docs(iam): clarify boundary rollback recovery

oidc-deploy-roles.yaml

@@ -338,30 +338,17 @@ Resources:
               StringEquals:
                 "iam:PermissionsBoundary": !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary"
 
-          # Boundary management — SET the boundary only. DELETE is NOT
+          # Boundary management is SET-only. Granting delete would let this
-          # granted: for a delete, the iam:PermissionsBoundary condition key
+          # role create a boundary-gated role, strip the boundary, then pass an
-          # reflects the boundary CURRENTLY attached to the target role, so
+          # unconstrained role to Lambda. SAM creation and teardown need only
-          # a StringEquals condition on the boundary ARN MATCHES exactly the
+          # PutRolePermissionsBoundary and DeleteRole.
-          # roles the gate protects. Granting delete under that condition
-          # lets this role create a boundary-gated role with an inline *:*
-          # policy, strip the boundary, and pass the now-unbounded role to
-          # Lambda — defeating the primary escalation control. Verified live
-          # against the mgmt copy 2026-07-27 (simulate-principal-policy:
-          # iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary = allowed).
           #
-          # OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCE — read before debugging a stuck stack.
+          # Removing a boundary therefore fails by design. A failed rollback
-          # SAM does not need the delete for the common paths: it SETS the
+          # reaches UPDATE_ROLLBACK_FAILED and needs admin recovery by skipping
-          # boundary on roles it creates, and stack teardown calls DeleteRole.
+          # or replacing the role. A successful rollback reaches the stable
-          # But there IS one path that now fails by design: updating an
+          # UPDATE_ROLLBACK_COMPLETE state and can accept a corrective update.
-          # existing AWS::IAM::Role to REMOVE its PermissionsBoundary property
+          # Removing a SAM function boundary is a security regression, so
-          # makes CloudFormation call DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary, which is
+          # failing loudly is intentional.
-          # denied. If rollback also fails, the stack reaches
-          # UPDATE_ROLLBACK_FAILED and needs out-of-band admin recovery (remove
-          # the boundary directly, skip the resource during rollback, or
-          # replace the role by renaming its logical id). A successful rollback
-          # reaches UPDATE_ROLLBACK_COMPLETE and can accept a corrective update.
-          # Removing the boundary from a SAM function is a security regression
-          # anyway, so failing loudly here is the intent.
           - Sid: IAMPutPermissionsBoundary
             Effect: Allow
             Action: