.github/oidc-deploy-roles.yaml

AWSTemplateFormatVersion: "2010-09-09"
Description: >-
  GitHub Actions OIDC deploy roles for Sea Haven Industries repos.
  Each repo gets a scoped IAM role that GitHub Actions assumes via OIDC.

Parameters:
  GitHubOrg:
    Type: String
    Default: Sea-Haven-Industries
    # No glob metacharacters: this value is interpolated into StringLike trust
    # conditions, where a '*' override would silently open every role's trust
    # to any GitHub org with a same-named repo.
    AllowedPattern: "^[A-Za-z0-9-]+$"
  CreateOIDCProvider:
    Type: String
    Default: "false"
    AllowedValues: ["true", "false"]
    Description: Set to true only if the GitHub OIDC provider does not already exist in this account

Conditions:
  ShouldCreateOIDCProvider: !Equals [!Ref CreateOIDCProvider, "true"]

Resources:

  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  # OIDC Provider (conditional — already exists for seahaven-site)
  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  GitHubOIDCProvider:
    Type: AWS::IAM::OIDCProvider
    Condition: ShouldCreateOIDCProvider
    Properties:
      Url: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
      ClientIdList:
        - sts.amazonaws.com
      ThumbprintList:
        - 6938fd4d98bab03faadb97b34396831e3780aea1

  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  # Lambda execution permissions boundary (INFRA-103)
  #
  # This managed policy is the CEILING for every Lambda execution role that the
  # five SAM stacks auto-generate via AWS::Serverless::Function. Applying it as
  # PermissionsBoundary on those roles means the effective permissions are the
  # intersection of the role's own policies and this boundary, so a misconfigured
  # SAM role can never exceed what is listed here.
  #
  # The boundary is intentionally a SUPERSET of the union of all runtime
  # permissions currently granted across the five stacks.  Being slightly broad
  # is the correct trade-off at this stage — a boundary that is too tight will
  # break Lambda functions at runtime after deploy, which is worse than a slightly
  # loose boundary that is tightened in a follow-up.
  #
  # Permission sources per stack:
  #
  #   afterhours-shift-manager
  #     - DynamoDB CRUD (afterhours-shifts table)
  #     - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue (afterhours-shift-manager/*)
  #     - ses:SendEmail (SES identity)
  #     - CloudWatch Logs (all functions)
  #
  #   payments-dashboard
  #     - DynamoDB CRUD / Read (PaymentsDashboard table)
  #     - S3 GetObject (payroll-emails, payments-csv buckets)
  #     - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue (payments-dashboard/*)
  #     - sqs:SendMessage + sqs:ReceiveMessage + sqs:DeleteMessage etc.
  #       (PayrollBatchQueue + DLQs)
  #     - lambda:InvokeFunction (ExpenseReceiver → ExpenseProcessor)
  #     - ec2:CreateNetworkInterface / DescribeNetworkInterfaces /
  #       DeleteNetworkInterface (VPC-attached functions)
  #     - CloudWatch Logs
  #
  #   meal-order-manager
  #     - DynamoDB CRUD / Read (meal-order-manager-orders table)
  #     - S3 CRUD (ReportsBucket) + s3:GetObject (ReportsBucket presigned URLs)
  #     - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue (meal-order-manager/*)
  #     - ssm:GetParameter (/meal-order-manager/*)
  #     - lambda:InvokeFunction (submit-order → slack-notifier,
  #                               close-form → aggregate-orders)
  #     - ses:SendRawEmail
  #     - CloudWatch Logs
  #
  #   front-integrations
  #     - DynamoDB CRUD (front-sla-alerts table)
  #     - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue (by ARN, various)
  #     - CloudWatch Logs
  #
  #   afi-backup-monitor
  #     - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue (by ARN)
  #     - CloudWatch Logs
  #
  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  LambdaExecutionBoundary:
    Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
    Properties:
      ManagedPolicyName: seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary
      Description: >-
        Permissions boundary ceiling for all SAM-managed Lambda execution roles.
        Applied via PermissionsBoundary on every Globals.Function in the five
        SAM stacks (INFRA-103). Effective permissions are the intersection of
        this policy and the role's own inline policies.
      PolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:

          # ── CloudWatch Logs (every Lambda) ──────────────────────────────────
          - Sid: CloudWatchLogs
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - logs:CreateLogGroup
              - logs:CreateLogStream
              - logs:PutLogEvents
              - logs:DescribeLogGroups
              - logs:DescribeLogStreams
            Resource: "*"

          # ── X-Ray tracing (standard Lambda execution) ────────────────────
          - Sid: XRay
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - xray:PutTraceSegments
              - xray:PutTelemetryRecords
            Resource: "*"

          # ── VPC / ENI management (payments-dashboard VPC functions) ────────
          # Matches AWSLambdaVPCAccessExecutionRole exactly.
          # AssignPrivateIpAddresses / UnassignPrivateIpAddresses are for EFA
          # and secondary IPs — not part of the Lambda ENI lifecycle — omitted.
          - Sid: Ec2Eni
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - ec2:CreateNetworkInterface
              - ec2:DescribeNetworkInterfaces
              - ec2:DeleteNetworkInterface
              - ec2:DescribeSubnets
              - ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups
              - ec2:DescribeVpcs
            Resource: "*"

          # ── DynamoDB (afterhours, payments, meal-order, front-integrations) ─
          # Table/* covers base-table operations; table/*/index/* is required for
          # Query/Scan on Global Secondary Indexes.
          - Sid: DynamoDB
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - dynamodb:GetItem
              - dynamodb:PutItem
              - dynamodb:UpdateItem
              - dynamodb:DeleteItem
              - dynamodb:Query
              - dynamodb:Scan
              - dynamodb:BatchGetItem
              - dynamodb:BatchWriteItem
              - dynamodb:DescribeTable
              - dynamodb:ConditionCheckItem
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/*"
              - !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/*/index/*"

          # ── S3 (payments-dashboard read, meal-order-manager CRUD) ──────────
          - Sid: S3
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - s3:GetObject
              - s3:PutObject
              - s3:DeleteObject
              - s3:ListBucket
              - s3:GetBucketLocation
              - s3:GetObjectVersion
              - s3:GetObjectTagging
              - s3:PutObjectTagging
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::*-${AWS::AccountId}"
              - !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::*-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
              # meal-order-manager ReportsBucket (non-AccountId suffix pattern)
              - !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-reports-${AWS::AccountId}"
              - !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-reports-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
              - !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-form-${AWS::AccountId}"
              - !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-form-${AWS::AccountId}/*"

          # ── Secrets Manager (all stacks) ──────────────────────────────────
          - Sid: SecretsManager
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue
              - secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:*"

          # ── SSM Parameter Store (meal-order-manager, afterhours) ──────────
          - Sid: SSMParameterRead
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - ssm:GetParameter
              - ssm:GetParameters
              - ssm:GetParametersByPath
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/*"

          # ── SQS (payments-dashboard batch queues) ─────────────────────────
          - Sid: SQS
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - sqs:SendMessage
              - sqs:ReceiveMessage
              - sqs:DeleteMessage
              - sqs:GetQueueAttributes
              - sqs:GetQueueUrl
              - sqs:ChangeMessageVisibility
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:*"

          # ── Lambda invocation (payments, meal-order inter-function calls) ──
          - Sid: LambdaInvoke
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - lambda:InvokeFunction
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:*"

          # ── SES (afterhours weekly-post, meal-order email-report) ──────────
          - Sid: SES
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - ses:SendEmail
              - ses:SendRawEmail
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:ses:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:identity/*"
              - !Sub "arn:aws:ses:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:configuration-set/*"

          # ── KMS (CMK-encrypted resources) ─────────────────────────────────
          # Required for Lambda functions that read/write CMK-encrypted AWS
          # resources.  Verified live state:
          #   - PaymentsDashboard DynamoDB table: CMK key/0b660af3 (KMS:ENABLED)
          #   - payments-dashboard CloudWatch log groups: CMK key/b748750c
          # Secrets Manager + SQS queues in these stacks use AWS-managed keys
          # (aws/secretsmanager, aws/sqs) which do not require explicit kms:*
          # actions in the execution role policy.  The CMK keys are scoped to
          # this account to prevent cross-account KMS calls.
          - Sid: KMS
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - kms:Decrypt
              - kms:GenerateDataKey
              - kms:DescribeKey
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*"

  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  # IAM role lifecycle for the CFN execution role — BOUNDARY-GATED
  # (attached managed policy)
  #
  # Ported verbatim from seahaven-org-baseline
  # lib/deploy-substrate/deploy-substrate.template.yaml (stack
  # seahaven-deploy-substrate, deployed and verified in seahaven-prod and
  # seahaven-dev 2026-07-27). Keep the two copies in lockstep.
  #
  # Why a MANAGED policy and not inline on the role: this role's inline
  # policies total ~10,006 bytes against IAM's hard 10,240-byte per-role
  # inline limit — about 234 bytes of headroom. The Deny statements below
  # do not fit inline (the equivalent attempt in prod/dev failed with
  # ServiceLimitExceeded). Attached managed policies carry their own
  # separate 6,144-byte budget.
  #
  # SECURITY: iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary is deliberately ABSENT from
  # the Allow below, and explicitly Denied further down. Granting it under
  # the StringEquals iam:PermissionsBoundary condition is self-defeating:
  # for a delete, that condition key reflects the boundary CURRENTLY
  # attached to the target role, so it matches exactly the roles the gate
  # protects — letting this role create a boundary-gated role with an
  # inline *:* policy, strip the boundary, and pass the now-unbounded role
  # to Lambda. Verified live on this very role 2026-07-27 via
  # simulate-principal-policy (returned: allowed).
  #
  # THIS IS THE ONLY COPY. It was introduced alongside an inline
  # iam-role-management-boundary-gated policy that carried the older,
  # vulnerable version of these statements; that inline copy was removed once
  # this one was deployed and verified. Consolidating here also freed the
  # role's inline budget from 10,006 to 8,261 of the 10,240-byte limit —
  # prefer adding future statements here rather than inline.
  #
  # OPERATIONAL NOTES
  # - Detaching or deleting this policy does not just drop the Deny backstops,
  #   it drops every IAM permission the role has, so SAM deploys stop working
  #   immediately and loudly rather than silently becoming less safe. The role
  #   cannot do it to itself (DenySelfMutation below), but an administrator
  #   can — treat detach/delete as a break-glass action, not a cleanup step.
  # - A managed policy keeps at most 5 versions. CloudFormation creates a new
  #   version on every change to this document, so if an update ever fails with
  #   LimitExceeded, prune old versions (list-policy-versions /
  #   delete-policy-version) rather than assuming the template is wrong.
  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SamCfnIamManagementPolicy:
    Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
    Properties:
      # Fixed name: changing it makes CloudFormation create a replacement policy
      # and detach this one, which briefly drops the role's IAM permissions
      # mid-update. Treat a rename as a coordinated migration, not an edit. This
      # is the role's FIRST attached managed policy (per-role quota is 10).
      ManagedPolicyName: seahaven-cfn-exec-iam-management
      Description: >-
        Boundary-gated IAM role lifecycle for github-cfn-execution-role, plus the
        explicit Deny backstops that keep the permissions boundary from being
        detached or rewritten. Separated from the role's inline policies to stay
        under IAM's 10,240-byte inline limit.
      PolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          # Create role — MUST attach boundary
          - Sid: IAMCreateRoleWithBoundary
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - iam:CreateRole
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                "iam:PermissionsBoundary": !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary"

          # Attach managed policies — MUST have boundary already on role
          - Sid: IAMAttachPolicyWithBoundary
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - iam:AttachRolePolicy
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                "iam:PermissionsBoundary": !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary"

          # Put inline policy — MUST have boundary already on role
          - Sid: IAMPutRolePolicyWithBoundary
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - iam:PutRolePolicy
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                "iam:PermissionsBoundary": !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary"

          # Boundary management — SET the boundary only. DELETE is NOT
          # granted: for a delete, the iam:PermissionsBoundary condition key
          # reflects the boundary CURRENTLY attached to the target role, so
          # a StringEquals condition on the boundary ARN MATCHES exactly the
          # roles the gate protects. Granting delete under that condition
          # lets this role create a boundary-gated role with an inline *:*
          # policy, strip the boundary, and pass the now-unbounded role to
          # Lambda — defeating the primary escalation control. Verified live
          # against the mgmt copy 2026-07-27 (simulate-principal-policy:
          # iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary = allowed).
          #
          # OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCE — read before debugging a stuck stack.
          # SAM does not need the delete for the common paths: it SETS the
          # boundary on roles it creates, and stack teardown calls DeleteRole.
          # But there IS one path that now fails by design: updating an
          # existing AWS::IAM::Role to REMOVE its PermissionsBoundary property
          # makes CloudFormation call DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary, which is
          # denied. The stack update fails and rolls back, and because cd-sam's
          # pre-flight hard-fails on *ROLLBACK_COMPLETE, that repo's deploys
          # stay blocked until it is cleared. Recovery is an out-of-band admin
          # action (remove the boundary directly, or replace the role by
          # renaming its logical id) — not a pipeline retry. Removing the
          # boundary from a SAM function is a security regression anyway, so
          # failing loudly here is the intent.
          - Sid: IAMPutPermissionsBoundary
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                "iam:PermissionsBoundary": !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary"

          # Explicit Deny backstop (AWS's documented NoBoundaryPolicyEdit /
          # NoBoundaryDelete delegation pattern). A Deny is required, not
          # merely omitting the Allow: without it, any future Allow added to
          # this role — or a broader managed policy attached to it — silently
          # reopens the escalation. Covers both removing a boundary from a
          # role and rewriting the boundary POLICY DOCUMENT itself (the
          # latter is only implicitly denied today).
          - Sid: DenyBoundaryTampering
            Effect: Deny
            Action:
              - iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary
              - iam:DeleteUserPermissionsBoundary
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
              - !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:user/*"

          # Scoped to the whole seahaven-* policy family, not just the boundary:
          # this policy carries the Deny statements, so it is now a
          # higher-value target than the boundary it protects. Safe to scope
          # broadly — the role holds no iam:CreatePolicy anywhere and no SAM
          # stack manages a managed policy through it (both verified
          # 2026-07-27), so nothing legitimate writes policy versions here.
          - Sid: DenyBoundaryPolicyEdit
            Effect: Deny
            Action:
              - iam:CreatePolicyVersion
              - iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
              - iam:DeletePolicyVersion
              - iam:DeletePolicy
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-*"

          # Self-protection. Without this the whole control is one API call
          # from being undone: IAMRoleReadAndDelete below grants
          # iam:DetachRolePolicy on Resource "*" with no condition, so this
          # role could detach the very policy carrying these Denies from
          # itself and reinstate the escalation. Verified live 2026-07-27:
          # simulate-principal-policy returned "allowed" for DetachRolePolicy,
          # DeleteRolePolicy and DeleteRole against this role's own ARN and
          # against githubdeploy-* roles.
          #
          # Also closes a denial-of-service and a self-elevation precondition:
          # iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary is condition-pinned to the Lambda
          # boundary ARN but NOT scoped by target, so this role could apply
          # that runtime boundary to itself or to a githubdeploy-* role —
          # bricking the pipelines, unrecoverable without an admin because
          # removing a boundary is denied above, and making the otherwise-inert
          # AttachRolePolicy/PutRolePolicy self-elevation conditions start
          # matching.
          #
          # Costs nothing operationally: the deploy substrate's own roles are
          # managed by THIS stack, which is deployed manually with
          # administrator credentials (no --role-arn), so CloudFormation never
          # exercises these actions against them as this role. SAM-generated
          # roles are named <stack>-<Function>Role-<hash> and are unaffected.
          - Sid: DenySelfMutation
            Effect: Deny
            Action:
              - iam:AttachRolePolicy
              - iam:DeleteRole
              - iam:DeleteRolePolicy
              - iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary
              - iam:DetachRolePolicy
              - iam:PutRolePolicy
              - iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary
              - iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
              - iam:UpdateRole
              - iam:UpdateRoleDescription
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/github-cfn-execution-role"
              - !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/githubdeploy-*"

          # Read / tag / delete role and policy — no boundary condition needed
          - Sid: IAMRoleReadAndDelete
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - iam:DeleteRole
              - iam:DeleteRolePolicy
              - iam:DetachRolePolicy
              - iam:GetRole
              - iam:GetRolePolicy
              - iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
              - iam:ListRolePolicies
              - iam:ListRoles
              - iam:TagRole
              - iam:UntagRole
              - iam:UpdateRole
              - iam:UpdateRoleDescription
              - iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
              - iam:GetPolicy
              - iam:GetPolicyVersion
              - iam:ListPolicies
              - iam:ListPolicyVersions
            Resource: "*"

          # PassRole — CloudFormation passes the Lambda execution role
          # to the Lambda service.  Scoped to SAM-generated role pattern.
          - Sid: IAMPassRole
            Effect: Allow
            Action:
              - iam:PassRole
            Resource:
              - !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                "iam:PassedToService": "lambda.amazonaws.com"

  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  # Shared CloudFormation execution role (SAM stacks) — INFRA-97 scoped
  #
  # Replaces the previous blanket managed-policy set (IAMFullAccess +
  # *FullAccess) with per-service inline statements that cover exactly
  # what the five SAM stacks need during a CloudFormation deploy/update.
  #
  # PRIMARY ESCALATION CONTROL
  # iam:CreateRole and iam:AttachRolePolicy / iam:PutRolePolicy are
  # conditioned on iam:PermissionsBoundary StringEquals the boundary ARN
  # (seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary, created in INFRA-103).  That
  # condition is what prevents the CFN execution role from minting an
  # unconstrained admin role.
  #
  # SAM RolePath deviation note
  # The original cross-review suggestion mentioned scoping IAM role
  # creation to a specific path (/cfn-managed/).  AWS::Serverless::Function
  # does NOT support a custom RolePath on auto-generated execution roles —
  # the PermissionsBoundary property is supported, but the role always lands
  # at path /.  Relying on a path condition (iam:ResourceTag or path-prefix)
  # would therefore exclude the SAM auto-roles and break every deploy.
  # The iam:PermissionsBoundary condition achieves the same security goal
  # without requiring a path.  For any explicit AWS::IAM::Role resources
  # in SAM templates (e.g. AdminAuthorizerInvokeRole in meal-order-manager)
  # where we can control the path, path scoping can be added in a follow-up.
  #
  # DEPLOY ORDER DEPENDENCY
  # This role references the boundary ARN by literal value, so the
  # seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary managed policy must exist before this
  # stack is deployed. It is created by this same stack above, and is not
  # modified by the Phase A change.
  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SamCfnExecutionRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      RoleName: github-cfn-execution-role
      ManagedPolicyArns:
        - !Ref SamCfnIamManagementPolicy
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Service: cloudformation.amazonaws.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRole
      Policies:

        # ── CloudFormation transforms (SAM macro) ─────────────────────────
        - PolicyName: cloudformation-transforms
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: AllowSAMTransform
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
                Resource:
                  - arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:aws:transform/*

        # ── Lambda management ─────────────────────────────────────────────
        # Covers function create/update/delete, aliases, event source
        # mappings, and Lambda layers — all needed for SAM deploys.
        - PolicyName: lambda-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: LambdaFunctions
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - lambda:AddPermission
                  - lambda:CreateFunction
                  - lambda:DeleteFunction
                  - lambda:GetFunction
                  - lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration
                  - lambda:ListFunctions
                  - lambda:RemovePermission
                  - lambda:UpdateFunctionCode
                  - lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration
                  - lambda:UpdateFunctionEventInvokeConfig
                  - lambda:PutFunctionEventInvokeConfig
                  - lambda:DeleteFunctionEventInvokeConfig
                  - lambda:GetFunctionEventInvokeConfig
                  - lambda:ListTags
                  - lambda:TagResource
                  - lambda:UntagResource
                  - lambda:GetPolicy
                  - lambda:ListVersionsByFunction
                  - lambda:PublishVersion
                  - lambda:CreateAlias
                  - lambda:DeleteAlias
                  - lambda:UpdateAlias
                  - lambda:GetAlias
                Resource:
                  - !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:*"
              - Sid: LambdaLayers
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - lambda:PublishLayerVersion
                  - lambda:DeleteLayerVersion
                  - lambda:GetLayerVersion
                  - lambda:ListLayerVersions
                  - lambda:ListLayers
                  - lambda:AddLayerVersionPermission
                  - lambda:RemoveLayerVersionPermission
                Resource:
                  - !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:layer:*"
              - Sid: LambdaEventSourceMappings
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping
                  - lambda:DeleteEventSourceMapping
                  - lambda:GetEventSourceMapping
                  - lambda:ListEventSourceMappings
                  - lambda:UpdateEventSourceMapping
                Resource: "*"

        # ── API Gateway (HTTP APIs + REST APIs) ───────────────────────────
        - PolicyName: apigateway-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: ApiGateway
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - apigateway:GET
                  - apigateway:POST
                  - apigateway:PUT
                  - apigateway:PATCH
                  - apigateway:DELETE
                Resource:
                  - "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::*"

        # ── DynamoDB ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
        - PolicyName: dynamodb-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: DynamoDBTables
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - dynamodb:CreateTable
                  - dynamodb:DeleteTable
                  - dynamodb:DescribeTable
                  - dynamodb:UpdateTable
                  - dynamodb:ListTables
                  - dynamodb:TagResource
                  - dynamodb:UntagResource
                  - dynamodb:DescribeTimeToLive
                  - dynamodb:UpdateTimeToLive
                  - dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
                  - dynamodb:UpdateContinuousBackups
                Resource:
                  - !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/*"

        # ── S3 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
        # Covers bucket create/configure + object operations for SAM
        # artifact buckets and application buckets.
        - PolicyName: s3-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: S3BucketOps
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - s3:CreateBucket
                  - s3:DeleteBucket
                  - s3:GetBucketLocation
                  - s3:GetBucketPolicy
                  - s3:PutBucketPolicy
                  - s3:DeleteBucketPolicy
                  - s3:GetBucketTagging
                  - s3:PutBucketTagging
                  - s3:GetBucketVersioning
                  - s3:PutBucketVersioning
                  - s3:GetLifecycleConfiguration
                  - s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration
                  - s3:GetBucketPublicAccessBlock
                  - s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock
                  # Explicit BucketEncryption blocks (first: payments-dashboard
                  # BoaRawBucket, 2026-07-22) need the encryption config pair.
                  - s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration
                  - s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration
                  - s3:GetBucketNotification
                  - s3:PutBucketNotification
                  - s3:GetBucketWebsite
                  - s3:PutBucketWebsite
                  - s3:DeleteBucketWebsite
                  - s3:GetBucketAcl
                  - s3:PutBucketAcl
                Resource:
                  - "arn:aws:s3:::*"
              - Sid: S3ObjectOps
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - s3:GetObject
                  - s3:PutObject
                  - s3:DeleteObject
                  - s3:ListBucket
                  - s3:ListBucketVersions
                  - s3:GetObjectVersion
                Resource:
                  - "arn:aws:s3:::*"
                  - "arn:aws:s3:::*/*"

        # ── CloudWatch Logs ───────────────────────────────────────────────
        - PolicyName: cloudwatch-logs-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: CWLogs
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - logs:CreateLogGroup
                  - logs:DeleteLogGroup
                  - logs:DescribeLogGroups
                  - logs:PutRetentionPolicy
                  - logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
                  - logs:ListTagsLogGroup
                  - logs:TagLogGroup
                  - logs:UntagLogGroup
                  - logs:ListTagsForResource
                  - logs:TagResource
                  - logs:UntagResource
                  - logs:CreateLogDelivery
                  - logs:GetLogDelivery
                  - logs:UpdateLogDelivery
                  - logs:DeleteLogDelivery
                  - logs:ListLogDeliveries
                  - logs:PutResourcePolicy
                  - logs:DescribeResourcePolicies
                  - logs:PutDestination
                  - logs:DeleteDestination
                  - logs:DescribeDestinations
                  - logs:AssociateKmsKey
                  - logs:DisassociateKmsKey
                  # Reconciles drift: these three exist on the DEPLOYED role
                  # (added out-of-band 2026-06-29) but were never back-ported
                  # here. afterhours-shift-manager creates an
                  # AWS::Logs::MetricFilter through this role, so omitting them
                  # risks a future write-back silently stripping them.
                  - logs:PutMetricFilter
                  - logs:DeleteMetricFilter
                  - logs:DescribeMetricFilters
                Resource: "*"

        # ── EventBridge / CloudWatch Events (scheduled Lambdas) ───────────
        - PolicyName: eventbridge-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: EventBridge
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - events:DeleteRule
                  - events:DescribeRule
                  - events:EnableRule
                  - events:DisableRule
                  - events:ListRules
                  - events:ListTargetsByRule
                  - events:PutRule
                  - events:PutTargets
                  - events:RemoveTargets
                  - events:TagResource
                  - events:UntagResource
                  - events:ListTagsForResource
                  - events:PutPermission
                  - events:RemovePermission
                Resource: "*"

        # ── SES (afterhours weekly-post, meal-order email-report) ─────────
        - PolicyName: ses-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: SESRules
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - ses:CreateReceiptRule
                  - ses:DeleteReceiptRule
                  - ses:DescribeReceiptRule
                  - ses:UpdateReceiptRule
                  - ses:CreateReceiptRuleSet
                  - ses:DescribeActiveReceiptRuleSet
                  - ses:DescribeReceiptRuleSet
                  - ses:SetActiveReceiptRuleSet
                  - ses:ReorderReceiptRuleSet
                  - ses:GetIdentityVerificationAttributes
                  - ses:ListIdentities
                Resource: "*"

        # ── SQS (payments-dashboard queues + DLQs) ────────────────────────
        - PolicyName: sqs-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: SQSQueues
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - sqs:CreateQueue
                  - sqs:DeleteQueue
                  - sqs:GetQueueAttributes
                  - sqs:SetQueueAttributes
                  - sqs:GetQueueUrl
                  - sqs:ListQueues
                  - sqs:TagQueue
                  - sqs:UntagQueue
                  - sqs:ListQueueTags
                  - sqs:AddPermission
                  - sqs:RemovePermission
                Resource:
                  - !Sub "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:*"

        # ── SNS (validation / alarm notifications) ────────────────────────
        - PolicyName: sns-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: SNS
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - sns:CreateTopic
                  - sns:DeleteTopic
                  - sns:GetTopicAttributes
                  - sns:SetTopicAttributes
                  - sns:Subscribe
                  - sns:Unsubscribe
                  - sns:ListSubscriptionsByTopic
                  - sns:ListTopics
                  - sns:TagResource
                  - sns:UntagResource
                Resource:
                  - !Sub "arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:*"

        # ── CloudWatch Alarms ─────────────────────────────────────────────
        - PolicyName: cloudwatch-alarms-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: CWAlarms
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudwatch:PutMetricAlarm
                  - cloudwatch:DeleteAlarms
                  - cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
                  - cloudwatch:EnableAlarmActions
                  - cloudwatch:DisableAlarmActions
                  - cloudwatch:ListTagsForResource
                  - cloudwatch:TagResource
                  - cloudwatch:UntagResource
                Resource: "*"

        # ── EC2 / VPC / NAT / EIP / Security Groups ───────────────────────
        # payments-dashboard deploys a VPC, NAT gateway, EIP, route tables,
        # subnets, security groups, and gateway VPC endpoints.
        - PolicyName: ec2-vpc-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: EC2VPC
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - ec2:AllocateAddress
                  - ec2:AssociateRouteTable
                  - ec2:AttachInternetGateway
                  - ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress
                  - ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress
                  - ec2:CreateInternetGateway
                  - ec2:CreateNatGateway
                  - ec2:CreateRoute
                  - ec2:CreateRouteTable
                  - ec2:CreateSecurityGroup
                  - ec2:CreateSubnet
                  - ec2:CreateVpc
                  - ec2:CreateVpcEndpoint
                  - ec2:CreateTags
                  - ec2:DeleteInternetGateway
                  - ec2:DeleteNatGateway
                  - ec2:DeleteRoute
                  - ec2:DeleteRouteTable
                  - ec2:DeleteSecurityGroup
                  - ec2:DeleteSubnet
                  - ec2:DeleteVpc
                  - ec2:DeleteVpcEndpoints
                  - ec2:DescribeAddresses
                  - ec2:DescribeAvailabilityZones
                  - ec2:DescribeInternetGateways
                  - ec2:DescribeNatGateways
                  - ec2:DescribeRouteTables
                  - ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups
                  - ec2:DescribeSubnets
                  - ec2:DescribeVpcEndpoints
                  - ec2:DescribeVpcs
                  - ec2:DescribePrefixLists
                  - ec2:DetachInternetGateway
                  - ec2:DisassociateAddress
                  - ec2:DisassociateRouteTable
                  - ec2:ModifySubnetAttribute
                  - ec2:ModifyVpcAttribute
                  - ec2:ModifyVpcEndpoint
                  - ec2:ReleaseAddress
                  - ec2:RevokeSecurityGroupEgress
                  - ec2:RevokeSecurityGroupIngress
                  - ec2:UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsEgress
                  - ec2:UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress
                Resource: "*"

        # ── CloudFront + OAC (meal-order-manager form distribution) ───────
        - PolicyName: cloudfront-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: CloudFront
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudfront:CreateDistribution
                  - cloudfront:DeleteDistribution
                  - cloudfront:GetDistribution
                  - cloudfront:GetDistributionConfig
                  - cloudfront:UpdateDistribution
                  - cloudfront:TagResource
                  - cloudfront:UntagResource
                  - cloudfront:ListTagsForResource
                  - cloudfront:CreateOriginAccessControl
                  - cloudfront:DeleteOriginAccessControl
                  - cloudfront:GetOriginAccessControl
                  - cloudfront:GetOriginAccessControlConfig
                  - cloudfront:UpdateOriginAccessControl
                  - cloudfront:ListOriginAccessControls
                  - cloudfront:CreateInvalidation
                  - cloudfront:GetInvalidation
                Resource: "*"

        # ── SSM Parameter Store (meal-order-manager, afterhours) ──────────
        # Write is needed because meal-order-manager creates
        # /meal-order-manager/slack-channel-id via AWS::SSM::Parameter.
        - PolicyName: ssm-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: SSMParameters
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - ssm:GetParameter
                  - ssm:GetParameters
                  - ssm:GetParametersByPath
                  - ssm:PutParameter
                  - ssm:DeleteParameter
                  - ssm:DeleteParameters
                  - ssm:DescribeParameters
                  - ssm:AddTagsToResource
                  - ssm:RemoveTagsFromResource
                  - ssm:ListTagsForResource
                Resource:
                  - !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/*"
              # WAF association needs SSM parameter read at deploy time
              # (/seahaven/waf/app-web-acl-arn value lookup)
              - Sid: SSMParameterDescribe
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - ssm:DescribeParameters
                Resource: "*"

        # ── WAF (meal-order-manager CloudFront WebACL association) ────────
        - PolicyName: waf-management
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Sid: WAF
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - wafv2:GetWebACL
                  - wafv2:GetWebACLForResource
                  - wafv2:ListWebACLs
                  - wafv2:AssociateWebACL
                  - wafv2:DisassociateWebACL
                  - wafv2:ListResourcesForWebACL
                Resource: "*"

  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  # SAM deploy roles (4 repos)
  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  AfterhoursShiftManagerDeployRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      RoleName: githubdeploy-afterhours-shift-manager
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Federated: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud: sts.amazonaws.com
              StringLike:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub: !Sub repo:${GitHubOrg}/afterhours-shift-manager:ref:refs/heads/main
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: sam-deploy
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DeleteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStackEvents
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStacks
                  - cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:GetTemplate
                  - cloudformation:ListStackResources
                  - cloudformation:UpdateStack
                  - cloudformation:CreateStack
                  - cloudformation:TagResource
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/afterhours-shift-manager/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:GetTemplateSummary
                Resource: "*"
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStacks
                  - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:CreateStack
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/aws-sam-cli-managed-default/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - s3:PutObject
                  - s3:GetObject
                  - s3:ListBucket
                  - s3:GetBucketLocation
                  - s3:CreateBucket
                  - s3:PutBucketPolicy
                  - s3:GetBucketPolicy
                  - s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration
                  - s3:PutBucketVersioning
                  - s3:DeleteObject
                Resource:
                  - arn:aws:s3:::aws-sam-cli-managed-default-samclisourcebucket-*
                  - arn:aws:s3:::aws-sam-cli-managed-default-samclisourcebucket-*/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - iam:PassRole
                Resource:
                  - !GetAtt SamCfnExecutionRole.Arn

  FrontIntegrationsDeployRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      RoleName: githubdeploy-front-integrations
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Federated: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud: sts.amazonaws.com
              StringLike:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub: !Sub repo:${GitHubOrg}/front-integrations:ref:refs/heads/main
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: sam-deploy
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DeleteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStackEvents
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStacks
                  - cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:GetTemplate
                  - cloudformation:ListStackResources
                  - cloudformation:UpdateStack
                  - cloudformation:CreateStack
                  - cloudformation:TagResource
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/front-integrations/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:GetTemplateSummary
                Resource: "*"
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStacks
                  - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:CreateStack
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/aws-sam-cli-managed-default/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - s3:PutObject
                  - s3:GetObject
                  - s3:ListBucket
                  - s3:GetBucketLocation
                  - s3:CreateBucket
                  - s3:PutBucketPolicy
                  - s3:GetBucketPolicy
                  - s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration
                  - s3:PutBucketVersioning
                  - s3:DeleteObject
                Resource:
                  - arn:aws:s3:::aws-sam-cli-managed-default-samclisourcebucket-*
                  - arn:aws:s3:::aws-sam-cli-managed-default-samclisourcebucket-*/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - iam:PassRole
                Resource:
                  - !GetAtt SamCfnExecutionRole.Arn

  AfiBackupMonitorDeployRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      RoleName: githubdeploy-afi-backup-monitor
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Federated: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud: sts.amazonaws.com
              StringLike:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub: !Sub repo:${GitHubOrg}/afi-backup-monitor:ref:refs/heads/main
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: sam-deploy
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DeleteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStackEvents
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStacks
                  - cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:GetTemplate
                  - cloudformation:ListStackResources
                  - cloudformation:UpdateStack
                  - cloudformation:CreateStack
                  - cloudformation:TagResource
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/afi-backup-monitor/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:GetTemplateSummary
                Resource: "*"
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStacks
                  - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:CreateStack
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/aws-sam-cli-managed-default/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - s3:PutObject
                  - s3:GetObject
                  - s3:ListBucket
                  - s3:GetBucketLocation
                  - s3:CreateBucket
                  - s3:PutBucketPolicy
                  - s3:GetBucketPolicy
                  - s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration
                  - s3:PutBucketVersioning
                  - s3:DeleteObject
                Resource:
                  - arn:aws:s3:::aws-sam-cli-managed-default-samclisourcebucket-*
                  - arn:aws:s3:::aws-sam-cli-managed-default-samclisourcebucket-*/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - iam:PassRole
                Resource:
                  - !GetAtt SamCfnExecutionRole.Arn

  PaymentsDashboardDeployRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      RoleName: githubdeploy-payments-dashboard
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Federated: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud: sts.amazonaws.com
              StringLike:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub: !Sub repo:${GitHubOrg}/payments-dashboard:ref:refs/heads/main
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: sam-deploy
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DeleteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStackEvents
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStacks
                  - cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:GetTemplate
                  - cloudformation:ListStackResources
                  - cloudformation:UpdateStack
                  - cloudformation:CreateStack
                  - cloudformation:TagResource
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/payments-dashboard/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:GetTemplateSummary
                Resource: "*"
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStacks
                  - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:DescribeChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet
                  - cloudformation:CreateStack
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/aws-sam-cli-managed-default/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - s3:PutObject
                  - s3:GetObject
                  - s3:ListBucket
                  - s3:GetBucketLocation
                  - s3:CreateBucket
                  - s3:PutBucketPolicy
                  - s3:GetBucketPolicy
                  - s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration
                  - s3:PutBucketVersioning
                  - s3:DeleteObject
                Resource:
                  - arn:aws:s3:::aws-sam-cli-managed-default-samclisourcebucket-*
                  - arn:aws:s3:::aws-sam-cli-managed-default-samclisourcebucket-*/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - iam:PassRole
                Resource:
                  - !GetAtt SamCfnExecutionRole.Arn

  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  # CDK deploy roles (4 repos)
  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  ExecAideDeployRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      RoleName: githubdeploy-exec-aide
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Federated: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud: sts.amazonaws.com
              StringLike:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub: !Sub repo:${GitHubOrg}/exec-aide:ref:refs/heads/main
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: cdk-deploy
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - sts:AssumeRole
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/cdk-hnb659fds-*

  SeahavenDoorUnlockApiDeployRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      RoleName: githubdeploy-seahaven-door-unlock-api
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Federated: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud: sts.amazonaws.com
              StringLike:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub: !Sub repo:${GitHubOrg}/seahaven-door-unlock-api:ref:refs/heads/main
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: cdk-deploy
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - sts:AssumeRole
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/cdk-hnb659fds-*

  ProcurementIngestDeployRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      RoleName: githubdeploy-procurement-ingest
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Federated: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud: sts.amazonaws.com
              StringLike:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub: !Sub repo:${GitHubOrg}/procurement-ingest:ref:refs/heads/main
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: cdk-deploy
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - sts:AssumeRole
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/cdk-hnb659fds-*

  ApmWoAnalysisDeployRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      RoleName: githubdeploy-apm-wo-analysis
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Federated: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud: sts.amazonaws.com
              StringLike:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub: !Sub repo:${GitHubOrg}/apm-wo-analysis:ref:refs/heads/main
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: cdk-deploy
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - sts:AssumeRole
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/cdk-hnb659fds-*

  SeahavenAccountBaselineDeployRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      RoleName: githubdeploy-seahaven-account-baseline
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Federated: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
            Condition:
              StringEquals:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud: sts.amazonaws.com
              StringLike:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub: !Sub repo:${GitHubOrg}/seahaven-org-baseline:ref:refs/heads/main
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: cdk-deploy
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - sts:AssumeRole
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/cdk-hnb659fds-*

  # Scoped runtime role for the meal-order-manager weekly-menu workflow
  # (Monday scrape + order-form publish). Deliberately narrower than the
  # repo's deploy role: the scheduled job reads stack outputs and app config,
  # writes menu items and the published form, and invalidates the form's
  # CloudFront path. It deploys nothing, so it gets no CloudFormation write
  # actions, no PassRole, and no access outside the form bucket.
  MealOrderManagerWeeklyMenuRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      RoleName: github-meal-order-manager-weekly-menu
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Federated: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
            Condition:
              # StringEquals (not the sibling roles' StringLike): no wildcard is
              # intended, and job_workflow_ref pins this runtime role to the ONE
              # workflow it serves — unlike the deploy roles, any main-branch
              # workflow must NOT be able to mint these credentials.
              StringEquals:
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud: sts.amazonaws.com
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub: !Sub repo:${GitHubOrg}/meal-order-manager:ref:refs/heads/main
                token.actions.githubusercontent.com:job_workflow_ref: !Sub ${GitHubOrg}/meal-order-manager/.github/workflows/weekly-menu.yml@refs/heads/main
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: weekly-menu-publish
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudformation:DescribeStacks
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/meal-order-manager/*
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue
                # Secrets Manager appends a random 6-char suffix to every secret
                # ARN, so a name-based match needs a glob — but exactly six '?'
                # (one char each), NOT '-*', which would also match any future
                # secret extending the name (e.g. form-api-key-backup).
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:meal-order-manager/form-api-key-??????
                  - !Sub arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:meal-order-manager/slack-bot-token-??????
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - ssm:GetParameter
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/meal-order-manager/google-client-id
                  - !Sub arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/meal-order-manager/slack-channel-id
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - dynamodb:GetItem
                  - dynamodb:PutItem
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/meal-order-manager-orders
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - s3:PutObject
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-form-${AWS::AccountId}/index.html
                  - !Sub arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-form-${AWS::AccountId}/archive/*.html
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - cloudfront:CreateInvalidation
                # Distribution ID = the meal-order-manager stack's DistributionId
                # output (stable for the life of the distribution).
                Resource:
                  - !Sub arn:aws:cloudfront::${AWS::AccountId}:distribution/E314J1CJJ9ZTRA

Outputs:
  LambdaExecutionBoundaryArn:
    Value: !Ref LambdaExecutionBoundary
    Description: >-
      ARN of the Lambda execution permissions boundary. Set this as
      PermissionsBoundary on Globals.Function in all five SAM stacks.
    Export:
      Name: seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary-arn
  SamCfnExecutionRoleArn:
    Value: !GetAtt SamCfnExecutionRole.Arn
    Export:
      Name: github-cfn-execution-role-arn
  AfterhoursShiftManagerDeployRoleArn:
    Value: !GetAtt AfterhoursShiftManagerDeployRole.Arn
  FrontIntegrationsDeployRoleArn:
    Value: !GetAtt FrontIntegrationsDeployRole.Arn
  AfiBackupMonitorDeployRoleArn:
    Value: !GetAtt AfiBackupMonitorDeployRole.Arn
  PaymentsDashboardDeployRoleArn:
    Value: !GetAtt PaymentsDashboardDeployRole.Arn
  # SeahavenSlackBotDeployRoleArn removed 2026-07-27: the role was deleted
  # out-of-band on 2026-07-23, so this !GetAtt failed as a live IAM read and
  # broke every stack update. Nothing imported it (the Output had no
  # ExportName, and no stack imports any export from this stack).
  ExecAideDeployRoleArn:
    Value: !GetAtt ExecAideDeployRole.Arn
  SeahavenDoorUnlockApiDeployRoleArn:
    Value: !GetAtt SeahavenDoorUnlockApiDeployRole.Arn
  ProcurementIngestDeployRoleArn:
    Value: !GetAtt ProcurementIngestDeployRole.Arn
  ApmWoAnalysisDeployRoleArn:
    Value: !GetAtt ApmWoAnalysisDeployRole.Arn
  SeahavenAccountBaselineDeployRoleArn:
    Value: !GetAtt SeahavenAccountBaselineDeployRole.Arn
  MealOrderManagerWeeklyMenuRoleArn:
    Value: !GetAtt MealOrderManagerWeeklyMenuRole.Arn