get_ivr/set_ivr_routes/extract_ivr_routes targeted a nonexistent IVRs entity
set with an Options[].Route/TimeoutForward shape. The live 3CX IVR is the
Receptionists entity: the no-input/timeout route is the scalar TimeoutForwardDN,
and the key-0 route is a child of the Forwards collection (matched by Input=='0'),
written via a parent deep-PATCH. Routes are now destination numbers. Caught by the
live prod round-trip (get_ivr returned 405) before any holiday ran; rewritten and
re-verified against the live PBX. v1.11.1.
Holiday day-shifts (08:00-17:00 ET) with N slots and 1.5x pay. A new
afterhours-holiday-router Lambda, fired by per-holiday EventBridge Scheduler
one-offs, repoints IVR 800 (key-0 + no-input/timeout) to holiday queue 802 and
sets 802's membership to the day's assignees (ext 100 fallback when unfilled),
reverting at 17:00. Pickups after a shift starts go through an admin Approve/Deny
flow for both regular and holiday shifts. Pay (weekly post + /oncall pay) shows
holiday rates distinctly.
Adds HOLIDAY and PICKUP_REQUEST DynamoDB record types, scheduler IAM scoped to
holiday-* schedules with conditioned PassRole, and the holiday-router function
with a 60-day log group and error alarm.
* Fix payroll email: grant SES config-set permission + isolate failures
The weekly pay-summary email to payroll has been failing with SES
AccessDenied since 2026-06-08. The sending identity (seahaven.com) gained
a default configuration set (seahaven-email-events), and SES authorizes
SendEmail against the config-set ARN as well as the identity — but the
WeeklyPostFunction role only granted ses:SendEmail on identity/*.
- template.yaml: add the configuration-set ARN (scoped to the known set
name) to the SES policy so sends are authorized again.
- weekly-post/app.py: wrap _send_pay_email in try/except so a delivery
failure can never abort the handler before the Slack schedule post.
Previously the SES error also blocked the two-week schedule post.
- Add a regression test covering the isolation.
Cross-family GPT-4.1 IAM review: APPROVE.
* Bump to v1.10.1 in CHANGELOG and sync App Home copy
* Add changelog-driven releases and App Home tab
Version the bot continuously from CHANGELOG.md (the single source of
truth for both the version and the staff-readable notes) and surface
changes to users in two ways:
- A new afterhours-release-notifier Lambda posts a "What's New" message
to the shift channel on minor/major releases (patches stay silent).
- The bot gains an App Home "About" tab showing what it does, the
command list, and the current version's notes.
release.yaml runs on Deploy success (not release:published — GITHUB_TOKEN
events don't start downstream workflows), checks out the deployed commit,
and tags + publishes a GitHub Release + invokes the notifier. It assumes a
dedicated, boundary-carrying OIDC role scoped to InvokeFunction on the
notifier; the account's cfn role gates role creation on that boundary.
The manual Version Bump workflow is retired. A CI guard enforces that a
CHANGELOG edit is a clean SemVer bump and that the in-package copy matches.
* Harden release workflow and regex against CodeQL findings
Address three code-scanning alerts on the PR:
- Critical (actions/untrusted-checkout): split release.yaml into a
read-only `prepare` job that checks out and runs repo code, and a
privileged `publish` job (contents:write + OIDC) that never checks out
repo code — it tags, releases, and invokes purely through the GitHub
and AWS APIs. Also assert head_branch == main.
- High x2 (py/polynomial-redos): rewrite the italic and link regexes in
markdown_to_mrkdwn with possessive quantifiers and exclusive character
classes so they run in linear time on adversarial input. Adds a
regression test.
* Move release/announce into Deploy workflow to clear CodeQL
The workflow_run-triggered release.yaml kept tripping CodeQL's
privileged-context rules (untrusted-checkout, then cache-poisoning) —
CodeQL distrusts any workflow_run that checks out a ref, regardless of
the main-only guarantee, and there is no autofix.
Fold the release job into deploy.yaml gated on `needs: deploy`. A
push-to-main run is a trusted context, so checking out and running repo
code with write/OIDC is safe there. This still gates on deploy success
and serializes via the deploy concurrency group, and removes the
separate workflow entirely.
Human-readable history of the bot from launch (Apr 3) through v1.9.2, written
for a non-technical reader. Recent entries map to the new semantic version tags
(v1.7.19-v1.9.2); earlier work is grouped by dated milestone since those
releases were daily auto-versioned.
