meal-order-manager/.security-review/suppressions.json

{
  "suppressions": [
    {
      "id": "gitleaks-generic-api-key-45",
      "justification": "False positive. tests/test_submit_order.py defines a synthetic Google OAuth audience used only for mocked token verification. OAuth client IDs are public identifiers, this fixture is not a credential, and the tests make no real Google or AWS calls."
    },
    {
      "id": "checkov-CKV_AWS_260-39",
      "justification": "The meals API ALB is the CloudFront HTTP origin for orders.seahaven.com. TLS and WAF terminate at CloudFront. Restricting the security group to the CloudFront managed prefix list would block GitHub-hosted weekly-menu HMAC publish, which must call the origin with X-Meals-Publish-Key. Application gates are HMAC on /api/publish, Cognito or Google Bearer on admin, and public submit only. Accepted as the HTTP-origin design for PLAT-215; TLS on the ALB is a follow-up."
    },
    {
      "id": "checkov-CKV_AWS_111-42",
      "justification": "LINE SHIFT ONLY: dropping the workflow_ref trust condition shifts github_deploy from 49 to 42. The permission document is unchanged. Original justification: githubdeploy-meal-order-manager needs ecr:GetAuthorizationToken and ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition, both of which AWS documents as Resource *. Trust is pinned to environment:dev or environment:prod and job_workflow_ref on org cd-hcp-fargate.yaml@*. iam:PassRole is limited to the ECS task and execution roles. ECR push and SSM parameter reads are already resource-scoped."
    }
  ]
}