The /api/admin/* routes (GET/PUT/DELETE /api/admin/orders and
GET /api/admin/summary-pdf) were AuthorizationType NONE, relying entirely on
the in-handler _verify_admin Google-token + admin-email check. This adds an
HTTP API Lambda authorizer that enforces the same check at the gateway, so
unauthenticated requests are rejected before reaching the integration.
- New admin_authorizer Lambda: validates the Authorization: Bearer Google ID
token (aud + allowed Workspace domain) and the admin_emails allow-list from
DynamoDB, returning the HTTP API simple response {isAuthorized}. Fails closed
on missing config, unavailable client ID, bad token, or DynamoDB error.
- OrderApi gains an AdminGoogleAuthorizer with result caching disabled
(AuthorizerResultTtlInSeconds: 0) so expired tokens / removed admins can't be
served from cache. Wired onto all four admin events; no DefaultAuthorizer, so
public routes (submit-order, form-status, roster) stay NONE.
- IAM role for API Gateway to invoke the authorizer; 60-day log group.
- 10 unit tests for the authorizer.
No client change: the admin panel already sends Authorization: Bearer
<google_id_token>. The in-handler _verify_admin check stays as defense-in-depth.
Cross-reviewed by GPT-4.1 (APPROVE-WITH-FIXES); both BLOCK items applied
(disable authorizer caching, fail-closed on DynamoDB error).
