ci: add deterministic PR policy gate

Refs: PLAT-62

.github/dependabot.yml

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ updates:
     directory: "/"
     schedule:
       interval: "weekly"
+    commit-message:
+      prefix: "chore(deps)"
     groups:
       minor-and-patch:
         update-types:

.github/workflows/callable-pr-policy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,697 @@
+name: PR Policy
+
+# Reusable PR metadata gate for all Sea-Haven-Industries repos.
+#
+# Validates pull-request metadata — title convention, branch naming, body
+# structure, commit subjects, Jira existence, AI attribution footers, and
+# workflow file pin compliance — without executing any PR code or checking
+# out the repository. All checks run through the GitHub API only.
+#
+# Callers trigger this on `pull_request` (NOT pull_request_target) with event
+# types: opened, reopened, synchronize, edited, labeled, unlabeled,
+# ready_for_review. The check-run name is `<caller-job-id> / pr`; the
+# canonical caller job id is `policy`, producing the context `policy / pr`.
+#
+# Secrets are optional at the declaration level. For human PRs that include a
+# Jira key, all three must be configured or the check fails closed (POLICY-INFRA).
+# Dependabot skips Jira/branch/body checks but still runs commit-subject and
+# workflow supply-chain checks.
+#
+# Emergency-revert exemption: when the title type is `revert`, the PR has no
+# Jira key in the title, and the `emergency-revert` label is present on the PR,
+# a candidate exemption is computed before title validation so the Jira key is
+# not required in the title. The exemption is confirmed by verifying that the
+# label was applied by a collaborator with maintain or admin permission. Any
+# pagination truncation of the event timeline is POLICY-INFRA — partial history
+# is never trusted. Unauthorized/null-actor/bot results add a violation.
+# Branch, body, and commit checks remain regardless.
+#
+# Known platform limitation: metadata edits (labels, title changes) made via
+# GITHUB_TOKEN do not reliably emit a new pull_request event. Org automation
+# that applies labels must use a GitHub App token or a PAT so the policy gate
+# re-runs automatically after the label is applied.
+#
+# Caller example:
+#   jobs:
+#     policy:
+#       uses: Sea-Haven-Industries/.github/.github/workflows/callable-pr-policy.yaml@<sha> # vX.Y.Z
+#       secrets:
+#         JIRA_CLOUD_ID: ${{ secrets.JIRA_CLOUD_ID }}
+#         JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL: ${{ secrets.JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL }}
+#         JIRA_API_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.JIRA_API_TOKEN }}
+
+on:
+  workflow_call:
+    secrets:
+      JIRA_CLOUD_ID:
+        required: false
+      JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL:
+        required: false
+      JIRA_API_TOKEN:
+        required: false
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+  issues: read
+  pull-requests: read
+
+jobs:
+  pr:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 10
+    steps:
+      - name: Validate PR
+        uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3  # v9.0.0
+        env:
+          JIRA_CLOUD_ID: ${{ secrets.JIRA_CLOUD_ID }}
+          JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL: ${{ secrets.JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL }}
+          JIRA_API_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.JIRA_API_TOKEN }}
+        with:
+          script: |
+            // ── Pure validation functions ────────────────────────────────────────────
+            // Extracted and exercised by test/pr-policy.test.mjs via PR_POLICY_TEST.
+            // These functions have no side effects and make no API calls.
+
+            const CONV_TYPES = ['feat','fix','docs','style','refactor','perf','test','build','ci','chore','revert','release'];
+            const REQUIRED_H2 = ['Summary','Validation','Tests','Notes'];
+
+            // AI-attribution footer patterns — case-insensitive, multiline.
+            // Matches Co-authored-by: trailers naming known AI tools and "Generated by/with"
+            // phrases. Does NOT flag generic prose like "uses AI" or "AI-powered".
+            // GPT variants: gpt-3, gpt-4, gpt-4o, gpt-5, gpt-o, etc. covered by gpt-[a-z0-9]+.
+            const AI_FOOTER_RE = /^(?:co-authored-by:\s+(?:claude|chatgpt|gpt-[a-z0-9]+|copilot|github\s+copilot|gemini|cursor(?:\s*ai)?|codeium|anthropic|openai|codex)\b|generated\s+(?:with|by)\s+(?:claude(?:\s+code)?|github\s+copilot|chatgpt|codex|gpt-[a-z0-9]+|gemini|codeium|cursor(?:\s*ai)?|anthropic|openai)|🤖\s+generated\b)/im;
+
+            function validateTitle(title, isDependabot, jiraMaybeExempt) {
+              const errs = [];
+              if (title.length > 72) errs.push('Title is ' + title.length + ' chars — max 72');
+              const m = title.match(/^(feat|fix|docs|style|refactor|perf|test|build|ci|chore|revert|release)(\([^)]+\))?(!)?: (.+?)(\s+\((DEV|PLAT|SEC)-\d+\))?$/);
+              if (!m) {
+                errs.push('Title must match: type(scope): description (KEY-NNN). Allowed types: ' + CONV_TYPES.join(' '));
+                return errs;
+              }
+              const desc = m[4];
+              const jiraSuffix = m[5];
+              if (desc.endsWith('.')) errs.push('Description must not end with a period');
+              if (!/^[a-z]/.test(desc)) errs.push('Description must start with a lowercase letter');
+              if (!isDependabot && !jiraSuffix && !jiraMaybeExempt) {
+                errs.push('Missing Jira key — expected (DEV-NNN), (PLAT-NNN), or (SEC-NNN) at end of title');
+              }
+              return errs;
+            }
+
+            function getJiraKey(title) {
+              const m = title.match(/\((DEV|PLAT|SEC)-(\d+)\)$/);
+              return m ? m[1] + '-' + m[2] : null;
+            }
+
+            function validateBranch(branch, isDependabot) {
+              if (isDependabot) return [];
+              const errs = [];
+              // Segment must be proper kebab-case: no consecutive hyphens, no trailing hyphen.
+              const m = branch.match(/^(feature|fix|hotfix|chore|docs|refactor|release)\/([a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*)$/);
+              if (!m) {
+                errs.push('Branch "' + branch + '" must match prefix/kebab-case (no consecutive/trailing hyphens, no uppercase, one segment). Prefixes: feature fix hotfix chore docs refactor release');
+                return errs;
+              }
+              if (/(?:DEV|PLAT|SEC|INFRA)-\d+/i.test(m[2])) errs.push('Branch segment must not contain a Jira key');
+              return errs;
+            }
+
+            function validateBody(rawBody, isDependabot) {
+              if (isDependabot) return [];
+              if (!rawBody || !rawBody.trim()) return ['PR body is empty'];
+              const errs = [];
+              // Strip fenced code blocks line-by-line before scanning headings.
+              // Fence markers: backtick (0x60) or tilde. Up to 3 leading spaces allowed
+              // (CommonMark spec). Use charCode to avoid literal backtick in source
+              // (which confuses actionlint's expression scanner).
+              const TICK = String.fromCharCode(0x60);
+              const bodyLines = rawBody.split('\n');
+              const stripped = [];
+              let inFence = false;
+              let fenceChar = '';
+              let fenceLen = 0;
+              const fenceRe = new RegExp('^ {0,3}(' + TICK + '{3,}|~{3,})');
+              for (const line of bodyLines) {
+                if (!inFence) {
+                  const fm = fenceRe.exec(line);
+                  if (fm) {
+                    inFence = true;
+                    fenceChar = fm[1][0];
+                    fenceLen = fm[1].length;
+                    stripped.push('');
+                  } else {
+                    stripped.push(line);
+                  }
+                } else {
+                  const fm = fenceRe.exec(line);
+                  if (fm && fm[1][0] === fenceChar && fm[1].length >= fenceLen && line.trim() === fm[1]) {
+                    inFence = false;
+                    stripped.push('');
+                  } else {
+                    stripped.push('');
+                  }
+                }
+              }
+              const cleaned = stripped.join('\n').replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, '');
+              const h2s = Array.from(cleaned.matchAll(/^## (.+)$/gm)).map(function(x) { return x[1].trim(); });
+              if (h2s.length !== 4) {
+                errs.push('Body must have exactly 4 ## headings (Summary/Validation/Tests/Notes), found ' + h2s.length + (h2s.length ? ': ' + h2s.join(', ') : ''));
+                return errs;
+              }
+              for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+                if (h2s[i] !== REQUIRED_H2[i]) errs.push('Heading ' + (i + 1) + ': expected "## ' + REQUIRED_H2[i] + '", got "## ' + h2s[i] + '"');
+              }
+              const sectionParts = cleaned.split(/^(?=## )/m).filter(function(p) { return p.startsWith('## '); });
+              for (let i = 0; i < Math.min(sectionParts.length, 4); i++) {
+                const content = sectionParts[i].replace(/^## [^\n]*\n?/, '').trim();
+                if (!content) errs.push('## ' + REQUIRED_H2[i] + ' section is empty');
+              }
+              return errs;
+            }
+
+            function validateCommitSubject(subject) {
+              const errs = [];
+              if (subject.length > 72) errs.push('Commit subject is ' + subject.length + ' chars — max 72');
+              const m = subject.match(/^(feat|fix|docs|style|refactor|perf|test|build|ci|chore|revert|release)(\([^)]+\))?(!)?: (.+)$/);
+              if (!m) {
+                errs.push('Not conventional: "' + subject.slice(0, 60) + (subject.length > 60 ? '\u2026' : '') + '"');
+                return errs;
+              }
+              const desc = m[4];
+              if (!/^[a-z]/.test(desc)) errs.push('Commit description must start with a lowercase letter');
+              if (desc.endsWith('.')) errs.push('Commit description must not end with a period');
+              if (/\s+\((DEV|PLAT|SEC)-\d+\)$/i.test(subject)) errs.push('Commit subject must not carry a Jira key suffix — only the PR title does');
+              return errs;
+            }
+
+            function detectAiFooter(text) {
+              return AI_FOOTER_RE.test(text);
+            }
+
+            function isWorkflowFilename(filename) {
+              return /^\.github\/workflows\/[^/]+\.ya?ml$/.test(filename) ||
+                /^workflow-templates\/[^/]+\.ya?ml$/.test(filename);
+            }
+
+            // Deterministic line scanner for workflow YAML content.
+            //
+            // Block-scalar tracking: any YAML key whose value begins with | or >
+            // (including explicit indent/chomp forms |2, |2-, |-2, >+2, etc.)
+            // starts a block scalar. Lines inside ANY block scalar are not parsed
+            // as structural YAML keys — they are content. For run: block scalars,
+            // the content is still scanned for expression injection (expressions
+            // must flow through env:). For non-run block scalars (e.g. script:,
+            // name:), the content is skipped entirely — no uses: or run: detection.
+            //
+            // Quoted keys: "uses", 'uses', "run", 'run', "permissions" are all
+            // recognized in addition to their unquoted forms.
+            //
+            // Quoted action refs: `uses: "owner/repo@sha" # vX.Y.Z` correctly
+            // parses the comment outside the closing quote as the version annotation.
+            //
+            // Fails closed on YAML forms the line scanner cannot safely resolve:
+            //   - Escaped/encoded keys in double-quoted strings ("u\u0073es")
+            //   - Flow-style sequence steps (- { uses: ... }, - { run: ... })
+            //   - YAML aliases/anchors on run:, uses:, or permissions: values
+            //
+            // All-zero SHAs and v0.0.0 placeholder pins are rejected.
+            function validateWorkflowContent(content, filename) {
+              const errs = [];
+              const EXPR_OPEN = '$' + '{{';
+
+              // 1. Top-level permissions key required at column 0 (may be quoted).
+              if (!/^(?:"permissions"|'permissions'|permissions):/m.test(content)) {
+                errs.push(filename + ': missing top-level "permissions:" key');
+              }
+
+              // 1b. Top-level permissions alias check.
+              if (/^(?:"permissions"|'permissions'|permissions):[ \t]+\*/m.test(content)) {
+                errs.push(filename + ': YAML alias for top-level "permissions:" value is not supported — inline the permissions map');
+              }
+
+              // 2. Line-by-line scan.
+              // inBlock: currently inside a block scalar
+              // blockIndent: indent of the key that opened the block scalar
+              // blockIsRun: the block belongs to a run: key (check expressions)
+              const lines = content.split('\n');
+              let inBlock = false;
+              let blockIndent = -1;
+              let blockIsRun = false;
+
+              for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+                const line = lines[i];
+                const rawIndent = (line.match(/^([ \t]*)/) || ['', ''])[1].length;
+
+                // ── Inside a block scalar ────────────────────────────────────────
+                if (inBlock) {
+                  if (line.trim() === '') continue;
+                  if (rawIndent > blockIndent) {
+                    // Content of block scalar.
+                    // Only flag expression injection for run: block scalars.
+                    if (blockIsRun && line.includes(EXPR_OPEN)) {
+                      errs.push(filename + ':' + (i + 1) + ': run: block contains ' + EXPR_OPEN + ' }} — expressions must go through env:');
+                    }
+                    continue;
+                  }
+                  // Indent at or below the block key — exit block scalar.
+                  inBlock = false;
+                  blockIndent = -1;
+                  blockIsRun = false;
+                  // Fall through to process this line as structural YAML.
+                }
+
+                // ── Escaped/encoded double-quoted key — fail closed ───────────────
+                // A double-quoted key containing \ cannot be reliably resolved by
+                // the line scanner (e.g. "u\u0073es" parses as "uses" in YAML).
+                // Reject any such key at the structural position.
+                if (/^[ \t]*(?:-[ \t]+)?"[^"]*\\[^"]*":/.test(line)) {
+                  errs.push(filename + ':' + (i + 1) + ': escaped key in double-quoted string is not supported — use literal key names (run:, uses:, permissions:)');
+                  continue;
+                }
+
+                // ── Flow-style sequence step — fail closed only for structural keys ─
+                // `- { ... }` form cannot be safely resolved when it contains a
+                // structural run: or uses: key (including quoted or escaped forms).
+                // Non-step data objects like `- { os: ubuntu, node: 24 }` are
+                // allowed — they cannot contain action refs or run scripts.
+                // `permissions: {}` is a mapping value (not a sequence item),
+                // so it is unaffected by this check entirely.
+                if (/^[ \t]*-[ \t]+\{[^}]/.test(line)) {
+                  const braceIdx = line.indexOf('{');
+                  const flowContent = line.slice(braceIdx);
+                  if (/[{,]\s*(?:"uses"|'uses'|uses|"run"|'run'|run|"[^"]*\\[^"]*")\s*:/.test(flowContent)) {
+                    errs.push(filename + ':' + (i + 1) + ': flow-style step mapping with structural "run:" or "uses:" key is not supported — use block mapping style');
+                  }
+                  continue;
+                }
+
+                // ── Any block scalar key detection (| or >) ──────────────────────
+                // Matches quoted ("key", 'key') and unquoted (key) key names,
+                // with optional sequence-item prefix (- ), followed by a block
+                // indicator (| or > with optional explicit-indent/chomp modifiers).
+                // YAML block scalar header forms: |  |2  |-  |+  |2-  |2+  |-2  |+2
+                // and equivalents with > (folded). Both digit-first and chomp-first
+                // orderings are recognized per the YAML 1.2 spec.
+                // Groups: [1]=indent [2]=full-key [3]=dq-content [4]=sq-content [5]=unquoted [6]=indicator
+                const blockM = line.match(/^([ \t]*)(?:-[ \t]+)?("([^"]*)"|'([^']*)'|([\w-]+)):[ \t]*([|>](?:[1-9][-+]?|[-+][1-9]?)?)[ \t]*(?:#.*)?$/);
+                if (blockM) {
+                  const keyName = blockM[3] !== undefined ? blockM[3] : (blockM[4] !== undefined ? blockM[4] : (blockM[5] || ''));
+                  inBlock = true;
+                  blockIndent = blockM[1].length;
+                  blockIsRun = (keyName === 'run');
+                  continue;
+                }
+
+                // ── Inline run: value (no block indicator) ───────────────────────
+                // Handles mapping form and sequence-item form; quoted and unquoted key.
+                // A run: &anchor | line (anchor before block indicator) falls here
+                // because blockM cannot match it; the & causes the alias check below.
+                const inlineRunM = line.match(/^[ \t]*(?:-[ \t]+)?(?:"run"|'run'|run):[ \t]+(.*)$/);
+                if (inlineRunM) {
+                  const runVal = inlineRunM[1].trimStart();
+                  // A YAML alias is *name; an anchor is &name (non-whitespace after &).
+                  // Ordinary shell & like 'echo "R&D build"' does not start with * or &word.
+                  if (runVal[0] === '*' || /^&\S/.test(runVal)) {
+                    errs.push(filename + ':' + (i + 1) + ': YAML alias/anchor in "run:" value is not supported — inline the run script');
+                    continue;
+                  }
+                  if (inlineRunM[1].includes(EXPR_OPEN)) {
+                    errs.push(filename + ':' + (i + 1) + ': run: value contains ' + EXPR_OPEN + ' }} — expressions must go through env:');
+                  }
+                  continue;
+                }
+
+                // ── uses: key detection ──────────────────────────────────────────
+                // Handles mapping form and sequence-item form; quoted and unquoted key.
+                const usesM = line.match(/^[ \t]+(?:-[ \t]+)?(?:"uses"|'uses'|uses):[ \t]+(.+)$/);
+                if (!usesM) continue;
+
+                // Parse the action ref — handle quoted scalar with comment outside quotes.
+                const rawVal = usesM[1].trim();
+
+                // Reject YAML alias/anchor in uses: value.
+                // An alias is *name; an anchor is &name (non-whitespace after &).
+                if (rawVal[0] === '*' || /^&\S/.test(rawVal)) {
+                  errs.push(filename + ':' + (i + 1) + ': YAML alias/anchor in "uses:" value is not supported — inline the action ref');
+                  continue;
+                }
+
+                let ref;
+                let extComment = '';
+
+                if (rawVal[0] === '"' || rawVal[0] === "'") {
+                  const q = rawVal[0];
+                  const closeIdx = rawVal.indexOf(q, 1);
+                  if (closeIdx !== -1) {
+                    ref = rawVal.slice(1, closeIdx);
+                    const rest = rawVal.slice(closeIdx + 1).trimStart();
+                    if (rest[0] === '#') extComment = rest;
+                  } else {
+                    ref = rawVal; // malformed quote — treat as unquoted
+                  }
+                } else {
+                  ref = rawVal;
+                }
+
+                // Local and docker refs are exempt from SHA pinning.
+                if (ref.startsWith('./') || ref.startsWith('docker://')) continue;
+
+                // Validate SHA + version comment.
+                // For quoted refs, combine the unquoted value with any external comment.
+                const forShaCheck = extComment ? ref + '  ' + extComment : ref;
+                const shaMatch = forShaCheck.match(/@([0-9a-f]{40})[ \t]+#[ \t]+v(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)$/i);
+                if (!shaMatch) {
+                  const short = ref.length > 80 ? ref.slice(0, 77) + '\u2026' : ref;
+                  errs.push(filename + ': "uses: ' + short + '" must be pinned to a 40-char SHA with "# vX.Y.Z" comment');
+                  continue;
+                }
+
+                // Reject all-zero placeholder SHA.
+                if (/^0{40}$/.test(shaMatch[1])) {
+                  const short = ref.length > 60 ? ref.slice(0, 57) + '\u2026' : ref;
+                  errs.push(filename + ': "uses: ' + short + '" uses a placeholder all-zero SHA — replace with the actual release SHA');
+                }
+
+                // Reject v0.0.0 placeholder version.
+                if (shaMatch[2] === '0' && shaMatch[3] === '0' && shaMatch[4] === '0') {
+                  const short = ref.length > 60 ? ref.slice(0, 57) + '\u2026' : ref;
+                  errs.push(filename + ': "uses: ' + short + '" uses placeholder version v0.0.0 — update to the actual release version');
+                }
+              }
+
+              return errs;
+            }
+
+            // Retry-After header parser — supports integer seconds and HTTP-date.
+            // Returns milliseconds to wait, capped at 60000. Returns 0 for invalid
+            // or non-positive values so the caller uses exponential fallback instead.
+            // nowMs is injectable for testing; defaults to Date.now().
+            function parseRetryAfterMs(header, nowMs) {
+              if (!header) return 0;
+              const secs = parseInt(header, 10);
+              if (!isNaN(secs) && secs > 0) return Math.min(secs * 1000, 60000);
+              const date = new Date(header);
+              if (!isNaN(date.getTime())) {
+                const ms = date.getTime() - (nowMs !== undefined ? nowMs : Date.now());
+                return ms > 0 ? Math.min(ms, 60000) : 0;
+              }
+              return 0;
+            }
+
+            // Pure helpers for commit and file count limit checks.
+            function checkCommitLimit(prCommits) {
+              if (prCommits > 250) {
+                return 'POLICY-INFRA: PR has ' + prCommits + ' commits — GitHub REST API caps listCommits at 250; not all commit subjects can be validated';
+              }
+              return null;
+            }
+
+            function checkFilesLimit(prChangedFiles) {
+              if (prChangedFiles > 3000) {
+                return 'POLICY-INFRA: PR has ' + prChangedFiles + ' changed files — GitHub REST API caps listFiles at 3000; not all workflow files can be validated';
+              }
+              return null;
+            }
+
+            // ── Test escape ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+            // Set PR_POLICY_TEST=1 to extract pure functions without hitting any API.
+            if (process.env.PR_POLICY_TEST === '1') {
+              return {
+                validateTitle,
+                getJiraKey,
+                validateBranch,
+                validateBody,
+                validateCommitSubject,
+                detectAiFooter,
+                isWorkflowFilename,
+                validateWorkflowContent,
+                parseRetryAfterMs,
+                checkCommitLimit,
+                checkFilesLimit,
+              };
+            }
+
+            // ── Jira API helper ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+            // Retries on 429/5xx up to 3 times with Retry-After header support.
+            // On the final attempt (attempt === 3), 429/5xx falls through to the
+            // status-specific throw. Never logs secrets or response bodies.
+            async function jiraGetIssue(cloudId, issueKey, email, token) {
+              const https = require('https');
+              const apiPath = '/ex/jira/' + cloudId + '/rest/api/3/issue/' + issueKey + '?fields=key';
+              const authHeader = 'Basic ' + Buffer.from(email + ':' + token).toString('base64');
+              for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= 3; attempt++) {
+                const result = await new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {
+                  const req = https.request({
+                    hostname: 'api.atlassian.com',
+                    path: apiPath,
+                    method: 'GET',
+                    headers: { 'Authorization': authHeader, 'Accept': 'application/json' },
+                  }, function(res) {
+                    const chunks = [];
+                    res.on('data', function(c) { chunks.push(c); });
+                    res.on('end', function() {
+                      resolve({ status: res.statusCode, retryAfter: res.headers['retry-after'], body: Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8') });
+                    });
+                  });
+                  req.on('error', reject);
+                  req.end();
+                });
+                if (result.status === 200) {
+                  let parsed;
+                  try { parsed = JSON.parse(result.body); } catch (_) {
+                    const e = new Error('Jira API returned non-JSON'); e.isInfra = true; throw e;
+                  }
+                  if (parsed.key !== issueKey) throw new Error('Jira returned key "' + parsed.key + '" but expected "' + issueKey + '"');
+                  return parsed;
+                }
+                if (result.status === 404) throw new Error('Jira issue ' + issueKey + ' not found');
+                if (result.status === 401 || result.status === 403) {
+                  const e = new Error('Jira auth rejected (HTTP ' + result.status + ')'); e.isInfra = true; throw e;
+                }
+                if ((result.status === 429 || result.status >= 500) && attempt < 3) {
+                  const headerMs = parseRetryAfterMs(result.retryAfter);
+                  const delayMs = headerMs > 0 ? headerMs : Math.min(2000 * (attempt + 1), 30000);
+                  await new Promise(function(r) { setTimeout(r, delayMs); });
+                  continue;
+                }
+                const e = new Error('Jira API returned HTTP ' + result.status); e.isInfra = true; throw e;
+              }
+            }
+
+            // ── Main ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+            const violations = [];
+            const infraCodes = [];
+            let infraFailed = false;
+            const MAX_ANNOTATIONS = 50;
+
+            function addViolation(msg) { violations.push(msg); }
+            function addInfra(msg) { infraCodes.push(msg); infraFailed = true; }
+
+            const repoOwner = context.repo.owner;
+            const repoName = context.repo.repo;
+            const pr = context.payload.pull_request;
+            const prNum = pr.number;
+            const isDep = pr.user.login === 'dependabot[bot]';
+            const titleTypeMatch = pr.title.match(/^([a-z]+)/);
+            const titleType = titleTypeMatch ? titleTypeMatch[1] : '';
+
+            // Pre-compute emergency-revert candidate before title validation.
+            // Only a revert title that LACKS a Jira suffix triggers emergency
+            // authorization; a revert title that already carries a Jira key does not.
+            const hasEmergencyLabel = pr.labels.some(function(l) { return l.name === 'emergency-revert'; });
+            const titleHasJira = !!getJiraKey(pr.title);
+            const isEmergencyCandidate = !isDep && titleType === 'revert' && hasEmergencyLabel && !titleHasJira;
+
+            // 1 — title convention
+            for (const e of validateTitle(pr.title, isDep, isEmergencyCandidate)) addViolation('Title: ' + e);
+
+            // 2 — branch naming (Dependabot exempt)
+            for (const e of validateBranch(pr.head.ref, isDep)) addViolation('Branch: ' + e);
+
+            // 3 — body structure (Dependabot exempt)
+            for (const e of validateBody(pr.body, isDep)) addViolation('Body: ' + e);
+
+            // 4 — AI attribution footer in title/body
+            if (detectAiFooter((pr.title || '') + '\n' + (pr.body || ''))) {
+              addViolation('AI attribution footer detected in PR title or body');
+            }
+
+            // 5 — commits: subject convention + AI footer
+            // GitHub REST API caps listCommits at 250 total. Fail infra immediately
+            // when pr.commits exceeds that limit; compare fetched count to detect
+            // API truncation.
+            {
+              const commitLimitErr = checkCommitLimit(pr.commits);
+              if (commitLimitErr) addInfra(commitLimitErr);
+
+              let commitPage = 1;
+              let commitMore = true;
+              let totalFetched = 0;
+              while (commitMore) {
+                let resp;
+                try {
+                  resp = await github.rest.pulls.listCommits({ owner: repoOwner, repo: repoName, pull_number: prNum, per_page: 100, page: commitPage });
+                } catch (err) {
+                  addInfra('POLICY-INFRA: Failed to fetch commits (page ' + commitPage + '): ' + err.message);
+                  break;
+                }
+                const commits = resp.data;
+                const link = (resp.headers && resp.headers.link) ? resp.headers.link : '';
+                totalFetched += commits.length;
+                if (!link.includes('rel="next"') || commits.length === 0) commitMore = false;
+                for (const c of commits) {
+                  const subject = c.commit.message.split('\n')[0];
+                  for (const e of validateCommitSubject(subject)) addViolation('Commit ' + c.sha.slice(0, 8) + ': ' + e);
+                  if (detectAiFooter(c.commit.message)) addViolation('Commit ' + c.sha.slice(0, 8) + ': AI attribution footer detected');
+                }
+                commitPage++;
+              }
+              if (pr.commits <= 250 && totalFetched > 0 && totalFetched !== pr.commits) {
+                addInfra('POLICY-INFRA: Fetched ' + totalFetched + ' commits but PR reports ' + pr.commits + ' — API truncation suspected');
+              }
+            }
+
+            // 6 — emergency-revert authorisation
+            // Event timeline truncation is always POLICY-INFRA regardless of whether
+            // an earlier label event was found — partial history is never trusted.
+            let jiraExempt = isDep;
+            let emergencyAuthFailed = false;
+            if (isEmergencyCandidate) {
+              try {
+                let evPage = 1;
+                let evMore = true;
+                let latestLabelEvent = null;
+                let evTruncated = false;
+                while (evMore) {
+                  const evResp = await github.rest.issues.listEvents({ owner: repoOwner, repo: repoName, issue_number: prNum, per_page: 100, page: evPage });
+                  const evLink = (evResp.headers && evResp.headers.link) ? evResp.headers.link : '';
+                  for (const ev of evResp.data) {
+                    if (ev.event === 'labeled' && ev.label && ev.label.name === 'emergency-revert') latestLabelEvent = ev;
+                  }
+                  if (!evLink.includes('rel="next"') || evResp.data.length === 0) {
+                    evMore = false;
+                  } else if (evPage >= 20) {
+                    evMore = false;
+                    evTruncated = true;
+                  }
+                  evPage++;
+                }
+                if (evTruncated) {
+                  // Partial history cannot verify the most-recent label event.
+                  // An earlier maintainer event might have been superseded.
+                  addInfra('POLICY-INFRA: Event timeline truncated at pagination limit — cannot verify the most-recent emergency-revert label actor; Jira key required');
+                  emergencyAuthFailed = true;
+                } else if (!latestLabelEvent) {
+                  addViolation('emergency-revert: label present but no label event found in timeline — Jira key required');
+                } else if (!latestLabelEvent.actor) {
+                  addViolation('emergency-revert: label event actor is null — Jira key required');
+                } else if (latestLabelEvent.actor.type === 'Bot') {
+                  addViolation('emergency-revert: label applied by a bot — Jira key required');
+                } else {
+                  const permResp = await github.rest.repos.getCollaboratorPermissionLevel({ owner: repoOwner, repo: repoName, username: latestLabelEvent.actor.login });
+                  if (permResp.data.permission === 'maintain' || permResp.data.permission === 'admin') {
+                    jiraExempt = true;
+                  } else {
+                    addViolation('emergency-revert: label applied by user without maintain/admin permission — Jira key required');
+                  }
+                }
+              } catch (err) {
+                addInfra('POLICY-INFRA: Emergency-revert authorisation check failed: ' + err.message);
+                emergencyAuthFailed = true;
+              }
+            }
+
+            // 7 — Jira existence (Dependabot exempt; emergency-revert may be exempt)
+            // Skip entirely when emergency auth already produced an infra error to
+            // avoid a redundant credential error on a PR that has no Jira key.
+            const jiraKey = isDep ? null : getJiraKey(pr.title);
+            if (!jiraExempt && jiraKey && !emergencyAuthFailed) {
+              const cloudId = process.env.JIRA_CLOUD_ID || '';
+              const jiraEmail = process.env.JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL || '';
+              const jiraToken = process.env.JIRA_API_TOKEN || '';
+              if (!cloudId || !jiraEmail || !jiraToken) {
+                addInfra('POLICY-INFRA: Jira credentials missing — JIRA_CLOUD_ID, JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL, and JIRA_API_TOKEN must all be set for human PRs');
+              } else if (!/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i.test(cloudId)) {
+                addInfra('POLICY-INFRA: JIRA_CLOUD_ID is not a valid UUID');
+              } else {
+                try {
+                  await jiraGetIssue(cloudId, jiraKey, jiraEmail, jiraToken);
+                } catch (err) {
+                  if (err.isInfra) addInfra('POLICY-INFRA: ' + err.message);
+                  else addViolation('Jira: ' + err.message);
+                }
+              }
+            }
+
+            // 8 — workflow file supply-chain checks
+            // GitHub REST API caps listFiles at 3000. Fail infra immediately when
+            // pr.changed_files exceeds that limit; compare fetched count to detect
+            // truncation at lower file counts.
+            try {
+              const filesLimitErr = checkFilesLimit(pr.changed_files);
+              if (filesLimitErr) addInfra(filesLimitErr);
+
+              let filesPage = 1;
+              let filesMore = true;
+              let totalFilesFetched = 0;
+              while (filesMore) {
+                const filesResp = await github.rest.pulls.listFiles({ owner: repoOwner, repo: repoName, pull_number: prNum, per_page: 100, page: filesPage });
+                const filesLink = (filesResp.headers && filesResp.headers.link) ? filesResp.headers.link : '';
+                totalFilesFetched += filesResp.data.length;
+                if (!filesLink.includes('rel="next"') || filesResp.data.length === 0) filesMore = false;
+                for (const file of filesResp.data) {
+                  if (!isWorkflowFilename(file.filename)) continue;
+                  if (file.status !== 'added' && file.status !== 'modified' && file.status !== 'renamed') continue;
+                  try {
+                    const blobResp = await github.rest.git.getBlob({ owner: repoOwner, repo: repoName, file_sha: file.sha });
+                    const raw = blobResp.data;
+                    const encoding = raw.encoding === 'base64' ? 'base64' : 'utf8';
+                    const fileContent = Buffer.from(raw.content, encoding).toString('utf8');
+                    for (const e of validateWorkflowContent(fileContent, file.filename)) addViolation(e);
+                  } catch (blobErr) {
+                    addInfra('POLICY-INFRA: Cannot fetch blob for ' + file.filename + ': ' + blobErr.message);
+                  }
+                }
+                filesPage++;
+              }
+              if (pr.changed_files <= 3000 && totalFilesFetched > 0 && totalFilesFetched !== pr.changed_files) {
+                addInfra('POLICY-INFRA: Fetched ' + totalFilesFetched + ' changed files but PR reports ' + pr.changed_files + ' — API truncation suspected');
+              }
+            } catch (err) {
+              addInfra('POLICY-INFRA: Failed to list PR files: ' + err.message);
+            }
+
+            // 9 — emit annotations + step summary, then fail once
+            // Both annotations and summary entries are capped at MAX_ANNOTATIONS
+            // to prevent oversized outputs on PRs with many violations.
+            const annotated = violations.slice(0, MAX_ANNOTATIONS);
+            for (const msg of annotated) core.error(msg);
+            for (const msg of infraCodes.slice(0, MAX_ANNOTATIONS)) core.error(msg);
+            if (violations.length > MAX_ANNOTATIONS) {
+              core.warning((violations.length - MAX_ANNOTATIONS) + ' additional violation(s) suppressed (max ' + MAX_ANNOTATIONS + ' annotations)');
+            }
+
+            const totalCount = violations.length + infraCodes.length;
+            const summaryParts = [totalCount === 0 ? '## PR Policy: All checks passed \u2713' : '## PR Policy: ' + totalCount + ' issue(s) found'];
+            if (violations.length > 0) {
+              summaryParts.push('', '### Policy violations');
+              const shownV = violations.slice(0, MAX_ANNOTATIONS);
+              for (const msg of shownV) summaryParts.push('- ' + msg);
+              if (violations.length > MAX_ANNOTATIONS) {
+                summaryParts.push('- _...and ' + (violations.length - MAX_ANNOTATIONS) + ' more violation(s) not shown_');
+              }
+            }
+            if (infraCodes.length > 0) {
+              summaryParts.push('', '### Infrastructure failures');
+              const shownI = infraCodes.slice(0, MAX_ANNOTATIONS);
+              for (const msg of shownI) summaryParts.push('- ' + msg);
+              if (infraCodes.length > MAX_ANNOTATIONS) {
+                summaryParts.push('- _...and ' + (infraCodes.length - MAX_ANNOTATIONS) + ' more infra error(s) not shown_');
+              }
+            }
+            await core.summary.addRaw(summaryParts.join('\n')).write();
+
+            if (violations.length > 0 || infraFailed) {
+              core.setFailed('PR policy: ' + violations.length + ' violation(s), ' + infraCodes.length + ' infrastructure error(s)');
+            }

.github/workflows/ci.yaml

@@ -50,7 +50,11 @@ jobs:
     name: ci / ci
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v7
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1  # v7.0.1
+
+      - name: Run policy unit tests
+        run: node --test test/pr-policy.test.mjs
+        shell: bash
 
       - name: Install actionlint
         env:

.github/workflows/policy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+name: policy
+
+# Self-caller: runs the org-wide PR policy gate on THIS repo's own pull requests.
+#
+# This workflow is new and will begin enforcing policy on PRs opened AFTER it
+# merges to main. PRs that are already open at merge time are not retroactively
+# re-evaluated until one of the trigger events fires again (e.g. a new commit).
+#
+# The check-run name this emits is `policy / pr`, matching the org standard
+# documented in callable-pr-policy.yaml. Do not rename the job below — the
+# job id (`policy`) is the first segment of that context.
+#
+# Uses a local path reference because this repo IS the source of the reusable;
+# pinning to a SHA of itself would lag by one merge every time either file
+# changes. Local `./` refs are exempt from the SHA-pin policy.
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    types: [opened, reopened, synchronize, edited, labeled, unlabeled, ready_for_review]
+
+concurrency:
+  group: policy-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+  issues: read
+  pull-requests: read
+
+jobs:
+  policy:
+    uses: ./.github/workflows/callable-pr-policy.yaml
+    secrets:
+      JIRA_CLOUD_ID: ${{ secrets.JIRA_CLOUD_ID }}
+      JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL: ${{ secrets.JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL }}
+      JIRA_API_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.JIRA_API_TOKEN }}

.github/workflows/release-on-merge.yaml

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ on:
       - ".github/workflows/**"
       - "!.github/workflows/ci.yaml"
       - "!.github/workflows/labeler.yaml"
+      - "!.github/workflows/policy.yaml"
       - "!.github/workflows/release-on-merge.yaml"
   workflow_dispatch:
     inputs:

README.md

@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ The two sanctioned deploy paths are merge to `main` triggering the pipeline and
 
 **`.github/workflows/cd-dotnet-eb.yaml`** — Reusable CD for .NET apps on AWS Elastic Beanstalk. Publishes the project, packages a bundle, uploads it, creates an application version, and updates an **existing** environment with OIDC credentials — it never creates an environment. Serialised per environment via a `concurrency` group, and the post-deploy check fails the job if EB rolls the deploy back. The caller owns branch-to-environment mapping.
 
+**`.github/workflows/callable-pr-policy.yaml`** — Reusable PR metadata gate. Validates PR title convention (type/scope/Jira key), branch naming, four-section body, commit subjects, AI attribution footers, and workflow file pin compliance — all via GitHub API, no checkout. Emits `policy / pr` when the caller job is named `policy`. Optional secrets `JIRA_CLOUD_ID`, `JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL`, and `JIRA_API_TOKEN` must all be set for human PRs; Dependabot skips Jira/branch/body but still runs commit and workflow supply-chain checks. Emergency `revert` PRs may skip Jira with the `emergency-revert` label applied by a human collaborator with `maintain` or `admin` permission.
+
+> **Workflow file constraints enforced by the supply-chain scanner.** Changed workflow files scanned by this policy must use block-style structural keys and inline `run:`/`uses:` values. The scanner fails closed on YAML forms it cannot safely resolve: flow-style step mappings (`- { uses: ... }`, `- { run: ... }`), escaped or Unicode-encoded structural keys in double-quoted strings (`"u\u0073es"`, `"r\u0075n"`), and YAML aliases or anchors on `run:`, `uses:`, or `permissions:` values (`run: *cmd`, `uses: &anchor ...`). Use the literal unquoted key forms and inline values in all workflow steps.
+
 **`.github/workflows/callable-labeler.yaml`** — Org-wide PR auto-labeler. Label rules live inline here (single source of truth) — consumer repos need only a thin caller with `contents: read`, `pull-requests: write`, and `issues: write`; no per-repo labeler.yml.
 
 **`.github/workflows/callable-dependency-review.yaml`** — Dependency review on PRs, failing on high severity. Requires Dependency Graph.
@@ -58,6 +62,8 @@ The two sanctioned deploy paths are merge to `main` triggering the pipeline and
 
 **`.github/workflows/release-on-merge.yaml`** — Repo automation (not callable): cuts a tag and GitHub Release for **this** repo whenever a merge to `main` changes a reusable workflow, so Dependabot has a release to advance consumer SHA pins to (see the pinning policy below).
 
+**`.github/workflows/policy.yaml`** — This repo's own thin caller of `callable-pr-policy.yaml`, so PR policy runs on `.github`'s own PRs. Uses a local path reference (`./.github/workflows/callable-pr-policy.yaml`); begins enforcing on PRs opened after its merge to main.
+
 **`.github/workflows/labeler.yaml`** — This repo's own thin caller of `callable-labeler.yaml`, so the labeler runs on `.github`'s own PRs.
 
 **`.github/workflows/ci.yaml`** — Self-CI for this repo: actionlint (checksum-verified install) over all workflow files, emitting the required `ci / ci` status context. Its shellcheck integration is enabled, so `run:` bodies are shell-linted too; the two deploy steps that rely on intentional word-splitting (`sam deploy … $PARAMS`, `cdk deploy $STACKS`) carry a per-line, commented `# shellcheck disable=SC2086` rather than being quoted or globally exempted.
@@ -66,6 +72,8 @@ The two sanctioned deploy paths are merge to `main` triggering the pipeline and
 
 Starter workflows offered on the org's **Actions → New workflow** page: `cdk-deploy`, `ci-dotnet`, `ci-mobile-ios`, `ci-node`, `ci-python`, `ci-python-app`, `ci-static`, `ci-typescript-frontend`, `dependency-review`, `dotnet-eb-deploy`, `labeler`, `mobile-ios-deploy`, `release`, `sam-deploy`, `triage`. Each is a thin caller of the corresponding reusable workflow above (`triage` is standalone). Every template has a paired `properties.json` (name, description, icon, `filePatterns` for auto-suggestion). Replace any `REPLACE-ME` placeholders before enabling. Templates are not scanned by Dependabot, so refresh their pinned SHAs opportunistically when editing one.
 
+A `pr-policy` starter template can be added to `workflow-templates/` only after the PR that introduces `callable-pr-policy.yaml` merges and `release-on-merge.yaml` cuts the first release containing it. Until then, consumer repos must add the caller workflow manually (see §3).
+
 ### Ref pinning policy
 
 All workflow refs across the org are pinned to full commit SHAs:
@@ -157,6 +165,14 @@ Managed under **Organization Settings > Secrets and variables > Actions**. Each
 
 The CI and CD workflows below need no org secret — CD authenticates to AWS via OIDC using the per-repo `AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_ARN` secret (see §3).
 
+Three additional org-level secrets are required for the PR policy Jira check. Set each to **selected repositories** visibility and grant to each consumer repo:
+
+| Secret | Value | Consumed by |
+|--------|-------|-------------|
+| `JIRA_CLOUD_ID` | Atlassian Cloud ID UUID (find in **Jira Settings → Products → Jira Software**) | `callable-pr-policy.yaml` |
+| `JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL` | Email of the service account with read access to DEV/PLAT/SEC projects | `callable-pr-policy.yaml` |
+| `JIRA_API_TOKEN` | API token for that account (generated at **id.atlassian.com/manage-profile/security/api-tokens**) | `callable-pr-policy.yaml` |
+
 ### 2. Add CI to a repo
 
 Create `.github/workflows/ci.yaml` in the target repo. Examples:
@@ -222,7 +238,45 @@ jobs:
     uses: Sea-Haven-Industries/.github/.github/workflows/ci-typescript-cdk.yaml@81cf168170f356d1423d7736f7ce93fd6611ad53 # v1.0.4
 ```
 
-### 3. Add CD to a repo
+### 3. Add PR policy to a repo
+
+Create `.github/workflows/policy.yaml` in the target repo. The Jira secrets must already be granted to the repo (see §1).
+
+```yaml
+name: PR Policy
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    types: [opened, reopened, synchronize, edited, labeled, unlabeled, ready_for_review]
+
+concurrency:
+  group: policy-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+  issues: read
+  pull-requests: read
+
+jobs:
+  policy:
+    uses: Sea-Haven-Industries/.github/.github/workflows/callable-pr-policy.yaml@<full-commit-sha> # vX.Y.Z
+    secrets:
+      JIRA_CLOUD_ID: ${{ secrets.JIRA_CLOUD_ID }}
+      JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL: ${{ secrets.JIRA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL }}
+      JIRA_API_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.JIRA_API_TOKEN }}
+```
+
+Replace `<full-commit-sha>` with the SHA of the release that contains `callable-pr-policy.yaml`:
+
+```bash
+gh api /repos/Sea-Haven-Industries/.github/commits/vX.Y.Z --jq .sha
+```
+
+The check-run name is `policy / pr`. If your branch-protection ruleset requires this context, add it after the first PR passes.
+
+> **Known platform limitation — GITHUB_TOKEN label and metadata events.** When the `policy` workflow re-runs on `labeled` or `edited` events, the metadata edits themselves (label adds, title edits) must be performed by a GitHub App or a PAT that owns its own event stream. Edits made through `GITHUB_TOKEN` do not reliably emit a new `pull_request` event to trigger re-evaluation; the check stays in its prior state until the next push or manual re-run. Org automation that applies labels (such as the `emergency-revert` label) must therefore use a GitHub App token or a PAT — not `GITHUB_TOKEN` — or the policy gate will not re-run automatically after the label is applied. This is a GitHub platform constraint, not a deficiency that can be solved at the workflow level.
+
+### 4. Add CD to a repo
 
 Create `.github/workflows/deploy.yaml` in the target repo. Requires `AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_ARN` repo secret.