meal-order-manager/.security-review/suppressions.json
Adam Moussa bab8e2b95d
chore(security): retarget githubdeploy Checkov suppression
The OIDC dual-claim edit shifted CKV_AWS_111 from line 40 to 49. Permissions are unchanged.
2026-09-22 15:32:17 -04:00

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{
"suppressions": [
{
"id": "gitleaks-generic-api-key-45",
"justification": "False positive. tests/test_submit_order.py defines a synthetic Google OAuth audience used only for mocked token verification. OAuth client IDs are public identifiers, this fixture is not a credential, and the tests make no real Google or AWS calls."
},
{
"id": "checkov-CKV_AWS_260-39",
"justification": "The meals API ALB is the CloudFront HTTP origin for orders.seahaven.com. TLS and WAF terminate at CloudFront. Restricting the security group to the CloudFront managed prefix list would block GitHub-hosted weekly-menu HMAC publish, which must call the origin with X-Meals-Publish-Key. Application gates are HMAC on /api/publish, Cognito or Google Bearer on admin, and public submit only. Accepted as the HTTP-origin design for PLAT-215; TLS on the ALB is a follow-up."
},
{
"id": "checkov-CKV_AWS_111-49",
"justification": "LINE SHIFT ONLY: the OIDC dual-claim change adds a workflow_ref condition and retargets job_workflow_ref, shifting github_deploy from 40 to 49. The permission document is unchanged. Original justification: githubdeploy-meal-order-manager needs ecr:GetAuthorizationToken and ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition, both of which AWS documents as Resource *. Trust is pinned to environment:dev or environment:prod, job_workflow_ref on org cd-hcp-fargate.yaml@*, and workflow_ref on the thin deploy-api.yaml caller at refs/heads/main or refs/tags/v*. iam:PassRole is limited to the ECS task and execution roles. ECR push and SSM parameter reads are already resource-scoped."
}
]
}