facing error. Return a generic message and log response_data server-side only, mirroring the existing HTTPStatusError fix (Gap 4). * fix: fail closed for unbound-legacy sandboxes and catch repo mismatch Gap 1: a thread with a persisted sandbox_id but no in-memory cache and no recorded bound_repo (a pre-binding legacy thread, post-deploy) previously reconnected-and-served the sandbox to the current repo, then rebound it. Now fail closed: drop the stale id and recreate a fresh sandbox bound to this repo, logging a reconnect-with-missing-binding event. A sandbox is never served to a repo unless its binding is known and matches; new threads bind on first run unchanged. Gap 3: catch SandboxRepoMismatchError at the agent and reviewer run entrypoints, log it for alarming, and surface a clean sanitized error instead of letting an opaque deep-stack exception crash-loop the worker. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive in token-TTL tests Add a machine-level suppression for the fake "ghp_secret" GitHub token used by the cached-token TTL/revocation unit tests (CWE-798). Not a real credential and not a valid PAT; scoped to the unit test only.
2026-06-29 12:21:19 -04:00
_SECRET = "linear-signing-secret"
def _sign(body: bytes) -> str:
return hmac.new(_SECRET.encode("utf-8"), body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def _now_ms() -> int:
return int(datetime.now(UTC).timestamp() * 1000)
def test_fresh_timestamp_accepted() -> None:
body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment", "webhookTimestamp": _now_ms()}).encode()
refactor: split webapp.py into api/ + per-source webhook routes Plan step C4 (docs/upstream-sync/domain-reorg/reorg-build-plan.md, approved decisions 1-2): split the 2,590-line agent/webapp.py monolith into agent/webhooks/common.py (shared verify/dispatch helpers), agent/api/app.py (composition), agent/api/health.py (/health + /webhooks/run-complete), and per-source {github,linear,slack,jira,confluence}_routes.py. Atlassian Connect lifecycle + descriptor routes (/connect/*) fold into confluence_routes.py; webapp.py becomes the upstream-shaped compatibility shim (from .api.app import app). langgraph.json http.app stays agent.webapp:app via the shim. Fork content, upstream layout: linear/slack route files verified content-identical to upstream 8356eb34 and taken verbatim; github_routes is upstream + the fork's CI auto-fix trigger wiring; jira/confluence routes are fork-only, transformed to the same common.X / service.X module-attribute style. All signature verification (GitHub HMAC, Slack, Linear timestamp-freshness, verify_jira_secret + opt-in HMAC/timestamp/IP allowlist, Connect JWT/qsh), token-attribution gating, TID-COLLIDE-01 repo binding, _is_repo_auto_review_enabled gates, and public-repo org gate move unchanged. Handlers rewired from webapp.X to common.X; test monkeypatch sites across 26 files + conftest.py + e2e/harness.py retargeted to webhook_common/handler/route modules per upstream's pattern. Residual agent.webapp importers: only the shim, langgraph.json http.app, Makefile uvicorn target, and docs (doc-path updates land in C7). Gates: ruff check + format, pytest --co, full unit (1637 passed), full Playwright E2E vs real langgraph dev (9/9), residual-importer sweep.
2026-07-17 14:30:05 -04:00
assert webhook_common.verify_linear_signature(body, _sign(body), _SECRET) is True
fix: resolve security-review findings (sandbox isolation, IAM list scope, webhook replay, info-leak) (#54) * fix: enforce a replay window on Linear webhooks (AUTHZ-001) verify_linear_signature accepted any correctly-signed body with no freshness check, so a captured request could be replayed indefinitely. Parse the signed webhookTimestamp (Unix ms) and reject requests outside a 60s window, failing closed when the field is missing or malformed — mirroring the Slack verifier. * fix: stop leaking upstream auth-error bodies into user comments get_github_token_for_user folded the raw upstream response text into the error string that becomes a Slack/Linear comment (AUTH-RESP-LEAK-01). Log the full body server-side only and return a generic "GitHub auth failed (status <code>)". Also document the accepted shared-installation-token blast radius on the bot-token-only path (AUTHZ-003). * fix: bind sandbox and token caches to repo to prevent thread-id collision A PR head-branch name is attacker-controllable and get_thread_id_from_branch derives a thread_id from its first UUID with no repo binding (TID-COLLIDE-01). The in-memory sandbox cache and the per-thread GitHub-token cache were keyed on thread_id alone, and a cached sandbox was reused after only an echo-ping, so a different repo's webhook could bind to another thread's sandbox or token. Without changing the persistent thread-id scheme: - Persist the bound repo (owner/name) in thread metadata on sandbox creation and refuse to reuse a sandbox whose bound repo does not match the current event (SandboxRepoMismatchError); the in-memory proxy also carries the binding. - Bind the GitHub-token cache entries to their repo and evict on a cross-repo read so a colliding thread_id cannot be served another repo's token. - Thread repo through the reviewer and the webhook token resolvers. * fix: scope s3:ListBucket to the releases/ prefix (F-1/IAC-04) The instance role and the GitHub deploy app role granted s3:ListBucket on the whole assets bucket. Every caller (deploy.sh, the publish/rollback scripts) only ever lists under releases/, so add a StringLike s3:prefix=releases/* condition. GetBucketLocation has no s3:prefix in its request context, so it moves to its own unconditioned statement. Also document the accepted F-2 cross-env existence-oracle residual on BatchGetSecretValue. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive; document AUTHZ-002 Add a machine-level suppression for the fake Datadog key in the test_team_credentials encryption-roundtrip fixture (CWE-798, not a real credential). Clarify that the within-org thread-write path is intentional by design (AUTHZ-002) — comment only, no behavior change. * fix: casefold repo-binding keys to avoid spurious cross-repo mismatch GitHub owner/name are case-insensitive. Casefold the owner/name key on both the write (binding) and read (compare) sides — repo_cache_key and the metadata bound_repo read — so Org/Repo and org/repo resolve to one repo and a legitimate same-repo run cannot raise a spurious SandboxRepoMismatchError (Gap 2). * fix: stop leaking upstream auth body in unexpected-result branch The 2xx-but-missing-token/url branch echoed the parsed upstream response body into the user-facing error. Return a generic message and log response_data server-side only, mirroring the existing HTTPStatusError fix (Gap 4). * fix: fail closed for unbound-legacy sandboxes and catch repo mismatch Gap 1: a thread with a persisted sandbox_id but no in-memory cache and no recorded bound_repo (a pre-binding legacy thread, post-deploy) previously reconnected-and-served the sandbox to the current repo, then rebound it. Now fail closed: drop the stale id and recreate a fresh sandbox bound to this repo, logging a reconnect-with-missing-binding event. A sandbox is never served to a repo unless its binding is known and matches; new threads bind on first run unchanged. Gap 3: catch SandboxRepoMismatchError at the agent and reviewer run entrypoints, log it for alarming, and surface a clean sanitized error instead of letting an opaque deep-stack exception crash-loop the worker. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive in token-TTL tests Add a machine-level suppression for the fake "ghp_secret" GitHub token used by the cached-token TTL/revocation unit tests (CWE-798). Not a real credential and not a valid PAT; scoped to the unit test only.
2026-06-29 12:21:19 -04:00
def test_stale_timestamp_rejected() -> None:
stale = _now_ms() - 10 * 60 * 1000 # 10 minutes old
body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment", "webhookTimestamp": stale}).encode()
# Signature is valid, but the timestamp is outside the freshness window.
refactor: split webapp.py into api/ + per-source webhook routes Plan step C4 (docs/upstream-sync/domain-reorg/reorg-build-plan.md, approved decisions 1-2): split the 2,590-line agent/webapp.py monolith into agent/webhooks/common.py (shared verify/dispatch helpers), agent/api/app.py (composition), agent/api/health.py (/health + /webhooks/run-complete), and per-source {github,linear,slack,jira,confluence}_routes.py. Atlassian Connect lifecycle + descriptor routes (/connect/*) fold into confluence_routes.py; webapp.py becomes the upstream-shaped compatibility shim (from .api.app import app). langgraph.json http.app stays agent.webapp:app via the shim. Fork content, upstream layout: linear/slack route files verified content-identical to upstream 8356eb34 and taken verbatim; github_routes is upstream + the fork's CI auto-fix trigger wiring; jira/confluence routes are fork-only, transformed to the same common.X / service.X module-attribute style. All signature verification (GitHub HMAC, Slack, Linear timestamp-freshness, verify_jira_secret + opt-in HMAC/timestamp/IP allowlist, Connect JWT/qsh), token-attribution gating, TID-COLLIDE-01 repo binding, _is_repo_auto_review_enabled gates, and public-repo org gate move unchanged. Handlers rewired from webapp.X to common.X; test monkeypatch sites across 26 files + conftest.py + e2e/harness.py retargeted to webhook_common/handler/route modules per upstream's pattern. Residual agent.webapp importers: only the shim, langgraph.json http.app, Makefile uvicorn target, and docs (doc-path updates land in C7). Gates: ruff check + format, pytest --co, full unit (1637 passed), full Playwright E2E vs real langgraph dev (9/9), residual-importer sweep.
2026-07-17 14:30:05 -04:00
assert webhook_common.verify_linear_signature(body, _sign(body), _SECRET) is False
fix: resolve security-review findings (sandbox isolation, IAM list scope, webhook replay, info-leak) (#54) * fix: enforce a replay window on Linear webhooks (AUTHZ-001) verify_linear_signature accepted any correctly-signed body with no freshness check, so a captured request could be replayed indefinitely. Parse the signed webhookTimestamp (Unix ms) and reject requests outside a 60s window, failing closed when the field is missing or malformed — mirroring the Slack verifier. * fix: stop leaking upstream auth-error bodies into user comments get_github_token_for_user folded the raw upstream response text into the error string that becomes a Slack/Linear comment (AUTH-RESP-LEAK-01). Log the full body server-side only and return a generic "GitHub auth failed (status <code>)". Also document the accepted shared-installation-token blast radius on the bot-token-only path (AUTHZ-003). * fix: bind sandbox and token caches to repo to prevent thread-id collision A PR head-branch name is attacker-controllable and get_thread_id_from_branch derives a thread_id from its first UUID with no repo binding (TID-COLLIDE-01). The in-memory sandbox cache and the per-thread GitHub-token cache were keyed on thread_id alone, and a cached sandbox was reused after only an echo-ping, so a different repo's webhook could bind to another thread's sandbox or token. Without changing the persistent thread-id scheme: - Persist the bound repo (owner/name) in thread metadata on sandbox creation and refuse to reuse a sandbox whose bound repo does not match the current event (SandboxRepoMismatchError); the in-memory proxy also carries the binding. - Bind the GitHub-token cache entries to their repo and evict on a cross-repo read so a colliding thread_id cannot be served another repo's token. - Thread repo through the reviewer and the webhook token resolvers. * fix: scope s3:ListBucket to the releases/ prefix (F-1/IAC-04) The instance role and the GitHub deploy app role granted s3:ListBucket on the whole assets bucket. Every caller (deploy.sh, the publish/rollback scripts) only ever lists under releases/, so add a StringLike s3:prefix=releases/* condition. GetBucketLocation has no s3:prefix in its request context, so it moves to its own unconditioned statement. Also document the accepted F-2 cross-env existence-oracle residual on BatchGetSecretValue. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive; document AUTHZ-002 Add a machine-level suppression for the fake Datadog key in the test_team_credentials encryption-roundtrip fixture (CWE-798, not a real credential). Clarify that the within-org thread-write path is intentional by design (AUTHZ-002) — comment only, no behavior change. * fix: casefold repo-binding keys to avoid spurious cross-repo mismatch GitHub owner/name are case-insensitive. Casefold the owner/name key on both the write (binding) and read (compare) sides — repo_cache_key and the metadata bound_repo read — so Org/Repo and org/repo resolve to one repo and a legitimate same-repo run cannot raise a spurious SandboxRepoMismatchError (Gap 2). * fix: stop leaking upstream auth body in unexpected-result branch The 2xx-but-missing-token/url branch echoed the parsed upstream response body into the user-facing error. Return a generic message and log response_data server-side only, mirroring the existing HTTPStatusError fix (Gap 4). * fix: fail closed for unbound-legacy sandboxes and catch repo mismatch Gap 1: a thread with a persisted sandbox_id but no in-memory cache and no recorded bound_repo (a pre-binding legacy thread, post-deploy) previously reconnected-and-served the sandbox to the current repo, then rebound it. Now fail closed: drop the stale id and recreate a fresh sandbox bound to this repo, logging a reconnect-with-missing-binding event. A sandbox is never served to a repo unless its binding is known and matches; new threads bind on first run unchanged. Gap 3: catch SandboxRepoMismatchError at the agent and reviewer run entrypoints, log it for alarming, and surface a clean sanitized error instead of letting an opaque deep-stack exception crash-loop the worker. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive in token-TTL tests Add a machine-level suppression for the fake "ghp_secret" GitHub token used by the cached-token TTL/revocation unit tests (CWE-798). Not a real credential and not a valid PAT; scoped to the unit test only.
2026-06-29 12:21:19 -04:00
def test_future_timestamp_rejected() -> None:
future = _now_ms() + 10 * 60 * 1000
body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment", "webhookTimestamp": future}).encode()
refactor: split webapp.py into api/ + per-source webhook routes Plan step C4 (docs/upstream-sync/domain-reorg/reorg-build-plan.md, approved decisions 1-2): split the 2,590-line agent/webapp.py monolith into agent/webhooks/common.py (shared verify/dispatch helpers), agent/api/app.py (composition), agent/api/health.py (/health + /webhooks/run-complete), and per-source {github,linear,slack,jira,confluence}_routes.py. Atlassian Connect lifecycle + descriptor routes (/connect/*) fold into confluence_routes.py; webapp.py becomes the upstream-shaped compatibility shim (from .api.app import app). langgraph.json http.app stays agent.webapp:app via the shim. Fork content, upstream layout: linear/slack route files verified content-identical to upstream 8356eb34 and taken verbatim; github_routes is upstream + the fork's CI auto-fix trigger wiring; jira/confluence routes are fork-only, transformed to the same common.X / service.X module-attribute style. All signature verification (GitHub HMAC, Slack, Linear timestamp-freshness, verify_jira_secret + opt-in HMAC/timestamp/IP allowlist, Connect JWT/qsh), token-attribution gating, TID-COLLIDE-01 repo binding, _is_repo_auto_review_enabled gates, and public-repo org gate move unchanged. Handlers rewired from webapp.X to common.X; test monkeypatch sites across 26 files + conftest.py + e2e/harness.py retargeted to webhook_common/handler/route modules per upstream's pattern. Residual agent.webapp importers: only the shim, langgraph.json http.app, Makefile uvicorn target, and docs (doc-path updates land in C7). Gates: ruff check + format, pytest --co, full unit (1637 passed), full Playwright E2E vs real langgraph dev (9/9), residual-importer sweep.
2026-07-17 14:30:05 -04:00
assert webhook_common.verify_linear_signature(body, _sign(body), _SECRET) is False
fix: resolve security-review findings (sandbox isolation, IAM list scope, webhook replay, info-leak) (#54) * fix: enforce a replay window on Linear webhooks (AUTHZ-001) verify_linear_signature accepted any correctly-signed body with no freshness check, so a captured request could be replayed indefinitely. Parse the signed webhookTimestamp (Unix ms) and reject requests outside a 60s window, failing closed when the field is missing or malformed — mirroring the Slack verifier. * fix: stop leaking upstream auth-error bodies into user comments get_github_token_for_user folded the raw upstream response text into the error string that becomes a Slack/Linear comment (AUTH-RESP-LEAK-01). Log the full body server-side only and return a generic "GitHub auth failed (status <code>)". Also document the accepted shared-installation-token blast radius on the bot-token-only path (AUTHZ-003). * fix: bind sandbox and token caches to repo to prevent thread-id collision A PR head-branch name is attacker-controllable and get_thread_id_from_branch derives a thread_id from its first UUID with no repo binding (TID-COLLIDE-01). The in-memory sandbox cache and the per-thread GitHub-token cache were keyed on thread_id alone, and a cached sandbox was reused after only an echo-ping, so a different repo's webhook could bind to another thread's sandbox or token. Without changing the persistent thread-id scheme: - Persist the bound repo (owner/name) in thread metadata on sandbox creation and refuse to reuse a sandbox whose bound repo does not match the current event (SandboxRepoMismatchError); the in-memory proxy also carries the binding. - Bind the GitHub-token cache entries to their repo and evict on a cross-repo read so a colliding thread_id cannot be served another repo's token. - Thread repo through the reviewer and the webhook token resolvers. * fix: scope s3:ListBucket to the releases/ prefix (F-1/IAC-04) The instance role and the GitHub deploy app role granted s3:ListBucket on the whole assets bucket. Every caller (deploy.sh, the publish/rollback scripts) only ever lists under releases/, so add a StringLike s3:prefix=releases/* condition. GetBucketLocation has no s3:prefix in its request context, so it moves to its own unconditioned statement. Also document the accepted F-2 cross-env existence-oracle residual on BatchGetSecretValue. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive; document AUTHZ-002 Add a machine-level suppression for the fake Datadog key in the test_team_credentials encryption-roundtrip fixture (CWE-798, not a real credential). Clarify that the within-org thread-write path is intentional by design (AUTHZ-002) — comment only, no behavior change. * fix: casefold repo-binding keys to avoid spurious cross-repo mismatch GitHub owner/name are case-insensitive. Casefold the owner/name key on both the write (binding) and read (compare) sides — repo_cache_key and the metadata bound_repo read — so Org/Repo and org/repo resolve to one repo and a legitimate same-repo run cannot raise a spurious SandboxRepoMismatchError (Gap 2). * fix: stop leaking upstream auth body in unexpected-result branch The 2xx-but-missing-token/url branch echoed the parsed upstream response body into the user-facing error. Return a generic message and log response_data server-side only, mirroring the existing HTTPStatusError fix (Gap 4). * fix: fail closed for unbound-legacy sandboxes and catch repo mismatch Gap 1: a thread with a persisted sandbox_id but no in-memory cache and no recorded bound_repo (a pre-binding legacy thread, post-deploy) previously reconnected-and-served the sandbox to the current repo, then rebound it. Now fail closed: drop the stale id and recreate a fresh sandbox bound to this repo, logging a reconnect-with-missing-binding event. A sandbox is never served to a repo unless its binding is known and matches; new threads bind on first run unchanged. Gap 3: catch SandboxRepoMismatchError at the agent and reviewer run entrypoints, log it for alarming, and surface a clean sanitized error instead of letting an opaque deep-stack exception crash-loop the worker. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive in token-TTL tests Add a machine-level suppression for the fake "ghp_secret" GitHub token used by the cached-token TTL/revocation unit tests (CWE-798). Not a real credential and not a valid PAT; scoped to the unit test only.
2026-06-29 12:21:19 -04:00
def test_missing_timestamp_rejected() -> None:
body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment"}).encode()
refactor: split webapp.py into api/ + per-source webhook routes Plan step C4 (docs/upstream-sync/domain-reorg/reorg-build-plan.md, approved decisions 1-2): split the 2,590-line agent/webapp.py monolith into agent/webhooks/common.py (shared verify/dispatch helpers), agent/api/app.py (composition), agent/api/health.py (/health + /webhooks/run-complete), and per-source {github,linear,slack,jira,confluence}_routes.py. Atlassian Connect lifecycle + descriptor routes (/connect/*) fold into confluence_routes.py; webapp.py becomes the upstream-shaped compatibility shim (from .api.app import app). langgraph.json http.app stays agent.webapp:app via the shim. Fork content, upstream layout: linear/slack route files verified content-identical to upstream 8356eb34 and taken verbatim; github_routes is upstream + the fork's CI auto-fix trigger wiring; jira/confluence routes are fork-only, transformed to the same common.X / service.X module-attribute style. All signature verification (GitHub HMAC, Slack, Linear timestamp-freshness, verify_jira_secret + opt-in HMAC/timestamp/IP allowlist, Connect JWT/qsh), token-attribution gating, TID-COLLIDE-01 repo binding, _is_repo_auto_review_enabled gates, and public-repo org gate move unchanged. Handlers rewired from webapp.X to common.X; test monkeypatch sites across 26 files + conftest.py + e2e/harness.py retargeted to webhook_common/handler/route modules per upstream's pattern. Residual agent.webapp importers: only the shim, langgraph.json http.app, Makefile uvicorn target, and docs (doc-path updates land in C7). Gates: ruff check + format, pytest --co, full unit (1637 passed), full Playwright E2E vs real langgraph dev (9/9), residual-importer sweep.
2026-07-17 14:30:05 -04:00
assert webhook_common.verify_linear_signature(body, _sign(body), _SECRET) is False
fix: resolve security-review findings (sandbox isolation, IAM list scope, webhook replay, info-leak) (#54) * fix: enforce a replay window on Linear webhooks (AUTHZ-001) verify_linear_signature accepted any correctly-signed body with no freshness check, so a captured request could be replayed indefinitely. Parse the signed webhookTimestamp (Unix ms) and reject requests outside a 60s window, failing closed when the field is missing or malformed — mirroring the Slack verifier. * fix: stop leaking upstream auth-error bodies into user comments get_github_token_for_user folded the raw upstream response text into the error string that becomes a Slack/Linear comment (AUTH-RESP-LEAK-01). Log the full body server-side only and return a generic "GitHub auth failed (status <code>)". Also document the accepted shared-installation-token blast radius on the bot-token-only path (AUTHZ-003). * fix: bind sandbox and token caches to repo to prevent thread-id collision A PR head-branch name is attacker-controllable and get_thread_id_from_branch derives a thread_id from its first UUID with no repo binding (TID-COLLIDE-01). The in-memory sandbox cache and the per-thread GitHub-token cache were keyed on thread_id alone, and a cached sandbox was reused after only an echo-ping, so a different repo's webhook could bind to another thread's sandbox or token. Without changing the persistent thread-id scheme: - Persist the bound repo (owner/name) in thread metadata on sandbox creation and refuse to reuse a sandbox whose bound repo does not match the current event (SandboxRepoMismatchError); the in-memory proxy also carries the binding. - Bind the GitHub-token cache entries to their repo and evict on a cross-repo read so a colliding thread_id cannot be served another repo's token. - Thread repo through the reviewer and the webhook token resolvers. * fix: scope s3:ListBucket to the releases/ prefix (F-1/IAC-04) The instance role and the GitHub deploy app role granted s3:ListBucket on the whole assets bucket. Every caller (deploy.sh, the publish/rollback scripts) only ever lists under releases/, so add a StringLike s3:prefix=releases/* condition. GetBucketLocation has no s3:prefix in its request context, so it moves to its own unconditioned statement. Also document the accepted F-2 cross-env existence-oracle residual on BatchGetSecretValue. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive; document AUTHZ-002 Add a machine-level suppression for the fake Datadog key in the test_team_credentials encryption-roundtrip fixture (CWE-798, not a real credential). Clarify that the within-org thread-write path is intentional by design (AUTHZ-002) — comment only, no behavior change. * fix: casefold repo-binding keys to avoid spurious cross-repo mismatch GitHub owner/name are case-insensitive. Casefold the owner/name key on both the write (binding) and read (compare) sides — repo_cache_key and the metadata bound_repo read — so Org/Repo and org/repo resolve to one repo and a legitimate same-repo run cannot raise a spurious SandboxRepoMismatchError (Gap 2). * fix: stop leaking upstream auth body in unexpected-result branch The 2xx-but-missing-token/url branch echoed the parsed upstream response body into the user-facing error. Return a generic message and log response_data server-side only, mirroring the existing HTTPStatusError fix (Gap 4). * fix: fail closed for unbound-legacy sandboxes and catch repo mismatch Gap 1: a thread with a persisted sandbox_id but no in-memory cache and no recorded bound_repo (a pre-binding legacy thread, post-deploy) previously reconnected-and-served the sandbox to the current repo, then rebound it. Now fail closed: drop the stale id and recreate a fresh sandbox bound to this repo, logging a reconnect-with-missing-binding event. A sandbox is never served to a repo unless its binding is known and matches; new threads bind on first run unchanged. Gap 3: catch SandboxRepoMismatchError at the agent and reviewer run entrypoints, log it for alarming, and surface a clean sanitized error instead of letting an opaque deep-stack exception crash-loop the worker. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive in token-TTL tests Add a machine-level suppression for the fake "ghp_secret" GitHub token used by the cached-token TTL/revocation unit tests (CWE-798). Not a real credential and not a valid PAT; scoped to the unit test only.
2026-06-29 12:21:19 -04:00
def test_non_numeric_timestamp_rejected() -> None:
body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment", "webhookTimestamp": "not-a-number"}).encode()
refactor: split webapp.py into api/ + per-source webhook routes Plan step C4 (docs/upstream-sync/domain-reorg/reorg-build-plan.md, approved decisions 1-2): split the 2,590-line agent/webapp.py monolith into agent/webhooks/common.py (shared verify/dispatch helpers), agent/api/app.py (composition), agent/api/health.py (/health + /webhooks/run-complete), and per-source {github,linear,slack,jira,confluence}_routes.py. Atlassian Connect lifecycle + descriptor routes (/connect/*) fold into confluence_routes.py; webapp.py becomes the upstream-shaped compatibility shim (from .api.app import app). langgraph.json http.app stays agent.webapp:app via the shim. Fork content, upstream layout: linear/slack route files verified content-identical to upstream 8356eb34 and taken verbatim; github_routes is upstream + the fork's CI auto-fix trigger wiring; jira/confluence routes are fork-only, transformed to the same common.X / service.X module-attribute style. All signature verification (GitHub HMAC, Slack, Linear timestamp-freshness, verify_jira_secret + opt-in HMAC/timestamp/IP allowlist, Connect JWT/qsh), token-attribution gating, TID-COLLIDE-01 repo binding, _is_repo_auto_review_enabled gates, and public-repo org gate move unchanged. Handlers rewired from webapp.X to common.X; test monkeypatch sites across 26 files + conftest.py + e2e/harness.py retargeted to webhook_common/handler/route modules per upstream's pattern. Residual agent.webapp importers: only the shim, langgraph.json http.app, Makefile uvicorn target, and docs (doc-path updates land in C7). Gates: ruff check + format, pytest --co, full unit (1637 passed), full Playwright E2E vs real langgraph dev (9/9), residual-importer sweep.
2026-07-17 14:30:05 -04:00
assert webhook_common.verify_linear_signature(body, _sign(body), _SECRET) is False
fix: resolve security-review findings (sandbox isolation, IAM list scope, webhook replay, info-leak) (#54) * fix: enforce a replay window on Linear webhooks (AUTHZ-001) verify_linear_signature accepted any correctly-signed body with no freshness check, so a captured request could be replayed indefinitely. Parse the signed webhookTimestamp (Unix ms) and reject requests outside a 60s window, failing closed when the field is missing or malformed — mirroring the Slack verifier. * fix: stop leaking upstream auth-error bodies into user comments get_github_token_for_user folded the raw upstream response text into the error string that becomes a Slack/Linear comment (AUTH-RESP-LEAK-01). Log the full body server-side only and return a generic "GitHub auth failed (status <code>)". Also document the accepted shared-installation-token blast radius on the bot-token-only path (AUTHZ-003). * fix: bind sandbox and token caches to repo to prevent thread-id collision A PR head-branch name is attacker-controllable and get_thread_id_from_branch derives a thread_id from its first UUID with no repo binding (TID-COLLIDE-01). The in-memory sandbox cache and the per-thread GitHub-token cache were keyed on thread_id alone, and a cached sandbox was reused after only an echo-ping, so a different repo's webhook could bind to another thread's sandbox or token. Without changing the persistent thread-id scheme: - Persist the bound repo (owner/name) in thread metadata on sandbox creation and refuse to reuse a sandbox whose bound repo does not match the current event (SandboxRepoMismatchError); the in-memory proxy also carries the binding. - Bind the GitHub-token cache entries to their repo and evict on a cross-repo read so a colliding thread_id cannot be served another repo's token. - Thread repo through the reviewer and the webhook token resolvers. * fix: scope s3:ListBucket to the releases/ prefix (F-1/IAC-04) The instance role and the GitHub deploy app role granted s3:ListBucket on the whole assets bucket. Every caller (deploy.sh, the publish/rollback scripts) only ever lists under releases/, so add a StringLike s3:prefix=releases/* condition. GetBucketLocation has no s3:prefix in its request context, so it moves to its own unconditioned statement. Also document the accepted F-2 cross-env existence-oracle residual on BatchGetSecretValue. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive; document AUTHZ-002 Add a machine-level suppression for the fake Datadog key in the test_team_credentials encryption-roundtrip fixture (CWE-798, not a real credential). Clarify that the within-org thread-write path is intentional by design (AUTHZ-002) — comment only, no behavior change. * fix: casefold repo-binding keys to avoid spurious cross-repo mismatch GitHub owner/name are case-insensitive. Casefold the owner/name key on both the write (binding) and read (compare) sides — repo_cache_key and the metadata bound_repo read — so Org/Repo and org/repo resolve to one repo and a legitimate same-repo run cannot raise a spurious SandboxRepoMismatchError (Gap 2). * fix: stop leaking upstream auth body in unexpected-result branch The 2xx-but-missing-token/url branch echoed the parsed upstream response body into the user-facing error. Return a generic message and log response_data server-side only, mirroring the existing HTTPStatusError fix (Gap 4). * fix: fail closed for unbound-legacy sandboxes and catch repo mismatch Gap 1: a thread with a persisted sandbox_id but no in-memory cache and no recorded bound_repo (a pre-binding legacy thread, post-deploy) previously reconnected-and-served the sandbox to the current repo, then rebound it. Now fail closed: drop the stale id and recreate a fresh sandbox bound to this repo, logging a reconnect-with-missing-binding event. A sandbox is never served to a repo unless its binding is known and matches; new threads bind on first run unchanged. Gap 3: catch SandboxRepoMismatchError at the agent and reviewer run entrypoints, log it for alarming, and surface a clean sanitized error instead of letting an opaque deep-stack exception crash-loop the worker. * chore: suppress test-fixture credential false positive in token-TTL tests Add a machine-level suppression for the fake "ghp_secret" GitHub token used by the cached-token TTL/revocation unit tests (CWE-798). Not a real credential and not a valid PAT; scoped to the unit test only.
2026-06-29 12:21:19 -04:00
def test_bad_signature_rejected_even_when_fresh() -> None:
body = json.dumps({"type": "Comment", "webhookTimestamp": _now_ms()}).encode()
refactor: split webapp.py into api/ + per-source webhook routes Plan step C4 (docs/upstream-sync/domain-reorg/reorg-build-plan.md, approved decisions 1-2): split the 2,590-line agent/webapp.py monolith into agent/webhooks/common.py (shared verify/dispatch helpers), agent/api/app.py (composition), agent/api/health.py (/health + /webhooks/run-complete), and per-source {github,linear,slack,jira,confluence}_routes.py. Atlassian Connect lifecycle + descriptor routes (/connect/*) fold into confluence_routes.py; webapp.py becomes the upstream-shaped compatibility shim (from .api.app import app). langgraph.json http.app stays agent.webapp:app via the shim. Fork content, upstream layout: linear/slack route files verified content-identical to upstream 8356eb34 and taken verbatim; github_routes is upstream + the fork's CI auto-fix trigger wiring; jira/confluence routes are fork-only, transformed to the same common.X / service.X module-attribute style. All signature verification (GitHub HMAC, Slack, Linear timestamp-freshness, verify_jira_secret + opt-in HMAC/timestamp/IP allowlist, Connect JWT/qsh), token-attribution gating, TID-COLLIDE-01 repo binding, _is_repo_auto_review_enabled gates, and public-repo org gate move unchanged. Handlers rewired from webapp.X to common.X; test monkeypatch sites across 26 files + conftest.py + e2e/harness.py retargeted to webhook_common/handler/route modules per upstream's pattern. Residual agent.webapp importers: only the shim, langgraph.json http.app, Makefile uvicorn target, and docs (doc-path updates land in C7). Gates: ruff check + format, pytest --co, full unit (1637 passed), full Playwright E2E vs real langgraph dev (9/9), residual-importer sweep.
2026-07-17 14:30:05 -04:00
assert webhook_common.verify_linear_signature(body, "deadbeef", _SECRET) is False